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A Choice, Not an Echo: Polarization and the Transformation of the American Party 
System 
 
Abstract 
 
This dissertation offers an intellectual and institutional history of party polarization and 
ideological realignment in the postwar United States.  It treats the construction of an 
ideologically sorted party system as a political project carried out by conscious actors within and 
around the Democratic and Republican parties. The work of these activists, interest groups, and 
political elites helped to produce, by the last decades of the twentieth century, an unpredicted and 
still-continuing era of strong, polarized partisanship in American politics.  In tracking their work, 
the dissertation also account for changing ideas about the party system over time, starting with an 
influential postwar scholarly doctrine that cast bipartisanship as a problem for which polarization 
would provide the solution. 
National politics at mid-century involved high levels of bipartisanship in government 
given the presence of significant liberal and conservative factions within both parties; weak and 
federated party structures; and mass partisan attachments defined more by affective ties of 
tradition and communal affiliation than by issues and ideology.  National politics at century’s 
end involved levels of partisan discipline in Congress unseen since the Gilded Age; robust 
national party organizations; and an electorate that had followed political elites in sorting itself 
ideologically among the two parties.  The movement from the first era to the second is the 
subject of this project, which argues that, during these decades, America’s two-party system 
gained a programmatic cast and logic long considered alien to the country’s political traditions.  
Long-term technological and demographic developments undergirded the rise to predominance 
of issue-driven party activism, while southern realignment provided a key electoral engine 
Dissertation Advisor: Lizabeth Cohen  Sam Hoffmann Rosenfeld 
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driving ideological sorting.  But these processes took specific form through the work of activists 
and party elites, and they drive the dissertation’s narrative.  
The project contributes a historical narrative and context to the popular and scholarly 
discussion of contemporary party polarization, by identifying the origins of modern polarization 
in developments dating to the early postwar period and by historicizing Americans’ longstanding 
debates over partisanship.  By restoring parties as institutions to the forefront of an analysis of 
postwar political history, moreover, the project helps to recast key historiographic themes 
relating to the rise of the right and the decline of the New Deal order.  
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“Let us concede that the American people will never create a 
powerful party system unless they want one.” 
 
-- E. E. Schattschneider, 1948
1
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 E.E. Schattschneider, The Struggle for Party Government (College Park: University of Maryland Press, 1948), 12. 
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Introduction 
 
 Nationally successful politicians, as opposed to academics, tend to be a practical sort.  
Necessity demands a pragmatic approach to working within the political constraints of the 
moment.  But on occasion, such politicians have been prompted to take the long view about how 
the American political system functions, and how they think the two major parties should fit into 
it.  During the middle of the twentieth century, a particular set of questions about the party 
system recurred among national leaders, and they disagreed with each other about the answers.   
In 1944, Franklin Roosevelt turned to an aide and declared, “We ought to have two real 
parties – one liberal, and the other conservative.” He made that remark in the course of pursuing 
secret inquiries into the prospect of orchestrating a party realignment from the top down, by 
forging an alliance with his moderate, internationalist Republican opponent of 1940, Wendell 
Willkie, on behalf of a new party combining the liberal wings of the existing Democratic and 
Republican parties.  Such a configuration would have left conservative Republicans and the large 
minority of (disproportionately southern) conservative Democrats to ally in a single new party as 
well.  Willkie responded favorably to the idea, lamenting the current state of affairs in which 
“both parties are hybrids.”1   
Fifteen years later, in 1959, Vice President Richard Nixon took the opposite tack of 
Roosevelt and Willkie.  “It would be a great tragedy,” he told a California audience in 1959, “if 
we had our two major political parties divide on what we would call a conservative-liberal line.”  
It would be a tragedy because “one of the attributes of our political system has been that we have 
avoided generally violent swings in Administrations from one extreme to the other.  And the 
reason we have avoided that is that in both parties there has been room for a broad spectrum of 
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 Susan Dunn, Roosevelt’s Purge: How FDR Fought to Change the Democratic Party (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2010), 231-232. 
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opinion.”  Bringing about an ideological sorting the parties, Nixon predicted, would lead not 
only to extreme swings in policy, but also to “very violent contests in elections.”2 
Four years after that, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy – then embroiled in a conflict 
pitting his brother’s administration against fellow Democratic leaders of massive resistance to 
desegregation in the South – expressed a sentiment similar to Nixon’s in a discussion with the 
journalist Godfrey Hodgson.  “With some vehemence,” Hodgson later recalled, Kennedy insisted 
that, since “the country was already split vertically, between sections, races, and ethnic groups,” 
it would be “dangerous to split it horizontally, too, between liberals and conservatives.”  Down 
that path “lay the rift between haves and have-nots, and the ideological politics of Europe.”3  The 
jumble of cross-cutting partisan and ideological alliances helped to ensure national stability and 
political inclusion, he argued. 
South Dakota Senator George McGovern disagreed with Nixon and Kennedy, and agreed 
with Roosevelt and Willkie.  In 1969, a journalist had asked him what he thought about “a 
realignment of American parties to something a little closer to the British system, with 
conservatives in one party and liberals in another.”  He responded that, “on balance, it would 
serve the national interest and serve the interests of our party … if we did move more in the 
direction of a unified party where we can expect the overwhelming majority at least of our 
membership to follow the party’s platform and program.”4  A few years later, a fellow senator 
with radically different ideological views, Jesse Helms of North Carolina, concurred with 
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 Radio broadcast of the Commonwealth Club of California, June 11, 1959; audio accessed at 
http://www.commonwealthclub.org/node/82025.  
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 Godfrey Hodgson, The World Turned Right Side Up: A History of the Conservative Ascendancy in America 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996), 2. 
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 Transcript of Meet The Press, July 6, 1969, Box 10, Folder “Commission  Chronological File, August 1969,” 
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McGovern by calling for “a general realignment into Conservative and Liberal parties, by 
whatever names.”5          
Politicians were not the only ones with views on this subject.  Ordinary voters sometimes 
chimed in as well.  “[I]t is now time,” an Arkansas man wrote to California Senator William F. 
Knowland in 1956, “to get all the right-wingers on one side, and all the left-wingers on the 
other.”6  Many Americans agreed with the letter-writer in the middle decades of the twentieth 
century – but many more apparently did not.  Between the 1930s and the 1970s, George Gallup’s 
polling firm periodically surveyed Americans on the question of ideologically sorting the parties, 
using various iterations of this question: “It has been suggested that we give up the present 
Republican and Democratic Parties and have two new parties, one for the Liberals and one for 
the Conservatives.  Would you favor this idea?”7  Across four decades, those answering in the 
affirmative to this question never even reached one third of the total polled.   
Gallup has long since stopped asking Americans whether or not they would prefer that 
the parties sort themselves according to ideology, just as politicians in the contemporary period 
have rarely opined in public about the desirability of such a development.  That is because what 
had been a matter of speculation has now become a reality.  By the end of the twentieth century, 
Franklin Roosevelt and George McGovern and Jesse Helms had gotten their wish, while Richard 
Nixon and Robert F. Kennedy and, it seems, consistent majorities of Americans did not.  The 
two major American political parties are now sorted quite clearly along ideological lines, with, 
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 Jesse Helms, “The New American Majority: Time for a Political Realignment?,” May 15, 1974, American 
Conservative Union Papers, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT.    
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 Michael Bowen, The Roots of Modern Conservatism: Taft, Dewey, and the Battle for the Soul of the Republican 
Party (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 193. 
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 This specific wording can be seen in Gallup Poll no. 394, April 9, 1947, accessed at Gallup Brain, 
http://brain.gallup.com.  
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for example, the most liberal Republican member of Congress amassing a voting record that is to 
the right of the most conservative Democrat.
8
  When politicians and the public alike now opine 
about the two-party system and its role in American politics, they are much more likely to lament 
the incivility, gridlock, and dysfunction that they attribute to the phenomenon that is commonly 
called “polarization.”9      
 A slew of institutional changes has accompanied the ideological sorting of the parties.  
Contemporary parties are not only more ideologically cohesive and distinct than at midcentury.  
They are also more disciplined when in power, and more centralized in their internal authority at 
the national level.  The parties’ later twentieth-century development along those three 
dimensions – the degree to which they are defined and driven by programmatic (policy-based or 
ideological) goals, their capacity for discipline when in power and opposition, and their 
orientation around national issues and national party leadership – is what has given 
contemporary politics its distinct, oft-lamented quality of mobilized partisan warfare.
10
    
                                                 
8
 By Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal’s measurements, the very last lawmaker to represent an 
“overlap” position in the House -- a Republican with a voting record slightly to the left of the right-most Democrat – 
left office in 2003.  The last senator representing such an overlap – a Democrat positioned to the right of the most 
liberal Republican -- left office two years later.  See Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 30-32; and their updated data at http://voteview.com/political_polarization.asp.   
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has occurred to a much greater extent than ideological polarization. Matthew Levendusky, The Partisan Sort: How 
Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).  
For a similar terminological distinction, see Morris P. Fiorina, Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America (New 
York: Pearson and Longman, 2005). Given my focus on the parties as institutions and governing organizations, I 
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useful exploration of competing understandings of polarization, see Hans Noel, Political Ideologies and Political 
Parties in America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 165-170. 
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 Popular laments include Juliet Eilperin, Fight Club Politics: How Partisanship is Poisoning the House of 
Representatives (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006); Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. 
Ornnstein, The Broken Branch: How Congress is Failing America and How to Get it Back on Track (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006); Ronald Brownstein, The Second Civil War: How Extreme Partisanship Has 
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Put simply, the story this dissertation tells is the momentous shift in American politics 
from a mid-twentieth century era of decentralized and ideologically non-cohesive parties to a 
late-century era of ideologically sorted and highly disciplined parties.  National politics at mid-
century involved historically high levels of bipartisanship in government given the presence of 
significant liberal and conservative factions within both parties, weak and highly federated party 
structures, and mass partisan attachments that were defined more by affective ties of tradition 
and communal affiliation than by policy issues and ideology.
11
  National politics at century’s end 
involved levels of partisan discipline in congressional voting unseen since the Gilded Age, robust 
national party organizations, and an electorate that had followed political elites in sorting itself 
ideologically among the two parties.  The movement from the first era to the second through the 
construction of a new, ideologically defined two-party system is the subject of this dissertation, 
which argues that, during these decades, American party politics gained a programmatic cast and 
logic long considered alien to the country’s political traditions.    
The term “construction” is used advisedly, as the narrative highlights the work of 
purposive historical actors, on both the left and right, who waged interconnected struggles to 
restructure the parties ideologically from the early postwar years into the Reagan era.  That, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Paralyzed Washington and Polarized America (New York: Penguin Press, 2007); and Bill Bishop, The Big Sort: 
Why the Clustering of Likeminded America is Tearing Us Apart (New York: Haughton Mifflin, 2008). 
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 The political science scholarship on the bases of mass partisan affiliation remains contentious  regarding the 
question of how “affective” versus substantive are the sources of voters’ partisanship.  The classic statement on 
“affective” party voting is Angus Campbell et al, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960).  
On increasing voter awareness over the course of the postwar period of policy-related and ideological distinctions 
between the parties and its influence on voting, see Gerald M. Pomper, Voters’ Choice: Varieties of American 
Electoral Behavior (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1975); Pomper and Marc D. Weiner, “Toward a More Responsible 
Two-Party Voter: The Evolving Bases of Partisanship,” in Responsible Partisanship? The Evolution of American 
Political Parties Since 1950, eds. John C. Green and Paul S. Hernnson (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
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Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010)..  For an argument reemphasizing the importance of affective 
ties to parties, see Donald Green, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler, Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political 
Parties and the Social Identity of Voters (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).     
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indeed, is the dissertation’s core claim: The party system we have today is not simply the 
byproduct of structural developments, but was a political project carried out by conscious actors 
– men and women who had reasons to think that forging disciplined, programmatically distinct 
parties would provide answers to certain endemic problems they saw in the American political 
and constitutional system.  Arguing for the significance of conscious historical actors in 
reconstructing the party system also means emphasizing the intellectual lineage of polarization.  
Thus, in addition to offering an institutional history of party transformation, this dissertation 
offers an intellectual history of postwar scholarly and journalistic ideas about parties and their 
role in American politics – starting with a midcentury theory, “responsible party doctrine,” that 
cast bipartisanship as a problem for which polarization could provide the solution.   
In 1950, the American Political Science Association (APSA) published Toward a More 
Responsible Two-Party System, an influential and highly controversial report that called for the 
development of more programmatically distinct and disciplined parties along European 
parliamentary lines, which would be “able to bring forth programs to which they commit 
themselves and … possess sufficient internal cohesion to carry out these programs.”12  The 
report articulated a view of party politics that reflected most directly the frustrations of liberal 
Democrats grappling with the legislative power of the southern conservative wing of their party 
at midcentury.  But that vision also engendered heavy criticism from scholars, journalists, and 
political actors who celebrated the loose, non-ideological nature of traditional American parties 
and questioned the desirability or feasibility of developing more “responsible” ones given the 
federalized and fragmented U.S. constitutional structure.   
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 Committee on Political Parties, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Report of the Committee On 
Political Parties of the American Political Science Association (New York: Rinehart, 1950), 17. 
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When both parties entered a period of tumult and institutional experimentation from the 
late 1960s on, responsible-party prescriptions remained influential among important factions and 
leaders.  Aspects of the theory informed the work of actors pursuing both intra-party political 
struggles as well as major institutional reforms of Congress and the parties’ presidential 
nominating procedures in the 1970s.  And though such efforts helped to lay the basis for a 
revival of partisanship that shows no current signs of abating, they occurred during an era in 
which the dominant scholarly and journalistic view emphasized American parties’ declining 
strength and relevance.  Indeed, the contemporary era of party polarization represents a 
fulfillment of key responsible-party tenets that was as unheralded in its development as it is 
widely decried today.      
 
Parties, Ideology, and Ideological Partisanship 
The very fact that this partisan resurgence, which was underway by the late 1970s, came 
about as such an analytical surprise to scholars preoccupied with party decline and dealignment 
helps to underscore a central theme of this work: namely, that the functional relationship 
between ideological politics and partisanship is itself subject to historical change.  The roots of 
modern party polarization lie in a change in that relationship during the later twentieth century 
that contemporary observers had difficulty recognizing as it happened.  A party – “an organized 
effort to get control of the government,” to use one classic formulation – and an ideology – “a 
configuration of ideas … in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint,” 
to use another – are, of course, distinct phenomena, and thus so are partisanship and ideological 
affinity.
13
  But midcentury arrangements had conditioned several generations of observers to 
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 E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942), ix; Phillip E. Converse, 
“The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” in Ideology and Discontent, ed. David E. Apter (New York: Free 
Press, 1964), 207. 
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conceive of the two phenomena as existing in inherent conflict.  The key historical development 
at the heart of this dissertation, however, was the revival of partisanship as a result of, rather than 
in spite of, ideological politics.  
Parties, whether conceived of as teams of office-seekers or as coalitions of interests, need 
not be driven by coherent and comprehensive policy programs with ideological foundations, and 
a relative absence of ideology was long considered to be one of the key distinguishing features of 
American parties in comparative terms.
14
  The last period of intensely disciplined partisanship in 
American political history, for example – the “party period” of the later nineteenth century, with 
its torchlight parades, patronage armies, and sky-high voting participation among white males – 
featured what might be characterized as a non-ideological system of strong party polarization.  
The post-Civil War Republican and Democratic Parties were federated and locally embedded 
institutions that stitched far-flung communities together into two national coalitions.  Positions 
on certain issues, such as tariff and currency policy, divided the parties, but many other potential 
issues were sidelined from partisan contestation in a federal policymaking regime dominated by 
the distributive politics of expansion and development rather than redistributive and regulatory 
                                                 
14
 The most sustained recent argument against the traditional view that American parties have been historically less 
ideological than their European counterparts is John Gerring, Party Ideologies in America, 1828-1996 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998).  Using systematic content analyses of national party platforms and presidential 
campaign rhetoric, Gerring argues that both parties have demonstrated coherent and distinct ideological views since 
the advent of the “Second Party System” in 1828, with the Democrats’ ideology changing three times since that year 
and the Whig-Republicans’ ideology changing once.  Gerring’s methodology, however, excludes from analysis the 
relative intensity or weakness of internal party factionalism over time, and thus has little to say about what might be 
significant about the ideological sorting of the parties in the later twentieth century.  Hans Noel, meanwhile, 
marshals quantitative evidence for the proposition that a “unidimensional” left-right ideological divide has emerged 
– gradually, but consistently in one direction – over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  See his 
Political Ideologies and Parties in America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), especially 82-92.  He 
argues that, independent of partisan politics, issues positions articulated by writers, intellectuals, and advocates in 
civil society came increasingly over time to cohere into two overarching ideological clusters, possibly for the first 
time in two centuries.  Noel’s evidence for a longue duree rise in ideological thinking is partial and suggestive, but it 
warrants further engagement by historians.       
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interventions.  Mass party affiliation and rank-and-file party activism alike stemmed from 
communal ties and material inducement more typically than coherent ideological positions.
15
 
The aberrant era of bipartisanship and depolarization in the middle of the twentieth 
century, meanwhile, stemmed from a new interaction between ideological coalition-making and 
partisan politics.  A broad and enduring liberal-conservative ideological division had developed 
at the hands of intellectuals and movement leaders in the wake of industrialization, the New 
Deal, and World War II.  But this ideological division cross-cut, rather than reinforced, the 
partisan alignment.  Such a mismatch – and the ideological bifurcation of the two major parties 
that it produced – set the context for a historically unique period of bipartisan policymaking and 
of entrenched norms fostering pragmatic bargaining and fluid political alliances.  It also 
reinforced the popular and scholarly conception of the U.S. two-party tradition as exceptional in 
its very aversion to ideological politics and in its pragmatically inclusive big-tent parties.   
At the same time, the midcentury mismatch between ideological and partisan alignments 
also provoked discontent among those who saw the existing party alignment and its institutional 
effects within the parties as hindering the accomplishment of policy goals. The protagonists of 
this dissertation translated that discontent into a critique of the existing party system, and many 
pursued practical work in the service of changing the country’s partisan dynamics.  As will be 
shown, those actors’ struggles met potent resistance for many decades, thanks to the “stickiness” 
of existing party allegiances among voters as well as key politicians’ and interests’ investment in 
existing arrangements within the parties and in the broader political arena.  What enabled their 
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eventual success was the confluence of effective political activism with long-term institutional 
and demographic developments in American politics that opened new opportunities for major 
partisan transformations.   
Two distinct but related long-term developments provide particularly important 
background settings for this dissertation’s account.  The first is the long decline of the patronage 
basis of mass partisanship that began in the Progressive Era.  The second is the long-term rise in 
the education level of the mass electorate during the same period.  What both of these trends 
helped to foster was the rise of issue-driven and ideological activism as a predominant basis for 
engaged party work, as well as a growing capacity among American voters to connect candidate 
and parties to ideological positions.
16
  It was the work of ideologically driven activists, factional 
fighters, and strategic party elites to bring about the ideological sorting that would make such 
durable linkages between parties and issues possible.  And it was the further work of many of 
these same actors to struggle to reform the parties as institutions to render them more permeable 
by, and accountable to, issue- and ideologically-driven activists like themselves.               
Ideological activism began to disrupt dominant partisan arrangements in the 1950s and 
1960s before achieving major institutional breakthroughs during the 1970s.  Then, contrary to 
widespread predictions, it helped to catalyze a process of partisan resurgence during the last 
decades of the century.  Ideological activism, in other words, lay at the root of a chain of political 
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and institutional developments – issue sorting, procedural and organizational reform, and the 
steady and still-continuing rise of partisan discipline and nationalized strength – that have made 
the contemporary era a new great age of partisanship.
17
  The fact that this kind of partisanship 
derived its strength precisely from ideological sorting was what rendered the process itself 
invisible to so many scholars and observers educated to consider ideology and partisanship as 
mutually exclusive and conflicting approaches to politics.       
A focus on the changing relationship between ideology and partisanship helps us to 
transcend single-issue explanations for political change.  Because the fulcrum of partisan change 
in the postwar United States occurred in the formerly one-party South, and because political 
changes in that region revolved around the explosive issue of civil rights for African Americans, 
race has long dominated explanations for party realignment in the later twentieth century.
18
  As 
will be seen, the politics of civil rights unquestionably provided a key catalyst for factional 
developments and organizational changes within both parties during the second half of the 
twentieth century.  But those who struggled to remake the parties along ideological lines were 
themselves ideological actors, motivated by dueling systems of belief (some more tightly 
constrained than others) that encompassed positions on multiple issues.  A growing body of 
political science scholarship identifies the beginning of ideological sorting around racial issues – 
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with economic liberals tending to advocate pro-black positions and economic conservatives 
tending to oppose them – as early as the late New Deal era.19  This finding complements the 
historical scholarship on the Long Civil Rights Movement, with its emphasis on labor-oriented 
racial advocacy over a decade prior to the emergence of the “classical phase” of the movement.20  
This sorting of racial positions into the conservative and liberal ideological agendas long before 
the flashpoints of civil rights policymaking and political conflict in the 1960s and beyond should 
make it unsurprising that the parties have sorted themselves in the last several decades around a 
slew of issues beyond those pertaining to race.
21
  They have also ideologically sorted themselves 
in every region of the country, not just the South.
22
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A focus on ideological partisanship also challenges an influential account of partisan 
developments since the 1960s positing that the party system has simply replaced the set of issues 
defining the division rather than reorganized the parties into newly coherent ideological vehicles.  
In this account, the “realignment” of the later twentieth century saw the parties depolarize around 
one set of issues – the economic issues of the New Deal era – while polarizing around social and 
cultural issues pertaining to ethnic and racial identity, gender, morality, and other 
“postmaterialist” controversies.23  The post-1960s period did indeed see the rise to political 
salience of new issues in the socio-cultural realm that came to divide the parties.  But much new 
empirical work by political scientists confirms that measurable partisan polarization has occurred 
across both the older economic issues and the newer cultural ones simultaneously, in a 
development categorized by some of those scholars as “conflict extension.”24  The narrative 
account that follows in this dissertation, grounded in archival sources and focused on the actors 
who worked to put this sorting into action, complements such findings.  Activists on both the left 
and right after the 1960s worked consciously and in the face of great obstacles to forge and 
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sustain coalitions between, respectively, labor liberals and the cultural left and antistatist 
economic interests and social conservatives.       
  
Prophets of Polarization 
Who were these actors?  Who transformed the American party system?  The quotes on 
party realignment discussed at the outset offer something of a clue about where not to look.  
While Roosevelt and Willkie and McGovern argued in favor of ideological parties, none of them 
proved capable of bringing that system into being in the short term – not even Roosevelt, 
arguably the century’s most transformative president and a man who worked actively to 
orchestrate a party realignment from the top down.  And while Nixon (in his 1959 incarnation, at 
least) and Robert Kennedy defended the ideological heterogeneity of American parties, they and 
the many other politicians who agreed with them ultimately proved incapable of stopping the 
parties’ ideological sorting in the long run.  Presidents, presidential aspirants, and other national 
political leaders cannot themselves compel the broad reshuffling of interest coalitions, 
organizational priorities, and voting allegiances required for party transformation merely through 
force of will and political skill.  Something similar might be said for ordinary voters, whether 
letter-writers like the Arkansan in 1956 or poll responders like those surveyed by Gallup.  Much 
evidence in social science highlights the degree to which the mass public takes their cues on 
issue positions and ideological belief from elites in the party with which they are already 
aligned.
25
  If the parties have become more ideologically distinct and internally cohesive, that 
process is unlikely to have been driven centrally by the activities of ordinary voters. 
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Instead, the actors at the heart of this narrative occupy a broad middle range of influence 
and formal power between the mass voting public and the occupants of high offices – a middle 
range that might be said to be a shared analytical subject of much of the most promising recent 
scholarship in both American political history and historically-engaged political science.  
Politically-minded historians of postwar urban and suburban history have highlighted the work 
of issue activists, grassroots partisan workers, and movement builders whose locally-rooted 
mobilizations had national ramifications.
26
  Others, influenced by the organizational and 
policymaking orientation of historical-institutionalist and American Political Development 
scholarship, have chronicled the interaction between organized activist coalitions and the formal 
political arena to help explain institutional reform and changes in policy.
27
  And a small but 
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growing number of scholars have begun to apply such a focus to activism within the political 
parties themselves that helped shaped partisan and broader political developments over time.
28
      
Political scientists’ study of American parties, meanwhile, has undergone important 
changes during the contemporary era of polarized hyperpartisanship in real-world politics.  
Eschewing models that put either the strategic decisions of national politicians or mass political 
behavior at the center of explanations for party development,  a diverse and growing scholarship 
has renewed attention to issue activists, organized interests, and  ideological advocates as the 
prime drivers in American politics.  At the broadest level they include all “engaged citizens” – 
the most politically informed and active subset of American voters, who are also the most 
ideologically polarized.
29
  A somewhat more elite component includes the ideological activists 
and partisans both informally and formally at work within the “meso-level” of party activity, 
running party organizations as well as satellite advocacy groups, drafting state and national 
platforms, mobilizing voters, and organizing collective pressure on office holders.
30
  And, 
                                                 
28
 Catherine E. Rymph, Republican Women: Feminism and Conservatism from Suffrage to the Rise of the New Right 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); Leah Wright, “The Loneliness of the Black Conservative: 
Black Republicans and the Grand Old Party, 1964-1980” (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2009); Tim Stanley, 
Kennedy Vs. Carter: The 1980 Battle for the Democratic Party’s Soul (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
2010); Michael Bowen, The Roots of Modern Conservatism: Dewey, Taft, and the Battle for the Soul of the 
Republican Party (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Jonathan Bell, California Crucible: The 
Forging of Modern Liberalism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012); Geoffrey Kabaservice, Rule 
and Ruin: The Downfall of Moderation and the Destruction of the Republican Party, From Eisenhower to the Tea 
Party (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
29
 The term is Alan Abramowitz’s.  See Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center. 
30
 The term is Feinstein and Schickler’s. See Feinstein and Schickler, “Platforms and Partners,” 6.  See also Barbara 
Sinclair, Party Wars: Polarization and the Politics of National Policy Making (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 2006), 22-28, 36-66.  Conceived broadly enough, this middle range also includes members of Congress and 
leaders of national advocacy organizations and pressure groups who are able to hold party leaders accountable to 
sufficiently well-organized and articulated demands.  This conception of the relationship between the rank-and-file 
majorities of the parties’ congressional caucuses and party leaders in Congress is central to the theory of Conditional 
Party Government, which emphasizes members’ growing ideological cohesion to explain the revival of 
congressional partisanship since the late 1970s.  See David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); John H. Aldrich and Rohde, “The Logic of Conditional Party 
Government: Revisiting the Electoral Connection,” in Congress Reconsidered, 7th Ed., eds. Lawrence Dodd and 
Bruce Oppenheimer (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2001), 26-92; and Sinclair, Party Wars, 67-184.  In the world of 
interest-group and social-movement activism, the key actors are those bridge-builders between activists in civil 
17 
 
outside the day-to-day work of partisan politics and interest-group and advocate strategy, there 
are also the intellectuals constructing and legitimating overarching ideologies out of disparate 
issue positions over time.
31
  This change in focus has helped give rise to an influential new 
conception of parties not as organized teams of politicians but rather as long coalitions of 
“intense policy demanders” – activists, interests, and ideologues using vote-seeking politicians as 
agents rather than principals in the quest to achieve policy-related goals.
32
      
A wide variety of actors, from small-town citizens to presidents, play roles in the 
narrative that follows.  This dissertation frequently highlights the activities of national 
lawmakers and leaders of the national party committees who were responsive to political 
currents, as they offer useful case studies and entry points into changing ideological and partisan 
dynamics over time.  But at the heart of this account of the emergence of a polarized party 
system are precisely the ideologically driven thinkers, activists, and politicians in the middle 
range of influence and formal power.  They are the men and women, sometimes pursuing short-
range goals, sometimes explicitly seeking long-range systemic change, who worked over the 
course of decades to remake the parties in their image, and ultimately succeeded.   Such actors 
appeared on both the left and the right.  Precisely because the ideological division at midcentury 
cross-cut rather than defined the partisan division, ideological opponents might share kindred 
goals – and prove to be partners in a shared project – when it came to challenging the structure of 
the party system itself.   
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Political History through a Partisan Lens 
 
As an exercise in disciplinary bridge-building, this work pursues a twofold analytical 
agenda.  It places purposive historical actors at the center of the story of polarization – a subject 
that has remained largely the purview of quantitative political science.  At the same time, it seeks 
to restore parties as institutions to the forefront of an analysis of postwar U.S. political history – 
a subfield that has experienced exciting revival in the past two decades but that has remained 
more focused on spatial politics and grassroots mobilizations than changes in formal political 
institutions.
33
  As the central collective actors in American democratic politics, parties have 
helped to shape the historical evolution of political participation and policymaking.  But political 
participants themselves can, and have, worked to alter the structure and function of those very 
parties.  This dialectic between political actors and parties requires careful attention if historians 
hope to contribute to the collective understanding of the origins of contemporary polarization.  
Parties began to matter in new ways in the later twentieth century, and thus parties should matter 
in the period’s historiography.   
Putting the changing relationship between ideology and partisanship at the center of the 
story of postwar American politics informs how historians characterize and periodize the latter 
half of the twentieth century.  First, this work offers a new angle of revision on the early postwar 
decades, an era still commonly characterized as a period of liberal “consensus” despite sustained 
assaults on this term by historians of labor, business, and politics alike.
34
   On the one hand, this 
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dissertation complements such revisionist scholarship’s emphasis on midcentury conflict by 
identifying in the initial postwar decades the origins of many of the developments driving later 
partisan transformations.  What appeared to be consensual policymaking is more accurately seen 
as partisan depolarization, and this depolarization was itself a byproduct of cross-cutting – rather 
than non-existent – ideological divisions in society.  On the other hand, the dissertation also 
argues that the bipartisanship stemming from such ideological cross-cutting was, in fact, a 
historically significant phenomenon that influenced political culture and policymaking and 
delineates the midcentury decades as a distinct era in American politics.  If the political order 
forged in the wake of the New Deal can usefully be considered a “long exception” in American 
history, dependent on a contingent and very fragile confluence of institutional and social 
arrangements, the exceptional bipartisanship that characterized the years of that order’s 
dominance undoubtedly played an important role in those arrangements.
35
   
This work also speaks to scholars’ continuing efforts to characterize the last third of the 
twentieth century historically.  The existing political historiography of the post-1960s period 
takes as its central narrative the breakdown of the New Deal coalition and the attendant rise of 
the right to national power.  An ever-growing list of historical studies tracks the stresses and 
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travails of the New Deal Democratic coalition beginning in the 1960s and the contemporaneous 
development of intellectual, cultural, organizational, and eventually electoral movements on the 
political right that coalesced as a mainstream national force in Ronald Reagan’s election to the 
presidency in 1980.
36
  Historical accounts of liberalism during this period are unsurprisingly less 
numerous, but the prevailing narrative of those accounts that do exist stress the political crack-
ups of the 1960s and subsequent intellectual and institutional disarray and decline.
37
  The two 
major parties obviously feature in this literature, but their development as organizations and 
changing roles in American politics generally do not play a significant role.
38
  Explicit treatment 
of ideological polarization and partisan resurgence is largely lacking in political histories of the 
period, even those that extend into the last two decades of the twentieth century.   
This lack of engagement with partisan developments has interpretive consequences.  
Ironically, it causes even the rich historical literature on the rise of the right to understate the far-
reaching impact of the conservative movement.  That movement was a partisan project.  As such, 
it proved to be a significant force not only in shaping policy debates but also in hastening 
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changes in the party system itself, helping to render both parties organizationally stronger, 
increasingly programmatic, and more influential in shaping political and policy outcomes during 
the last decades of the twentieth century.  The prevailing historical literature also gives analytical 
short shrift to post-1960s liberalism, by obscuring processes of ideological consolidation and 
organizational development within the Democratic Party and among its allied interest groups that 
paralleled – though hardly matched – developments on the right.  By putting parties at the 
analytic forefront of its account, this dissertation illuminates such themes.  And by tracking the 
parties together in a single narrative rather than in isolation, it identifies shared characteristics, 
asymmetries, and mutual interactions in their development.   
The question of symmetry is an important one.  Historians’ emphasis on the rise of the 
right in the last third of the twentieth century is not misplaced.  Conservative political power is a 
signal theme of the period, and reframing an interpretation of the era around party polarization 
does not imply that liberals and conservatives contributed equally to the process or that the 
contemporary Democratic and Republican parties are equivalently ideological vehicles.  Political 
scientists have supported historians’ emphasis on conservative ascendancy with a slew of 
quantitative evidence for a process of “asymmetric polarization,” in which Republicans have 
moved much farther to the right since the 1970s than Democrats have moved left.
39
    
This dissertation confirms the asymmetry of modern polarization.  It also, however, 
offers a correction to the prevailing historiography’s singular focus on liberal disarray and 
fragmentation, by emphasizing the significance of decreasing ideological distance among 
Democratic-aligned officials, activists, and ordinary voters and increasing organizational 
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capacity and mechanisms of partisan discipline from the 1970s onward.  In doing so, this 
dissertation argues that the two parties underwent parallel but asymmetric developments in the 
1970s.  In the Democrats’ case, electoral and interest-group sorting – including the atrophying of 
the party’s conservative southern wing – combined with the conscious organizational efforts of 
leading liberal activists to result in a rough rapprochement between left-of-center elements that 
had battled each other since the 1960s.  The party’s contested absorption of social movement 
energies and the transformed politics of organized labor were central to this development.
40
  
Factional fighting would of course continue during the subsequent decades, but the ideological 
space separating the battlers was much diminished from the prior era.  This greater cohesion had 
substantive consequences.  In the short term, the growth in Democratic party discipline served to 
curb the policy impact of the “Reagan Revolution” significantly, as consolidated opposition 
helped to stall Reagan’s legislative agenda after 1982.  In the longer term, the coalitional work of 
liberal activists contributed to the simultaneous partisan polarization on both economic and 
cultural issues though the end of the twentieth century.   
Liberals’ contribution to party transformation in the later twentieth century extended 
beyond the work of coalition-building and sorting.  They were also the chief instigators of 
institutional reforms to both party procedures and Congress that proved central to the emergence 
of a new, more programmatic party system.  Contemporary scholarly assessments cast these 
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reforms as misguided interventions that fragmented the parties and hastened the rise of 
candidate-centered politics.
41
  Subsequent historical scholarship, to the limited extent that it has 
addressed institutional changes in the parties and Congress, has largely echoed those initial, 
critical analyses.
42
  Historians have rightly come to view the 1970s as a “pivotal decade” 
producing lasting transformations in U.S. politics, but have mostly ignored the role that the 
institutional reconstruction of the parties played in those transformations.
43
  This dissertation 
reassesses the reforms and their historical significance.  It shows that the two reform initiatives, 
of nomination procedures and congressional organization, were connected in personnel and 
outlook, and that the responsible-party themes of issue politics and party nationalization were 
central to the efforts of key activists involved.  These reforms, so often cast as contributors to 
party decline, in fact helped to create a newly receptive institutional setting for programmatic 
activism in the parties, with direct consequences for the parties’ subsequent ideological sorting.   
If this work brings the processes of polarization and partisan resurgence to bear on 
existing historical understanding of postwar politics, it also contributes an actor-centered 
narrative and historical context to the political science literature on U.S. parties and 
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polarization.
44
  The common empirical story in that literature posits a sequence in which party 
elites first sorted ideologically, then prompted sorting within the mass electorate through partisan 
cues.  The process of the initial elite polarization, however, largely remains a historical black 
box.  By treating the construction of an ideologically sorted party system as a political project 
carried out by conscious historical actors, this dissertation serves to open that box.   
Doing so yields insights into several ongoing pursuits in research on parties and 
polarization.  The narrative details both the institutional changes necessary for, and the active 
coalitional work directed towards, the sorting of the two parties on both economic and cultural 
issues -- the “conflict extension” that scholars have identified as a notable and unanticipated 
characteristic of modern polarization.
45
  It also reveals the work of partisan transformation to be 
unavoidably dialectical.  Even as ideological activists worked to transform the parties in their 
own image, the existing partisan setting helped to shape and structure their strategic choices and 
outlook on the political system.
46
  Finally, a focus on the interplay between ideology and party 
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structure helps to reveal the mechanisms by which polarization contributed to the emergence of 
organizationally strong and well-resourced national party apparatuses in recent decades.
47
   
This work also historicizes postwar political science itself, tracing scholars’ internal 
debates about parties, their changing conceptions of power, and the influence of both on real-
world politics.
48
  Two key threads of this intellectual history are the postwar political career of 
responsible party doctrine and the declensionist turn in public and scholarly understandings of 
parties from the 1960s onward.
49
  Investigating the sources of such ideas as well as their impact 
on political developments sheds light on the role that normative ideas about the political system 
play in that system’s very development.  It also helps to account for the sheer unexpectedness of 
late-century polarization and partisan revival from the point of view of contemporary observers.   
 
Chapter Outline 
 
The dissertation proceeds in two parts, each consisting of three chapters.  Part I, “The 
Bipartisan Era, 1948-1968,” recounts political developments in the exceptionally depolarized 
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partisan era of the mid-twentieth century, a period characterized by high levels of legislative 
bipartisanship and two federated and non-programmatic national parties.  The intellectual revival 
of an alternative vision of party politics, the rise of issue-driven activism on both the left and the 
right, and the transformational politics of civil rights all served to strain existing partisan 
arrangements to the breaking point by the tumultuous 1960s.       
The first chapter, “The Idea of Responsible Partisanship,” recounts the origins of the 
APSA Committee on Political Parties, its publication of Toward a More Responsible Two-Party 
System in 1950, and the debate the report engendered.  Shaped by the politics of the New Deal 
state, postwar responsible party doctrine offered a potent critique of the fragmented and 
undisciplined American party system and prescribed an alternative model involving disciplined, 
programmatic, and mutually distinct parties.  The publication of the APSA report in turn 
motivated critics of that doctrine to mount a vigorous defense of traditional American parties as 
forces for stabilization and inclusion.    
The vision of parties articulated by the APSA report would influence most directly the 
liberal wing of the Democratic Party in the 1950s and 1960s, as “amateur”-style reform activism 
and the politics of civil rights increased liberals’ receptivity to arguments made in behalf of 
ideological realignment.  Chapter Two, “Democrats and the Politics of Principle,” documents 
Paul Butler’s stormy chairmanship of the Democratic National Committee from 1954 to 1960 as 
a case study in the political and institutional tensions besetting the postwar Democratic coalition.  
Butler’s tenure featured responsible-party innovations as well as incessant clashes with southern 
Democrats, party professionals, and the powerful congressional leaders Sam Rayburn and 
Lyndon Johnson, two men who embodied a starkly different outlook on the value and function of 
parties in America.  It then explores the ways in which the explosive social movement 
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mobilizations of the 1960s interacted with partisan politics.  It identifies continuities, in both 
style and outlook, linking the era’s new left-liberal mobilizations to the issue-driven middle-class 
reform activism of the 1950s. 
Political divisions within the Republican Party in the early postwar decades similarly 
reflected competing visions for the party and clashing theoretical claims about partisanship itself.  
Chapter Three, “A Choice Not an Echo,” explores these conflicts, elucidating the dynamics they 
shared with the Democratic story.  Factional disputes over political strategy in the early postwar 
years took on ideological coloring, as ubiquitous conservative charges of “me, too” posturing 
among GOP politicians prompted deeper questions about the very existence of an American 
consensus.  Against the backdrop of declining transactional party organizations and a resurgent 
conservative intellectual movement, GOP politics in the later 1950s witnessed intensifying 
clashes between supporters of a moderate, Eisenhower-centered partisan vision and issue-driven, 
amateur-style activists on the right.  In a mirror-image reflection of the Democratic dynamic, 
conflicting ideological visions for the Republican future aligned with conflicting strategic 
postures toward the Solid South, particularly with respect to civil rights.  I trace the evolution of 
conservative advocacy for an ideological party realignment via GOP alliance with southern 
whites, from Senator Karl Mundt’s organization of a Dixie-focused Committee to Explore 
Political Realignment in 1951, to debates carried out within internal party councils during the 
Eisenhower years, and finally to the right’s capture of the party’s presidential nomination in 
1964.   
Part II, “Redrawing the Lines, 1968-1980,” analyzes the 1970s as a decade of 
underappreciated dynamism, flux, and experimentation in American party politics that produced 
the key characteristics of our modern polarized era.  After years during which efforts to 
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restructure the parties around ideological agendas had met decisive obstacles, what explains 
activists’ success in transforming the parties in the 1970s?  As a brief introductory section to Part 
II discusses, the long-term rise of issue-based party activism and long-term decay of the parties’ 
existing organizational structures rendered the parties vulnerable to the potent challenges to 
major social institutions that were such a signature of the tumultuous late 1960s and early 1970s.  
This allowed reformers and issue activists on both the left and right to achieve decisive 
breakthroughs in reorienting the parties ideologically.  Ultimately, the arc of change from 
Nixon’s presidency to Ronald Reagan’s inauguration involved a tightening alignment between 
the policy positions and partisan affiliation of political activists and elites.  Though this dynamic 
would drive the revival of partisanship in subsequent decades, most analysts in the 1970s 
emphasized party decline as the key theme of their political era, in part because they retained an 
older conception of the parties that automatically counterposed ideology and partisanship.   
Chapter Four, “The Age of Party Reform,” reassesses the sweeping institutional changes 
pursued by Democrats in the late 1960s and 1970s relating to their presidential nominating 
system and their organization in Congress. It offers a new account of the transformations 
initiated by the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection (commonly known as the 
McGovern-Fraser Commission) and continued by successor commissions, emphasizing the 
intellectual premises that animated participants.  It connects this story of party reform, moreover, 
to the congressional reforms enacted during the same years relating to the seniority system and 
committee structure.  Responsible party doctrine informed the outlook of key figures in both 
reform projects.  Often cast at the time as contributors to party fragmentation and decline, both 
reform initiatives in fact ultimately helped to create a newly receptive institutional setting for 
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issue-based activism within the parties, with consequences for future ideological sorting and 
polarization. 
The following two chapters shift focus from the formal reconstruction of partisan 
institutions to the political work done within this new institutional context by party-oriented 
activists on the left and right. Chapter Five, “The Making of a Vanguard Party,” recasts the 
familiar narrative of conservative ascendance in the 1970s as a project of ideological party-
building.  Strategists in the Nixon years articulated a vision of a new political majority waiting to 
be won through partisan realignment.  Some activists would pursue an experiment in third-party 
building before backing Ronald Reagan’s potent intraparty challenge to Gerald Ford in 1976, the 
immediate result of which was a rightward shift in the party’s platform.  Carter-era struggles 
would further drive conservatives’ takeover of the Republican Party machinery amidst ongoing 
southern realignment, new business mobilizations, and a dramatic influx of ideologically-driven 
grassroots activism in the form of the Christian Right.   
Chapter Six, “Liberal Alliance-Building for Lean Times,” challenges the prevailing 
historiographic narrative of post-1960s liberal decline, arguing that liberal coalition-building and 
activism in the inhospitable 1970s contributed to the making of a more ideologically sorted party 
system.   The Ford and Carter years would see fracture and disarray among liberals at the 
policymaking level but a gradual process of coalitional reformation at the activist and interest-
group level, seen most importantly in the reemergence of a labor-liberal alliance uniting 
progressive unions with “new social movement” groups.  Reform-mandated midterm Democratic 
conventions in 1974 and 1978 served as forums for tightening such coalitional ties, an important 
factor in the decade’s second major intraparty challenge to a sitting president, Ted Kennedy’s 
1980 bid for the Democratic nomination.   
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A brief concluding chapter, “Polarization Without Responsibility,” surveys the unfolding 
dynamics of an ideologically sorted party system during the Reagan years and beyond.  Partisan 
resurgence and divided rule defined politics in the Reagan era.  Issue activists came increasingly 
and consciously to be drawn into the logic of two-party electoral competition, enlisting as 
soldiers for one or the other major party.  Congress proved to be the leading edge in manifesting 
the resurgent polarization and partisanship that were soon found in other realms of government.  
The consequences of partisan sorting have underlay every major flashpoint in national politics 
since, from the Republican congressional takeover in 1994 to the Clinton impeachment of 1998 
to the interbranch warfare of the Bush and Obama presidencies in the new century.  Decades of 
work carried out by the activists, intellectuals, and political elites at the center of this dissertation 
had finally helped to produce the nationalized and ideologically distinct American parties 
prescribed by responsible party doctrine.  In a political system still defined by separated powers 
and myriad veto points, however, party majorities find themselves with no sustained capacity to 
implement their program.  Hence the modern American predicament of responsible partisanship 
without responsible party government – a volatile ill-fit between disciplined ideological 
partisanship and fragmented political institutions that turns routine conflict into chronic crisis. 
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Part I: The Bipartisan Era, 1948-1968 
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Chapter 1: The Idea of Responsible Partisanship 
 
 On November 4, 1952, Adlai Stevenson lost handily to Dwight Eisenhower in his bid for 
president, bringing an end to twenty years of Democratic control of the office.  Over eighty 
thousand people wrote Stevenson in the immediate aftermath of the election.
1
  One of them was 
the political scientist E.E. Schattschneider. 
 The Wesleyan professor had read newspaper reports that Stevenson was assuming the 
mantle of leader of the Democratic opposition, and he wrote to express his hope that this 
leadership would embody “a more active effective sense than that implied in the expression 
‘titular head’ of the party. As a lifelong student of the American party system I have come to feel 
that the opportunity for leadership in the opposition party is second in importance only to the 
presidency itself.”  Since American politics “generates remarkably few genuinely national 
leaders at any time,” he noted, “it would be tragic if the Democratic party and the liberal forces 
in the country were forced to begin all over again four years hence to try to discover and develop 
new leadership.”  What was needed instead was for Stevenson – who along with Harry Truman 
had already “done very much to interpret for the nation the idea of party government and party 
responsibility” – to build upon the popular following and policy agenda he had established in the 
campaign and sustain them in opposition.
2
 
 What end would this leadership serve?  “The function of the Democratic party as an 
opposition party,” Schattschneider wrote, “is to remain, first, a liberal party, and second … to 
help the public understand the meaning of the liberal alternatives” to the coming Republican 
rule.  Interpreting the election less as a party mandate for the GOP than a personal one for 
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Eisenhower, Schattschneider was confident that Democrats would be returning to power soon.  
Moreover, ongoing structural developments, particularly the “the breakup of the Solid South, 
which seems now to be near at hand,” might allow for a newly effective party governance when 
they returned.  Thus the party should prepare now for that power and responsibility, by mounting 
a cohesive opposition.  “For this job we can expect some leadership from the Democrats in 
Congress but not very much.”  The primary burden, and opportunity, was Stevenson’s.   
 Adlai Stevenson responded to this letter, as he responded to the many others articulating 
similar arguments in the winter of 1952, with a courteous and noncommittal note of thanks, after 
which the politician and the professor never appear to have communicated again.
3
  In itself, the 
exchange meant little.  But Schattschneider and Stevenson were both, in different ways, 
significant actors in a shared story of postwar intellectual and political history, and the scholar’s 
letter hinted at some of what that story entailed.      
 Schattschneider had indeed been a lifelong student of American parties, and by 1952 was 
associated more closely than any other scholar with a specific outlook on how they should 
function, summed up by two terms he used in the letter: “party government and party 
responsibility.”  Proponents of responsible party government viewed the federated character of 
the two national parties as anachronistic in an industrial age of large-scale institutions and 
national issues, and they sought to nationalize the parties’ structures and orientation while 
facilitating the majority party’s ability to govern effectively.  They also sought programmatic 
parties, which would organize both their electoral appeals and behavior in power around policy 
positions rather than tradition, patronage, or personality.  And finally, to secure democratic 
accountability in a system that only provided voters with a choice of two alternatives, they 
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sought mechanisms of discipline that could ensure that the two parties’ respective programs were 
at once coherent and mutually distinct.  The goal, as a Schattschneider-led committee of the 
American Political Science Association (APSA) wrote in 1950, was a system in which the 
parties “bring forth programs to which they commit themselves and … possess sufficient internal 
cohesion to carry out these programs.”4   
This was a theory of party reform with intellectual roots in the turn of the century, but 
one for which the more specific political experiences of the 1930s and 1940s had helped to 
mobilize a new set of advocates.  The modern national state created by the New Deal and World 
War II brought with it a new politics centered on issues of federal policy.  Franklin Roosevelt’s 
presidency reshaped American liberalism as a public philosophy of activist state administration.  
But, crucially, that liberalism only partially defined the program and personnel of the party that 
Roosevelt led – a party that contained factions ideologically or instrumentally opposed to various 
aspects of New Deal liberalism.  Liberal Democrats, frustrated with the obstacles to effective 
policymaking posed by dissident elements of their own party, would thus prove the eagerest 
proponents of responsible party notions in the ensuing decades.   
Seeking to ensure, as Schattschneider did, that the Democratic Party would “remain, first, 
a liberal party,” such liberals targeted those Democrats whose partisan identity did not relate to 
the programmatic agenda of the New Deal.  These included the declining ranks of non-
ideological patronage-based organizations as well as the conservative party leaders of the Solid 
South.  The southern bloc compromised the coherence and effectiveness of the Democratic Party 
in Congress – hence Schattschneider’s pessimism about congressional leaders’ capacity to lead 
the opposition – and made mischief in conventions and national committee deliberations.  Thus, 
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liberals valorized partisan discipline in Congress and majority rule within national party affairs.  
Schattschneider’s heralding of two-party competition in the South, meanwhile, hinted at a logical 
end product of these intraparty struggles: a realigned party system structured by coherent policy 
agendas, consisting of one broadly liberal and one broadly conservative party.  
The doctrine of responsible party government was most clearly articulated in the report of 
APSA’s Committee on Political Parties, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, which 
met intense controversy upon its publication in 1950.  It motivated critics of responsible party 
theory to respond not merely with critiques of the document’s contents, but with a vigorous 
defense of traditional American parties themselves as valuable forces for stabilization and 
inclusion.  This scholarly dispute helped to set the terms of debate for conflicts that would soon 
erupt in the rough and tumble world of party politics.  And indeed, the questions it touched on – 
about the proper function of parties, their connection to policy and ideology, and their role in the 
American system – would recur in American politics for another half century.            
 
The New Deal’s Incomplete Revolution  
 
“We ought to have two real parties – one liberal and the other conservative.” 5  When 
Franklin Roosevelt said this in 1944 and Republican Wendell Willkie concurred, a top-down 
party realignment appeared as a tantalizing possibility.  Some mistimed press leaks, a spate of 
cold feet, and – most importantly – Willkie’s sudden death that October all compelled the 
president to abandon this pursuit.  But the mere fact of his overture signified how the New Deal 
era had provided a new impetus for the ideological realignment of the parties.  
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The New Deal transformed American politics and partially transformed American 
parties.  The disjunction between the former and the latter set the context for the revival of 
responsible party doctrine as both an idea and a plan of action.  Government activism during the 
Roosevelt years ushered in a politics centered on conflicts over federal public policy and a new 
governing philosophy of state intervention on behalf of economic regulation and social 
provision.  Though Roosevelt’s massive electoral victories occurred under the Democratic label, 
the New Deal was not a party program.  The congeries of interest groups, social movements, 
experts, and public officials that mobilized to implement and secure New Deal policies was not 
primarily integrated with the party.
6
  To be sure, the New Deal’s effect on the Democratic Party 
was dramatic, shifting its electoral center of gravity to the North, associating its national agenda 
with the president’s liberalism, and compelling a limited but real degree of centralization in its 
internal affairs.
7
  Countervailing developments, however, compromised Roosevelt’s ability to 
mobilize his party for programmatic ends, most importantly the emergence by 1938 of an 
effective obstructionist coalition of Republicans and conservative Democrats – mainly southern, 
disproportionately senior, and empowered by the congressional committee system.
8
  In his 
famous “purge” campaign that year, Roosevelt intervened in the primary contests of leading 
conservative Democrats in Congress in a largely failed effort to replace them with pro-New Deal 
alternatives.  Roosevelt explained this effort to radio audiences in explicitly ideological terms, 
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saying that, as “head of the Democratic Party,” charged with carrying out “the definitely liberal 
declaration of principles” in the 1936 platform, he was obligated to intervene in primary contests 
pitting a liberal against a conservative.
9
     
Four years after the fact, Schattschneider would hail the purge campaign as “one of the 
greatest experimental tests of the nature of the American party system ever made,” and that test’s 
failure did not put an end to liberals’ interest in party realignment after World War II.10  The 
dramatic political year of 1948, for example, saw upheaval within the Democratic coalition 
followed by an ideologically polarized general election.  In a stunning demonstration of the 
growing internal party clout of northern liberals, insurgent activists at the 1948 Democratic 
convention succeeded in adding a forceful civil rights plank to the party platform, prompting 
four delegations from the segregationist South to bolt and mount a third-party presidential bid.  
For a general election featuring major efforts by a Republican, a Dixiecrat, and the left-wing 
Progressive Party candidate Henry Wallace, Harry Truman’s political strategists devised an 
aggressively liberal campaign for the president, mobilizing core New Deal constituencies like 
organized labor in the name of securing and expanding Franklin Roosevelt’s programmatic 
legacy.  Truman’s upset victory, accomplished without the Deep South’s support, accompanied 
the election of a slew of energetic liberal newcomers to Congress.  It seemed to herald an era in 
which Democrats could compete nationally free from a dependence on southern conservatives.
11
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Related developments in the early postwar years helped to bolster the two-party system 
and channel left-liberal energies into the Democratic Party, enlarging the potential constituency 
within that party in favor of stronger discipline and ideological cohesion.  The national 
orientation of New Deal politics combined with the pressures of domestic anti-communism to 
hasten the decline of regional third-party movements, like Minnesota’s Farmer-Labor Party.12  In 
national politics, the Progressive Party disintegrated, while the anti-communist Americans for 
Democratic Action (ADA) consolidated its position as an elite satellite group, nominally non-
partisan but functionally dedicated to liberalizing the Democratic Party.
13
  A similar dynamic 
obtained in the political strategy of the labor movement.  After flirting with third-partyism, 
industrial labor leaders like Walter Reuther abandoned the effort by 1947 in favor of integration 
into the Democratic coalition.
14
  Their long-range strategy was to partner with liberal and civil 
rights activists within Democratic ranks, compel the exit of illiberal blocs (chiefly southern 
conservatives), and achieve an ideological realignment through which the party might be 
transformed further.
15
                    
 Meanwhile, the experience of failure during Truman’s second term – the grinding 
frustrations of congressional obstruction and partisan disarray that crippled the Fair Deal 
domestic agenda – prompted liberal Democrats to diagnose more intensively the institutional and 
                                                 
12
 Jennifer A. Delton, Making Minnesota Liberal: Civil Rights and the Transformation of the Democratic Party 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 1-39. 
13
 Steven M. Gillon, Politics and Vision: The ADA and American Liberalism, 1947-1985 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), 35-56. 
14
 Kevin Boyle, The UAW and the Heyday of American Liberalism, 1945-1968 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1998), 50-51. 
15
 Stephen Amberg, “The CIO Political Strategy in Historical Perspective: Creating a High-Road Economy in the 
Postwar Era,” in Organized Labor and American Politics, 1894-1994: The Labor-Liberal Alliance, ed. Kevin Boyle 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 169-173.  On the mid-century emergence and functioning of a 
labor-liberal Democratic faction, see Daniel DiSalvo, “The Politics of a Party Faction: The Labor-Liberal Alliance 
in the Democratic Party, 1948-1972,” Journal of Policy History 22 (Fall 2010): 269-299.  
 39 
 
political roadblocks to effective party governance.
16
  This was the setting into which stepped a 
phalanx of sympathetic political scientists, eager to help. 
 
The Prescription of Party Responsibility   
 
 The doctrine of responsible party government originated in the scholarly writings of 
Progressives like Woodrow Wilson and Henry Jones Ford, and one strong current within the 
New Deal and World War II-era intellectual revival of the doctrine reflected classic Progressive 
concerns with modernizing administration and rationalizing the politics of national policy.
17
  
Making the parties more cohesive and programmatic was bound up in a broader reform project 
of adapting America’s cumbersome and fragmented “horse-and-buggy” constitutional structure 
to the needs of a modern industrial and military state.  Thomas Finletter, a New York lawyer and 
diplomat who served as Truman’s Air Force Secretary, typified this reformist impulse in his 
1945 book Can Representative Government Do the Job?, which warned that the political drift 
and division fostered by American federalism and the separation of powers imperiled the 
national interest in an era of global crisis.  He advocated fostering closer legislative-executive 
branch coordination and ridding the legislature of such “anachronisms” as the Senate filibuster, 
the autonomy of committees, and the seniority system, all of which impeded action and 
fragmented authority.  Giving presidents the power to dissolve Congress and coordinating the 
elections of the House, Senate, and presidency, meanwhile, would help to produce that “party 
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discipline which alone in representative government can constitute an effective bridge between 
the Executive and Congress and alone can bring them to work together harmoniously.”18     
 As Finletter’s prescriptions hinted, the British parliamentary system loomed large as a 
model in postwar reformist thinking, due to both its technocratic appeal as well as, for liberals, a 
substantive affinity for the postwar Labor Party’s rule under Clement Atlee.  That government’s 
implementation of a sweeping program of social provision and nationalization offered American 
liberals a stark contrast to the deadlock and disappointments of Truman’s stalled Fair Deal.19  
British intellectuals like Harold Laski contributed directly to this comparative analysis of the two 
party systems, while young American scholars like Samuel Beer studied the dynamics of British 
politics with an eye toward gleaning applicable lessons.
20
  “I was much influenced by the British 
example of strong party government getting things through the legislature,” Beer later recalled.  
“I thought, well, that’s what we need: A political party which has a program that’s been 
explained to voters who then choose this program rather than another.”21 
 To these respective Progressive and Anglophile strands of responsible party thinking, 
Elmer Eric Schattschneider would add both a sweeping overarching framework as well as a 
potent rhetorical posture of hardnosed realism – a highly un-Progressive celebration of the raw 
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and messy potentialities of power in real-life democratic politics.
22
  Writing in a distinctively 
terse, aphoristic style in the 1940s, Schattschneider celebrated the restless power-seeking 
energies of the two major American political parties (the first chapter of his major work, Party 
Government, was called “In Defense of Political Parties”) even as he sought their reconstruction 
into forces for cohesive policy agendas.  He shared the Progressive goal of issue-based politics 
while shunning the Progressive impulse toward antipartyism, noting how the latter served to 
impede the former in the wake of the New Deal’s ongoing revolution of national politics.  
Progressive antipartyism was “formulated in language which seems to condemn all partisanship 
for all time but [was], in fact, directed at a special form of partisan alignment which frustrated a 
generation of Americans,” he pointed out.23  Its legacy was a “folklore of politics” that venerates 
independence and thus vitiates effective governance.  “Independence per se is a virtue, and party 
loyalty per se is an evil.  We cling to this notion” even in the face of evidence that “independence 
is a synonym of ineffectiveness in a game in which teamwork produces results.”24   
Schattschneider similarly eschewed the Progressive tendency toward formalism and 
institutional reform.  Though well aware of the constitutional structures fostering localism and 
fragmentation in the parties, his confidence in the potentialities of political power led him to 
believe that a new commitment among partisans to unity behind a shared program could itself 
trigger far-reaching changes in the entire system.  The priority was thus political: to will 
discipline and organization into existence on behalf of programmatic national parties.  In turn, 
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the ceaseless electoral competition of those parties campaigning on their programs would have 
the happy byproduct of smashing the boss rule of urban machines and the Southern gentry.
25
   
 The intellectual force of Schattschneider’s arguments and his infectious enthusiasm as a 
teacher and scholar gave him a devoted following in the 1940s.
26
  “You’re the prophet,” his 
protégé Austin Ranney wrote in 1948. “I never expect to cease being a disciple.”27  Other 
devotees of Schattschneider’s vision with important connections to real-world politics included 
Steven K. Bailey, who alternated between stints in government and academia throughout the 
1950s; James MacGregor Burns of Williams College; and Hubert Humphrey’s circle of 
publically active political scientists at the University of Minnesota.
28
  Altogether, 
Schattschneider’s influence outstripped his public name recognition.  It was not a surprise when 
APSA named him to chair a Committee on Political Parties in 1947. 
 The APSA Committee on Political Parties was one example of a broader disciplinary 
commitment to providing prescriptive expertise in the service of planning and reform in the early 
postwar years (a commitment that would soon after recede).  As the association put it in a 1945 
manifesto, “Ceaseless change in the social and economic world presents government with ever-
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new problems,” and part of political scientists’ task was to “spread as widely as possible a 
knowledge of what good government is and what its benefits are to all citizens.”29  An immediate 
model for the parties committee was APSA’s Committee on Congress, whose 1945 report had 
exerted modest influence on the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.  Schattschneider 
indirectly inspired the new committee’s formation by publishing an article in 1946 concerning 
partisan dynamics in the new Joint Economic Committee in Congress.
30
  His analysis intrigued 
three scholars working in federal agencies at the time, Fritz Morstein Marx, Bertram Gross, and 
Paul T. David, who subscribed to responsible party doctrine and thought a comprehensive case 
might be made for reforms under the imprimatur of a national commission.  They circulated a 
proposal for a Committee on Political Parties, and in December 1946, APSA’s Executive 
Council authorized its formation, with a mission to “study the organization and operation of 
national political parties and elections, with a view to suggesting changes that might enable the 
parties and voters to fulfill their responsibilities more effectively.”31  APSA’s president named 
the members of the committee in April.
32
  The committee circulated and commented on a series 
of position memos by mail in 1947, then held meetings over the course of 1948 and 1949.
33
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 Though Schattschneider did not personally dominate the activities of the committee in all 
its particulars, responsible party doctrine certainly dominated the body’s assumptions and 
approach.  All of the most active participants, among them Schattschneider, Gross, Marx, Louise 
Overacker, and Clarence Berdahl, were committed to fostering better disciplined, more 
programmatic, and more nationally-oriented parties, and the few dissident members did little to 
challenge the consensus.  (No one produced a minority report.)  Committee members most 
strongly differed from Schattschneider’s views on the subject of internal party procedures.  
Schattschneider had long viewed efforts to foster mechanisms of democratic participation inside 
the parties as irrelevant at best and pernicious at their frequent worst, while most other members 
believed that intra-party democracy bolstered rather than jeopardized programmatic cohesion.  
The latter position survived in the Committee’s eventual report, Toward a More Responsible 
Two-Party System, a document whose primary author was not Schattschneider but Fritz Marx.
34
  
The spirit of the committee’s chairman was well reflected, however, by the confident declaration 
in the report’s Foreword that “the weakness of the American two-party system can be overcome 
as soon as a substantial part of the electorate wants it overcome.”35 
 Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, a cleanly written 100-page document 
released to considerable fanfare in the fall of 1950, framed the problem of irresponsibility in this 
manner: “Historical and other factors have caused the American two-party system to operate as 
two loose associations of state and local organizations, with very little national machinery and 
very little national cohesion.”  This meant that either party, when in power, “is ill-equipped to 
organize its members in the legislative and executive branches into a government held together 
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and guided by the party program.”  Lest Americans resign themselves to muddling through, the 
report warned that modern conditions in foreign and domestic affairs rendered the situation truly 
“grave” – for “it is no longer safe for the nation to deal piecemeal with issues that can be 
disposed of only on the basis of coherent programs.”  The authors of the report were emphatic 
that parties should be organized in terms of issues – “the choices provided by the two-party 
system are valuable to the American people in proportion to their definition in terms of public 
policy” – and attributed the new policy-oriented basis of partisanship to the creation of the New 
Deal state: “The reasons for the growing emphasis on public policy in party politics are to be 
found, above all, in the very operations of modern government.”36   
 The suggested reforms offered by the Committee concerned changes along three 
dimensions of party operations – developing policy positions, ensuring discipline and cohesion, 
and centralizing power at the national level.  It advocated a 50-member party council that would 
meet regularly to manage the party’s continuing affairs and to steer the formulation of the party 
platform while devising party positions on new policy issues as they arose.  Notably, the council 
would also act as a disciplinary board authorized to “make recommendations to the National 
Convention, the National Committee or other appropriate party organs with respect to 
conspicuous departures from general party decisions by state or local party organizations.”  As a 
further means to foster integration, cohesion, and deliberation over policy programs, the 
committee recommended that national party conventions take place biennially.  Concerning 
Congress, the committee recited what by that time had become a standard litany of reform 
proposals to rationalize, if not quite parliamentarize, both chambers: curbing the autonomy of 
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committees and the sanctity of seniority; centralizing authority in the party leadership; and 
abolishing that iconic countermajoritarian institution, the Senate filibuster.
37
 
 
In Defense of Indiscipline   
The APSA report stirred strong feelings among American political scientists. Intensely 
controversial from the outset, it helped set the terms of debate about American political parties 
for much of the next decade.
 38
  Indeed, a testament to its impact was its success in motivating 
the Committee’s opponents – scholars who had never endorsed the analyses and ethos of the 
responsible party school – to mount a vigorous defense of American parties as they traditionally 
functioned. 
    To do this, critics largely rearticulated the main lines of argument laid out a decade 
earlier by Pendleton Herring in his major statement on the American party system, The Politics 
of Democracy.  Herring agreed that American parties were not suited to generating coherent and 
distinct programs, but he did not see that as a problem.  “Our present system does not mean the 
negation of policies because the parties seem so similar in viewpoint,” he wrote.  “There is ample 
room for positive programs, but our parties are not the channels best suited to their initiation.” 
Instead, interest groups and activists in society better served that role.  The parties functioned 
less as channels of policy generation than as arenas in which “differences of viewpoint upon 
public questions may in large measure be either disregarded or compromised,” and in so doing 
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the parties served as forces for stability, integration, and incremental, pragmatic policy change.
39
  
Reflecting the pluralism that would dominate political science in the coming decades, Herring 
argued that loose, non-programmatic parties not only fit institutionally with America’s 
fragmented constitutional order, but also served as useful forces for inclusion and compromise in 
a notably diverse population composed of a jumble of cross-cutting group interests.  Any 
strongly majoritarian vision of comprehensive mandates and responsible parties was at best 
unrealistic in such a setting.  Indeed, the acute danger posed by party alignments based on deep 
ideological or group cleavages was the central historical theme in another influential 
contemporary defense of American parties, Herbert Agar’s The Price of Union.40       
 Scholarly critics of the APSA committee report sounded anew these cautionary notes.  
“How Much Party Centralization Do We Want?,” T. William Goodman asked.  Expressing doubt 
that most voters ever consciously associated their vote with support for a given party’s platform, 
and invoking Madisonian reservations about the potential for majority tyranny, his answer was 
clear: not nearly as much as the Committee on Political Parties wanted.
41
  The most notable 
voice in this chorus was Schattschneider’s erstwhile “disciple” Austin Ranney, who in the course 
of writing his dissertation had become, as he later recalled, “more and more skeptical about the 
applicability, the reality, of the Schattschneider prescription.”  Herring and Agar’s work helped 
resensitize him to the political necessity of concepts like “consensus and majority forbearance 
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and minority acquiescence” that responsible party proponents often sidelined.42  He published a 
critique of the Committee’s report challenging its presumption that Americans’ fundamental 
democratic commitment was to effective majority rule.  In fact, he countered, a sensitivity to 
minority rights and to the prevention of unchecked control of the full government by any given 
majority was deeply ingrained in American political culture, and “the same popular beliefs about 
government which sustain our present anti-majoritarian constitutional system will continue to 
sustain … our anti-majoritarian party system.”43   
What little direct evidence existed of Americans’ normative views about the party 
system, moreover, showed general hostility to the prospect of a programmatic party realignment, 
contrary to the Committee report’s claim that the scrambled ideological lines of the 
congressional parties was “a serious source of public discontent.”44  Gallup polled Americans in 
1947: “It has been suggested that we give up the present Republican and Democratic Parties and 
have two new parties, one for the Liberals and one for the Conservatives.  Would you favor this 
idea?”  Thirteen percent said yes.  In 1950, Gallup asked, “Would you like to have the 
Republican party officially join with the Southern conservative Democrats in a new political 
party?,” to which neither a majority of Republicans, nor a majority of northern Democrats, nor a 
majority of Southern Democrats answered in the affirmative.
45
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In the face of such polling data, committee members likely would have responded that 
their central aim was to educate citizens about the virtues of strong, responsible parties.  In fact, 
however, the committee’s report was notably coy on the related subjects of ideology and 
realignment.  Though the implication may have been obvious in, say, their claim that “the sort of 
opposition presented by a coalition that cuts across party lines, as a regular thing, tends to 
deprive the public of a meaningful alternative,” the report’s drafters deliberately avoided an 
explicit discussion of party realignment.
46
  They even claimed that “needed clarification of party 
policy in itself will not cause the parties to differ more fundamentally or more sharply than they 
have in the past.”  Since that clarification would produce a more realistic, results-based public 
discussion, “the contrary is much more likely to be the case.”47  In his critique of the report, T. 
William Goodman expressed incredulity at this obvious fudge.  “If parties are not ‘to differ more 
fundamentally or more sharply’ in the future than in the past,” he asked, “what is all the 
hullaballoo about? How will the voters have any clearer choices than they have had?”48  The 
report deepened its own ambiguity with an artful formulation on ideology.  “Increasing concern 
with their programs” will not “cause the parties to erect between themselves an ideological 
wall,” the Committee wrote.  “There is no real ideological division in the American electorate, 
and hence programs of action presented by responsible parties for the voter’s support could 
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hardly be expected to reflect or strive toward such division.”49  This statement was obviously 
pregnant with the assumptions and vocabulary of midcentury liberal thinking about a national 
consensus, but more practically it raised the question of what would motivate and shape the 
construction of two alternative party programs, if not some differing set of principles or 
“ideology.”   
Far from being clear on this point in his own writing, Schattschneider actually betrayed 
just such a thin conception of political disagreement in Party Government, notwithstanding his 
exuberant celebration of conflict as the energy of democracy.  What mattered to him was simply 
the existence of a choice between programs and the ability of the party in government to carry its 
program out.  The formulation of the programs and their mutual distinctiveness would come as 
byproducts of the parties’ competition for votes.  He could even write approvingly of the often 
muddled programmatic results of this process.
50
  Ideology and principle played little role in his 
self-consciously pragmatic conception of politics. Partisan competition was, for him, the all-
powerful mechanism for achieving responsible party government.
 51
  But his and the APSA 
committee’s unexamined assumptions about the sources of political belief had implications for 
that very party competition.  As one critic of the report noted prophetically, disciplined national 
parties might produce more rather than less one-party dominance in localities given the uneven 
distribution of political beliefs across the country.
52
  Moreover, as we shall see, the most zealous 
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advocates of programmatic politics in the 1950s – the amateur foot soldiers of party 
responsibility – would be precisely those most drawn to a political language of principle and 
ideological conviction.    
The controversy over Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System was largely 
confined to academics in the early 1950s, though the report did circulate elsewhere.  Its 
publication garnered front-page coverage in the New York Times and a supportive editorial in the 
Washington Post.
53
  Schattschneider traveled to Washington at Hubert Humphrey’s invitation to 
discuss the report with labor activists and party leaders.
54
  Truman administration officials 
showed the report to the president, who agreed with certain specific recommendations (like 
enhancing the party’s research capacities) but thought the party council idea impractical.55  Some 
of the report’s language also circulated among activist organizations.  A 1951 ADA pamphlet 
suggested possible topics for discussion at chapter meetings, one of which was: “Should we have 
responsible political parties?”56  Still, the report’s early political impact was modest.   
During those same years, however, a groundswell of grassroots political activism 
evincing a distinctly programmatic ethos attended Adlai Stevenson’s rise to Democratic 
leadership.  His presidential campaign in 1952 drew an influx of reformist liberals into the ranks 
of state and national Democratic organizations, thereby enlarging the potential constituency for 
an ideological reconstruction of the parties.  One such Stevenson booster, an energetic national 
committeeman from Indiana named Paul Butler, would come across Toward a More Responsible 
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Two-Party System in 1952, on the eve of his rise to power within the Democratic National 
Committee.  Butler took the report to heart, and as DNC chairman would pursue something of an 
experiment in responsible party leadership in the later 1950s.        
 
 
 53 
 
Chapter 2: Democrats and the Politics of Principle 
 
The scholarly apostles of responsible party doctrine in the postwar years tended to be 
liberal Democrats who shared their ilk’s frustration with the party’s internal divisions and 
contradictions.  When E.E. Schattschneider wrote to Adlai Stevenson after the 1952 election, he 
laid out a vision of a disciplined and coherent Democratic opposition that increasing numbers of 
liberal activists and voters found attractive.
1
  As his noncommittal reply suggested, Stevenson’s 
role in realizing this vision would be partial, somewhat unlikely, and at times even unwitting.  
An introspective patrician rather than a party warrior – and an ideological moderate to boot – 
Stevenson nonetheless served as a vessel for programmatic liberal energies in the 1950s.  His 
two campaigns for president facilitated, on the one hand, the coalescence of a powerful cadre of 
policy intellectuals that helped to shape a liberal agenda during the Eisenhower era, and, on the 
other hand, a major grassroots influx of new Democratic activists committed to party reform as 
well as substantive, issue-based politics.  Both developments created constituencies that were 
open to making American party politics more national in scope, programmatic in orientation, and 
coherent in structure.   
The Democratic struggle for party responsibility was less visible in Stevenson’s actual 
campaigns than in nascent efforts to reform Congress, skirmishes in the national conventions, 
and, most vividly, the controversial tenure of Democratic National Committee (DNC) Chairman 
Paul Butler.  During his chairmanship from late 1954 to 1960, Butler institutionalized a key 
responsible party reform proposal – an official party council – and articulated an increasingly 
explicit vision of vigorous party opposition.  His actions drew him into ceaseless public conflicts 
with southern Democrats, urban bosses, and the congressional leaders Sam Rayburn and Lyndon 
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Johnson, two men who embodied a starkly different outlook on the value and function of parties 
in America.   
These struggles proved inconclusive in the Eisenhower era.  They raised crucial questions 
about the nature of political conflict in the United States and the relationship between parties and 
principles without answering them.  Because the struggle for party responsibility pitted liberals 
against conservative southern Democrats, it was inextricably bound up in the politics of civil 
rights.  The substantive fight for civil rights would prove to be a great dynamic force for 
nationalizing power within the Democratic Party, bolstering its capacity for internal discipline, 
and, eventually, ushering an ideological realignment of both parties.  But that process would 
involve more conflict and take more time than Schattschneider and others anticipated.  With the 
inauguration of a new Democratic president in 1961, the forces of programmatic liberalism were 
once again ascendant, while still entwined in an unreconstructed party system.  In the ensuing 
years, issue-driven and ideological activism rocked the party with explosive force.  But the 
origins of that activism, and that approach to party politics, could be found in the previous, 
allegedly staid decade of the 1950s. 
         
Paul Butler, Adlai Stevenson, and the Amateur Spirit 
 
 That national party chairmen rarely acted as historically significant players in American 
politics is testament to the very institutional features that subordinated the national committees to 
the authority of local and state organizations and muddied national party leadership.  The title of 
a leading scholarly assessment of the party committees summarized their peculiar position: 
Politics Without Power.
2
  Paul Butler, whose tenure as DNC Chairman from 1954 to 1960 was 
lengthy by the standards of these thinly institutionalized entities, cannot be said to have 
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successfully transcended the limits of his post or transformed it in an enduring manner.  But his 
unusually energetic effort to do just that, driven by both substantive commitments and 
responsible party theory, served to highlight dynamic tensions within the Democratic coalition 
and the American party system.   
 Butler was a lawyer from South Bend, Indiana, who had risen through the Democratic 
ranks in a state with a competitive two-party system.  In his native setting he was not a good-
government reformer.  Committed to the party, comfortable with patronage, and scornful of anti-
party reforms, he wrote in a 1950 letter that he made “no pretense of being anything but an 
organization Democrat.”3  He was, however, a devoted New Deal liberal, and despite his modest 
reform bona fides, he owed his ascension within the DNC to a new breed of Democrats who saw 
in him a kindred spirit.
4
  “Paul had observed the discontent brewing in the Party in many states 
over the ineffectiveness of the old politics,” recalled Michigan party chairman Neil Staebler, 
“and was determined to bring the new approach into the National Committee.”5 
 What was “the old politics?”  What was “the new approach?”  Staebler’s language hinted 
at an important current of intraparty dynamism that ran through Democratic politics across a 
slew of states and cities in the 1950s.  At the vanguard of this change was a postwar generation 
of predominantly middle-class liberal party activists – the “club Democrats.”  In state after state 
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beginning in the late 1940s, the club Democrats came into conflict with existing party machinery 
and leadership, unless, as was sometimes the case, they took over with little resistance at all.   
The context for these power struggles was the postwar acceleration of a trend that had 
begun during the Progressive Era: the long-term decay of transactional, non-programmatic local 
and state party organizations.  Observers recognized this decline as it happened.  Journalist John 
Fischer, who had worked on the Stevenson campaign in 1952, described in a Harper’s essay the 
following year the “almost total collapse of the party organization” across the country that had 
hindered that campaign’s efforts:  “The city machines turned out to be a toothless and rheumatic 
team of dragons,” he wrote, “far gone in senility and fatty degeneration.  The old-time bosses … 
found they could no longer deliver the votes.”6  The senility may have been partly willful in 1952 
– many party regulars were unimpressed by Stevenson and disinclined to work hard for his 
election – but the underlying process was real enough.   
Myriad forces drove the unraveling of the parties’ classic patronage model in most 
localities over the course of half a century.
7
  Economic growth and the creation and expansion of 
a national welfare state reduced the demand for the material inducements offered by the old 
machines.  Civil service reforms in states and cities, meanwhile, drastically depleted those 
machines’ supply of such inducements in the form of public sector employment.  (“Grandma no 
longer needed to see her precinct captain about that pension,” Fischer wrote in explaining the 
pincer dynamic hastening the machines’ decline. “Instead she talked to a brisk civil servant with 
a Vassar degree in the neighborhood Social Security office.”)8  Finally, increases in mass 
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educational attainment combined with the advent of new communications media – most 
importantly, television – to reduce the need for party organizations to mediate and prescribe 
political information and voting choices.  To be sure, as catalogued by the studies of Angus 
Campbell and his University of Michigan colleagues, well into the 1950s the voting behavior of 
the mass electorate continued largely to be structured by stable partisan affiliations formed early 
in life, with issues and ideology playing very limited roles.
9
  But the long-range trends were 
working to destabilize those patterns in the electorate, while they set the context for more visible, 
immediate changes among the parties’ activist ranks. 
The pattern recurred in multiple states in the late 1940s and early 1950s.  Young, 
educated New Deal liberals, motivated largely by convictions related to national issues, forged 
alliances with organized labor and racial minorities to square off against sclerotic, generally non-
ideological existing Democratic organizations.  There was the California Democratic Council, 
launching pad for future liberal congressional stalwarts like George Miller, Phil Burton, and 
Henry Waxman, which produced in the 1950s a zealous and energetic DNC committeeman in 
Beverly Hills attorney Paul Ziffren.
10
  The Democratic Organizing Committee of Wisconsin, a 
para-party band of liberals, swamped and supplanted the existing state party leadership through 
primary fights in the late 1940s.  (James E. Doyle, Sr., became the state party chairman in 
1953.)
11
  The Michigan Democratic Club formed in the wake of liberals’ failed efforts to oust the 
state party leadership in 1946.  Through painstaking statewide organizational work by Neil 
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Staebler in alliance with Walter Reuther’s United Auto Workers (UAW), the Club launched G. 
Mennen “Soapy” Williams to a record six terms as governor starting in 1948.12  In some states, 
like New York and Illinois, with more robust existing machines capable of defending 
themselves, new reformers and clubs still managed to establish organized beachheads from 
which they became meaningful players in intraparty activities.  Even in one-party Texas, a 
vigorous liberal cadre, inspired initially by the Stevenson campaigns, established the Democrats 
of Texas in 1957 as an organizational base for Senator Ralph Yarborough, providing a left flank 
for what was now a tripartite factional division within the state party.
13
   
Contemporaries described such activists as “New Look” Democrats. 14  What 
distinguished them from their fellow partisans?  The leading scholarly observer of the “amateur 
Democrats,” James Q. Wilson, contrasted such activists with the professionals in terms of their 
outlooks on the ends of politics and the functions of the party system.  “The amateur takes the 
outcome of politics – the determination of policies and the choice of officials – seriously, in the 
sense that he feels a direct concern for what he thinks are the ends these policies serve and the 
qualities these officials possess.”  By contrast, public policy to the non-ideological professionals 
was merely “the by-product of efforts that are aimed, not at producing the good society, but at 
gaining power and place for one’s self and one’s party.”  Parties served as “neutral agents which 
mobilize majorities for whatever candidates and programs seem best suited to capturing public 
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fancy.”15  A key implication of this distinction was that the amateur’s attention to issues of 
public policy made him at least a potential advocate for a party system organized around 
coherent agendas – that is, responsible party government.  The authors of Toward a More 
Responsible Two-Party System had heralded the emergence of just a type of activist helping to 
“break down the patronage-nomination-election concept of party” and to build programmatic 
parties in its wake.
16
  As the 1950s progressed, advocates like Schattschneider and Burns 
similarly welcomed signs of ascendant issue-based voting and party activism.
17
 
No development proved more galvanizing to the grassroots emergence of that activism in 
the 1950s than Adlai Stevenson’s first campaign for president.  Stevenson was in many ways an 
unlikely vessel for such liberal energies.  He was frequently at pains to point out that his own 
beliefs on issues ranging from civil rights to economics were a good deal more conservative than 
those of the activists manning the Draft Stevenson movement and populating Stevenson Clubs in 
1952, as well as those of policy advisors and speechwriters like Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and John 
Kenneth Galbraith.  What endeared him to the new breed of issues-based party activists was 
clearly his political style and posture toward the party machinery.  His intelligence and evident 
aversion to the grubby business of old-fashioned party politicking struck a chord with amateurs 
whose interest in politics was, to use Wilson’s later term, “purposive” and ends-focused rather 
than transactional.
18
  In this sense the Stevenson followers’ proud adoption of the pejorative 
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“egghead” label reflected not merely their dominant social characteristics, but a particular 
disposition toward politics that was of growing prevalence and significance for both parties.
19
         
 Butler, an early Stevenson supporter who was first elected national committeeman in 
1952, built a reputation among his fellow DNC members as an energetic and innovative 
proponent of issue-based, program-oriented party politics, traveling endlessly to foster intra-
party communication while proposing organizational reforms that stemmed directly from the 
work of the American Political Science Association (APSA) Committee on Political Parties.
20
  
Butler’s introduction to the committee had come by way of Paul Willis, a University of Indiana 
political scientist with whom he collaborated on a proposal for a 1954 midterm national party 
convention.
21
  The first page of Butler’s proposal, “A Democratic National Convention in 
1954?”, explicitly cited the APSA report and its proposal for biennial party conventions.22  He 
argued that a midterm convention would generate publicity for the party while helping to keep it 
engaged on national issues and a coherent program.  The response to the proposal at the DNC 
Executive Committee offered an early illustration of the intraparty fault lines that would later 
define Butler’s chairmanship.  Chairman Stephen Mitchell and several reformist committeemen 
expressed interest.  But Pittsburgh mayor David Lawrence, a powerful machine boss, articulated 
a skepticism shared by many party professionals when he pointed out that to “have a convention 
and have the linen washed out over television” might exacerbate rather than resolve intraparty 
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tensions.
23
  Unity-minded professionals, conservative southerners, and congressional leaders 
jealously guarding their dominance over policy all voiced opposition.
24
  One congressman called 
the idea “asinine.”25  Mitchell appointed a committee to consider the idea, which dismissed it on 
ostensibly logistical grounds.
26
        
 Similar factional lines recurred in Butler’s 1954 bid to succeed Mitchell as DNC 
chairman, with one important difference.  Unlike his two main rivals for the job – Harry 
Truman’s favored candidate, Mike DiSalle of Ohio, and the leading urban bosses’ pick, James 
Finnegan of Pennsylvania – Butler lacked a powerful political patron backing his effort.  He was 
the only candidate to actively campaign for the job, personally calling 93 of the 105 DNC 
members to solicit their vote.
27
  At the December meeting where the vote took place, Butler 
secured the support of reformist committee members from states like California, Wisconsin, 
Michigan, and Minnesota, while Finnegan and DiSalle split the machine-dominated East Coast.
28
  
Surprisingly, however, Butler also swept the votes of southern committee members, the region 
least committed to responsible-party reforms, nationalized parties, or issues-based politics.  In an 
uncharacteristically cynical gambit, Butler secured the support of key southern committeemen 
thanks to a secret pledge he signed at a closed-door meeting with Georgia Democratic Chairman 
John Sammons Bell.  “I do not consider the question of segregation a political issue,” read the 
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note that bore Butler’s signature.  “I see no reason for any chairman of our party at any level to 
project segregation into our political discussions.”29  Expediency appears to explain Butler’s 
signature, since his personal views as of December 1954 were progressive on civil rights and 
critical of the South’s role in the party.  As we will see, a mid-fifties intra-party détente on racial 
issues soon broke down as the issue grew in political salience, and Butler would become an 
outspoken advocate on behalf of this process. 
Butler’s early years as party chairman saw little movement on civil rights but a number of 
initiatives reflecting the issues-based, programmatic orientation of his core allies.  He appointed 
Neil Staebler as chairman of a new Advisory Committee on Political Organization (ACPO), 
which offered suggestions on party structure, worker training, and communication.  Among 
ACPO’s recommendations were several reflecting a responsible party belief in issue-based 
partisanship.  District and regional issues conferences, for example, would foster the intraparty 
circulation of “a common body of information and argument for party members,” in the words of 
a 1957 report, while televised town hall meetings could publicize those positions.
30
  ACPO also 
recommended measures promoting disciplined commitment to party programs, such as a 
Platform Review Committee operating between conventions that would report to the DNC 
concerning “the manner in which the Democratic Party Platform is being implemented.”31   
Butler’s own conception of the relationship between program and party reflected 
responsible party theory.  In a 1959 speech, he would explain why a modern party must be “first 
and foremost an ‘issue-oriented’ organization – one held together primarily by belief in and 
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devotion to some commonly held, clearly enunciated principles that provide motivation for 
political action.”  
The extent and nature of the modern means of mass communication, the 
increased educational level of the population, the increasing importance 
of nationalizing trends as regards both section and nationality, the 
expanding participation of citizens in the processes of political parties 
and the growing importance of governmental programs in the Nation’s 
economy and the everyday life of the citizen are all increasing the 
emphasis on the power of issues, principles, and ideas as the forces 
which are most responsible for the attraction and lasting attachment of 
new people to the banners of political parties.  Party leaders are fast 
discovering, some the hard way, that political organizations based solely 
on patronage, personal favors, and the power and prestige of public 
office no longer enjoy the tremendous effectiveness they once possessed. 
 
Using a term that would gain currency a decade later, Butler explained that “the ‘new politics’ 
places a premium on principles and demands greater attention be given to issues.”  Wherever the 
party takes “a hard-hitting approach based on issues designed to clarify the differences between 
our party and the opposition, we are making steady and often phenomenal progress.”32    
Proposals like the midterm convention and platform review committee reflected 
simultaneously the attention to national issues that Butler’s allies stressed as a political strategy 
and the drive toward a cohesive program that responsible party reformers advocated.  Neither 
came to pass during Butler’s tenure.  But a related reform – also with origins in the APSA report 
– did.  The Democratic Advisory Council (DAC), a party council with a broad policy purview, 
was Butler’s crowning innovation, an experiment that achieved an outsized impact precisely by 
sharpening rather than papering over the party’s institutional and ideological tensions.     
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From Brain Trust to Party Council 
 
The core driver behind the DAC was not Butler, but rather an unofficial network of 
intellectuals, politicians, and ex-New Dealers associated with Stevenson and known amongst one 
another as “the Finletter group,” named after its social center and patron, ex-Air Force Secretary 
and Stevenson ally Thomas Finletter.
 33
  The Finletter group owed its existence to the liberal 
impetus to publicize a positive, distinct Democratic program in the Eisenhower years.  A chorus 
of such voices urged Stevenson to maintain a national presence after his loss in 1952, starting 
with his adviser, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
34
  Resolutions passed after the election by Stevenson 
clubs and state and local parties pledged continued activity on behalf of his national agenda.
35
  
Staebler’s Democratic State Central Committee in Michigan, for instance, unanimously resolved 
that “the continuing active leadership of Governor Adlai E. Stevenson is essential in building a 
party of principle and vitality” and urged that the DNC in conjunction with volunteer groups 
finance a radio and television presence for Stevenson and other party spokesmen.”36  Saturday 
Review editor Norman Cousins suggested that Stevenson help establish a High Council for the 
Democratic Party to develop issue positions, while Hubert Humphrey urged him to sustain a 
vigorous, public advocacy of liberal principles and to combat the party’s right wing.37  Stevenson 
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heeded the call in 1953 and 1954 by authorizing an informal stable of experts, writers, and 
politicians to produce detailed memos and speech material for party officials.   
It was fitting that Tom Finletter would lead such an effort, holding the first meeting at his 
apartment in October 1953.  A hardliner on military matters but a staunch liberal domestically, 
he generally encouraged boldness in the party’s policy pronouncements.  More significant was 
his abiding intellectual interest in strengthening the lines of accountability and partisan cohesion 
in the political system.  Finletter had advocated a partial parliamentarization of government in 
his book Can Representative Government Do the Job?, and the Democrats’ ouster in 1952 
sharpened his focus on the problem of opposition.
38
  “The idea of a ‘cabinet,’ an organization in 
opposition, a shadow organization, was in my mind for a long time,” he later recalled.39   
 The collective research and communication capacities of this brain trust provided not 
only Stevenson but also other leading Democrats with a steady supply of ammunition for 
attacking the policies of the Eisenhower administration and articulating alternatives.  Arthur 
Schlesinger and John Kenneth Galbraith were leaders and informal coordinators of the ad-hoc, 
ever-changing roster of participants.
40
  The group’s output between 1953 and 1956 was often 
reactive, responding to issues and agendas set by congressional Republicans or the Eisenhower 
administration.  But collectively the papers circulated by the group amounted to a coherent 
articulation of Cold War liberal orthodoxy – hawkish and internationalist, aggressively 
Keynesian, and committed to enhancing New Deal-vintage activism in labor relations, 
healthcare, social insurance, and agriculture.  Importantly, this was primarily northern 
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Democratic doctrine, advocated without the threat of veto from southern or other conservative 
party professionals.
41
  By 1955 the “Finletter group” was a phrase and a phenomenon readily 
discussed in the press.  The Christian Science Monitor described the group that year as the 
“secretariat of a shadow-government … one of the most interesting innovations in the evolution 
of the United States political system.
42
  Soon enough, the DNC under Paul Butler’s stewardship 
would absorb the group’s approach, and much of its key personnel, into a formal party apparatus.   
The Democrats’ recapture of Congress in the 1954 midterms intensified efforts among 
some to publicize a party program in competition with Eisenhower.  Stevenson sought to 
formalize the Finletter group’s activities with a salaried director, and discussed his intensions 
with Butler.
43
  From a different source within the DNC came renewed attention to policy 
promulgation – and to the sticky subject of coordinating with the congressional leadership.  After 
the midterms, Truman aide and DNC special counsel Charles Murphy suggested that the 
committee liaison with congressional leaders to develop a distinct policy agenda for the party, 
arguing that “it is not enough to wait for Eisenhower’s recommendations and vote them up or 
down “44  He sent Butler a dossier of collected material for drawing up a Democratic legislative 
program and strategized about how they might share it with the congressional leadership 
“without undue ruffling of feelings” or provoking suspicions of “mischievous interference.”45  
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 Murphy’s fears on this latter score were prescient.  The conflict that flared up in the later 
1950s between Paul Butler and the congressional Democratic leaders Sam Rayburn and Lyndon 
Johnson was overdetermined, combining clashes over strategy, ideology, political theory, and 
personality.  Underlying all of it, however, were the institutional barriers to cohesive party 
agendas inherent in the American system.  Policymaking authority for the minority party 
belonged to congressional officials, each of whom were directly responsible to local constituents 
rather than a collective party organ.  The party committees’ own organizational weakness, 
meanwhile, rendered any claim to a policy role dubious.  The drafters of the 1950 APSA report 
had been well aware of this predicament when they cast their proposal for a Party Council not as 
an incursion on congressional prerogative but rather an instrument of integration, one 
incorporating a large congressional contingent.
46
  But the very divisions the council was meant to 
heal made the prospect of establishing such a body difficult.  Frustration would compel liberals 
to begin addressing this dilemma, and electoral defeat would embolden them to action. 
 The frustration stemmed from the performance of congressional Democrats during the 
Eisenhower years, first in the minority and especially in the majority during the 83
rd
 Congress 
(1955-1956).  The political strategy toward Eisenhower adopted by Rayburn and Johnson was 
well-publicized, and its watchword was cooperation.  They surmised that the president’s 
immense personal popularity, combined with policy divisions between his administration and the 
Old Guard majority of congressional Republicans, necessitated a constructive rather than 
oppositional Democratic posture.  Democrats should seek opportunities to find common ground 
with the president, which would exacerbate fractures within the GOP.   This implied that 
Congressional leaders should work to blur programmatic differences between the parties while 
                                                 
46
 Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, 43. 
 68 
 
avoiding issues that divided Democrats.
47
  Rayburn and Johnson took their recapture of 
congressional control in 1954 as vindication of this strategy.  “We are going to look upon the 
president’s recommendation with kindliness,” Rayburn said upon reclaiming the Speaker’s 
gavel, “because he is the leader of our country.  We are not going to be against [his program] just 
because a Republican President has recommended it.”48  Throughout 1955 and 1956, newspapers 
depicted the “bipartisan love match” and “Capitol Hill armistice” governing executive-legislative 
relations.”49   Assessing congressional politics prior to the 1956 party conventions – typically a 
time ripe with campaign-eve partisanship – William S. White marveled how “Little that is stark 
and unarguably clear stands to differentiate the parties as they enter the final weeks of this 
session.”50 
 For liberals, that was just the problem.  To their minds, it was both politically and 
substantively perverse for Democratic leaders to insulate Eisenhower from the taint of 
congressional Republicans’ conservatism while melding the Democratic agenda with his own.  
What the opposition party needed was a program that contrasted with Eisenhower’s while 
illustrating the degree to which his moderate image was window-dressing.  In a widely circulated 
1955 memo, Schlesinger described how Eisenhower’s “bear hug” of congressional Democrats – 
a strategy “designed to obscure and minimize the issues between the parties” – might “result in 
squeezing a good deal of the vitality out of the Democratic appeal.”  Democrats needed instead 
to “clarify the differences between the parties,” in part by passing an array of bills intended to 
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draw presidential vetoes.
51
  This veto strategy was significant, for it spoke directly to the tricky 
question of applying responsible party principles to a system where power could be – and for 
much of the 1950s, was – divided between the parties.  Liberals advocated approaching 
lawmaking like the opposition party in a parliamentary system: passing bills doomed to veto 
would help amass a record to run on in the next election, while the very process of committing to 
a bold agenda could resolve the chronic problem of intraparty ideological division through 
victory on the part of the liberal majority.  Both goals were anathema to Johnson and Rayburn.
52
 
When Stevenson lost the 1956 election by even bigger margins than in 1952, a wave of 
intra-Democratic recrimination ensued.  “The election of 1956 was over before the campaign 
began,” ex-senator Herbert Lehman argued.  “The Democrats in Congress failed to make the 
issues during the 18 months we were in control.  On the contrary, almost everything the 
leadership did during that time was designed to prevent any controversial issue from being 
seriously joined or vigorously debated.”53  The fact that Eisenhower made gains among key 
Democratic constituencies, particularly African Americans and union members, illustrated to 
liberals the costs of letting two congressional southerners dictate party strategy.
54
  The 
domination of committees by southerners far more reactionary than Johnson or Rayburn, 
moreover, posed even more of an electoral burden.  One party boss summarized the predicament 
faced by northerners when trying to get out the labor and black votes for Stevenson that year: to 
counter the Democrats’ appeal, the Republicans “just say ‘Eastland’; they say ‘Barden’; and that 
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answered all kinds of arguments.”55  These were not new complaints, but Stevenson’s second 
loss at last prompted action to institutionalize a party voice outside of Congress. 
Surprisingly, the Democratic Advisory Council was born of mixed amateur and 
professional parentage inside the DNC.  The central mover on its behalf was California’s Paul 
Ziffren, who epitomized those “new look” liberal committeemen devoted to issues-based politics 
and loyal to Paul Butler.  But two powerful big-city professionals, former Illinois Cook County 
boss Jacob Arvey and Pittsburgh mayor David Lawrence, joined Ziffren in proposing the council 
at a DNC Executive Committee meeting in late November.
56
  They suggested a two-part 
resolution: first, a reaffirmation of the contents of the 1956 Democratic platform and a call for 
the Democratic congressional majorities to enact it; and second, authorization for the Chairman 
to establish an advisory committee made up of the full DNC Executive Committee as well as 
party leaders from Congress, state and local government, and elsewhere that would meet from 
time to time to “coordinate and advance efforts in behalf of Democratic programs and 
principles.”57 The three pitched their proposal in tactical terms, as a way to thwart Eisenhower’s 
increasingly aggressive efforts to co-opt Democratic issues.  “We have to beat [the Republicans] 
to the punch,” argued Lawrence, “and I think this is the only medium we have of doing it.”   
Predictably, the Executive Committee members most skeptical of this proposal were 
southern.  Camille F. Gravel, Jr., a committeeman from Louisiana who was racially moderate 
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and loyal to the national party, worried that “we might be playing with political dynamite if we 
try to take the position in this committee that we should advise the members of Congress and the 
Senators as to what sort of legislative program they should adopt.”  Assuring the committee that 
“we are going to have trouble with our states in the South,” Gravel questioned whether “the 
Executive Committee of the Democratic National Committee should adopt a resolution in the 
face of major conflicts we apparently have within the Democratic Party.”  Even the proposed 
symbolic reaffirmation of the platform gave him pause.  He reminded his colleagues of how 
much unhappy intersectional compromise had been required just to secure grudging agreement to 
that platform in the first place.  This prompted Arvey to interject that he saw nothing wrong “in 
asserting our belief in the principles which we adopted in our last Democratic Convention.  We 
either meant those things at that time, or we did not.”  Gravel was dubious:       
Gravel:  110 members of the Democratic House are from the  
South. 
Arvey:  Just a minute, they were elected on the Democratic  
platform, were they not? 
Gravel:  Parts of it. 
Arvey:  Well, parts of it. 
(Laughter) 
Gravel:  I mean seriously, now that – 
Arvey:  My friend, let me finish. We either have a National Party  
or we do not have.  
 
Gravel’s fellow southerner on the Executive Committee echoed his skepticism, but both agreed 
to join the others in passing the resolution, which authorized Butler to extend invitations to 
twenty Democrats for membership.  During the meeting Butler expressed hope that he could 
secure cooperation from congressional leaders, though he allowed that he had a better shot with 
Rayburn than Johnson.  When Ziffren acknowledged the likelihood that “Mr. Johnson will view 
this with less than enthusiasm,” DNC Treasurer Mike McCloskey chimed in: “That’s an 
understatement.”  “That’s the understatement of the year,” Gravel added, to laughter. 
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 The congressional leaders’ response to the Democratic Advisory Council was, indeed, 
immediate and negative.  Johnson wrote Rayburn in December that the council idea “opened up 
a real hornet’s nest” and “is capable of deepening divisions within the Democratic Party.”58  He 
suggested that all members of the congressional leadership convey appreciation for the spirit of 
the resolution but refuse to join the council on the grounds that membership would conflict with 
their obligations to colleagues.
59
  Rayburn expressed this to Butler, whose follow-up pleading 
fell on deaf ears.
60
  The leaders’ refusal to join the council had the effect of dissuading most 
other invited congressmen from joining, along with two southern governors.  Reporters covering 
these demurrals conveyed a sense that the council was stillborn.    
But Butler, characteristically persistent, did not take the congressional opposition as a 
reason to scrap the initiative.  He pressed on without them, asking Charles Murphy to draw up an 
organizational plan and bylaws.
61
  The DNC Executive Committee made Butler chairman of the 
DAC, authorizing him to appoint an organizing committee and hire an executive director.
62
  Over 
the course of two DAC meetings in early 1957, members hashed out the basic contours of the 
organization, with key internal leadership eventually concentrated within an administrative 
committee that met several times a month, consisting of Butler, Murphy, Finletter, Maryland 
committeeman Phil Perlman, and prominent New Dealer Henry Fowler.
63
  Significantly, on two 
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early occasions the full DNC endorsed the initiative.  In February, it ratified the establishment of 
the council over the objections of several southern members.
64
  In May, southerners pushed a 
resolution requiring full committee approval for any DAC policy declaration; it was defeated 67 
to 26.
65
  The DAC rested on a strong foundation of DNC support.   
 Those committeemen and women who backed the DAC largely shared its view that the 
national committee had a legitimate claim to contribute to party policy.  The congressional party, 
they argued, could not exercise a monopoly on policy during non-convention years, not only 
because institutional constraints compromised its effectiveness, but because doing so shut out 
millions of Democrats not represented by their party in Congress.  “The Democratic Party is not 
just a Congressional party, it is a National party,” Stevenson declared in justifying the DAC.  
“To be an effective opposition, the Democratic Party must have a broader base than the 
Democrats in Congress.”66  Phil Perlman argued that, given the regional biases of the 
congressional party, “on many policy matters, if not all of them, the Democratic National 
Committee is more truly representative of the entire Party.”67  The council’s executive director, 
Charles Tyroler, put it more bluntly decades later: the DAC’s founders were “goddamned tired 
of the presidential wing of the party – the liberal, national-oriented wing of the party, stalwarts of 
it, who controlled 60 percent of the electoral votes – not being listened to in the off-years. 
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Everybody was listening to Sam and Lyndon. Who were they but a couple of Texas 
politicians?”68 
 Rayburn and Johnson may have just been a couple of Texans, but their opposition to the 
DAC – and its ripple effects on others’ agreement to participate – served to render the council’s 
membership much more monolithically liberal than originally intended.  Indeed, the two 
congressional members who bucked their leaders to accept Butler’s invitation at the outset, 
Senators Estes Kefauver and Hubert Humphrey, epitomized the council’s ideological and 
operational cast.  Humphrey had long served as a leader of the Senate Democrats’ liberal bloc, 
and just as the DAC took shape in 1957 he sponsored a comprehensive Democratic legislative 
program in the Senate, in conjunction with Eugene McCarthy’s introduction of a similar 
manifesto in the House.
69
  In addition to Kefauver, Humphrey, and the 14 ex-officio members 
from the DNC’s Executive Council, the DAC’s membership included figures such as Truman, 
Stevenson, and Soapy Williams, joined in later years by the likes of Herbert Lehman, Governors 
Pat Brown and Orville Freeman, labor chief George Harrison, and, eventually, 1960 presidential 
hopefuls Stuart Symington and John F. Kennedy.  This was a body with real stature.  But it was 
also, more by circumstance than design, the mouthpiece of a specific party faction.               
 What did the DAC council actually do?  Its core function, like that of the Finletter group 
before it, lay in issuing substantive policy statements.  It interpreted its mandate in the same 
broad manner as had the APSA report in suggesting a Party Council that could “make more 
specific or reformulate the party principles in their application to current situations.”70  Between 
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January 1956 and June 1960, the DAC produced a total of 61 statements.
71
  Ranging from 
lengthy essays to short reactions to current events, they emerged from the work of issue-specific 
advisory committees comprised of academics and activists, including groups on foreign affairs, 
economic policy, labor, natural resources, and civil rights.  Intramural conflicts emerged within 
some advisory committees, but they were differences of degree.  The DAC’s published output 
reflected members’ shared support for military buildup, criticism of Eisenhower’s approach to 
foreign and domestic policy, and advocacy of Keynesian management and more equitable social 
provision.  The most significant subset of DAC statements, by dint of its sheer distance in tone 
and content from the congressional party’s output, was undoubtedly civil rights, discussed 
below.  
As a vehicle for transmitting a distinct and relatively coherent party policy agenda to a 
national political audience, the DAC was a success.  It commanded widespread and prominent 
press attention.
72
  National and local newspapers alike routinely covered DAC pronouncements 
between 1957 and 1960, often reprinting their full text and frequently portraying them as official 
party positions.  On occasion journalists even assessed the council’s institutional significance.  
“The U.S. political system has been often criticized for its failure to produce a coherent and 
challenging opposition between national elections,” the Dayton Daily News editorialized in 
1957, pointing by contrast to “Britain’s annual party meetings” that helped to elevate and 
organize political debate in that country.  “For that reason, the Democratic hierarchy rates an ‘A’ 
for effort for taking up the chore of periodic policy review.”73  Two years later the Christian 
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Science Monitor declared the DAC “a significant development in the political evolutionary 
process.”74     
Press reports like these spoke directly to Butler’s own vision for the council and his 
overall leadership of the DNC.  Butler developed an increasingly articulate theoretical 
commitment to party responsibility over the course of his tenure.  Years of pitched conflict 
within his party and frustration with the fragmented machinery of national lawmaking sharpened 
his diagnosis of the American party system’s ailments.  In an extraordinary address in the 
summer of 1958, Butler offered an analysis that would have sounded familiar in a political 
science seminar but hardly constituted the typical rhetoric of party chairmen.
75
  During the 
speech, Butler ticked off some of the main components of American party irresponsibility, 
including “loose party organization in the relationship of the state group to the national level … 
loosely organized national conventions and national committees, and the lack of mechanics to 
provide statements of official policy.”  The system’s crowning failure, however, was the “total 
lack of disciplinary authority in implementing the provisions of the party platform.”  Butler 
declared this “political party responsibility at its worst: the lack of capacity within our political 
parties to so discipline party members as to require such reasonable conformity to party policies 
as to best serve the public interest.”  He knew that the DAC could not eradicate the structures 
fostering indiscipline.  But he saw the body as one mechanism by which to compensate for it.    
Crucially, however, the impediments to party responsibility did not end with the 
institutional elements Butler identified.  Major ideological conflicts rent the party as well – 
substantive divisions that aligned with and thus compounded the institutional divisions and 
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ensured that a party council like the DAC could never fully transcend its lot as an embattled 
factional mouthpiece.
76
  That Butler invariably viewed such complications as goads to further 
action is what made his tenure a source of inspiration for some and exasperation for others. 
What did account for this heedless persistence of Butler’s, a widely noted trait that at 
times struck many as downright eccentric?  Critics frequently alleged that Butler’s seeming 
eagerness to ignite intra-party conflagrations stemmed from an interest in building a liberal base 
for a career of his own in electoral office, but little evidence bears that out.  (He considered 
running for Senate in 1958, but decided to stay on as DNC chair instead.)  Firsthand accounts of 
Butler’s personality emphasized both earnestness and guilelessness, a tendency to commit fully 
to abstractly reasoned plans without sensing the likely controversy they would engender.  
Murphy wrote to Harry Truman in 1957 that Butler was a bad executive but had both integrity 
and a “good, clear, orderly mind.”77  The man with that orderly mind appeared to lack a certain 
knack for the human touch.  Katie Loucheim, the savvy head of the DNC Women’s Division and 
a powerful player in the party, never warmed to his leadership, recalling him as a moody 
micromanager.  He never seemed to anticipate making enemies but was, Loucheim wrote, 
“afraid of no one.”78  Sidney Hyman portrayed Butler as the personal embodiment of the amateur 
spirit in modern American politics – the egghead as party boss: “Tall, thin, an abstainer from 
both smoking and drinking, he impresses most of those who meet him as an intense and innocent 
man, scholarly and stubborn … He seems lacking in all the back-slapping, yarn-swapping minor 
arts of politics. All this makes the ‘old pros’ uncomfortable in his presence.79 
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Those pros, Truman among them, never ceased in their efforts to oust Butler from the 
DNC, while the base of his support lay among reformist committeemen who shared his outlook 
and commitment to issue-based politics.  It was this commitment that won him the support of 
liberals nationally.  The symbolic stakes that came to be attached to Butler’s clashes with 
Rayburn and Johnson explain why Johnson’s aide George Reedy once advised his boss to take a 
public attitude toward Butler’s pronouncements akin to that of “a tolerant father toward a 
wayward son who drinks too much, necks too much, and gets himself hauled off into police court 
too many times for speeding. Any comments should be amused and tolerant and delivered with a 
smile – and should be held to a minimum.”80  That advice would be sorely tested in the late 
1950s. 
 
Parties, Principles, and the Dilemmas of Opposition 
 
 A Broadway hit came to Washington in June 1959.  “Sunrise at Campobello” depicted a 
young Franklin Roosevelt’s heroic struggle with polio, offering a showcase for actor Ralph 
Bellamy.  The capital’s Democratic Central Committee sponsored a gala opening at the National 
Theater and invited Democratic luminaries and party activists to the show.
81
  At one point in the 
play, Bellamy read aloud a letter Roosevelt wrote in 1922, warning that “this country will be 
enduring Republican presidents for a long time unless we rip the barnacles off the Democratic 
organization and make it a progressive and modern political party.”  At the reading of that line, 
the audience exploded into unexpected applause.
82
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The now familiar pattern of congressional electoral gains followed by liberal frustration 
at the Democrats’ legislative performance recurred after the 1958 midterms, with one difference.  
The party’s gains that election were massive, marking a watershed in the ideological makeup of 
Congress and thus compounding liberals’ ensuing impatience with its actual policy output.83  
Capitalizing on a recession and the electoral mobilization of organized labor facing a slew of 
state-level right-to-work proposals, Democrats picked up 48 House and 13 Senate seats in 
November 1958 – and virtually all of the new members were liberals from outside the South.  
Liberals now constituted not only a majority of the Democratic congressional ranks but 
something close to a majority of the full House and Senate.  A sense of ascendency helped set 
the tone for the DAC’s post-election statement, a 17-page agenda titled “The Democratic Task in 
the Next Two Years.”84  It called on Democrats to pass a gamut of bills covering, among others, 
foreign aid, defense spending, public housing, federal aid to education, rural electrification, the 
enforcement of desegregation and voting rights statutes in the South, Social Security expansion, 
the repeal of Taft-Hartley’s right-to-work provisions, and a minimum wage hike.  
Rayburn and Johnson, as usual, responded dismissively to the proposal, a reflection not 
merely of pique and differing strategy but also of the stark fact that the filibuster, the seniority 
system, and Congress’s committee structure all ensured the conservative coalition’s continued 
power even in the face of swelled liberal ranks.
85
  By the end of the first session of Congress, 
Democrats had passed less than a third of the council’s suggestions, and indeed the most 
important bill produced by the 86
th
 Congress turned out to be the anti-labor Landrum-Griffin 
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Act.
86
  Liberals reached new peaks of outrage toward Democratic Congressional leaders, 
expressed not merely in spontaneous applause from theater audiences but in jeremiads from the 
likes of ADA and the National Committee for an Effective Congress.
87
  The DAC issued a harsh 
analysis of “The Current Legislative Situation” at the end of the first session.  Careful to focus 
the blame not on Democrats but rather on Eisenhower for the “retarding and corrosive effects of 
‘veto government,’” the council nonetheless urged Congress to stop attempting “to water-down 
proposals to the limits of what the president might accept…The Congress should not be 
intimidated by threats of Presidential veto.  The American people are entitled to have the lines 
definitely drawn.” 88 
 But it was precisely Rayburn and Johnson’s strategy not to draw definite lines on 
legislative matters.  These leaders defended their approach with both pragmatic and normative 
arguments.  The practical case was simple.  Beyond the institutional obstacles to coordinated 
party activity in the American system, the scrambled ideological contours of both parties as they 
actually existed in the 1950s virtually guaranteed that legislative strategies would have to be 
bipartisan.  The Republicans’ main factional cleavage was not symmetrical to that of the 
Democrats, but the divisions between the Old Guard based in Congress and the “Modern 
Republicans” led by Eisenhower were real enough.  Ad hoc alliances of liberal Democrats and 
Eisenhower Republicans on certain issues alternated with conservative coalition action on others.  
All of this made for a fluid legislative terrain in which party labels did little to structure conflicts.  
In that terrain, Johnson and Rayburn sought to avoid explicitly partisan efforts whenever 
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possible.  Johnson had laid out this logic to Rayburn in arguing against the DAC in 1956: 
“Republicans who will vote for certain types of Democratic legislation … are highly unlikely to 
vote for that legislation when they are told that it was advanced by a committee whose sole 
objective is to sponsor a Democratic ticket that will elect a Democratic Congress in 1958 and 
Democratic President in 1960.”89  He retained this aversion to partisanship even after his party’s 
margins expanded in 1958. 
Johnson and Rayburn’s objections to the responsible party model as advocated by the 
DAC and other liberals also had a cultural context, specific to the institution they led – the set of 
norms and mores that defined virtuous behavior in the midcentury Congress. Those mores tended 
to emphasize attitudes antithetical to the vigorous discipline and programmatic commitment that 
responsible party theory required.  A slew of ethnographic studies portraying the social world 
and professional values of midcentury congressmen and senators revealed a focus on collegiality, 
compromise, deference , and bipartisanship.  “Integrity crosses party lines,” a Republican told 
one such scholar. “You rely on some of your Democratic colleagues equally.”90  The intensely 
self-conscious internal culture of the Senate in particular venerated civility, reciprocity, and a 
peculiar combination of individualism and conformity.
91
  It instilled a primary commitment to 
the Senate as a body.  As William S. White put it in his paean to the upper chamber, Citadel, the 
Senate type is “a man for whom the Institution is a career in itself, a life in itself, and an end in 
itself.”92  That meant, in turn, that lawmaking should always take priority over partisan efforts.  
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As a young Senator Robert Byrd told Butler in 1959, “We are here to legislate – not to make a 
political record.”93 
Such a congressional culture not only challenged responsible partisanship in the 
Schattschneider mode, but also helped buttress an alternative vision of American parties’ proper 
function, as big tents that mitigated rather than clarified conflict.  According to one early 
scholarly critique of Butler’s tenure, his commitment to implementing responsible party 
principles betrayed a disastrous misunderstanding of the American system, where federalism and 
the separation of powers demanded that parties serve not as programmatic bodies at all, but as 
“arenas of compromise” – decentralized “multi-group associations with liberal and conservative 
wings.”94  To scholars skeptical of the responsible party vision, the very “irresponsibility” of 
American parties was a feature rather than a bug, for many of the reasons articulated by the 
APSA committee report’s critics.  During the Eisenhower era, scholars further elaborated a 
Madisonian argument for loose, inclusive parties.  Each party incorporated a portion of all the 
various groupings in the population, according to this view, thus tempering any particular 
conflicts between them while protecting minority rights.  Schattschneider’s disciple-cum-heretic, 
Austin Ranney, laid out this argument at length in his 1956 collaboration with conservative 
theorist Willmoore Kendall.
95
  “The parties have been the peacemakers of the American 
community,” Clinton Rossiter wrote in his bestselling Parties and Politics in America, “the 
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unwitting but forceful suppressors of the ‘civil-war potential’ we carry always in the bowels of 
our diverse nation.  Blessed are the peacemakers, I am tempted to conclude.”96   
The normative defense of traditional American parties meshed well with the postwar 
flourishing of pluralist models in political science that portrayed politics writ large as the ad hoc, 
incremental, and non-ideological negotiation of group interests.  In his study of reform 
Democrats, James Q. Wilson cast a critical eye on such activists’ commitment to a politics of 
principle, issues, and outcomes, their belief that “the ends of government and the incentives for 
political action ought to be identical.”  Wilson, greatly influenced by his collaborations with 
Edward C. Banfield studying the rough and tumble of American urban politics, preferred a 
system consisting of unprincipled professionals and non-ideological voters, in which “public 
policies are the by-product of political self-seeking just as the distribution of goods and services 
is the by-product of economic self-seeking.”97   
Ideology – the politics of principle – occupied an ambiguous place in this discourse, just 
as it had in the contrasting arguments of Schattschneider and the APSA committee.  Celebrators 
of the American party system at times implicitly sidelined ideology in their own arguments, 
while at other times explicitly celebrated the system’s sidelining of ideology.  They alternated 
between, on the one hand, arguing that the parties’ non-ideological orientation reflected a real 
American consensus and, on the other hand, celebrating the parties for their role in mitigating a 
real American potential for ideological strife.  When Lyndon Johnson argued that “what the man 
on the street wants is not a big debate on fundamental issues; he wants a little medical care, a rug 
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on the floor, a picture on the wall,” he implied that Americans shared core premises and sought 
from politics only the incremental improvements of means and materials.  But when, in nearly 
the same breath, he intoned that “the biggest threat to American stability is the politics of 
principle,” he conveyed a fear that ideological conflict was in fact all too possible.98   
Likewise, Connecticut Senator Thomas Dodd combined optimism with alarm in a 1960 
speech that condemned Democratic reformers’ recklessness “when they try to whittle away at the 
deliberative process, when they attack the committee system of the Congress … when they 
propose binding party platforms and binding party caucuses.”99  Dodd associated the DAC with 
those lines of reform and warned against paving the road to the British system, which he cast as a 
heinous party dictatorship that crushed independent judgment and divided the country.  Such 
ominous warnings, though, jibed awkwardly with his complacent belief in an American 
consensus.  “The extreme liberals in the Democratic Party and their conservative counterparts in 
the Republican Party,” Dodd mused, “are fond of issuing manifestos calling for a repudiation of 
the moderate elements in each party and thus presenting the voters with a clear choice.”  The 
reason they always fell on deaf ears was simple: 
We live in a country which has an essentially sound system of 
government, a basically just social system, a growing and prosperous 
economy, a happy relationship between church and state, a satisfactory 
arrangement between workers and employers, and the absence of bitter 
conflict between the so-called classes. Why then should there be a 
doctrinaire division, a fundamental conflict between the two parties?  
Why should people resent the fact that our parties offer similar solutions 
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to most problems?  Why should there be a call for disagreement, merely 
for the sake of disagreement?  
 
Dodd’s rhetorical questions conjured an image of social peace and consensus.  Hindsight affords 
us the knowledge of just how soon afterwards the explosion of the long civil rights struggle into 
a mass movement of direct action and moral reckoning would belie that picture.   
This knowledge is not only relevant for critically engaging postwar American 
assumptions about consensus and ideology, however.  It is also central to an understanding of 
how the American party system eventually did transform.  As we have seen, responsible party 
innovations like the DAC were doomed to a life of factional controversy and illegitimacy so long 
as deep ideological divisions remained in the parties, while the existence of those divisions 
helped in turn to entrench an array of cultural and intellectual bulwarks against party 
responsibility.  The gradual emergence of issue-based activism and voting behavior at least 
created the possibility of ideological realignment in American parties and produced a set of 
constituencies potentially committed to it.  But a key catalyst for that eventual realignment – and 
a major fulcrum of party transformation as it actually took place – turned out to be civil rights.   
 
Civil Rights, Institutional Reform, and the Specter of Realignment 
Within the DNC, Butler’s initial posture toward civil rights was compromised.  His 
victory in the 1954 chairmanship election depended on a coalition of northern reformers on the 
one hand and highly un-reformist southerners on the other.  Butler’s early behavior in office 
relating to sectional issues was conciliatory toward the South, partly in reflection of Stevenson’s 
intraparty posture at the time.
100
  But Butler’s personal views on civil rights were liberal, and 
dynamics during the later 1950s increasingly compelled him and other Democrats like him to 
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marry their substantive commitment to civil rights with institutional reform commitments related 
to partisan nationalization and discipline.  
Leading Democrats’ substantive position on civil rights evolved as a result of pressure 
from African American advocates and politicians, other Democratic activists, and the logic of 
national events.  Black officials like Michigan congressman Charles Diggs and NAACP 
executive secretary Roy Wilkins lobbied Butler relentlessly regarding DNC policies and voting 
conditions in southern primaries.
101
  “We don’t think that Chairman Butler can blandly ask for 
the support of Negro voters over the country,” Wilkins wrote Hubert Humphrey in 1955, “when 
one branch of his party is so brazenly and brutally denying Negroes the right to vote in certain 
states.”102  Other reformist Democrats began articulating this same political logic.  As a state 
chairman wrote to Stevenson in 1956, increasing numbers of northern Democrats were 
“persuaded that the southern Democratic base no longer is a reality and that efforts to restore it 
are fatal to success in the north and the west,” an assessment with implications for the party’s 
positioning on civil rights.
103
   
But the substantive commitment among many Democrats was not merely strategic.  
Those middle-ranking activists most inclined toward programmatic partisanship – issue-based 
amateurs, laborites, urban constituencies – held disproportionately liberal views on civil rights.  
They served as a pressuring force on party officials that had little counterpart among 
Republicans, despite the moderate civil rights posture of many Modern Republican 
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officeholders.
104
  More and more Democrats concluded that a commitment to liberalism required 
a commitment to civil rights.
105
  Stevenson’s routing in 1956 and later southern resistance to the 
Supreme Court’s Brown decision helped bring Butler around to that position.  During the Little 
Rock desegregation controversy in 1957, he declared that “the Democratic Party will not be 
deterred in its stand for civil rights by any threat of a third party in the South.” 106  The DAC 
condemned Arkansas’s governor and later established an Advisory Committee on Civil Rights, 
headed by Eleanor Roosevelt, which called for the 1960 Democratic Party platform to explicitly 
endorse picketing and sit-down demonstrations.
107
  
Substantive conflict over civil rights had important institutional consequences.  Within 
the national committee, it prompted a little-noticed but important process of nationalization 
through the resolution of the so-called “loyalty oath” controversy.108  The Dixiecrat revolt of 
1948 had created a situation in which the ballots of four southern states listed, under the 
Democratic name and label, electors pledged to the States’ Rights Party nominee. To prevent this 
from recurring, Michigan Senator Blair Moody authored a resolution requiring that the duly 
nominated presidential and vice-presidential ticket appear on all states’ ballots under the 
Democratic label.  Three southern states refused to comply in 1952 and others expressed 
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opposition on federalist grounds.
109
  In 1953, a DNC panel revisited the rule.  Its proposal, 
adopted and aggressively enforced by Butler, made state party chairmen responsible for ensuring 
that the national ticket appear properly on all ballots and added a stringent loyalty requirement 
for DNC members.  Though a compromise measure, the new rule set a precedent for the 
nationalization of party authority.  It created a citable record of officials from both southern and 
northern states agreeing in principle with the DNC’s counsel that, with respect to national 
conventions and elections, “the state party is not acting by and for itself, but as a part of a 
national party and, linked with all other states parties, in a national effort.”110  As a novel 
demonstration of the national party’s power to set rules for conventions, it proved an entering 
wedge for transformative national reforms in later decades.
111
   
The most important way in which civil rights politics contributed to party nationalization 
and reform was in motivating a more intensive effort to restructure Congress.  The litany of 
suggested congressional reforms, including curbing seniority, subordinating the authority of 
committee chairmen to party leaders and caucuses, and abolishing the Senate filibuster, remained 
largely the same as those in the 1950 APSA report.  But civil rights threw into relief the 
connection between southern conservative power and the structure of Congress, since southern 
Democrats controlled key legislative chokepoints.  The conservative coalition’s obstructive 
capacity was never better demonstrated than during these fights, and this bipartisan alliance 
diminished the luster of bipartisanship itself to increasing numbers of liberals, inclining them 
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toward reforms to foster greater coherence in the legislative parties.
112
  The NAACP began 
lobbying for filibuster reform in 1949 and joined with labor and other activists in such efforts 
during every Congress in the 1950s.  Liberals inserted a call for ‘improved Congressional 
procedures so that majority rule prevails” into the party platform.113  The DAC’s very first policy 
statement endorsed filibuster reform, meanwhile, and conflict over the committee system 
provided subtext to its clashes with congressional leaders.  The council advocated not only 
policies that conservative chairmen opposed but also the kind of overarching party program that 
a fragmented system of autonomous committees could not sustain.  
 A related development, similarly catalyzed by the civil rights issue, was the organization 
of a liberal Democratic bloc in Congress.
114
  By 1957, the press was already familiar with 
“McCarthy’s Mavericks,” the informal caucus of liberal House Democrats who supported 
Minnesota Representative Eugene McCarthy’s proposed party manifesto that year.  Confidential 
proposals to formalize this faction and bolster its capacity in areas such as whip operations, 
coordinated floor speeches, and committee testimony circulated in ensuing years, resulting in the 
1959 formation of the 120-member Democratic Study Group (DSG).
 115
  At the outset, the DSG 
gave voice to liberal representatives’ growing criticism of their congressional leaders for being 
“more content … to keep peace between the North and South than to push the Democratic 
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Party’s aims.”116 An early DSG report analyzed the conservative coalition’s makeup and 
operations, while the staff distributed talking points and speech material to combat it.
117
   
Unsurprisingly, both Butler’s staff and the DAC sought to liaison with the DSG.118  As 
scholar James Sundquist later observed, the combined efforts of the DAC, the DSG, key 
Senators, and allied advocates amounted to a phalanx of liberal policy activism that directly 
influenced the party’s unprecedentedly aggressive 1960 platform.119  It was a feat of policy 
generation that, to Sundquist, actually warranted comparison to Schattschneider’s vision of 
responsible partisanship, despite the fact that it took place without the support of congressional 
leaders and in the context of deep intraparty division.  Civil rights exacerbated that division like 
nothing else, and so it is little surprise that the issue would motivate renewed interest not only in 
institutional reform but also in a further political endgame: realignment of the parties themselves.   
In October 1958, after reiterating his repudiation of Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus’s 
stance on school desegregation, Paul Butler received what by then had become a standard 
outpouring of angry correspondence from ordinary conservative Democrats.
 120
  “What are you 
trying to do, make Arkansas go Republican?” one elderly Iowan asked, while a Texan wrote to 
declare he was “beginning to think that maybe it would be a good idea if the South did quit the 
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Democratic Party.”121  These warnings were meant as a rhetorical argument, of course – the 
threat of party-bolting long made by southerners in the face of northern criticism.  But that threat 
was beginning to lose its sting among many liberals who, for the first time since FDR’s purge 
campaign, were willing to contemplate favorably a southern switch to the GOP that could 
produce a more coherent right-left ideological alignment of the parties                             
 Advocacy of ideological party realignment spread from responsible-party scholars to 
major liberal interest groups and activists in the later 1950s, thanks in part to civil rights’ 
intensification of sectional discord among Democrats.  As late as 1955, speculation about 
realignment retained an airily abstract quality given the absence of intense, immediate political 
conflict over civil rights.  James Macgregor Burns, making a case for ideological realignment 
that year in the New York Times, argued that long-range economic development in the South 
could have the effect of diminishing the region’s exceptional qualities, thus facilitating two-party 
competition along liberal-conservative lines.
122
  He did not depict this process as either a “bolt” 
or a “purge” precipitated by national political clashes over race.  But by 1958, Democratic 
politicians could earn praise from liberal activists and journalist specifically for taking positions 
that might run the white South out of the party.  The New Republic deemed the DAC’s post-
election policy manifesto that year “electrifying. They told the South if it wanted to bolt, to go 
bolt. Just like that.”  The magazine went further, connecting the prospect of a southern bolt to the 
possibility of a more effective American party system: “Ever since the Advisory Council began it 
has been helping to create a new, liberal national image of the party.  One can’t help hoping that 
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if it goes on long enough the United States will ultimately have coherent political parties like 
other nations, instead of foggy coalitions.”123   
Key elements of the labor movement, meanwhile, echoed this vision.  At its 
constitutional convention in 1959, the UAW passed a resolution calling for “a real realignment” 
of the party system and “a clear demarcation” between a liberal party and a conservative one.  
Americans could then “vote for a clear-cut program as represented by one of the major political 
parties with the full assurance that when elected that party will carry out its liberal program 
without qualification, compromise or delay.”124  This amounted to a tempered version of the 
political strategy developing at the farther ideological reaches of the labor movement, among 
activists associated with the socialist Max Shachtman.  Since the late 1940s, Shachtman had 
shared Walter Reuther’s commitment to working within the Democratic Party.  But, compelled 
by the civil rights conflicts of the later 1950s and under the influence of James MacGregor 
Burns’s writings, Shachtman now articulated a more elaborate, aggressive political project for 
labor radicals.
125
  The strategy involved uniting with civil rights and liberal forces and 
aggravating tensions within the Democratic coalition sufficiently to compel the exodus of 
reactionary southerners and urban bosses.
126
  By 1959 Shachtman had compelled the Socialist 
Party to endorse the strategy, called simply “realignment.”127  As we will see, the Shachtmanite 
doctrine of realignment would inform an important current of activism in the 1960s thanks to its 
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author’s influence among elements of the era’s civil rights, labor, and nascent radical 
movements. 
Closer to the political mainstream, meanwhile, Butler experienced firsthand the dynamic 
by which intraparty tensions over civil rights could prompt discussions of realignment.  
Appearing on television in 1958, Butler voiced concern about southern dominance of the 
congressional committee system, then described civil rights as an issue that “requires moral 
leadership,” promising it would be addressed “without compromise” in the 1960 Democratic 
platform.  As for southern Democrats who disagreed?  “Those people in the South who are not 
deeply dedicated to the policies and beliefs, in fact the philosophy, of the Democratic Party will 
have to go their own way,” taking “political asylum wherever they can find it, either in the 
Republican Party or a third party.”128  The outcry was swift.  House campaign chairman George 
Smathers of Florida told Butler to “pipe down,” while Mississippi’s Jamie Whitten warned that 
the South truly would bolt if he and others kept up such talk.
129
   
Criticism of Butler’s outbursts came not merely from southern conservatives, but also 
from northern machine elements within the party and those officials, like Harry Truman, 
sensitive to their views.  To be sure, some urban bosses were solidly committed to civil rights.  
But Butler’s moralistic rhetoric and zeal for making the party more programmatic clashed with 
these leaders’ longstanding commitment to pragmatic, non-ideological coalition-building.  At 
several points during Butler’s tenure, an alliance of southerners and northern machine leaders 
attempted to orchestrate a replacement at the top of the DNC, for which the latest controversies 
over Butler’s public statements usually provided the pretext.  Truman supported the first such 
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effort, in the summer of 1957, which included among the plotters Jacob Arvey, David Lawrence, 
and New York’s Tammany boss Carmine De Sapio.130  Most of the same participants mounted 
another “dump-Butler” effort two years later, following an infamous television appearance on 
the news show Celebrity Parade in which Butler explained his intention “to try to influence the 
Democratic leadership of the Congress to come along with the national program, rather than the 
more conservative and moderate program which they are trying to follow.”131   
The cycle of Butler-inspired exasperation and reproach was a familiar one by July 1959, 
but the furor sparked by these comments was outsized even by his standards – the sharply 
polarized response made headlines across the country.  Southern Democrats rushed en masse to 
denounce the chairman, while Sam Rayburn curtly retorted that “Mr. Butler can do the talking 
and we’ll do the acting and make the record.”132  Rayburn’s response in private correspondence 
was more aggressive.  He advised one donor to the DNC to hold off on a contribution so as to 
avoid demonstrating “endorsement of [Butler’s] criticism of Congress,” while telling other 
correspondents that Butler was “running wild,” having “allowed himself to be passed into the 
hands of the most radical element of the Democratic Party – that element being led by Paul 
Ziffren, DNC from California, and others of the Lehman type in New York.”133   
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Butler owed his survival to continued support among a majority of DNC members as well 
as liberals across the country.  The second ouster attempt collapsed when a planned DNC vote 
was called off in the face of a clear pro-Butler majority.  As one committeeman explained to a 
reporter, “we admire his integrity and courage.  He is a symbol of the liberal feeling which is 
dominant in the party.”134  Many activists and officials specifically endorsed his Celebrity Parade 
comments.
135
   In a floor speech, Michigan Senator Pat McNamara defended Butler and 
castigated congressional timidity.  “Leadership of the 86th appears to be more like leadership of 
the minority of the majority,” he said.  “Or perhaps it is leadership of the majority of the 
minority.  In any event, it is looking less like leadership of the majority party in Congress.”136   
It was, of course, the need for Johnson and Rayburn to accommodate disparate factions 
that prevented them from carrying out a legislative agenda supported by “the majority of the 
majority” as in a parliamentary system.  And as mainstays of the heterogeneous Democratic 
coalition, urban machines and southern elites shared an aversion to such programmatic 
partisanship even as they differed on countless other matters.  Lines of partisanship and ideology 
were shifting and intersecting in new ways by the eve of the 1960s, such that an iconic partisan 
brawler like Harry “Give Em Hell” Truman could appear as a spokesman for Democratic 
conciliation while the most zealous advocates of partisanship were those channeling the amateur 
spirit of the clubs.  That partisan zeal might stem from substantive commitments rather than non-
ideological team affinity was key to the eventual transformation of the system.  But the 
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transformation was not yet imminent as the decade came to a close with a spirited and close 
presidential contest between Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy.    
 
Party and Principle in the 1960s 
 
 The midcentury responsible party theorists had outlined a prescriptive model of partisan 
change in the United States along three lines of development.  They sought the nationalization of 
party operations and political contests.  They wanted policy issues and mutually distinctive party 
programs to be the central elements structuring national politics.  And they advocated the 
development of sufficient discipline within the parties to enable their carrying out of coherent 
programs when in power.   
Along all three of those dimensions, the 1950s saw the emergence of a number of 
phenomena providing necessary thought not sufficient conditions for the transformation of the 
party system.  Middle-class amateurs increasingly supplanted the diminishing ranks of old-style 
party workers as the parties’ key activist corps, and in doing so helped inject a programmatic, 
issue-oriented ethos into party politics.  Long-term regional economic development as well as the 
seismic rumblings of the civil rights revolution both promised to end the Solid South’s 
exceptional position in the political system by unleashing partisan competition.  Shorter-term 
internal Democratic disputes over civil rights and other issues fuelled the institutional 
development of formal national supremacy in party affairs, a break from American parties’ 
traditional decentralization and patchwork localism.  At the national level, meanwhile, liberal 
party factions devised new institutional innovations to foster both programmatic capacity and 
means of discipline within the Democratic National Committee and the congressional party.  
Ultimately, a potential byproduct of all three of these lines of development – the scale of politics, 
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its policy orientation, and the parties’ degree of internal cohesion – would be the realignment of 
the political system into two ideologically sorted parties.      
 Such developments were latent or incomplete by decade’s end, however.  The 
Democratic Party’s standard-bearer in 1960, John F. Kennedy, occasionally connected a theory 
of party politics to his overarching critique of Eisenhower-era drift.  “Legislative leadership is 
not possible without party leadership,” Kennedy declared in one speech.137  But the personalized 
nature of his campaign signaled a relative lack of interest in thoroughgoing party leadership.  He 
made it clear that the DAC would cease operation upon his election, and, after considering the 
reformist Neil Staebler to replace Butler, opted instead for Connecticut machine boss John 
Bailey.
138
  Meanwhile, his campaign strategy unfolded along the familiar lines of Democratic 
coalitional logic, in which securing a North-South sectional accord was seen as paramount, thus 
prompting the selection of Johnson as running mate.  The campaign against Nixon, then adopting 
the moderate positioning of Eisenhower’s “Modern Republican” brand, featured notably little in 
the way of clear-cut divisions on ideology or even basic policy stances.  The resulting electoral 
map showed little evidence of a fraying of the Democrat’s North-South coalition, excepting 
Mississippi’s plurality vote for Strom Thurmond’s third-party candidacy.  The forces underway 
that would bring transformative changes to the party system, in other words, were not yet in 
evidence at the level of national party politics.  
Signs abounded, however, to those who knew where to look.  They could be found in the 
burgeoning civil rights movement, whose rhetoric of moral transformation promised an 
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equivalent transformation of American political institutions.  They could be found in the 
increasingly impassioned language of middle-class reform clubs, captured in the inaugural 
declaration of Tom Finletter, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Herbert Lehman’s New York Committee 
for Democratic Voters.  “The day of boss rule and boss power … is nearing its end,” it 
proclaimed in 1959, employing a participatory language ahead of its time to advocate “the 
principles of democracy within all the reaches of the Democratic Party organization of New 
York.” 139  And they could be found in the words of the party chairman that Kennedy replaced.  
Five years before a more famous speech insisted that moderation in pursuit of justice was no 
virtue, Paul Butler sounded a similar note.  “The Democratic Party is not a party of 
accommodation or attainability or compromise,” he declared in 1959.  “People who are willing 
to accommodate themselves and the objectives of the Democratic Party to existing obstacles and 
obstructions to achievement do not typify the real spirit, the true courage or the genuine zeal of 
our Party.”  Most dangerous of all: “The Democratic Party is a party of principle.”140 
Paul Butler died of a heart attack in 1961.  His untimely death prevented him from 
observing what he would have likely thought of as a paradoxical political combination during the 
“liberal hour” of the early and mid-1960s.141  A new, historic high tide of liberal policymaking 
transformed American government and political culture during those years.  But this wave of 
legislative activism took place amidst a pervasive public rhetoric of non-ideological pragmatism, 
and followed coalitional dynamics that made it in many ways the very apogee of the midcentury 
bipartisan system. 
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Before falling to his own untimely death in 1963, John F. Kennedy typified the liberal 
era’s cool disavowal of ideological politics.  “The central domestic issues of our time,” he told 
Yale’s graduating class in 1962, “relate not to basic clashes of philosophy or ideology but to 
ways and means of reaching common goals.”142  Kennedy’s technocratic and dispassionate 
approach to governance did little, however, to break the immense constraints on legislative 
action posed by the postwar conservative coalition.  His policy agenda was largely frustrated.  In 
the process of pursuing that agenda, however, he and congressional allies succeeded in achieving 
a crucial early breakthrough in congressional reform – an expansion of the Rules Committee 
membership that diminished the conservative coalition’s ability to bottle up legislation. 
If Kennedy’s abbreviated presidency epitomized the paralysis that the bipartisan era 
could induce, his successor’s tenure revealed that system’s capacity for major and broad-based 
policy advances, under the right circumstances.  The popular trauma of Kennedy’s assassination, 
the exuberant boomtime economy, and an eventual landslide reelection victory all played a role 
in making the Great Society Congresses of Lyndon Johnson’s presidency historic high-water 
marks of bipartisan legislative productivity.  Johnson’s own extraordinary political skills, of 
course, were also key.  As he had done as Senate majority leader, President Johnson exercised a 
personalist and avowedly bipartisan kind of leadership, even as political conditions and personal 
conviction now compelled him toward a far more ambitious and activist approach to 
policymaking.  Johnson marginalized and starved national party organs like no president before 
him, disavowed rhetorical appeals to ideological and partisan conflict, and sought to incorporate 
and implicate leadership from all major institutions in American society into his Great Society 
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agenda, in a tableau of establishment consensus on behalf of an activist liberal state.
143
  
“President Johnson,” Rowland Evan and Bob Novak reported in 1964, “is attempting, with 
surprising success, to turn his party into a non-ideological, broad-based ‘consensus’ party 
cleansed of over-partisanship … the party is being moved outside the arena of political 
contention to become a rallying point for all controllers of power in America today.”144 
As Johnson would soon find out, however, the politics of principle – ideological conflict, 
moralized engagement with power, a new array of issue alignments – helped to make a hash of 
his consensus political project.  His difficulties had myriad sources.  Johnson’s embrace of the 
decades-spanning crusade for racial equality under the law, which culminated in the passage of 
the 1964 Civil Rights and 1965 Voting Rights Acts, only accelerated political stirrings in the 
South that would upend the cross-cutting arrangements mitigating partisan conflict.  But in the 
shorter term, a broad upsurge of movement-driven, issue-oriented political challenges upended 
the establishment order Johnson had sought to sustain. 
Key elements of this upsurge bore continuities with the issue-oriented amateur activism 
of the previous decade.  A liberal critique of partisan depolarization, a prescription of responsible 
party government, and an explicit call for realignment all found their way into the founding 
document of the New Left organization Students for a Democratic Society, 1962’s Port Huron 
Statement.  “The American political system is not the democratic model of which its glorifiers 
speak,” the statement intoned.  “In actuality it frustrates democracy by confusing the individual 
citizen, paralyzing policy discussion …   Instead of two parties presenting distinctive and 
significant differences of approach, what dominates the system is a natural interlocking of 
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Democrats from Southern states with the more conservative elements of the Republican party.”  
Such a “party overlap” served as a “structural obstacle of democracy in politics.”145  Betraying 
the influence of Shachtman and other laborite proponents of realignment, the Port Huron 
statement even championed the nascent Goldwater movement for its potential to help drive 
conservatives into one party.
146
  
As it had in the previous decade, meanwhile, the politics of civil rights served as a 
catalyst both for ideological sorting within the parties and for the centralization of Democratic 
Party authority at the national level.  This was put most vividly on display at the 1964 
Democratic convention, where the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party’s (MFDP) alternative 
slate of party delegates challenged the credentials of the state’s segregationist, Goldwater-
supporting regulars. Captivating and emotionally charged testimony by Fannie Lou Hamer and 
other civil rights activists conveyed to television audiences the brutality and visceral terror that 
black Mississippians faced in the pursuit of political participation.  But the MFDP’s procedural 
case before the credentials committee rested on the same questions of loyalty and party 
nationalization that had attended controversies over southern delegations for a decade and a half.   
Activists emphasized the responsibility of the national party to address local infractions 
of party policy just as they demanded federal intervention in local civil rights disputes.  “Federal 
support within the state and the seating of the Freedom Democratic Party at the National 
Convention are inseparable needs,” Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee chairman John 
Lewis wrote to Lyndon Johnson in the run-up to the convention, demanding protection for black 
civil rights in “all areas of American life where Mississippi Negroes seek full participation – 
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including the processes of the Democratic party, and the means by which they choose their 
candidates and leaders.”147  The MFDP – “the only Mississippi party chosen democratically,” as 
Martin Luther King put it – staked its procedural claim not only on the principle of intra-party 
democracy but on its substantive and political loyalty to a national party that the Mississippi 
regulars openly spurned.
148
  As the MFDP’s counsel Joe Rauh argued, contrasting the party’s 
slate with that of the Mississippi regulars, “We are here because we love the Democratic Party.  
We will work for its candidates … We pledged loyalty – what they won’t pledge … Are you 
going to throw out of here the people who want to work for Lyndon Johnson, who are willing to 
be beaten in jails, to die for the privilege of working for Lyndon Johnson?”149   In the short term, 
the MFDP’s struggle resulted only in a tepid compromise offer that the organization’s rank and 
file fatefully interpreted as a betrayal.  But, as discussed in Chapter Four, the real legacy of the 
fight was institutional.  It launched a process of structural reform of the party and its nominating 
processes that would ultimately prove transformative for the party system as a whole.   
A separate tributary of political activism also fed into the same nascent reform project 
within the party.  The new social movement activism of the later 1960s extended and amplified 
the “amateur spirit” that a previous generation of reformist activists had helped bring to postwar 
politics – namely, a focus on substantive issues and ideology and a willingness to apply 
moralizing rhetoric and appeals to partisan conflict.  It was, of course, conflict over issues – 
paramount among them the Vietnam War – that provoked the insurgent presidential campaigns 
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of Gene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy in 1968 and the battles at the Democratic convention 
that year.  And the perception by insurgent activists that existing party structures failed to be 
responsive and accountable to their issue demands helped motivate the movement for 
institutional reform.  
 In all of these ways, the 1960s marked less a break with the past than an acceleration of 
the postwar process by which “principle” might be made the basis of partisanship.     
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Chapter 3: A Choice, Not an Echo 
 
 Democrats struggling with internal ideological disagreement in the early postwar decades 
did not have a monopoly on arguments over principle in partisanship.  Indeed, Republican 
National Committee (RNC) leaders did their counterparts one better during the unusual inaugural 
gathering in 1959 of their own party council, called the Republican Committee on Program and 
Progress.  They put the very question of whether or not parties should stand for anything up for 
debate.   
To stimulate discussion among members of the newly formed committee, the group’s 
chairman brought in a young political scientist to offer a provocative challenge to its very raison 
d’etre.  “This Committee is charged with the task of formulating principles and objectives to 
guide the Republican Party,” Robert Goldwin began his presentation.  “The task assigned to me 
was to prepare a brief paper making the strongest possible case to show that it is neither possible 
nor desirable for a major political party to be guided by principles.”1  Goldwin proceeded to lay 
out the basic scholarly case for the undisciplined catch-all American party tradition – a case 
which he assured the assembled Republicans was “a commonplace feature of books on the 
American political system” and which, as we have seen, had recently gained renewed salience as 
an intellectual counterstrike against the APSA Committee on Political Parties’ advocacy of 
responsible party government.   
The reasons that so many analysts “say it is a good thing for the nation as a whole that 
neither of our two major parties stands for anything in particular” were myriad, Goldwin 
explained.  Structural conditions necessitated nonprogrammatic parties, for one.  A two-party 
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system in a large, heterogeneous nation forced both parties to seek majorities through appeals 
mostly to the same constituencies.  Federalism in both state and party vitiated the prospect of 
disciplined support behind a national party agenda determined from on high.  Separation of 
powers gave co-partisans in the executive and legislative branches different political bases and 
electoral strategies, further undermining national-level party cohesion.  And, “with both parties 
including liberals and conservatives within their ranks,” Goldwin said, “those differences which 
would otherwise be the main campaign issues are settled by compromise within each party.”  
According to the common account, all this was to the good.  American elections “have the effect 
of unifying the nation rather than dividing it on ideological or class lines… Our national unity 
would be weakened if the theoretical differences were sharpened.”  Given these arguments, 
Goldwin challenged the members to answer: “Are there good reasons even so why this 
Committee ought to try to formulate principles and objectives for the guidance of the Republican 
Party?”       
 The ensuing discussion was tortured, at times almost comically confused.
2
  Committee 
members blanched reflexively at the idea that parties should not have principles but struggled to 
explain why.  Some interpreted “principle” simply as integrity, with one surmising that “it was 
not where you stood on a particular issue that was a matter of principle, but that you stood.”  
Others defended the heterogeneity of a broad-based, majority-seeking party while still insisting 
that an underlying philosophy defined the GOP.  But, pushed by Goldwin to identify the 
principles that distinguished the party from Democrats, members faltered.  A tentative consensus 
eventually formed around the idea that both Democrats and Republicans shared core premises 
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and ultimate goals, while differing on the methods to achieve them.  Democratic means tilted 
toward the federal government, GOP ones toward individuals and the market.  “The objectives of 
both parties in many ways are the same, to provide the greatest fruits of the American system for 
all the people,” a member summarized. “The key to this whole thing is how we get where we are 
going.  What this Committee … has to do is define the differences in the means to the good end.”   
Such a formulation implied a committee-wide consensus on the existence of a basic 
American consensus.  One member rejected that assumption outright.  The premise that “we all 
have the same objectives” was a false one, insisted Stephen Shadegg of Arizona.  “We have men 
who have no desire to be self-sufficient, who have been conditioned by twenty years of our 
philosophy to depend on someone else.”  What Shadegg meant by “our philosophy” was not his 
own but rather the prevailing “collectivist” attitude of the New Deal era – “that man is significant 
materially, to be fed, housed, cared for, doctored, buried, have his worries removed.”  This 
conflicted directly with Shadegg’s concept of “the dignity of the individual, which is such that 
man has a spiritual need to do these things for himself and to deny them.  This is a basic conflict, 
I believe, between the collectivists who are in control of the Democrat Party and the philosophy 
of the Republican Party which we have somehow neglected …”  Shadegg cast this conflict in 
stark terms.  “What we are talking about,” he said, “is the nature of man, really.”       
Political conflict in the contemporary United States did involve a clash of core premises, 
Shadegg was arguing.  It limned a divide over deeper questions than those of mere governance.  
What is more, the philosophical divide was also a partisan divide – or it could be, if Republicans 
would reaffirm their commitment to principles that too many had “neglected” out of misguided 
political expediency.  Shadegg’s words were pointedly dissonant.  The Committee on Program 
and Progress was a project instigated by Dwight Eisenhower and administered by RNC chair 
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Meade Alcorn and the liberal GOP businessman Charles Percy, and its staff and membership 
largely reflected the moderate ideology and political posture to which the president had attached 
the moniker “Modern Republicanism.”3  Shadegg was in a minority among members as a 
representative of the party’s conservative wing – specifically, the deputy of that wing’s leader, 
Arizona senator Barry Goldwater.  In his professional life Shadegg was Goldwater’s campaign 
manager and advisor, and something of an intellectual alter ego.  In five years he would help him 
articulate a national political message that doubled as a commentary on the place of ideology in a 
two-party system.  “This will not be an engagement of personalities,” Goldwater would say in 
announcing his presidential bid in 1964, but “an engagement of principles.”  Shadegg’s 
insistence that political divides in postwar America transcended the instrumental and demanded 
partisan articulation found voice in Goldwater’s promise: “I will offer a choice, not an echo.”4  
As among Democrats, so too did political divisions among Republicans in the early 
postwar decades reflect competing visions for the party and clashing theoretical claims about 
partisanship itself.  Dynamics were not identical.  Ideological cleavages within the comparatively 
homogenous GOP were shallower than those wracking Democrats.  Intellectually, an anti-statist 
program ill-matched the Progressive, action-oriented ethos of responsible party doctrine, and so, 
with a few notable exceptions, that scholarship exercised less direct influence on the rhetoric and 
approach of conservative Republicans than it did liberal Democrats.  And, strategically, the post-
New Deal Republican Party’s chronic minority status informed an internal party debate that 
differed from a Democratic conflict borne of the dilemmas of a baggy majority coalition.  Liberal 
Democrats mainly sought clarity and cohesion through the excision of a dissident sectional 
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faction – a politics of subtraction -- whereas moderate and conservative Republicans alike had to 
frame their ideological conflict around the question of majority-making – a politics of addition.5   
Nevertheless, both parties’ internal debates over program and principle shared key 
dynamics, and were structured by many of the same forces in midcentury society and politics.  
Factional disputes over political strategy in the early postwar years took on ideological coloring, 
as ubiquitous conservative charges of “me, too” posturing by GOP politicians prompted deeper 
questions about the very existence of an American consensus.  Against the backdrop of declining 
transactional party organizations and a resurgent conservative intellectual movement, GOP 
politics in the later 1950s witnessed intensifying clashes between supporters of a moderate, 
Eisenhower-centered partisan vision and issue-driven amateur activists on the right.   
The role of the Solid South – solidly non-Republican, that is – was central to the party’s 
factional debate over program and principle.  Conflicting ideological visions for the party’s 
future aligned with conflicting strategic postures toward the South, especially regarding civil 
rights.  The alignment was a mirror image of the one defining Democratic factionalism.  
Republican advocates of a coherent ideological posture for the party were disproportionately 
conservatives seeking formal alliance with southern whites, in part through opposition to civil 
rights.  Conversely, those most committed to retaining their party’s traditional advocacy of civil 
rights through cooperative legislative action with northern Democrats were disproportionately 
moderates opposed to both parties’ ideological sorting.  Advocacy of an ideological realignment 
via GOP alliance with the South had a history dating as far back as the Long Civil Rights 
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Movement did, to the late New Deal.
6
  By tracing its postwar evolution, from Senator Karl 
Mundt’s organization of a Dixie-focused Committee to Explore Political Realignment to debates 
within internal Eisenhower-era party councils to Goldwater’s Deep South incursions in 1964, 
this chapter shows that the question of southern realignment was inextricably bound up with the 
growth of a broad conservative movement advocating an ideological conception of partisanship.   
As the long history of that southern debate helps illustrate, the eventual conservative 
capture of the GOP, long cast by many scholars as a story that begins with the movement for 
Goldwater’s 1964 campaign, actually originated in intellectual conflicts, party developments, 
and strategic choices made during the previous two postwar decades.
7
  Years of intra-party 
conflict amidst a changing postwar landscape helped to produce, by the early 1960s, a party 
constituency receptive to an argument rejecting American consensus and affirming ideology as 
central to principled partisanship.  That this constituency proved incapable of forging an electoral 
majority in 1964 only delayed rather than prevented the system’s eventual transformation.           
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“Me, Too”: Party Theories in the Dewey-Taft Wars 
 
 The political revolution wrought by the New Deal affected the Grand Old Party along 
with the Democracy.  Older party fissures dating to the Gilded Age and Progressive era 
diminished in the 1930s and 1940s.  Populist western progressives disappeared as a Republican 
faction as some (such as Robert LaFollette, Jr. and Henry Wallace) abandoned their party label 
in support of the New Deal while others followed their foreign policy isolationism into the 
adoption of a more orthodox conservatism.  Stalwart midwestern Republicans, disproportionately 
rural, overwhelmingly Protestant, and hostile to the New Deal, secured dominance over the 
party’s reduced congressional ranks.  Simultaneously, the long dormant eastern progressive 
Republican tendency – urban, paternalistic, internationalist – saw a revival.  A perceived need 
among many Republicans to compete with the Democrats’ electoral juggernaut through their 
own promises of activist government policy drove this revival, encouraged at an interest-group 
level by the new extent of government-business cooperation during both the New Deal and 
especially war years.
8
  The sectional and institutional lines delineating the two tendencies – 
stalwart and progressive, the latter more typically called “moderate” in its revived form – were 
hardly strict, but they were visible.  Stalwarts’ strongholds were Congress and the professional 
ranks of most state parties and RNC representatives.  Moderate leaders tended to be found 
among big-state governors and senators building statewide coalitions that included urban and 
labor constituencies.                 
 The three presidential contests of the 1940s – all considered at the time to be winnable by 
the Republicans – helped instantiate the factional division within the party that would take on 
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increasing ideological coloring in the postwar decades.  Wall Street attorney Wendell Willkie 
secured the 1940 nomination in an upset thanks to the support of eastern financiers and party 
leaders seeking an internationalist standard bearer amidst the worsening conflict in Europe.  His 
campaign failed to unseat Franklin Roosevelt but succeeded in consolidating moderate elements 
within the GOP as a factional force.  It also fueled stalwarts’ sense that tweedle-dum campaigns 
downplaying policy differences with the Democrats were electoral losers.
9
   
New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey emerged as the moderate faction’s leader in the 
early 1940s and, aided by the energy and tenacity of his media-savvy political operation based in 
Albany, secured the presidential nomination in 1944.  Dewey’s general election campaign style 
deemphasized issues outright, though his control of the platform guaranteed that on issues such 
as Social Security, health care, and labor law, interparty differences were minimal.  That 
election’s “outstanding characteristic,” a New York Times editorial summarized in retrospect, 
was “the promise by both parties of all good things to come from a benign and endless generous 
Government.”10  Dewey’s defeat to an ailing FDR left his party demoralized over its endemic 
minority status and divided about the course forward.  An effort among party eminences to craft 
a unified statement of principles in December fell apart when conservatives, led by Ohio Senator 
Robert Taft, blanched at retaining a Deweyite RNC chair.
11
  Congressional leaders would go on 
to issue their own separate statement of GOP principles the following year, one that connected 
policy positions to party strategy by urging both parties to give Americans a “cleancut choice.”12   
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Taft and Dewey were the men around whom the GOP’s factional division deepened and 
accrued increasing strategic and ideological valence in the later 1940s.  When the party captured 
control of Congress in 1946 during Harry Truman’s first term, its congressional leadership, 
including Taft, exercised impressive discipline over the rank and file, sustaining a conservative if 
hardly counterrevolutionary policy stance.
13
  The legislative centerpiece of the 80
th
 Congress was 
the Taft-Hartley Act, which amended to existing labor law provisions that outlawed the closed 
shop, allowed states to pass right-to-work laws, legalized federal injunctions against some 
strikes, and tilted the playing field in management’s favor during organizing drives through 
various speech regulations.  Congressional Republicans’ near unanimity in voting for the bill 
belied deep misgivings among moderates about the actual policy.
14
  Backed by the conservative 
coalition, Taft-Hartley was a classic cross-cutting issue of the bipartisan era, and a key flashpoint 
around which the GOP factions staked their claim in the run-up to 1948.  Outside of Congress, 
Taft- and Dewey-aligned forces battled for control of state party operations and the RNC.  
Dewey, flush with cash from financial and industrial interests, eventually secured the 1948 
nomination over Taft.  His victory came less from convincing a stable majority of party elites 
and their delegations about the merits of programmatic moderation than from outgunning Taft in 
the grittily transactional game of delegate hunting via patronage and local lobbying.
15
       
The factional warfare was not merely a matter of issueless power struggles and candidate 
allegiances, however.  Policy substance and strategic emphasis did matter.  With a presidential 
ticket consisting of two moderate big-state governors – Dewey and California’s Earl Warren – 
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and another big-state moderate, Hugh Scott, installed as RNC chair, 1948 would see the apogee 
of the Dewey wing’s institutional power within the party, and this had policy consequences. The 
party platform that year was brief, general, and focused on the middle ground rather than line-
drawing.  It offered a maxim that was considered in its Goldilocks-like, “just so” formulation: 
“Maximum voluntary cooperation between citizens and minimum dependence on law; never, 
however, declining courageous recourse to the law if necessary.”  It briefly and namelessly 
touted the 80
th
 Congress’s “sensible reform of the labor law” while pledging “continuing study to 
improve labor-management legislation;” advocated the expansion of Social Security benefits; 
and touted federal action on civil rights, voting rights, and the desegregation of the military.
16
  
On issues like these, the Taft wing generally advocated meaningfully different positions than 
Dewey’s supporters, explicitly defending Taft-Hartley, holding the line on expansion of New 
Deal programs like Social Security, and, as will be shown, resisting active civil rights policies.
17
  
On foreign affairs, by contrast, the formerly stark factional divide pitting isolationists against 
internationalists had diminished somewhat by 1948, as the postwar context left little space for 
avowed isolationism while the Cold War provided new terrain on which the party could seek 
common nationalist and anti-communist ground.
18
 
Dewey’s shocking 1948 defeat to an incumbent president facing extraparty challenges 
from important elements of the New Deal coalition unleashed a new, more intense round of 
Republican recrimination and soul-searching.  H.L. Mencken’s cutting post-election 
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characterization of Dewey’s campaign strategy – “to chase what appeared to be the other 
fellow’s ambulance” – found amplification among Taftites ready to publicize their frustration.19  
House Republicans, who lost 75 seats and thus the majority in 1948, established a policy 
committee soon after the election with the pointedly worded mandate to “guide the minority to a 
firmer national policy.
20
  Taft wrote a confidant that Dewey could have won “if he had put on a 
real fight on the issues” rather than offer pallid bromides and paeans to character.21  The 
Republican Senate Policy Committee under Taft’s control articulated this argument publically in 
an election postmortem targeting forces that had “entrapped the party into a ‘Me, too’ position 
and otherwise confused the distinctions between Republicans and Democrats” in the last several 
elections.
22
 
The “Me, too” charge was everywhere.  Hugh Scott solicited the views of GOP precinct 
workers across the country in the run-up to the RNC’s first postelection meeting in January 1949.  
“Why don’t you me-too guys who are running the party try dropping dead?” wrote one typical 
correspondent.
23
  Scott himself reported that 60 percent of the letters he received in response to 
his request for feedback from grassroots workers on the election and the state of the party echoed 
this criticism of me-tooism.  Senate Majority Leader and Taft ally Kenneth Wherry spoke out at 
the same meeting about “those who say we should revitalize the party by turning to the radical 
left and by out-promising New Dealers. A ‘me-too’ policy is the road to ruin for our party and 
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for our nation.”  Utah’s governor echoed Wherry by touting a “strong two-party system, with a 
definite cleavage on policy and theory of government” – a system Republicans had undermined 
by “hiding our light under a bushel.”24  Later that year, another RNC solicitation for the views of 
125,000 party workers regarding a proposal to generate a new statement of party policy revealed 
“overwhelming support” for the idea, the New York Times reported, with a majority of 
respondents calling for a “substantial rewriting” of the 1948 platform and expressing the “desire 
to be rid of ‘me-tooism.’”25  “Even the ‘me, too’ boys shrink from the ‘me, too’ label,” the 
Chicago Tribune editorialized.  “But ‘me, tooism’ is more than a label.  It is a policy that has 
brought the United States close to ruin.  It isn’t enough to slough off the label, or attempt to 
evade it.  It is the policy that must be repudiated.”26 
 The “me-too” charge served as a rallying cry for an organized factional drive to oust 
Scott from the RNC chairmanship and to install Taftites in party leadership, beginning at the 
same January 1949 meeting of the RNC.  Six months of wrangling would finally result in Scott’s 
resignation and replacement by a Taft ally.
27
  A party strategy committee that had been set up by 
Scott similarly became riven by factional warfare before conservative national committeemen 
took it over.  One leader of these conservatives urged in December 1949 that, “from this moment 
forward, the Republican Party as a matter of strategy – and patriotism, if you will – divest itself 
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of ‘me-tooism’ and go to the people with a program clearly and unmistakably in opposition to 
that now offered by our opponents.”28   
An RNC Policy Committee worked to make good on that request by devising a 
“Statement of Principles and Objectives” that would serve as the national party’s manifesto in 
the upcoming midterm congressional elections.  The committee met with its counterpart panels 
in the House and Senate in early 1950 to formulate the statement.  As was the case with 
Democrats several years later under Paul Butler’s tenure, the GOP’s effort at out-party agenda-
setting was complicated by institutional tensions between the national committee and the 
congressional parties and factional tensions between rival ideological camps.  But the manifesto 
that eventually emerged out of the now-Taftite controlled RNC, while a compromise document, 
was notably more conservative than either the 1944 or 1948 party platforms.
29
  Its framing of the 
coming elections rendered the partisan contrast in maximally ideological terms: “The major 
domestic issue today,” the statement declared, “is liberty against socialism … Basic American 
principles are threatened by the Administration’s program for a planned economy modelled on 
the Socialist governments of Europe…”30  In contrast to the party platforms under Dewey, the 
new document explicitly endorsed Taft-Hartley and advocated an array of conservative planks, 
including both tax and spending cuts as well as devolution to states and localities in the 
administration of welfare policies.  While some conservatives complained that the statement did 
not go far enough, GOP moderates condemned it outright.  At the committee meeting that passed 
the resolution, a northeastern-dominated group that included Senators Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., 
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and Margaret Chase Smith and Representatives Jacob Javits and James Fulton refused to vote for 
it, citing its anemic and heavily truncated plank on civil rights as particularly objectionable.
31
 
Another central plank of the party’s Statement of Principles and Objectives, a militant 
posture toward domestic anticommunism, reflected an emerging new locus of factional 
Republican conflict in the late 1940s and 1950s.  A section of the statement titled “Loyalty” 
denounced “the soft attitude of this Administration toward Government employees and officials 
who hold or support Communist attitudes” and pledged a robust new internal security program 
and the purging of Communists and their sympathizers from federal employment.  The release of 
the statement preceded by mere days Senator Joseph McCarthy’s instantly infamous speech in 
Wheeling, West Virginia, where he brandished a list of Communist “enemies from within” 
occupying positions in the State Department.  As the Red Scare intensified as a political issue at 
the start of the new decade, drawing Taft-aligned conservative Republicans into (sometimes tacit 
or arms-length) support of McCarthy and his tactics, it became a fulcrum for further factional 
division.
32
  Margaret Chase Smith rallied six fellow moderate Republican senators behind a 
Declaration of Conscience, which she read on the Senate floor in June 1950.
33
  Aiming at her 
fellow Republicans, Smith called out the “hate and character assassination” that was serving to 
“psychologically divide” the country.  She demanded that the minority party carry out its 
obligation to offer “constructive criticism” and to “allay fears by acting as responsible citizens” 
rather than as demagogues and opportunists.  If moderate Republican opponents of McCarthyism 
emphasized the importance of sober leadership and a politics of unity in national affairs, the 
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conservatives who rallied to the anticommunist cause – including an extraordinary new cadre of 
young conservative intellectuals and activists galvanized by this very debate – saw in it a vehicle 
for infusing partisan politics with crusading moral conviction and meaningful line-drawing.
34
             
 Thus, like postwar Democrats, the GOP at the dawn of the 1950s faced a factional divide 
that was also an ideological one – increasingly so as the decade wore on.35  As with the 
Democrats, these Republican ideological factions, occupying broadly differing institutional 
positions within the party, developed contrasting views of the roles that partisanship, issues, and 
ideology should play in the political system.  After repeated presidential electoral defeats and 
ubiquitous charges of “me, too” temporizing, moderate Republicans in many ways had the 
tougher affirmative case to make.  Political pragmatism remained central to their argument even 
after the 1948 loss.  In the first post-election RNC meeting, moderate committeeman Victor 
Anderson said that while he agreed with the Taft supporters that expediency should not require 
Republicans to cease being Republicans, “on the other hand, we are not required by consistency 
to commit political harikari by an over-zealous and ceremonious insistence upon the doctrines of 
laissez faire.”  The consequence of such arguments, however, was an unavoidable vagueness in 
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moderates’ typical prescription for their party’s ideological identity, as illustrated by Anderson’s 
own suggestion.  “America,” he declared, “needs a soundly liberal, or if you prefer – and I prefer 
it with you – a progressively conservative party.”  Scott endorsed the branding, calling the GOP 
“the indispensable catalytic agent to bring this conservatism and this liberalism together for the 
common good.”  And whereas Anderson and Scott sought to achieve party unity by combining 
liberalism and conservatism, another Deweyite advocated achieving the same goal by jettisoning 
both liberalism and conservatism in favor of a purely partisan affinity.  “We must stop 
identifying each other as ‘liberals’ or ‘conservatives’ or ‘reactionaries,’” Indiana congressman 
Cecil Harden insisted, urging all to claim “but one label … the label of the Republican Party.”36       
But some moderates offered a more affirmative argument, grounding their big-tent 
advocacy in a theory of the proper role of parties in American politics.  As the minority faction 
among both rank and file party activists and officials within the major party organs, these GOP 
moderates most often echoed conservative Democrats in celebrating the flexible and non-
programmatic aspects of the American party tradition. The moderates’ postwar standard-bearer 
himself mounted the most thorough elaboration of the connection between a positive, if vague, 
ideological program of moderate Republicanism and a broader normative defense of the 
ideological heterogeneity of the party system.  Delivering a lecture series at Princeton in 
February 1950, Governor Thomas Dewey laid out his thoughts on the American two-party 
tradition and his own vision for the Grand Old Party.
37
  Dewey traced his brand of Republican 
governance back to the Whig tradition that dominated the GOP program in the initial decades of 
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its existence as well as to the regulatory initiatives instituted under Theodore Roosevelt’s 
presidency.  Dewey emphasized that Republican governance historically encompassed active 
government intervention, through investment in the infrastructure required for economic growth 
as well as regulatory measures to restrain monopoly power and protect the health of citizens.
38
 
He devoted much more time, however, to a general defense of American parties’ 
traditional lack of uniform adherence to any particular programmatic approach, including his 
own preferred one.  Dewey celebrated rather than lamented the fact that, “in the sense of a 
unified organization with a national viewpoint on major issues,” neither the Democratic nor 
Republican parties could be described as “real” parties.  “There are wide divergencies of opinion 
in each of the two great parties … because each party represents a composite spectrum of 
roughly similar interests.”  Dewey countered the “me, too” charge by explaining how two-party 
competition in a heterogeneous nation ensured that “no single religion or color or race or 
economic interest is confined to one or the other of our parties … The result is that since the 
Civil War the parties have not been too far apart on most fundamentals of our system.”   
Dewey knew all too well that “this similarity is highly objectionable to a vociferous few.  
They rail at both parties, saying they represent nothing but a choice between Tweedledee and 
Tweedledum.”  Such critics’ “passion for neatness” endeared them to abstract notions about how 
the parties should be realigned.  They sought to purge moderates and liberals from the GOP and 
“have the remainder join forces with the conservative groups of the South.” 
Then they would have everything very neatly arranged, indeed.  The 
Democratic party would be the liberal-to-radical party.  The Republican 
party would be the conservative-to-reactionary party. The results would 
be neatly arranged, too.  The Republicans would lose every election and 
the Democrats would win every election.   
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For reasons he hardly intended, those last words would prove to be among Dewey’s most 
lastingly famous, a prime example of those unprescient gems of midcentury political 
prognostication offered by occupants of a complacent consensus center.  But Dewey’s electoral 
prediction was a sidenote to the main argument he offered in engaging the advocates of 
ideological realignment in America: his conviction that “the resemblance between the parties and 
the similarities which their party platforms show are the very heart of the strength of the 
American political system.”39  
 Dewey’s support for ideologically heterogeneous parties bolstered his support for the 
pragmatic, transactional politics of the traditional nominating conventions – and his opposition to 
idealistic reforms prescribed in the name of transparency and democratic principles.
40
  In contrast 
to multiparty European parliamentary systems, he explained, “we make our coalitions within the 
parties and instead of achieving them after elections, we make them before election,” and thus it 
was not surprising that the conventions often provided an arena for both noisy factional 
squabbling and frantic dealmaking.
41
  But such dealmaking forged the compromises and 
coalitional agreements that undergirded the stability and good sense of the system itself.   
 If Republican moderates echoed conservative Democrats in their normative arguments 
about the workings of the party system, conservative Republicans could often sound more like 
liberal Democrats.  In the project of realigning the parties ideologically, after all, ideological 
opponents could be strategic partners.  Similarly occupying a majority position within their 
party’s activist ranks, conservative Republicans advocated party adherence to the views of that 
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majority in the service of drawing stark lines of division on issues and ideology between the 
GOP and the Democratic Party.   
The intellectual foundations for conservatives’ advocacy of ideologically sorted parties 
differed somewhat from that of liberal Democrats, however.  The responsible party vision 
resonated with the latter group precisely because it connected the party coherence that they 
desired to a streamlined system of majoritarian and activist governance that they also desired.  
By reducing the number of veto points in the legislative process while rendering party politics 
both issue-based and national in orientation, responsible party government would enable the 
federal government to do more on behalf of the winning party’s program. As the faction most 
dedicated to governmental activism, liberal Democrats proved most naturally receptive to such 
an outlook.  The theoretical ties were bolstered by sociological ones.  Most of the leading 
scholarly advocates of responsible party government were themselves liberal Democrats, some 
of whom maintained social and professional connections to liberal Democratic politicians. 
A few notable conservatives of the period, either ignoring or disputing the statist subtext 
of much responsible party doctrine, embraced the theory’s prescription for party government.  
Henry Hazlitt, the economics writer most responsible for introducing the work of Ludwig von 
Mises and F.A Hayek to a popular American audience, dedicated an entire book in 1942 to an 
argument for replacing the Constitution with a new system of British-style parliamentary 
government.
42
  A New Constitution Now, like Arthur Finletter’s contemporaneous work and the 
treatises by Woodrow Wilson and Walter Bagehot that Hazlitt cited as his central inspirations, 
advocated party discipline under cabinet governance, in which a single authority would be 
accountable to the people for carrying out federal policy.  Hazlitt, a libertarian and vociferous 
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critic of Roosevelt, argued that such reforms, far from enabling perpetual governmental activism, 
were more likely to hinder presidents’ ability to aggrandize power in times of crisis.  Another 
Roosevelt foe, former president Herbert Hoover, also sounded responsible-party notes, taking the 
argument further by explicitly urging the ideological sorting of the parties.  “If there cannot be a 
reasonably cohesive body of opinion in each major party,” he declared in 1950, “you are on a 
blind road where there is no authority in the ballot or in government.”43  The APSA Committee 
on Political Parties quoted this passage approvingly in its report the same year.
44
    
 Such voices were exceptional, however.  Responsible party government advocates were 
generally hard to find on the Republican right, whose adherents more typically couched their 
critiques of New Deal liberalism in language venerating the time-honored wisdom of the 
American constitutional tradition and condemning the aggrandizement of centralized 
governmental power.  Members of the party that had toiled in the congressional minority for 
most of the past several decades were also more reflexively disposed toward an emphasis on 
minority rights rather than majority rule in lawmaking.  Rather than advocate congressional 
reform and endorse party government under an activist presidency, postwar conservatives 
typically endorsed Congress’s institutional norms and the overall political system’s 
countermajoritarian features, using arguments that would soon find full articulation in works by 
James Burnham and Willmoore Kendall.
45
  And rather than cite Great Britain’s parliamentary 
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system as an institutional model to emulate, as Hazlitt and liberal responsible party advocates 
alike did, conservative Republicans were more likely to invoke Atlee-era Britain merely to raise 
the specter of a slippery slope from the Fair Deal to, in Taft’s words, to “a controlled economy 
and a handout state.”46  “Unless we could turn the tide toward national socialism in the next 
Congressional and Presidential election,” conservative South Dakota senator Karl Mundt wrote 
in a typical formulation, “we are going to find America suffering from the same collapse of 
freedom now being tragically manifested before our eyes in the experiences of Great Britain.”47    
 But if the postwar factional warfare between Taft and Dewey had not turned conservative 
Republicans into advocates for parliamentary-style governance under disciplined parties, it had 
prompted them to sharpen an argument in favor of issue-based politics and party cohesion behind 
a distinct program.  The corollary to such an argument for substantive partisanship was a critique 
of non-substantive partisan affiliations.  “A political party,” Taft declared, “is not just an 
organization in which men of completely different points of view join because their parents or 
their friends belonged to that party, or because they became members through youthful and 
forgotten prejudices.”48  A belief in programmatic politics also implied opposition to a political 
strategy based on individual candidates’ personal electoral appeal.  Sharpening the ideological 
contrast between Republicans and Democrats would help to enable Americans to “vot[e] for 
ideas rather than built-up personalities,” as conservative writer Felix Morley put it.49 
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 These factional debates over GOP strategy and the politics of personality only intensified 
in the wake of Dewey’s decision to take himself out of presidential contention in 1952 – for his 
successor as the moderates’ favored candidate turned out to be a figure of truly extraordinary 
personal appeal across the country.  After heavy courting from both parties, General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower entered the race against Taft for the Republican presidential nomination backed by 
much of Dewey’s campaign machinery as well as his key areas of organizational support in the 
Republican Governor’s Association and among Eastern party donors.  Eisenhower’s strategic 
vagueness on policy issues came in for the same criticism from Taft supporters that Dewey’s had 
before him.  “The Republican voters of this country,” Republican Senatorial Campaign 
Committee chairman Everett Dirksen wrote in 1952, “are entitled to know whether the candidate, 
who only a few months ago wouldn’t say whether he was a Democrat or Republican, is now an 
advocate of Democratic or Republican national policies.”50  But the allure of a personally 
popular candidate proved hard to resist after such a prolonged political drought for the party.  “I 
am now past thirty years of age and I cannot remember an election when a Republican was 
elected president,” wrote one Republican in explaining his openness to supporting Eisenhower 
despite sharing Taft’s political views.  “It has just about gotten to the place with me that I don’t 
care who the candidate is as long as we can elect him.”51   
Eisenhower’s campaign operatives fanned out during the spring of 1952 to line up 
delegate support among state party leaders through promises of patronage and support in local 
factional matters, with virtually no discussion of policy issues or ideology.
52
  Nowhere did the 
hardnosed battle between the Eisenhower and Taft campaigns for delegate pledges prove more 
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intense and decisive than in the South, which sent one sixth of the total delegates at the national 
convention.  Eisenhower’s campaign managers had deliberately sought to cultivate opposing 
delegates to the Taft-leaning “old guard” in states like Texas, Louisiana, and Georgia, in the 
process involving themselves in internecine local factional squabbles within those state’s thinly 
institutionalized and virtually unpopulated Republican organizations.  The large majority of the 
98 delegate seats in dispute before the Credentials Committee of the Republican National 
Convention that summer belonged to southern states, and the bruising battle for them is what 
ultimately tipped the nomination in Eisenhower’s favor.53 
 There was, in fact, good reason that the battle for southern delegates proved particularly 
rife with opaque and personalized deal-making among small numbers of interested parties.  The 
virtual eradication of a popularly-backed Republican organizational presence in most parts of the 
South starting at the end of Reconstruction had rendered state Republican parties essentially 
empty shells, a collective regional “holdover organization functioning only for the power it could 
wield in national conventions,” as political scientist Malcolm Moos put it in 1956.  The legacy of 
that 19
th
 century expulsion for 20
th 
 century GOP politics was a quadrennial display of regional 
engagement at its most ruthlessly pragmatic and insular –  “the ‘demoralizing influence’ that 
went with the shameful scramble for the votes of southern delegates.”54  Eisenhower’s campaign 
manager recalled that the leaders of southern state Republican parties “represented almost no one 
at home,” surviving off of federal patronage directed their way in exchange only for nominating 
support at conventions, since they had no votes to deliver in the ballot box or the U.S. 
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Congress.
55
  The scramble to accumulate that support, devoid of either democratic stakes or 
much ideological content, reached new heights in 1952.   
If the intensity of the factional scrambling in southern states during the 1952 nominating 
fight highlighted the GOP’s organizational weakness in the region, however, the national 
political context was changing in ways that signaled the potential for momentous transformations 
in southern political alignments.  The great post-New Deal flourishing of the conservative 
coalition in Congress highlighted the power inherent in national agglomerations of conservative 
influence.  Simultaneously, southern electoral support at the presidential level for the Democratic 
Party was slowly eroding, as illustrated in the States’ Rights Party’s capture of four Deep South 
states in the 1948 election and Eisenhower’s eventual 49 percent showing in the southern popular 
vote in the general election of 1952.  The potential for a southern Republican Party that was not a 
shell but rather a viable organization and political contender was becoming increasingly 
apparent.  And thus, just like postwar Democratic debates over ideology and partisanship, intra-
Republican debates touched unavoidably on the subject of party realignment in Dixie – and the 
explosive issues of race and civil rights.     
 
The Southern Crossing    
 
 “I am a Southerner by birth and tradition,” G. Wartham Ages of Memphis wrote to RNC 
chairman Guy Gabrielson in December 1949, “but nearly all my life I have been an independent 
in politics, and especially so since Roosevelt destroyed the Democratic Party.”  Like 
conservatives throughout the country, Ages attributed Thomas Dewey’s defeat the previous year 
to “his promise to do everything that the New Dealers were doing but to do it better.”  He also 
attributed “all that has been accomplished in the 80th and 81st Congresses to defeat Truman’s 
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program” to “a combination of the conservative members of Congress from the North and 
South.”  This observation compelled a question – one that increasing numbers of conservatives 
began to ask in the postwar decades.  “Why not make that combination a real and permanent 
factor rather than a temporary one for expediency only?”56   
 Giving partisan shape to the conservative coalition had been a goal among some 
conservatives in both the North and the South since the very inception of the coalition during the 
late New Deal.  Southern congressional resistance to Franklin Roosevelt’s legislative agenda had 
spread and solidified gradually through the late 1930s and early 1940s.  That same resistance 
first broke out in presidential politics in 1944, when all of the delegates from three southern 
states and portions of the delegations from four others lodged protest votes against Roosevelt’s 
re-nomination, supporting Virginia Senator Harry Byrd instead.
57
   Some conservative 
Republicans, meanwhile, made tentative inquiries into building partisan inroads into the region 
through an anti-New Deal ideological appeal during this same period, with ideas ranging from 
changing the party’s name to the Constitution Party to boost southern appeal to nominating a 
joint Republican-Southern Democratic presidential ticket.
58
  Short of such dramatic moves, 
Republicans could only urge southerners to take it upon themselves to convert their partisanship 
into better alignment with their beliefs.  “I realize it is hard for those who have been active 
leaders in one party to change their allegiance,” Bob Taft told a Nashville audience in 1948, “but 
I suggest to the people of the Southern States that you lead your leaders into the Republican 
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Party.”59  But the strength of existing partisan ties in the electorate and the absence of enduring, 
interlocking relationships among activists and partisan elites in the northern Republican and 
southern Democratic parties rendered such ideas purely theoretical through the 1940s.   
Indeed, the southern revolt against the national Democratic Party that did eventually 
emerge during that decade – the Dixiecrat campaign of 1948 – illustrated the region’s continued 
aversion to the Republican label, even as it revealed the extent of political change underway 
there.  The long-run factors that drove the revolt would make the region increasingly ripe for 
political realignment after the revolt’s failure.  The impact of the New Deal and World War II in 
sparking regional development, agricultural mechanization, and industrialization in the South 
posed unavoidable challenges to the region’s one-party politics.  The stirrings of political 
activism among both working-class whites and African Americans exiting agricultural labor and 
emboldened by wartime service helped to provoke, in reaction, a closer political alliance 
between Bourbon agricultural elites and industrial and commercial businessmen in the South.
60
  
Looking at the national scene, those elites viewed with alarm the growing electoral strength of 
African American Democrats in the North and the rapid rise of racial liberalism to the forefront 
of the New Deal-Fair Deal ideological agenda.  This looming specter was best epitomized by the 
war-time Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) and President Truman’s postwar 
support for its permanent operation.   
The civil rights threat prompted a reevaluation of the party system and the South’s place 
in it.  Charles Wallace Collins, an Alabama lawyer, political activist, and propagandist for white 
supremacy, portrayed the fight over the FEPC and other Truman-endorsed civil rights measures 
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as a harbinger of a broader partisan breakdown in his hugely influential 1947 treatise, Whither 
Solid South?  “The South finds itself in the anomalous position of being the chief support of a 
political party which intends to put her through a second Reconstruction,” he wrote.61  Given the 
fact that there was now “a ‘liberal’ and a ‘conservative’ wing to each major party,” Collins’s 
preferred solution to the southern predicament was the forging of a “new two-party alignment” in 
which the respective wings would sort into a Liberal Party and a Conservative Party and the 
latter would serve to protect the southern racial order.
62
  But if political leaders proved incapable 
of bringing about such a transformation of the two-party system, Collins laid out a second-best 
alternative, one that became the blueprint for the States’ Rights Democratic Party campaign the 
following year: a regional third-party bid intended to deny any candidate a majority of electoral 
votes, thereby throwing the decision to the House of Representatives where Southerners could 
influence the outcome.  Precisely because existing partisan ties remained too strong to make an 
ideological realignment realistic, this second-best plan was the option pursued by the southern 
elites who launched the Dixiecrat revolt in 1948 behind the candidacy of Strom Thurmond.   
The legacy of the Dixiecrat campaign, both for southern political strategy and for the 
shaping of postwar American conservatism, was decidedly mixed.
63
  The party’s disappointing 
electoral performance provided further testimony to the continuing strength of traditional 
partisanship.  (It only won in the four southern states whose ballots listed Thurmond as the 
                                                 
61
 Charles Wallace Collins, Whither Solid South? A Study in Politics and Race Relations (New Orleans: Pelican 
Publishing Company, 1947), 19.  
62
 Collins, Whither Solid South?, 255-256. 
63
 Contemporary chroniclers, following V.O. Key’s description of the movement as “the dying gasp of the Old 
South,” typically portrayed it as a backward-looking venture, whose failure revealed the looming decline of white 
supremacy as a viable political appeal in a rapidly modernizing region.  V.O. Key, Southern Politics in State and 
Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), 671.  Recent scholarship has emphasized elements in the movement’s 
ideological appeal and alignment of support that presaged the rise of a national conservative movement and eventual 
party realignment in the South.  See Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt, Lowndes, From the New Deal to the New 
Right, 11-44, and Crespino, Strom Thurmond’s America, 61-84.   
 131 
 
regular Democratic nominee.)  And the scope of the Dixiecrats’ ambition had been modest to 
begin with.  Rather than an attempt to ideologically realign the American party system, the revolt 
amounted to a regionally-defined venture to restore one faction’s unique balance-of-power 
position within that system.  But precisely because it failed to achieve that goal, increasing 
numbers of political actors in the coming years began to envision national rather sectional 
partisan strategies for combatting racial and economic liberalism.  In this way, the Dixiecrats’ 
failure proved influential.  Moreover, while the Dixiecrat campaign proved both regionally 
circumscribed and explicitly racial in its appeal and policy program, certain participants in the 
campaign did pioneer ideological arguments that subsumed white supremacy into a deracialized 
and nationally-directed conservative anti-statism.  Such an ideological strategy would soon 
become central to the conservative project of partisan realignment.                          
While southern conservatives struggled over political strategy in the wake of the 1948 
election, northern conservatives in the GOP pursued new efforts at forging an electoral alliance 
with the South as part of their factional struggle with moderates.  At the center of the most 
significant of such efforts was South Dakota Senator Karl Mundt, whose national profile in the 
early postwar years was largely defined by his close alliance with Joe McCarthy.
64
  Mundt’s 
crusading anticommunism lent a sense of urgency to his interest in reconstructing partisan 
alliances in the United States.  The global spread of collectivism made America’s position as a 
redoubt for liberty all the more precious, he thought, but the diffusion of conservative forces into 
factions of both major American parties had enabled the creeping socialistic bent of New Deal-
Fair Deal liberalism to drive policy unchecked.  “Present political groupings,” he declared, 
“appear to be based much more upon geographical, traditional, or historical factors than upon a 
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grouping around basic economic, social, and political concepts.”65  Such foggy alignments 
muffled the voice of American conservatism at just the moment it was most needed.  A north-
South coalition of conservative voting strength was essential, he wrote, not only “for our two-
party system, but also for the most effective fight possible against Communism in America.”66   
 Starting in 1949, Mundt began corresponding with a circle of fellow senators and GOP 
aides on the subject of political realignment, including the fellow anticommunist militant Owen 
Brewster of Maine and the recently retired Albert Hawkes of New Jersey.  Two New York-based 
political aides and Republican activists named J. Harvie Williams and John Underhill spent the 
summer of 1949 soliciting support from northeastern businessmen and Republican donors to 
fund a “Citizens Political Committee” to explore the idea of party realignment through a North-
South conservative alliance.
67
  Williams’s prescribed strategy for such a union began in Congress 
rather than the Electoral College.  His head count estimated a slight majority in the Senate and a 
larger one in the House that, with the proper inducements and leadership, would support a 
reorganization of partisan congressional control “better reflect[ing] that substantial majority of 
public opinion which holds to traditional American concepts and values.”  The realigned 
congressional officials would then serve to help lead their electoral constituents into the new 
partisan alignment over the course of subsequent electoral cycles.  Republicans’ present hopeless 
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situation, Williams wrote, was matched by that of Southern Democrats.  “Our proposals are 
designed to help both to help each other.”68   
 Mundt shared Williams’s confidence in the existence of a basic conservative majority 
among both American voters and public officials in Washington, requiring only altered 
institutional contexts to empower.
69
  He disagreed, however, with Williams’ focus on Congress 
as the site for initial action, arguing that existing arrangements in both chambers, and particularly 
the complications that seniority privileges posed, would make individual members exceedingly 
cautious about attempting a collective leap into the uncharted waters of partisan realignment.
70
  
Instead, with the Dixiecrat revolt fresh in his mind, Mundt argued that realignment should be 
pursued through a presidential electoral strategy.  Republicans should plan to delay holding their 
1952 convention until after the Democrats, who would likely choose a platform and nominee 
(either Truman or a liberal alternative) odious to southern delegates.  If the Republicans then 
responded by nominating a ticket composed of a Republican and a Southern Democrat – Mundt 
suggested Georgia’s Richard Russel or Virginia’s Harry Byrd – and directly wooing alienated 
southerners in their platform and campaign appeals, a conservative electoral victory would be 
possible.  Very quickly thereafter, such a victory would compel a formal reorganization within 
both Congress and the national parties.  Mundt speculated that the ideologically cohesive parties 
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of this near future could be labeled “Laborites” and “Freedomites” if they failed to retain the 
existing names.  Beginning with a swing through the Northwest in the winter of 1949 and 1950 
and continuing with multiple speaking tours across every southern state, Mundt devoted much of 
the next two years to a campaign of direct appeal to southerners to help “bring about a permanent 
realignment of party forces in this country … so that henceforth in each of our 48 states the 
people would have a clear cut choice in all elections.”71   
Mundt’s speaking tours helped provide the impetus for the formal launch of a Committee 
to Explore Political Realignment in September 1951.
72
  The organization grew out of a three-day 
conference of conservative activists in Washington DC, at which Mundt gave the keynote 
address.  The Committee commissioned Williams and Underhill to draft a full report on the 
rationale and prospects for an ideological sorting of the parties, which eventually resulted in an 
80-page treatise, “Liberty and the Republic: The Case for Party Realignment.”73 The Committee 
listed among its leaders the ex-senators Albert Hawkes and Ed Burke and ex-governors Horace 
Hildreth and Charles Edison.  The leading southerner involved in the group was the former New 
Deal official turned conservative legal scholar and activist, Donald Richberg.  As indicated by 
the northern tilt of the membership, most conservative political elites in the South still proved 
reluctant to pursue openly the idea of a formal proto-partisan alliance with Republicans.
74
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Despite such leaders’ reluctance, southern audiences were welcoming of the Yankee 
senator’s message during his tours.  Standing ovations were typical.  The audience at one 1951 
address in Jackson, Mississippi, gave Mundt “not mere applause … but ear-splitting level yells,” 
according to the Jackson Daily News.”75  Charles Wallace Collins wrote to Mundt to express his 
support for the project.
76
  National conservative voices like radio personality Fulton Lewis, Jr., 
writer Felix Morley, and newspaper editor William Loeb all echoed this support and joined in the 
campaign.
77
  Speaking at the annual Mississippi Economic Council in 1951, Raymond Moley, 
another conservative ex-New Dealer, heralded the coming dissolution of the South’s one-party 
system, cribbing from V.O. Key’s mammoth recent study of southern politics to describe the 
southern state Democratic organizations as “merely a holding company of transient squabbling 
factions, most of which fail by far to meet the standards of permanence, cohesiveness, and 
responsibility.”78  An ideological realignment of the two parties, Moley argued, would finally 
render southern politics meaningfully coherent and issues-based and connect southern goals to 
the national political system. 
 All of this discussion was, of course, merely an abstraction if it did not face squarely the 
most potent source of the rift between southern Democrats and their national party: civil rights 
for African Americans.  Mundt made the policy implications of realignment clear when he 
repeatedly declared that a conservative alliance could only be possible if the Republicans gave 
“some thought to southern concepts in the writing of the platform” and avoided including “any 
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of the planks which are understandably repugnant to the people of the South.”79  The planks he 
meant, which had appeared in the 1948 platform drafted by the Dewey forces, were the 
endorsements of federal legislation challenging Jim Crow practices in the workplace and polling 
place.  As Raymond Moley bluntly put it, realignment depended on getting “Republicans to 
forego their past practice of baiting the South by support of a Federal civil rights program.”80   
Crucially, postwar Republican positions on federal civil rights measures had a factional 
valence.  Opposition was disproportionately found among Taft-aligned conservatives opposed to 
all manner of federal activism in social policy – and answering to few African American 
constituents or supporters.  Taft had long expressed private skepticism about courting black 
votes, writing in 1945 that it was hopeless to try since a measure like the FEPC bill “violates any 
possible party philosophy we could adopt.”81  Three years later he warned a Tennessee crowd 
that Truman “would center in Washington the entire field of control over questions involving 
civil rights, without even considering the proper functions of the Federal Government, the states, 
and local communities in dealing with different features of the problem.”82  Taftites opposed a 
permanent FEPC throughout the 1940s and stripped the 1950 statement on party principles of 
draft language endorsing aggressive civil rights measures.
83
  Mundt’s advocacy of jettisoning 
altogether the civil rights tradition that had been the GOP’s birthright as a party was not mere 
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opportunism in pursuit of party realignment, but a stance that was ideologically and politically 
congenial to many Republican conservatives.       
 Importantly, however, that congeniality needed to be expressed explicitly in terms of 
state’s rights and opposition to federal power rather than race and white supremacy.  As the 
Birmingham newspaperman John Temple Graves put it in heralding an ideological party 
realignment, “an obstacle in the path of this national political line-up is the impression given a 
great many Americans that the States’ Rights movement in the South is nothing but race hate in 
political action, and is a sort of political first cousin to the Klan.”84  Deracializing the language of 
southern conservatism – and of opposition to civil rights legislation in general -- was a 
prerequisite for realignment.  “The South must be led by men less identified with the Negro 
question and more identified with the national revolt against federalism in general,” he wrote.85  
Taftite Republicans were partners in this rhetorical project.  RNC Chairman Guy Gabrielson 
startled many political observers in the early 1950s by making direct appeals to the Dixiecrats, 
but he did so on race-neutral ideological grounds.  “Our friends call themselves States’ Righters 
and we call ourselves Republicans,” he declared in Alabama in 1952.  “But they oppose 
corruption and so do we … The Dixiecrat Party believes in states’ rights.  That’s what the 
Republican Party believes in.”86  Mundt even endorsed white southerners’ own framing of their 
opposition to federal action on civil rights, denying racist intent altogether.  “Southerners have 
no desire to hold the Negro down,” he insisted.  “They want to promote programs in an area 
where by evolution and education they must work out a harmonious adjustment.”87      
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 To pro-civil rights Republicans, such positions were as morally objectionable as they 
were strategically dubious.  In 1951, Mundt debated liberal Republican Congressman Clifford 
Case in the pages of Collier’s magazine on the question, “Should the GOP Merge With the 
Dixiecrats?”88  Case’s practical arguments against the idea emphasized Southern Democrats’ 
institutional clout in Congress, which would disincline them from seeking to upset existing 
arrangements, as well as the electoral punishment a merger would face north of the Mason and 
Dixon line.  But substantive policy lay at the heart of his objections.  “I do not want victory at the 
price of party character,” he wrote, echoing Margaret Chase Smith’s recent dissent against her 
party’s embrace of McCarthyism.  Case predicted that two-party politics would indeed soon 
come to the South, but that history and morality alike required that it come about through “a 
progressive Republican party which will align itself with, and provide a rallying point for, the 
progressive forces in Southern labor, industry, and agriculture – not with the Dixiecrats.”  
Antiracism was a central pillar of Case’s vision for southern Republcanism.  “In the South of the 
future there is a permanent place for a political party which really believes that the Negro is not 
an inferior person to be dealt with kindly but kept in his place, and which refuses to accept 
‘separate but equal treatment’ as the last word in handling racial problems.”  
 Case proceeded, however, to make a broader normative point about the American party 
system – one that underscored the degree to which one’s position within a party’s factional 
division at midcentury informed one’s perspective on how parties best functioned in American 
politics.  Like Thomas Dewey the year before, Case offered a note of caution to “those who, 
whether on doctrinaire grounds or because they are dazzled by the prospect of temporary 
political or economic advantage, would re-form our two great parties along separate interest 
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groupings and ideological lines.”  Achieving such a reformation, he argued, would strike at the 
very defining quality of the American two-party system, namely the fact “that our two great 
political parties do not divide the people into separate interest or ideological groups.”  Such 
inclusion and overlapping of constituents and interests fostered the stability, basic civic unity, 
and incremental adaptability in policy that were the hallmarks of the American political system.  
Case’s essay revealed the logic by which, under the existing alignment of political and 
ideological forces in the midcentury America, a moderate Republican’s forceful, entirely 
principled argument for civil rights and other progressive issue positions could also amount to a 
system-level celebration of the absence of principle in the division of the two parties. 
 The same logic explained why Mundt’s ideological enemies in the opposing party 
frequently endorsed his proposal for realignment.  Mundt engaged in a radio debate with leading 
liberal Democrat – and noted responsible party advocate – Hubert Humphrey in July 1951.  On 
the central question of ideological realignment, their “debate” turned out to be anything but.  
Both had plenty of harsh words to say regarding the substance of their opponent’s views, but 
Humphrey stated up front that he agreed with Mundt’s “propos[al] that we get the political 
parties cleaned up or cleared up on the basis of issues … I welcome it, because I would like to 
have the American people truly know what the political parties stand for.”89  Mundt appeared on 
The Eleanor Roosevelt Show the same year, where the former First Lady – and eminent liberal 
activist within the postwar Democratic Party – told her guest, “I agree with you when you say 
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that our present parties confuse people … You and I are not often in agreement, but I made a 
suggestion somewhat similar to that [for party realignment] also some time ago.”90   
She had also, of course, been privy to her husband’s landmark experiment in engineering 
a realignment in 1938 and his abortive consideration of it in 1944.  At a more fundamental level, 
Mundt credited Franklin Roosevelt with ushering in the political revolution – the mobilization of 
a new national program of liberal government activism – that made partisan transformation 
imperative.  “Some great changes have come about in the political thinking of America,” Mundt 
told Eleanor Roosevelt, “a great many of which, incidentally, are attributable to your husband … 
because he gave us the New Deal, which gradually took on the shape and the formation in large 
part of a somewhat different political concept, almost a new political party.”  The conservative 
Mundt and liberal Roosevelt agreed about the desirability of bringing those “great changes” to 
fulfillment within the party system itself. 
 In the short term, however, conservatives would prove no more capable than liberals of 
reconstructing the party system along ideological lines.  The shuttering of the Committee to 
Explore Political Realignment less than a year after its creation was illustrative.
91
  “I am not 
willing to raise a substantial amount of money from people all over the country,” Hawkes wrote 
to Mundt in explaining the decision, “until I feel we have some kind of a plan that justifies their 
contributing the money and justifies us in expecting to spend it wisely and effectively.”92  Such a 
plan was missing.  A surfeit of political caution disinclined large numbers of political leaders – 
North and South – from enlisting in the cause.  At this early stage in southern conservatives’ 
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break from the national Democratic leadership, too many retained investment in existing 
arrangements, and too few northern and southern activists, political funders, and politicians had 
developed close ties with each other, to make a short-term political breakthrough realistic.
93
  
Virginia’s powerful Democratic senator Harry Byrd, for example, launched his own campaign in 
the South against Truman’s civil rights policies in 1951 and called for the reinstatement of the 
old two-thirds requirement for Democratic presidential nominating conventions that had given 
Dixie veto power before 1936.
94
  But despite repeated meetings with Hawkes and other leaders 
involved in the Committee, Byrd resisted joining an explicit campaign for party realignment.
95
   
Explaining the “standoffish” attitude of many southern conservatives to party 
realignment, one journalist cited not only the pull of tradition and lingering suspicions of 
Republicans, but also the continued uniqueness of the South’s place in the political system.  
“Southerners exert a vital balance-of-power role in national affairs, particularly in the Congress,” 
he wrote, “and do all right on patronage, public works, and other items of Federal aid, too.”96  
That unique role depended on sectional solidarity among southern political elites, just as, from 
those elites’ perspective, the maintenance of Jim Crow depended on preventing party 
competition in the South, which could lead to efforts to mobilize African Americans as voters.  
National party realignment along ideologically defined lines threatened to disrupt that political 
solidarity.  To most southerners in the 1950s, the risk of such a disruption outweighed the 
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potential benefits that could come from a national consolidation of conservative forces hostile (or 
at least indifferent) to federal civil rights initiatives.
97
   
Nevertheless, stirrings from the South in 1952 indicated that increasing numbers in the 
region were beginning to change their calculations.  Eisenhower’s southern support was 
strongest in the urbanized and comparatively moderate peripheral states.
98
  But disenchantment 
with the national Democratic Party had grown sufficiently to compel increasing numbers of 
strong conservatives to jump ship as well.  From the Virginian Donald Richberg to the Texas oil 
baron Jack Porter, conservative southern activists and political donors mobilized on behalf of a 
Republican presidential candidate in numbers never seen before.
99
  And from the ranks of elected 
Democratic officials, South Carolina Governor James F. Byrnes led the push to campaign for 
Eisenhower against Stevenson in the general election.
100
   
Two developments would help to compel more southerners to join such apostates in the 
years to come.  First, as the region continued to grow economically and to incorporate ever 
increasing numbers of northern transplants, traditional partisan electoral attachments began to 
loosen and to more closely resemble national patterns.  Second, American conservatism itself 
attained a new coherence and self-conscious movement spirit, and as a result helped to empower 
the right in its factional battles within the GOP.  That national Republican right would advocate a 
political posture toward the South much more in keeping with Karl Mundt’s Dixie courting than 
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Clifford Case’s progressivism.101  Ironically enough, both of these developments would occur 
during the tenure of an exceptionally popular -- and deceptively ambitious – moderate 
Republican President.          
 
“Principle is Basic:” The Conservative Movement in the Age of Consensus 
 
 Conservative Republicans had reason to feel embattled during Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 
presidency.  Scholars have sharply revised the contemporary portrayal of Eisenhower as a 
grandfatherly executive amiably carrying out his tenure in both an apolitical and nonideological 
manner – documenting instead the sharp political and partisan instincts and personally strong 
Midwestern conservative convictions that drove Eisenhower’s “hidden-hand” leadership.102  But 
despite Eisenhower’s personal small-government convictions, his outlook on the GOP’s future 
emphasized substantive accommodation to the New Deal state and a political image makeover.  
Increasingly over the course of his two terms, Eisenhower pursued both high-profile and sub 
rosa political activities on behalf of a vision for the Republican Party and the alignment of 
factional forces within it that was sharply at odds with the interests of the party’s conservatives.   
Eisenhower’s substantive views shaped his brand of Republicanism.  Ideologically, he 
combined a fervent internationalism with a view of domestic policy that venerated what he 
termed “the Middle Way.”  “[T]he critical problem of our time,” he wrote to a friend in 1954, “is 
to find and stay on the path that marks the way of logic between conflicting arguments advanced 
by extremists on both sides on almost every economic, political, and international problem that 
arises.”  In the realm of social policy, this meant “establishing some kind of security for 
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individuals in a highly specialized and industrialized age” without “push[ing] further and further 
into the socialistic experiment.”103  His substantive disagreements with Republican conservatives 
took early political form in the well-publicized fight with the remaining congressional 
isolationists over Senator John Bricker’s proposed constitutional amendment to restrict the scope 
and process of treaty ratification, as well as in conservative grumbling over his appointment of 
Earl Warren as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
104
  In the electoral arena, Eisenhower 
actively promoted several moderates to run for House and Senate races, beginning with his 
encouragement of Clifford Case’s bid in New Jersey in 1954 and continuing through the year of 
his reelection in 1956.
105
 The famously protracted battle waged within the administration over 
whether or not to jettison Richard Nixon as the vice presidential nominee in 1956 was similarly 
colored by ideological factionalism, since the Californian Cold Warrior’s original ascension to 
the ticket had stemmed from his closeness to the party’s right wing.  Though Nixon stayed on, 
Eisenhower was by then newly committed, in his words, to “build[ing] up a strong, progressive 
Republican Party in this country … If the right wing wants a fight, they’re going to get it.”106 
In an unhappy irony for his cause, Eisenhower’s efforts to wage that fight ultimately did a 
great deal to shape, cohere, and motivate the postwar conservative movement that eventually 
captured the Republican Party.  At the level of ideological construction, William F. Buckley and 
other intellectual architects of the postwar conservative movement forged their political analysis 
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and movement project partly through combat with the philosophical exponents of Eisenhower-
style moderation, chief among them the administration official and law professor Arthur Larson.  
At the grassroots level, demographic and social developments similar to those driving the rise to 
predominance of a new kind of amateur liberal activist inside the Democratic Party also fostered 
the flourishing of amateur activism on the Republican right.  Those activists derived motivation 
and missionary zeal from the very fusionist conservative ideology that Buckley and others were 
disseminating.  The first stirrings of this newly powerful confluence of intellectual leadership 
and grassroots energy were felt in internal party initiatives that Eisenhower encouraged in the 
hopes of bolstering moderate Republicanism.  Those stirrings would turn into a storm of 
conservative activity in the 1960s that powered Barry Goldwater’s ascension to the presidential 
nomination.              
“Boy oh boy oh boy, does that Arthur Larson bear keeping one’s eye on!,” editorialized 
National Review in September 1956.
107
  That magazine’s writers and editors kept close eyes 
indeed on the man whom the New York Times called Eisenhower’s “chief theoretician” and Meet 
the Press’s moderator called the White House’s “ideologist-in-chief.”  Their engagement with 
Larson’s vision for the GOP and the two-party system itself helped to structure the conservative 
agenda they developed as an alternative course.  
Larson, like Eisenhower a Midwestern-raised Republican, was a legal scholar of the 
welfare state before serving the administration as Undersecretary of Labor, Director of the 
United States Information Agency, and eventually, chief presidential speechwriter.  His 
experience while in the Labor Department working with a centrist-liberal coalition of moderate 
Republicans and northern Democrats in Congress against the conservative coalition on behalf of 
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expansions in Social Security, unemployment insurance, and workmen’s compensation and 
disability insurance helped to inform his outlook on the alignment of forces in the contemporary 
political system.
108
  In 1956, as his work in the administration shifted to speechwriting and 
political consultation, he wrote a bestselling treatise connecting his policy views to a philosophy 
of the American political system, which received official endorsement from Eisenhower’s chief 
of staff, Sherman Adams, and, later, the president himself.  (Larson’s book, William F. Buckley 
quipped, “had the singular distinction of being read by President Eisenhower.”)109   
A Republican Looks at his Party promised to establish “two key political facts of mid-
century America,” the first being that “we have greater agreement than ever before in our history 
on fundamental issues,” the second that the Eisenhower Administration’s philosophy and 
policies reflected that agreement.
110
  The approach around which Americans had reached 
consensus offered a third way between what Larson termed the “1896 ideology” of laissez faire 
and the “1936 ideology” of proto-socialism.  Eisenhower’s “New Republicanism” acknowledged 
the changed reality of an urbanized industrial society requiring concerted federal action in many 
realms of life that had traditionally been left to states, localities, and the private sector.  It also, 
however, limited federal action only to those realms in which localized or private initiative could 
not meet the need.  The formula prescribed “as much government as necessary, but not enough to 
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stifle the normal motivations of private enterprise” or to hinder “the maximum restoration of 
responsibility to individuals and private groups.”111   
The way that the party system interacted with this ideological formulation was 
instructive.  Larson disavowed European-style party politics, “with its left-right arrangement of 
political status… In this country, we have alignments formed according to a complex system of 
sectional, local, traditional and interest groupings.”  The cumulative product of such fragmented 
alignments was the very “American Consensus” approach to policy that Larson endorsed.  But 
though “there is no American Center Party as such, and there probably never will be,” Larson 
explicitly predicted that New Republicanism in the Eisenhower mold could forge an enduring 
partisan majority for years to come.  This was because the opposition Democrats actually 
contained within their own coalition the most extreme exponents of both the 1896 and the 1936 
ideologies.  New Republicanism “captured the political center” by falling in between the 
extremes represented by a Democratic party that included “the most conservative elements in the 
country – the Southern Democrats – and the most radical – the ultra-Fair-Dealers.”112  The notion 
of an intrinsically bifurcated and ideologically schizophrenic Democratic Party – “a preposterous 
coalition of opposites,” as Larson put it to Eisenhower – was a recurring theme among 
Republicans in the 1950s.
113
  In a typical statement, the Republican National Conference of 1957 
passed a resolution highlighting the “bitter divisions rending the Democratic Party, which – not 
being a truly national party –would not dare to solicit the views of its party leaders … lest its 
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gatherings deteriorate into sectional bickering.”114   But Larson emphasized Democratic division 
not merely to convey the practical utility of the GOP’s comparative cohesion, as most partisan 
GOP statements did.  Rather, he cast the Democratic divide as intrinsic in order to bolster his 
case for an ideologically middle-of-the-road political project that could garner bipartisan 
majorities in the electorate and in Congress.   
Larson used the term “New Republicanism” to describe this project in his book.  By the 
time Eisenhower hit the campaign trail for reelection in 1956, after delivering a nomination 
acceptance speech at the GOP convention that Larson had written, “Modern Republicanism” had 
become the more popular phrase.  On the night of his second victory over Adlai Stevenson, 
Eisenhower declared that “modern Republicanism has now proved itself.  And America has 
approved of modern Republicanism.”115   
Disapproval of modern Republicanism helped to shape the politics and vision of the 
postwar conservative movement.  William F. Buckley, Brent Bozell, James Burnham, Frank 
Meyer, William Rusher, and the rest of the mid-1950s intellectual circle around National Review 
saw the ideological scrambling of the two-party system as the means by which a collectivist 
liberal elite could sustain itself in power.  “The most alarming single danger to the American 
system,” declared the National Review’s inaugural issue, “lies in the fact that an identifiable team 
of Fabian operators is bent on controlling both our major political parties – under the sanction of 
such fatuous and unreasoned slogans as ‘national unity,’ ‘middle-of-the-road,’ ‘progressivism,’ 
and ‘bipartisanship.’”  In the face of that threat, the new journal would stand “without 
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reservation” on the side of a “two-party system that fights its feuds in public and honestly.”116  In 
that vein, the magazine declined to endorse Eisenhower in 1956, and in the ensuing years made 
good on the promise to track the exploits of the president’s court philosopher, Larson, as he rose 
in prominence.  “[M]odern Republicans,” wrote the magazine, “are – as a matter of principle – 
against principle.”117  For that reason, they were to blame both for the GOP’s failure to recapture 
Congress while Eisenhower won reelection in 1956 and, most grievously, for the party’s 
mammoth losses in the 1958 congressional midterms.  “An organization needs people and 
money, but before that it needs a purpose,” Brent Bozell explained in 1958, augmenting 
conservatives’ substantive critique of Modern Republican governance with their longstanding 
strategic argument against me-tooism. “With the Republican Party deprived of a distinctive 
policy, the party organization was deprived of a reason for existing and working.”118   
Buckley offered his most thorough formulation of the connection between building a 
conservative ideological movement and engaging the party system in his 1959 book Up From 
Liberalism.  He attacked the postwar era’s atmosphere of ideological dissolution, issuing a call to 
reject consensus politics and revive ideology in America that in certain ways ironically 
anticipated arguments of the New Left.  Though “America, fashionable observers say, is a non-
ideological nation,” Buckley warned of the danger that looms “when a distrust of doctrinaire 
social systems eases over into a dissolute disregard for principle” and when Americans 
demonstrate a “failure to nourish any orthodoxy at all.”  Larson’s Modern Republicanism 
claimed to identify a coherent line of thought driving the seeming mishmash of centrist 
policymaking, but “in permitting so many accretions, modifications, emendations, maculations, 
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and qualifications” to its alleged philosophical priors, it had proven “simply not useful as a 
philosophy of government distinctive to a single faction in American life.”119  The context of a 
two-party system made the need for such a coherent and distinctive philosophy – and for the 
rejection of a centrist middle path that failed to engage the battle with liberalism – all the more 
urgent.  Our “challenge,” Buckley wrote, was “to restore principles to public affairs.”  Doing so 
required factional battle inside the GOP – and this required the cohesion that stemmed from 
intellectual coherence: “The conservative movement in America has got to put its theoretical 
house in order.”120             
 The way by which Buckley and other midcentury conservative intellectuals had set about 
doing just that constituted one of the more thoroughgoing and self-conscious projects of 
ideological construction in American history.  The “fusionism” of the postwar conservative 
project, to use Frank Meyer’s term, merged the economic libertarianism of Hayek with cultural 
traditionalism and a militant and morally charged anticommunism.
121
  At a theoretical level, 
intellectuals worked to make an affirmative case for how those outlooks fit together into a 
coherent conception of the proper relationship of individuals to the state and society.  But 
Buckley the activist was always explicit in asserting the practical necessity of fusion as a matter 
of coalition politics – of forging a “conservative framework” in the face of “modern realities.”  
In Up From Liberalism, he endorsed the centrality of a “negative response to liberalism” as the 
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organizing rationale of conservative unity, and used a navigational metaphor to describe an 
approach to disparate political issues that put them all “in range” of a single conservative 
outlook.  “There is a point from which opposition to the social security laws and a devout belief 
in social stability are in range,” he wrote; “as also a determined resistance to the spread of world 
Communism – and a belief in political non-interventionism … That is the position, generally 
speaking, where conservatives now find themselves on the political chart.”122  What was needed 
was to cohere and mobilize such conservatives into an ideological movement capable of 
achieving real political impact.     
 The grassroots and organizational manpower for that movement had several sources.  
One was the conservative core of Republican party activists and professionals referred to as the 
“Taft wing” prior to the Ohio senator’s death in 1953.  When, four years later, Eisenhower 
acknowledged in his private notes that his candidacy had been “forced down the throats of a lot 
of people in ‘52,” these rank and file conservatives at the base of the party were who he was 
describing.  “Some will never forget it … There is so much resentment, and these people will 
never give up.”123 In the years between Taft’s death and Goldwater’s national ascendency, such 
rank-and-file conservatives lacked an agreed-upon standard-bearer, though Taft’s successor as 
Republican Senate Leader, William Knowland, came close.  But even while politically 
leaderless, Republican conservatives articulated increasingly hard-edged critiques of Eisenhower 
Republicanism and support for polarization in the mid-1950s.  One 1957 RNC survey of 
Midwestern party officials found sentiments that were typified by one respondents’ suggestion to 
“Register all ‘Modern Republicans’ as Democrats.”124   
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 Beyond the enduring core of Taftites among the party’s rank and file was the emergence, 
over the first two postwar decades, of a right-wing corollary to the “amateur Democrats” of 
James Q. Wilson’s analysis: a great flourishing of organization-building and political activism by 
largely middle-class and highly ideological, issue-driven conservatives.
125
  A generation of 
historical scholarship has helped to uncover the outlook and experiences of the “suburban 
warriors” who populated the sprawling new developments of the booming postwar Sunbelt, and 
whose activism gave grassroots force to the fusionist ideology that Buckley and his fellow 
intellectuals helped construct.
126
  Locally rooted anticommunist groups, linked through national 
networks of organizations and syndicated media and radio programs like the Dan Smoot Report 
and the Manion Forum on Opinion, compelled millions of Americans to connect the global Cold 
War struggle to domestic political issues and ideological conflicts.
127
  Christian conservative 
groups like Spiritual Mobilization, the Freedom Clubs, and Fred Schwarz’s Christian Anti-
Communism Crusade gave powerful organizational form to the ideological melding of religious 
conservatism, Cold War hawkishness, and domestic free-market orthodoxy.
128
  At the day-to-day 
heart of much of this activism was a cohort of conservative women – educated wives and 
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mothers of the postwar boom – who organized the book clubs, arranged the speakers’ series, and 
galvanized community activism on behalf of local and national issues alike.
129
  
 The manner in which this amateur spirit began to penetrate the party system likewise had 
some parallels to the club Democrats.  Some existing paraparty organizations at the state level, 
like the California Republican Assembly, found themselves taken over by conservative 
insurgencies starting in the late 1950s, while conservatives in other states built new independent 
Republican groups from scratch.
130
  And movement funders such as Roger Milliken, Lemuel 
Boulware, and J. Howard Pew took tentative initial steps to form and bankroll national mass-
membership organizations dedicated to conservative advocacy.  
One core locus for the emergence of issue-driven and ideological party activism on the 
Right, however, had no equivalent parallel among liberal Democrats.  Intense ideological 
warfare – and eventual conservative triumph -- in the Young Republican and College Republican 
organizations at both the state and national level revealed Republican youths to be the canaries in 
the coalmine of future party transformations.
131
  Key conservative movement activists and party 
operators had cut their teeth in Young Republican National  Federation politics in the early 
postwar years, notably William Rusher and the campaign operative F. Clifton White – though the 
fact that they had belonged to a Dewey-aligned faction underscored the degree to which youth 
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GOP activism took on increasing ideological coloring as the 1950s progressed.
132
  By the time of 
the 1957 Young Republicans convention, committed conservatives representing a Midwestern-
Sunbelt regional coalition had secured control of the national organization.  Two years later, the 
federation passed a platform plank that explicitly denounced Eisenhower Republicanism.
133
   
By the late 1950s, then, grassroots elements within the Republican Party, in auxiliary 
organizations, and in civil society increasingly espoused a consciously ideological movement 
spirit.
134
  The translation of that spirit into a political mobilization behind a powerful new 
factional leader began occurring, ironically, within the very party-building initiatives that 
Eisenhower pursued during his second term in an effort to remake the national GOP along 
Modern Republican lines.  Eisenhower’s ambition as a presidential party leader far exceeded his 
capacity to change the ideological coloring of the party’s most engaged activists, and thus his 
efforts to secure Modern Republicanism had the profoundly unintended consequence of 
empowering the Republican right.         
“I still have a job of re-forming and re-vamping the Republican Party,” Eisenhower wrote 
upon his reelection in 1956.  Building Republican organizational capacity from the precinct level 
up would serve to provide “a strong basis for the Modern Republicanism that will best represent 
the interests of all the people.”135  To pursue both the manpower and ideological components of 
                                                 
132
 Clif White noted the parallels in factional and ideological developments between the Young Republicans and the 
national party itself in 1957, saying that the Federation’s factional problems “are as much symptomatic of the 
problems of the Republican Party as a whole as they are unique federation problems.”  F. Clifton White letter to 
Sullivan Barnes, October 15, 1957, Box 14, Folder “Republican Party (1957),” F. Clifton White Papers, Ashland 
University, Ashland, OH.  
133
 John A. Andrew III, The Other Side of the Sixties: Young Americans For Freedom and the Rise of Conservative 
Politics (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1996), 25. 
134
 This is the context for Bowen’s finding that, compared to the early postwar years, “[b]y 1960, party insiders, who 
had initially backed candidates out of self-interest and patronage, factored ideology much more prominently into 
their decisions.” Bowen, The Roots of Modern Conservatism, 173. 
135
 Galvin, Presidential Party Building, 57. 
 155 
 
his party-building agenda simultaneously, the president and his appointed RNC chairman Meade 
Alcorn called for six regional conferences of party workers and officials in 1957 to discuss party 
organization and program, culminating in a Republican National Conference in Washington that 
summer.  All seven meetings proved to be riven by ideological division, with conservative 
Republicans mobilizing to voice their criticism of the Modern Republican agenda.  At the 
National Conference, the president only managed to deepen rather than mollify the division 
when he gave an address denying that intra-Republican disagreements “concerned our basic 
principles.  I believe that they do not … Some of us Republicans have a talent for magnifying 
and advertising our differences.  Our opponents then seize on these statements to throw up a 
smoke screen to conceal their own deep division.  Why should we help them play that game?”136  
Eisenhower and Alcorn’s next party-building initiative, launched in the aftermath of the 
GOP’s devastating electoral losses in the 1958 midterms, provided further occasion for those 
magnifiers of difference to exercise their talent.  In early 1959 Alcorn appointed a Republican 
Committee on Program and Progress and tasked it with “providing the Republican Party with a 
concise understandable statement of our Party’s long-range objectives in all areas of political 
responsibility.”137 The impetus for this new entity – commonly called the Percy Committee after 
its moderate chairman, Charles Percy – shared some similarities with the rationale for the 
Democratic Advisory Council (DAC) under Paul Butler.  Both were responses to electoral losses 
that had seemed to reveal the need for a clearer and more identifiable national policy program 
that voters could associate with the party.  But if the DAC became a vehicle for the Democrat’s 
dominant liberal faction to amplify that liberalism under an official party imprimatur, the Percy 
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Committee served as an effort by elite Modern Republican proponents to secure a moderate 
programmatic branding for their party.  The president believed that the GOP’s electoral 
misfortunes derived not only from a moribund national organization and poor candidate 
recruitment, but, relatedly, a conservative programmatic outlook that failed to project youth, 
vigor, or optimism.  The Percy Committee, intentionally stacked with party outsiders and tasked 
with devising consensual policy positions on such themes as “The Impact of Science and 
Technology” and “Economic Opportunity and Progress,” was intended to remedy this by 
institutionalizing Modern Republicanism.
138
 
 Though Percy and the RNC staffers who organized the committee’s research and 
meetings worked to strike both a scholarly and non-ideological tone for the proceedings, 
participants from both the Modern Republican and conservative factions made the deepening 
fissures within the party unmistakably clear.
139
  Thomas Kuchel typified the moderates’ 
arguments regarding both political strategy and policy substance in his address at a March 1959 
session.  The moderate California senator, whom then-governor Earl Warren had originally 
appointed to fill Richard Nixon’s seat, made a point of celebrating Warren’s tenure as Chief 
Justice, including the Brown vs. Board of Education decision, as part of a venerable party 
tradition of progressivism.  Though Kuchel “regret[ted] to say” that Warren was “a controversial 
figure in this country,” he insisted that the Chief Justice was both “a very great man and a very 
great Republican.”  Kuchel argued on both political and substantive grounds that the 
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congressional GOP needed to abandon its alliance with southern Democrats in opposition to pro-
labor and pro-civil rights legislation.  But he insisted even to “those of you who disagree with 
some of the philosophy that I espouse” that the Republican Party “is big enough to have and … 
strong enough to have men of a conservative point of view, and I think it is big enough and 
strong enough to have men and women in it of a moderate to liberal point of view.”  Kuchel 
concluded by echoing Arthur Larson’s formulization of a centrist Republican program that 
would be deliberately positioned between the left and right poles contained within the 
Democratic Party.  “I do not believe we should be a party of extremists,” he said.  “I believe the 
extremists are located in the Democratic ranks far more than the Republican ranks.”140 
 A forceful, if oblique, counterargument came later in the same session, during a 
presentation by the new chairman of the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee who also 
happened to be the rapidly rising star of American conservatism.  By 1959, Arizona’s Barry 
Goldwater had already achieved conservative renown for the consistency – so unusual in a 
professional politician – with which he framed his positions on disparate issues within an 
overarching ideological vision.  An across-the-board anti-statist conservative, Goldwater was 
particularly notable in the Senate for his hostility to organized labor and the populist, pro-worker 
rhetoric he employed in the service of denouncing union leadership.  His smashing reelection 
victory in 1958 in the face of a concerted labor-backed effort to unseat him bucked the 
Republican trend that year and won him newfound national attention.
141
   
Goldwater’s presentation before the Percy Committee was designed in part to make the 
strategic case that a party comeback did not, in fact, require a reversal of position on labor policy 
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or any other core issue.  In his description of the 1958 Republican successes in Arizona, he 
emphasized the primacy of a clear party program over the individual attributes of any of the 
candidates.  He cited analyst Samuel Lubell’s post-election work surveying Arizona voters to 
find out why the state “went against the trend.  Voter after voter interviewed said they voted for 
us because they knew what we stood for. … Our position in Arizona was unambiguous and 
uncompromising, and it was clearly conservative, afraid neither of the word, nor its 
connotations.”  Goldwater combined his analysis of the Arizona campaign in 1958 with an 
historical argument about the strategic daftness of “me, too” party policies dating back to 1948.  
The conclusion he reached directly contrasted with Kuchel and other’s defense of party 
heterodoxy.  “Principle is basic.  That is the first consideration,” Goldwater insisted.  “It is 
axiomatic that a party must finally deteriorate into nothing if it becomes obsessed with technique 
and forgets its basic meaning and purpose … The trouble is not that we are Republican. The 
trouble may be that we are not Republican enough.”142   
A day later, during the forum on principles and partisanship discussed at the outset of this 
chapter, Goldwater’s aide Stephen Shadegg insisted that a fundamental ideological divide over 
the very “nature of man” defined contemporary America’s politics, if not yet its parties.  For a 
committee dominated by Modern Republicans seeking to broaden and brighten the GOP’s 
programmatic image, Goldwater and Shadegg served as skunks at the garden party.  But their 
argument for marshalling the Republican Party in the service of ideological battle galvanized 
more party activists than did the bromides issued forth by the Percy Committee.  That 
committee’s final report, published in book form as Decisions for a Better America in 1960, 
covered a laundry list of policy issues but did little to improve Modern Republicanism’s 
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reputation for vague philosophical straddling.  Its lack of ideological coherence and 
distinctiveness strongly contrasted with the parallel output of the DAC on the Democrats’ side. 
Conservative Republicans saw in it only capitulation and crypto-liberalism – “the ultimate, it 
may be hoped,” Goldwater speechwriter Karl Hess later wrote, “in the lemming-like Republican 
urge to accept Democratic programs, tacitly approve Democratic principles, but to propose 
implementing them in a more businesslike manner.”143  Decisions for a Better America barely 
made a ripple among American political readers and commentators.  Another volume released in 
1960 – a compendium of Goldwater’s speeches and writings polished into book form by William 
F. Buckley’s brother-in-law and released under the senator’s name as The Conscience of a 
Conservative – took aim at the statist New Deal philosophy that reflected “the view of a majority 
of leaders of one of our parties, and of a strong minority among the leaders of the other.”144  The 
book became a best-seller.  Over half a million copies were in print by November.
145
        
 
“Everything Should Be an Issue” 
 
As participant memoirs and historical scholarship alike have detailed, the tributaries of 
conservative activism flowing through the later 1950s first converged behind the political 
leadership of Barry Goldwater in 1960, well before his successful capture of the GOP 
nomination four years later.
146
  Conservative intellectuals alarmed at the chameleonism and 
opportunistic leftward drift of Richard Nixon, the party’s likely presidential nominee, looked to 
Goldwater as the potential channel through which ideological energy could be put to practical 
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use.  “The situation of conservatism in the United States,” Frank Meyer wrote to his fellow 
National Review editors in May of 1960, “presents a sharp contrast between the steady growth of 
conservative influence on the intellectual level and the cumulative debacle on the political level.”  
Only the “the emergence of Barry Goldwater as a principled conservative” on the national scene 
“gives us a public political symbol through which our position is expressed in the political 
arena.”147  The emerging conservative stronghold of young Republican organizations, 
meanwhile, mobilized early and dramatically on behalf of a draft-Goldwater movement for vice 
president, starting in the Midwestern Federation of College Young Republican Clubs.  Within 
half a year, the student campaign behind Goldwater took on a new organizational form, Young 
Americans for Freedom, at a meeting in William F. Buckley’s Connecticut estate.148  And 
finally, within formal GOP ranks, a delegate drive to nominate Goldwater for the presidency 
materialized – and it did so in the heart of Dixie, at the South Carolina Republican convention.  
That South Carolina would provide the triggering action – “the catalytic agent,” in F. 
Clifton White’s words – that launched Goldwater toward an active candidacy in the 1960 
convention helps to underscore the centrality of civil rights politics to the conservative 
ascendency within the GOP.
149
  The alignment of the party’s left-right ideological division with 
competing positions on civil rights, already close in the early postwar years, had tightened 
further in the wake of Brown vs. Board, massive resistance, and the beginnings of the civil rights 
movement’s “classical” phase of direct action against Jim Crow.  Racial conservatism was as 
much a component of movement leaders’ fusionist intellectual project as economic orthodoxy 
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and moral traditionalism.  In the later 1950s, National Review and other conservative organs 
helped to refine and legitimize “color-blind” states-rights and constitutional arguments against 
federal intervention on civil rights.
150
  The Conscience of a Conservative typified this emerging 
line in the two chapters it devoted to “States’ Rights” and “Civil Rights,” respectively.151   
That ideological work dovetailed with a nascent effort at Republican party-building in the 
state of South Carolina, on hard-edged conservative terms.  The Palmetto State proved a first 
mover in this regard.  Republican organizations in most states remained non-ideological shells, 
while Eisenhower and Meade Alcorn did pursue a significant RNC initiative at building southern 
GOP organizational capacity, but one that eschewed a strongly conservative, and segregationist, 
posture.  Instead, the RNC’s “Operation Dixie” in the Eisenhower era focused on building 
Modern Republican organizations and deepening party inroads among young urban professionals 
in the peripheral South, where the president had made the most gains in 1952 and 1956.
152
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What happened in South Carolina was different, and a harbinger of how conservative 
Republican advances would be made in other southern states in later years.
153
  As would be the 
case elsewhere, in an illustration of the profound stickiness of lifetime partisan allegiance even 
among some of the most staunchly right-wing Democrats, northern transplants proved central to 
the emergence of conservative Republicanism in South Carolina.  Even the 1948 Dixiecrat 
candidate himself, Strom Thurmond, remained a Democrat for another four years and was 
peripheral to the state GOP activity on behalf of Goldwater in 1960.  At the center of that activity 
instead was Gregory D. Shorey, Jr., a Massachusetts native, owner of a sports equipment 
company, and rock-ribbed conservative who had risen through the South Carolina GOP ranks in 
the 1950s as one of several younger activists battling a patronage-oriented Old Guard.  As party 
chairman in 1960, he worked with a fellow northern transplant, the textile magnate and 
Republican financier Roger Milliken, to assure a surprise vote at the state convention pledging 
all fourteen delegates to a Goldwater presidential candidacy.  As Milliken told a local journalist, 
the vote was “designed to call attention of GOP bigwigs and Nixon personally of conservative 
sentiment in these parts.”154  Unsurprisingly for Yankee businessmen like Shorey and Milliken, 
Goldwater’s anti-labor stances and economic conservatism were as significant components of his 
ideological appeal as his constitutional opposition to civil rights legislation.  Conservative 
ideology was broadening in the South – coming increasingly to resemble the national brand – at 
the same time that national conservatism became more “southernized” through a deepening and 
increasingly populist approach to racial issues.              
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Though conservative Republicans’ pursuit of this kind of southern strategy met with loud 
opposition from GOP moderates, a basic imbalance in the factional politics of civil rights was 
already apparent within the party by 1960.  To be sure, key Republican officials crusaded 
aggressively on behalf of civil rights.  Most notably in 1960, New York Governor Nelson 
Rockefeller withheld his endorsement of Richard Nixon until he could secure an aggressive civil 
rights plank in the party platform in the infamous (to conservatives) “Treaty of Fifth Avenue.”155  
Moreover, as typified by President Eisenhower’s dispatching of federal troops to Little Rock, 
Arkansas in 1957 to enforce the Brown decision, Republican governance in the executive branch 
in the later 1950s, while insufficient in the eyes of civil rights activists, was hardly calculated to 
win the political allegiance of segregationist southerners.
156
   
Nevertheless, support for civil rights was more prevalent at the elite level of Republican 
office-holders working to sustain electoral coalitions than it was in the middle range of engaged 
party activists and officials.  At least as early as the immediate postwar years, and likely earlier 
still, northern Democratic activists showed at once more pervasive and more intense support for 
civil rights than their Republican counterparts.
157
  “Basically and sociologically,” Theodore 
White wrote in Collier’s in 1956, “Republican state organizations are unlikely to go out for the 
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predominantly working class Negro unless flogged into it by the White House.”  As one RNC 
official told his chairman two years later, “How many Republicans would sit down in their own 
home and break bread with a Negro?  I’ve done it, but even I don’t say much about it for fear 
other Republicans would look down their nose at me.”158  The lack of a sizeable activist bloc for 
whom civil rights advocacy was a salient and central concern led the Nixon campaign in 1960 to 
err much further on the side of caution against alienating southern whites than against African 
Americans.  The campaign neglected black mobilization, and Nixon went to great lengths to 
avoid public interaction with civil rights activists, much to the vocal dismay of the RNC’s head 
of minority outreach.
159
  Already in 1960, as a consequence both of the balance of pressure 
within the party base and the developing political landscape for pursuing new voters, the GOP’s 
racial strategy was beginning to tilt in the direction that Barry Goldwater, one year later, would 
articulate to a Republican audience in Atlanta.  “We’re not going to get the Negro vote as a bloc 
in 1964 and 1968,” the senator declared, “so we ought to go hunting where the ducks are.”160    
 The Nixon-Kennedy race of 1960 was determinedly non-ideological.  As they had done 
in 1956, National Review’s staff debated whether or not to publish an endorsement.  William 
Rusher, always the most caustic when it came to considering the prospect of turning the GOP 
into a conservative vessel, argued strongly against offering any endorsements.  Even to pursue 
the hope of building and sustaining a viable conservative presence within that party seemed 
foolish to him.  “I think that both major parties, as presently constituted, are simply highly 
efficient vote-gathering machines,” he wrote.  “It is pointless to upbraid such a machine for 
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failing to concern itself with principles.”  Rusher held out hope for the independent emergence in 
the coming years of a “new and more highly ideologized political party.”161  As it would happen, 
just such an ideologized party seemed to appear, with deceptive speed, by 1964.  And contrary to 
Rusher’s prediction, the party in question turned out to be that very “machine” itself, the GOP.  It 
would, however, prove significantly less efficient than usual at the task of vote-gathering that 
year.    
 The story of the 1964 Goldwater insurgency is a tale that movement conservatives and 
their scholarly chroniclers have long reveled in detailing.  From the organizational spadework of 
F. Clifton White’s “Syndicate” of Young Republican allies, to the parliamentary maneuvering by 
which Goldwaterites swept the party offices in charge of delegate selection in one state after 
another, to the serially faltering efforts by established Republican moderates to beat Goldwater to 
the nomination, the tale makes for an irresistible origin story for the modern right.  The 
Goldwater insurgency was all the more remarkable for having been carried out through party 
nomination channels that had yet to be rendered more easily permeable via reform.  Its success 
provided a potent demonstration of the practical power of ideological zeal when effectively 
mobilized in pursuit of intraparty goals.  Goldwaterites’ Republican opponents underscored this 
point by frequently casting conservatives’ factional efforts as illegitimate and unfair play.  
“These groups are attempting to take over Republican committees and clubs in an effort to move 
the party to the rights by internal force,” one complained, “rather than create a climate of opinion 
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which would make such a move profitable in terms of votes.”162  Nelson Rockefeller similarly 
warned of “subversion from the radical right,” which was currently “boring from within.”163  
 As we have seen, however, the activists working on Goldwater’s behalf were hardly 
foreign entities or interlopers in GOP affairs, and the 1964 campaign itself was not actually the 
origin story of legend.  Rather, it represented a culmination of organizational and ideological 
work that had been shaped by two decades of factional debate within the Republican Party.  In 
this sense it was appropriate that A Choice Not an Echo, the surprise bestselling campaign book 
by the extraordinary grassroots organizer Phyllis Schlafly, framed its case for Goldwater 
conservatism in an account of a quarter century of intraparty betrayal, extending back even 
farther than the Dewey-Taft wars.  Schlafly’s book offered a conspiratorial vision of party 
irresponsibility, depicting the marginalization of the Republican Party’s conservative majority as 
the work of a cabal of “secret kingmakers.”164  
 The long factional struggle to which Schlafly alluded had, over time, taken on more fully 
elaborated ideological content.  By 1964, Goldwater delegates were startling longtime students 
of American party politics by espousing a conception of partisan strength that seemed downright 
foreign.  “Even if the party loses,” one told a political scientist, “at least we have presented a 
clear alternative to the people.  At least we’ll have a strong party.”  What did he mean by strong?  
“Cohesive, united on principles.”  Another delegate reveled in the way that ideologically driven 
partisanship drew more and more issues into the orbit of philosophical contestation.  “I think 
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everything should be an issue,” she said.  “Cuba should be an issue.  Civil Rights should be an 
issue.  This is the first time a race will be on issues.  I think it’s wonderful.”165          
 Most American voters that year found it less wonderful.  Goldwater’s loss was 
historically massive – though so were his victories in the South, six months after his Senate vote 
against the Civil Rights Act.   He won five southern states outright and notched major 
Republican gains over the party’s showing four years earlier in virtually every other one.  The 
totals outside of Dixie, however, seemed to provide ample evidence for one commentator’s post-
election insistence that Republicans “cannot win in this era of American history” except as a 
“me, too” party.166  
 Factional strife predictably resumed in the aftermath of the debacle.  The avowedly non-
ideological “organization man” Ray Bliss was installed at the RNC to refocus party efforts on 
ground games, candidate recruitment, and party professionalization rather than divisive 
ideological battles.  Liberal Republican organizations like the Ripon Society, intellectually and 
politically savvy if thinly supported at the grassroots, moved to repudiate the Goldwaterites.  In 
turn, predictably, Goldwaterites blamed the defeat on moderate Republicans’ abandonment of 
their candidate, and organized a new satellite organization, the American Conservative Union, to 
sustain a coordinated conservative presence within the GOP.  The Republican right was not 
going anywhere.  But it would take another decade of continued factional efforts and political 
experimentation, amidst a shifting and expanding issue terrain, before conservatives could 
consolidate power within the Republican Party again.    
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Part II: Redrawing the Lines, 1968-1970
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Part II: Introduction 
In the 1970s, diagnoses of American political parties tended to sound more like eulogies.  
David Broder told book readers in 1971 that The Party’s Over.1  Political scientists’ debates over 
realignment segued into a new discussion of partisan dealignment.
2
  The chief electoral advisors 
to the decade’s hapless presidents echoed the sentiment.  “Realignment is less likely than the 
disintegration of both parties,” wunderkind pollster Patrick Caddell  told a journalist in 1975, 
predicting “the death of the two-party system” shortly prior to joining Jimmy Carter’s longshot 
presidential campaign.
3
  “Elections have become virtually totally candidate-oriented,” observed 
Gerald Ford’s pollster Robert Teeter a year later, at a Republican National Committee meeting 
following the president’s reelection loss to Carter.  He called that election “a non-partisan media 
event” carried out before an electorate inexorably shedding its party ties.4  
Later, in the aftermath of a midterm congressional election in 1978 that had produced, on 
the surface, unremarkable results, here was how veteran reporter Lance Morrow described the 
national scene.  “Today,” Morrow declared in Time magazine, “the parties have virtually 
collapsed as a force in American politics. This fall’s campaigns were emphatic confirmation of a 
trend that has been at work for a decade or more: the draining of energy and resources away from 
the parties and into a sort of fragmented political free-for-all.”  The disintegration of the parties 
and “chaotic individualism of American politics” were as evident in the behavior of elected 
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officials – like those populating a Congress that “now has all the discipline of a five-year-old’s 
birthday party” – as in the rising rates of self-declared independence, split ticket voting, and 
disengagement among the mass electorate.  Institutions connecting voters with politicians, 
Murrow reported, no longer served to aggregate interests into stable party alignments, producing 
a disorderly political world populated by entrepreneurial politicians, candidate-centered 
campaigns, and ad hoc legislative coalitions.  Procedural reforms crippled parties’ ability to 
control nominations, television provided a direct link between office-seeking individuals and the 
public, and proliferating special interest groups mobilized to push policymaking in multiple 
directions simultaneously.  Underlying these changes in the organization of politics, he claimed, 
was a popular disenchantment with parties that reflected the broader “atomizing process of 
American culture” – a turning away from traditional institutions of all kinds.  Morrow feared a 
day when the two parties would be “reduced to performing merely decorative and ceremonial 
duties,” with candidates using the party label as “a flag of convenience, and no more.”5       
Something of the declensionist cast of the 1970s discourse on parties has survived to 
color the decade’s political historiography.  To the limited extent that historians of the 1970s 
have addressed the party system at all, it has been to note the deepening incoherence and 
irrelevance of party politics and the unintended fragmenting effects of misguided reforms.
6
  They 
fit the disaggregating trajectory of the parties into a broader cultural and institutional context 
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dominated by processes of fragmentation, flux, dissolution, atomization – that great 1970s 
historical wringer yielding an Age of Fracture that would last for decades to come.
7
       
 The trouble with this enduring image of party decline in the 1970s is that it obscures 
contrasting developments whose significance has only become evident in hindsight.  Along 
various measurable dimensions of strength, coherence, and influence, American parties did 
indeed reach a nadir in the 1970s following years of decline.  But the reversal of those trend 
lines, and the beginning of a gradual but uninterrupted thirty-year progression toward ever-
greater partisanship – that too is a story of the 1970s.   
Take measurements of mass partisanship among those atomizing ordinary Americans.  
The proportion of voters answering “Independent” to surveyors’ question of party affiliation hit a 
plateau in 1974 and began to decline around 1978.
8
  The prevalence of “split-ticket” voting 
similarly peaked in the mid-1970s then began to decline, while one estimate of the influence of 
party labels on vote choice showed a gradual, long-term rebound of such “party effects” after 
1972 for presidential voting and 1978 for congressional voting.
9
  As for the behavior of elected 
officials in Morrow’s undisciplined kindergarten Congress, it too had already begun slowly to 
reorient along party lines by the time of his quip – a process encouraged rather than hampered by 
the decade’s congressional reforms, as will be seen.  Both the frequency of votes cast in which a 
majority of one party voted against a majority of the other and the margins of those vote 
                                                 
7
 Daniel T. Rodgers, Age of Fracture (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 85-90.  See also Bruce J. 
Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics (New York: Da Capo Press, 
2001) and Edward D. Berkowitz, Something Happened: A Political and Cultural Overview of the Seventies (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2006). 
8
 James L. Sundquist pointed this out as early as 1983 in “‘Whither the American Party System?’ Revisited,” 
Political Science Quarterly Vol. 98 (Winter 1983/4): 576. It is reconfirmed in Larry Bartels, “Partisanship and 
Voting Behavior,” American Journal of Political Science Vol. 44 (2000): 35-37.  
9
 Barry C. Burden and David C. Kimball, Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided 
Government (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2002), 5, 66; Bartels, “Partisanship and Voting Behavior,” 42. 
 172 
 
differences began to rise starting in the early 1970s.
10
  And rather than reflecting mere reversions 
to some midcentury norm after temporary drops, these turnarounds would be revealed in time to 
be the beginning of a new, decades-spanning march of ever-rising partisanship. 
 What accounts for the dissonance between observers’ impression of party politics in the 
1970s and the partisan resurgence that appears to have originated in those years?  A second, 
related set of incipient trends offers a clue.  Trough-and-rebound arcs similar to those traced by 
measurements of party strength during the 1970s can also be seen in measures of ideological 
sorting among the two parties.  The parties’ ideological muddle at midcentury, a central theme in 
previous chapters, can be captured by a prevailing measurement of ideological distance between 
average members of the two congressional parties.  That figure remained at historic lows for the 
middle decades of the century – only to begin an unbroken upwards climb towards greater 
polarization starting in 1977.
11
  Within the mass electorate, meanwhile, trends in the measured 
association of partisan affiliation with self-described ideology and issue positions also showed 
long-term increases following early-1970s lows.
12
  Unsurprisingly, the percentage of Americans 
polled during presidential election years who affirmed the existence of meaningful differences 
between the two parties hit a nadir in 1972 and slowly, steadily increased after that.
13
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The following chapters argue that this very ideological sorting helped to drive the 
partisan resurgence.  One explanation for the declinism permeating the discussion of party 
politics at the time is that few contemporary observers drew such a relationship between 
partisanship and ideology, because their conception of the party system emphasized precisely its 
non-ideological nature.  American parties, according to this view, were broad-based, pragmatic 
coalitions incorporating diverse interests and outlooks, and partisan strength was measured in 
part by professionals’ ability to withstand the pressures of “purist” and issue-driven activists.  
But to counterpose parties and ideology in this way was to misapprehend some of the changes to 
the political system emerging in the 1970s.   
 Previous chapters have recounted the postwar circulation of ideas concerning partisanship 
and ideology and the frequently vexed efforts of activists on both the left and right during the 
1950s and 1960s to forge a national two-party politics of starker programmatic contrast – a 
choice, rather than an echo.  During the 1970s, the interplay of long-term developments with the 
concerted action of engaged activists, reformers, and political elites helped at last to render the 
two major parties more conducive to ideological sorting and differentiation, providing a new 
basis for the structure and orientation of party politics that lasted for decades to come.  By this 
account, the 1970s are better seen as an age of dynamic flux and experimentation for the parties 
than as the end state of parties’ terminal decline.  Indeed, the party system that 1970s activists 
helped to initiate would ultimately consist of less, rather than more, fragmentation – as parties, 
along the three dimensions traced in previous chapters, became increasingly centralized in their 
national organizations, increasingly defined and differentiated by issues, and increasingly 
capable of disciplined action.  Chapter Four reassesses the decade’s liberal-led reforms of both 
presidential nominating procedures and congressional rules and structure, revealing the 
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important currents of responsible-party thought motivating key reform architects and showing 
how those reforms helped to create a newly receptive institutional setting for programmatic 
party-building by activists.  Chapters Five and Six shift focus from the institutional setting to the 
activist mobilizations themselves, taking a look at who it was who engaged in these 
programmatic efforts during the 1970s, and with what consequences for the parties. 
Crucial to this story in the 1970s was the gradual fulfillment of a key goal of those 
activists: the emergence of two-party competition in the South.  Southern realignment enticed 
conservatives with the promise of new sources of conservative Republican electoral support as 
much as it enticed liberals with the promise of finally marginalizing the Democrats’ pesky 
internal conservative faction.  The forward march of this regional electoral process is a key factor 
both in the direction of change during the 1970s as well as its unheralded quality, since the 
realignment was slow and halting enough to be obscured by cross-cutting factors seeming to 
indicate partisan decline rather than transformation.  But the partisan changes were not only 
regional, and stemmed more from the efforts of engaged activists and political elites than from 
mass electoral behavior in any region.
14
  Ultimately, the arc of change traced in these chapters 
from Nixon’s presidency to Ronald Reagan’s inauguration involves a gradually tightening 
alignment between the policy positions and partisan affiliation of those comprising the “base” of 
each party.  It was a change wrought, in parallel if asymmetrical ways, by actors in both parties.       
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Chapter 4: The Age of Party Reform 
The first half of the 1970s saw two historic waves of party reforms initiated by 
Democratic activists – one aimed at the party’s presidential nominating procedures and national 
structure, the other aimed at its organization in Congress.  These were dramatic, highly contested 
efforts yielding far-reaching institutional changes that affected both parties. But if it is a cliché of 
reforms to invoke the law of unintended consequences, those of the 1970s were notable for the 
speed with which popular and scholarly discussion came to lament their ill effects.  Changes that 
proponents had initiated in the name of saving an endangered party system came soon enough to 
be blamed for that system’s very endangerment.  In 1970, the key party reform commission had 
declared that the alternative to opening up the Democratic Party’s nominating procedures would 
be either fragmentation or “the anti-politics of the street.”1  But by 1977, the prevailing tendency 
to blame the would-be treatment for the disease was typified by political scientist Everett Carll 
Ladd, Jr.,’s declaration in Fortune that “‘Reform’ is Wrecking the U.S. Party System.”2   
 What did these reforms entail?  The nominating changes emerged out of the debacle of 
the 1968 Democratic convention.  The Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection –
commonly referred to as the McGovern-Fraser Commission after its two succeeding chairmen, 
South Dakota Senator George McGovern and Minnesota Congressman Donald Fraser – 
established uniform standards for state nominating systems emphasizing transparency, grassroots 
participation, and “out-group” representation in convention delegations. One byproduct of states’ 
implementation of the reforms, largely unintended by the reformers, was a rapid proliferation of 
primary systems.  The reform impetus continued for a decade after the guidelines’ enactment, as 
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three successor commissions and a party charter-writing process tinkered continuously with the 
rules while consolidating McGovern-Fraser’s core transformations.  As for Congress, among the 
reforms made between 1970 and 1975 were requirements that the Democratic caucus vote to 
approve committee chairs, a diffusion of authority to subcommittees, the enhancement of party 
leaders’ institutional power, and, in the Senate, a reduction of the number of votes needed to 
break a filibuster.  This thumbnail sketch hardly does justice to the scope of activities during the 
Age of Party Reform.  But it can help to frame our understanding of the reputation that the 
period’s reformers have enjoyed – or, more accurately, suffered from – since their heyday. 
If the 1970s was a decade of party reform, it was also a decade dominated by agonized 
discussion of party decline.  That discussion provided the context in which early observers first 
lodged their critiques of reform efforts.  An initial, highly influential cycle of scholarly 
assessments cast the reforms as misguided interventions that weakened the parties, fragmented 
political authority, and hastened the rise of candidate-centered politics.
3
  More oddly, party 
decline has remained the context in which many historians have depicted the reforms, despite the 
fact that the allegedly terminal decline of parties reversed itself in the decades after their 
implementation.  To the limited extent that political historians of the 1970s have addressed these 
institutional changes, it has typically been either to note their unintended fragmenting effects or 
to implicate the reformers in a narrative centered on the decline of New Deal liberalism and its 
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Democratic vessel.
4
  They have rightly come to view the 1970s as a “pivotal decade” producing 
lasting transformations in U.S. politics, but have mostly ignored the role that the institutional 
reconstruction of the parties played in those transformations.
5
   
This chapter reassesses the reforms, their historical significance, and their connection to 
the subsequent emergence of a more programmatic, ideologically sorted party system.  It argues 
that the two reform initiatives, of nomination procedures and congressional organization, were 
connected in both personnel and outlook to a greater extent than scholars have noted.  It also 
argues that responsible party themes, especially the importance of issue politics and party 
nationalization, informed the outlook of key activists involved and helped shape some of the key 
outcomes of their efforts.  Ultimately, reforms so often cast as contributors to party decline in 
fact helped to create a newly receptive institutional setting for programmatic, issue-based 
activism within the parties, with consequences for future ideological sorting and polarization.   
 The crucible of the 1960s shaped the rhetoric and dynamics of efforts during the Age of 
Party Reform, underlying the paradoxical combination of centralizing and decentralizing, 
process-oriented and ideologically-driven elements that long muddied reforms’ reputation.  New 
social movement mobilizations fuelled a political insurgency within the Democratic Party in 
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1968 that was issue-oriented and ideological.  The insurgents attributed their political failure that 
year to a set of outdated party procedures and structures that empowered entrenched officials at 
the expense of activists motivated by substantive goals.  The reform movement they launched 
utilized the participatory rhetoric of 1960s social movements rather than older responsible party 
emphases on discipline and majority rule, leading many scholars to cast them as latter-day, anti-
party Progressives.
6
  But the reformers’ core goal resonated powerfully with classic responsible-
party themes: an issue-oriented party, accountable to an activist base representing its ideological 
majority.  This goal also underlay a shared set of antagonists, namely conservative southern state 
parties and northern urban machines.  Participatory reforms would empower issue activists at the 
expense of professionals in state and local parties motivated more typically by patronage and 
organizational incentives.  Because the reforms’ implementation required new assertions of 
national party power over states while benefitting activists concerned with national issues, the 
effort also shared the responsible party goal of nationalization.  Party nationalization in this sense 
did not mean the geographic expansion of the party – indeed, central to the reform project was 
the disempowerment of the party’s conservative southerners – but rather the centralization of 
institutional and power in national organs dominated by the party’s liberal majority.   
The movement for congressional reform that mobilized in parallel with party reform and 
with the support of an overlapping activist network pursued the same core goals.  Congressional 
reformers targeted the seniority norm because it entrenched conservative southern members in 
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positions of great power as committee chairmen.  Placing committee appointments instead in the 
hands of the caucus empowered the party’s ideological majority while providing incentives for 
discipline.  Ensuring majority rule in the party, and in the Senate as a whole via filibuster reform, 
fostered party nationalization by reducing the clout of a dissident sectional minority.   
Within the context of a two-party system, the long-term consequence of “ideologizing” 
and nationalizing the Democratic Party both in presidential politics and lawmaking would be an 
ideological sorting-out of both major parties.  Reformers were neither unaware nor leery of this 
consequence.  But the fragmentary confusions accompanying this sorting process once it got 
underway would look to critics more like the chaotic fruits of destructive reform rather than the 
gradual fulfillment of an ideological realignment that reform helped to birth.                  
 
From Revolt to Reform  
 
 If the origins of the 1970s party reforms lay in the political conflicts of the 1960s, then 
the translation of insurgent social movement energies into an institutional reform project that 
would last a decade arguably began on June 23, 1968.  That evening, 200 delegates to the 
Connecticut Democratic Party convention in Hartford staged a walk-out.   
The meeting was meant to select the 44 state delegates to the national party convention in 
Chicago that August.  Connecticut’s Democratic Party was a traditional, tightly organized 
machine, and the way that the state convention had worked in years past was straightforward.  
The organization, under the control of longtime party boss John Bailey, would select the 
delegates, all officially unpledged to any presidential candidate.  (This year, unofficially, the 
regulars were all Hubert Humphrey backers, as was Bailey.)  At the national convention, the 
delegation would vote as a single bloc, since Connecticut, like a dozen other states, employed the 
“unit rule,” which bound delegation minorities to majority decisions. 
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What made that year’s state convention different were the insurgent antiwar campaigns of 
Eugene McCarthy and the late Robert Kennedy, which had managed to secure almost a fourth of 
the delegates.
7
  That show of strength came as a shock to Bailey, who had predicted to the White 
House as recently as January that, at most, “10 or 15 state delegates out of 1,000 … might be 
noisy” at the state convention, and thus “there will be no problem at all.”8  In the face of 
insurgent delegates numbering instead in the hundreds, Bailey felt compelled at the outset of the 
convention to scrap the unit rule for the first time and to offer a handful of national delegation 
seats to McCarthy backers.  The McCarthy forces, led by Americans for Democratic Action 
(ADA) activist Joe Duffy and local organizer Anne Wexler, demanded twelve of the 44 seats, in 
proportion to their claimed strength at the state convention.  Nine was as high as regulars would 
let Bailey go.  Invective rained down from the stage: officials condemned the antics of the 
McCarthy supporters, while Kennedy confidante Richard Goodwin denounced Bailey as “the last 
nonelected boss in America.”  Finally, Duffy announced his delegates’ rejection of the party’s 
offer, rounded up the troops, and marched out of the hall to loud boos from the regulars.
9
 
What the exiles did next was consequential.  A steering committee of McCarthy delegates 
and state campaign organizers met that night in West Hartford.  All of them agreed immediately 
that a credentials challenge to the Connecticut delegation in Chicago would be necessary, but 
McCarthy’s state coordinator persuaded them to pursue something further.  The same obstacles 
that McCarthy supporters encountered in Connecticut in the run-up to the state convention – not 
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only the procedural irregularities and arbitrary actions of local officials, but the closed nature of 
the system itself – were experienced by activists in other states.  He argued that the credentials 
challenges planned for Chicago should have the backing of a report that would catalogue state 
nominating procedures across the country and make the case for systemic reform.  They gave a 
moniker to the yet-to-be-assembled panel intended as the face of this report: the Commission on 
the Democratic Selection of Presidential Nominees.  Over the next month, activists recruited six 
men and one woman to the body, to be chaired by Iowa’s pro-McCarthy governor, Harold 
Hughes.  This was a staff-driven operation, however.  The full commission only met once.
10
       
To deflect suspicions that the reform agenda was a mere stalking horse for McCarthy’s 
candidacy, the organizers of what would come to be known as the Hughes Commission took 
pains to include a Humphrey supporter in its ranks.  Donald Fraser fit the bill.  The Minneapolis 
Congressman was a longtime Democratic-Farmer-Labor (DFL) Party activist who remained 
loyal to his political mentor, Humphrey, while breaking with Lyndon Johnson’s administration 
over its policies in Vietnam.  His substantive sympathy for the insurgent campaigns’ policy 
agenda was matched by a longstanding interest in party reform that attracted him to these 
activists’ embryonic effort.  Fraser had long had an affinity for parliamentary forms of 
governance featuring disciplined but permeable parties with clear policy agendas.
11
  By 1968, he 
had assumed the chairmanship of the Democratic Study Group, the caucus of liberal House 
Democrats that was leading the charge in Congress to empower the party caucus and its 
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leadership.  His acceptance of the vice chairmanship of this new Commission signified, in his 
mind, an application of the same reform impulse to a different party arena.
12
 
The staff worked that summer on research for a report cataloguing inequities and 
inadequacies in state and territorial nominating systems as well as the national convention.  The 
resulting report was published as The Democratic Choice.  The Commission ensured the report’s 
practical impact at the Chicago Convention in August through coordination among allied 
members of both the Rules Committee and Credentials Committee.  This convention strategy had 
been shaped by the resolution of the Connecticut delegation dispute.  The McCarthy delegates’ 
walk-out there proved short-lived, as they eventually decided to accept the nine seats offered by 
John Bailey along with an added sweetener: two out of the delegation’s committee slots.13  Anne 
Wexler thus became a member of the Rules Committee, organizing a whip system to keep pro-
reform members of the panel coordinated.  She also ensured that a copy of The Democratic 
Choice was waiting for every member of the committee when it convened.
14
 
In both the substance of its recommendations as well as the basis for its critique of the 
nominating system, the report would prove highly influential.  “Events in 1968 have called into 
question the integrity of the convention system for nominating presidential candidates,” The 
Democratic Choice declared.  “Recent developments have put the future of the two-party system 
itself into serious jeopardy.”  Such developments included upheavals on campuses and in the 
ghettoes, which reflected growing popular alienation from the political system.  The irregularities 
and non-responsiveness encountered by the insurgent campaigns threatened to compound this 
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alienation, unless the the party made an effort to meet “the demand for more direct democracy 
and the call for an end to ‘boss control’ of the nominating machinery.”15   
The Commission recommended that certain actions be taken immediately in Chicago, 
most notably a prohibition on any delegation’s enforcement of the unit rule and an aggressive 
implementation of the provisions in the Democratic National Committee (DNC)’s Call to the 
1968 Convention relating to racial non-discrimination.  The panel also prescribed an array of 
state-level procedural changes for the future, starting with the outright abolition of all methods of 
delegate selection lacking direct popular participaiton.
16
  Further recommendations were 
organized around basic principles.  “Meaningful access” required an end to proxy voting, secret 
caucuses, and informal or unpublicized rules for delegate selection.  “Clarity of purpose” implied 
that voters would choose delegates for that role alone, without thereby selecting the same people 
as state party officers.  The principle of timeliness meant that no delegates could be chosen more 
than six months prior to the national Convention, before the issues and candidates relavent to the 
election had emerged.  (Over 600 delegates to the 1968 convention were chosen in 1966.)  
Finally, the report advocated proportional representation of candidate preferences at all levels of 
the delegate selection process except winner-take-all primaries.  As will be seen, all of these 
procedural critiques and prescriptions lived on in the reform efforts to come.   
Just as important was the Hughes Commission’s theory of the party system and political 
change.  The Democratic Choice put new calls for reform in the context of nearly two centuries 
of evolution toward more direct democracy in presidential politics.  More recent developments in 
communications technology, especially radio and television, “contributed to the continuing 
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expansion of the democratic dimension of the selection of presidents.”  But most important were 
ongoing changes in the mass electorate.  African Americans were increasingly dissatisfied with a 
role as “junior partners” in the New Deal Democratic coalition, putting them in conflict with 
northern party organizations at the state and city levels.  “Meanwhile,” the report claimed, 
“Negro demands for civil rights and the support of those demands by the Northern liberal wing 
of the Party have alienated the once Solid South and dropped the black belt from the list of states 
that could be counted on, or even hoped for, on the Democratic side in presidential elections.”17 
If the catylitic effects of the civil rights revolution created one stream of intra-party 
tensions and demands for institional reform, another stream grew out of a more gradual electoral 
development the Commission labeled “the emergence of the issue-oriented independent.”  “The 
electorate is generally more affluent and more widely educated,” it argued.  Stable partisan 
attachments have eroded, while “issue-oriented individuals who rank relatively abstract 
ideological questions high among the criteria by which they approve or disapprove of candidates 
have become a substantial portion of the electorate, as the Vietnam War has shown.”   How did 
this relate to the nominating system?  The proliferation of issue-oriented voters “has taken a 
significant portion of the electorate outside the tightly-knit groups represented by Democratic 
party operatives.”18  The thrust of the commission’s prescriptions was to empower issue-driven 
party activism relative to the exercise of control by those existing professionals.   
In offering this analysis, the report’s drafters had in mind most immediately those voters 
and activists influenced by the mobilizations of the 1960s, but their description of the increasing 
issue orientation in U.S. politics could also have described the “amateurs” analyzed by James Q. 
                                                 
17
 The Democratic Choice, 12, 13. 
18
 The Democratic Choice, 14. 
   
185 
 
Wilson in 1962 and the “purists” of Nelson Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky’s 1968 textbook.19  By 
using the designation “issue-oriented,” drafters implied that the key distinction between such 
voters and the party professionals was less a matter of differing issue positions than of differing 
relationships toward national issues per se.  At the outset of McCarthy’s candidacy in early 1968, 
journalist Andrew Hacker had identified this distinction as a key obstacle to the campaign’s 
efforts.  “The typical delegate is not only not chosen or pledged by a primary,” he wrote, “but he 
is a local party loyalist.  Most are year-round county committeemen, quite senior in service, and 
accustomed to going along with the leadership.  Very few, especially among the Democrats, 
have opinions that are in any way ideological and quite a few have no opinions at all on national 
issues.”20  Hacker concluded that, while “in the best of political worlds it might be possible for the 
parties to reflect and incorporate the most pressing issues of the day in their candidates and 
platforms,” such responsiveness was usually lacking.  “We do not, then, have a really ‘open’ 
political system.  It is smug and stolid and well-guarded by those who got into it first.”        
That system proved less well-guarded than Hacker had anticipated, given the surprising 
capacity of McCarthy and Kennedy (much of whose campaign, after his assassination, would 
hastily reassemble for the convention behind George McGovern) to amass delegates during the 
spring and summer of 1968.  But the insurgent forces still entered the Chicago convention on 
August 26
th
 facing an essentially insurmountable delegate deficit, which shaped their dual-track 
strategy.  First, they would wage an all-out fight over the Vietnam plank of the platform, lodging 
substantive arguments for an unconditional halt to bombing as well as a political argument about 
the need for the two-party system to produce a viable choice for voters on such an important 
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issue.  Second, they would pursue procedural and credentials challenges that, short of shaking up 
the delegate counts sufficiently to give an alternative candidate to Humphrey a chance at the 
nomination, would at least lay the groundwork for fundamental reforms in later years.  
Famously, the platform fight made it to the convention floor, where the antiwar plank went down 
to defeat while still garnering 40 percent of the vote.  Even more famously, violence outside the 
International Amphitheater escalated through the week as demonstrators clashed with police 
under the aggressive direction of Mayor Richard Daley, filling jail cells and hospitals by the 
hundreds and rendering Chicago a notorious watchword in convention history.  This spectacle of 
discord provided the backdrop for fateful decisions on party reform garnering no such attention. 
Battles within the Credentials Committee illustrated connections between a longstanding 
reform agenda related to the civil rights movement and the newer reform efforts.  The number of 
credentials challenges in 1968 was unprecedented: seventeen in total, covering fifteen states.
21
  
Most Deep South states faced challenges on the basis of alleged violations of the Call’s strong 
provisions regarding racial discrimination.  Those provisions had made it into the Call thanks to 
the work of the Special Equal Rights Committee, a DNC panel established in the wake of the 
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) challenge at the 1964 convention.  The drama of 
that prior fight and the subsequent work of the committee helped ensure that both McCarthy and 
Humphrey endorsed the challenge made in 1968 against the Mississippi regulars, which called 
for the seating of the alternative slate led by civil rights activist Aaron Henry.
22
  The Special 
Equal Rights Committee thus became a model for wresting institutional reforms from dramatic 
on-the-ground delegation fights, one that the new reformers took to heart.  The McCarthy forces, 
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whose credentials effort was headed by former MFDP counsel Joseph Rauh, took pains to build 
ties to alternative slates filing challenges in Alabama, Georgia, and Texas, thereby bootstrapping 
civil rights advocacy to the broader reform agenda they were developing at the convention.   
The Credentials Committee upheld the Mississippi challenge and meted out partial 
victories to two other southern challengers.  Both the Georgia regulars and Julian Bond’s 
alternative slate were seated, while the Alabama regulars were seated only on condition of 
signing an oath pledging not to support any presidential ticket “other than the nominees of the 
Democratic National Convention.”  Though the specter of George Wallace set the context for 
this requirement, the issue of loyalty to the national party had been a lightning rod in Democratic 
conventions for decades and a principle highlighted by civil rights activists to achieve reforms.  
The decisions to force a pledge on one delegation and to fully or partially replace two others with 
self-described “national” Democrats marked steps in the nationalization of southern parties.  This 
dynamic was also seen in the Special Equal Rights Committee’s final report, which called for a 
Commission on Party Structure “to study the relationship between the National Democratic Party 
and its constituent State Democratic Parties, in order that full participation of all Democrats 
without regard to race, color, creed or national origin may be facilitated by uniform standards.”23                 
Meanwhile, the reformers’ broader effort was evident in the array of credentials 
challenges filed against northern delegations that were unrelated to racial discrimination, 
justified instead on the basis of principles more sweeping than those typically seen in party 
conventions.  Challengers based their case against delegations in several states on the 
undemocratic character of the unit rule, the use of ex officio delegates, and delegate selection by 
unelected committees – all perfectly lawful devices.  Challenges against Connecticut and 
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Minnesota touted novel principles relating to proportional representation of candidate preference 
and adherence to the Supreme Court’s “one-man, one-vote” ruling in the allocation of state 
convention delegates.
24
  The McCarthy forces’ strategy in lodging such systemic challenges – 
mainly based on analyses in The Democratic Choice – was pragmatic, a short-term bid to sway 
delegates.
25
  But they set in motion future reform efforts, offered as fig leafs by Humphrey 
backers to secure the nomination.  The Credentials Committee rejected all of the northern 
challenges but included a resolution calling for the DNC to establish a new “Special Committee” 
to study delegate selection practices and recommend improvements following the principles of 
timeliness and participation.
26
  This resolution, following the Special Equal Rights Committee’s 
final report, became the second convention text calling for a reform commission.   
The third and most important document giving an official mandate to party reforms 
emerged from the Rules Committee.  There, Anne Wexler’s whip system kept sympathetic 
members behind a series of resolutions drawn from the findings of the Hughes Commission.  The 
Humphrey forces dismissed the commission as “an unofficial, largely self-appointed group,” and 
successfully voted down all of the Wexler faction’s resolutions.27  Importantly, though, their 
strategy focused on limiting the reformers’ short-term impact on the nomination rather than 
rebutting the substance of their arguments as laid out in The Democratic Choice.  Indeed, the 
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Humphrey forces conceded the validity of many of those arguments.
28
  In the process, they 
contributed to a growing consensus around the legitimacy of pursuing reforms after the election.   
Whereas the Humphrey strategists and party regulars were satisfied to leave questions of 
reform to a purely advisory future commission issuing non-binding recommendations, however, 
the reformers seized the opportunity to put the power of party law behind the mandate of any 
prospective reform body.  Wexler helped draft a Rules Committee minority report resolving that 
the Call to the 1972 Democratic Convention would include language requiring state parties to 
make “all feasible efforts” to adopt delegate selection procedures that allow for full and timely 
public participation and prohibiting the use of the unit rule at all levels of the process.
29
  When 
the convention adopted that report on Tuesday, August 27, in a surprise 1,350-1,206 vote – the 
only victory for any minority report in 1968 – few except the reform activists themselves 
realized its potential significance.  On top of the resolutions calling for a formal commission to 
study major party reforms, the convention had now committed the party to implementing such 
reforms for 1972 and provided guiding language for what kind of reforms they would be.           
The post-convention survival of the commission idea owed to the same dynamics that 
had fostered its emergence.  Democratic officials and Humphrey’s campaign operation endorsed 
the commission largely as a means of reconciling with McCarthy and Kennedy supporters, while 
the Hughes Commission activist network remained fully engaged on the issue both during the 
desultory months of the fall campaign and after Humphrey’s loss to Richard Nixon.  A new 
national party chair elected in January 1969, Fred Harris, explicitly championed thoroughgoing 
reform.  Humphrey, reeling from defeat and still mindful to repair relations with the party’s 
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insurgent wing, insisted at the January DNC meeting that “the winds of change are strong” and 
“will not be denied.”30  He endorsed resolutions authorizing Harris to appoint two reform 
commissions: a Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, to focus on nominating 
procedures and national-state party relations, and a Commission on Rules, focusing on the 
procedures of the party conventions themselves.  Both resolutions passed by voice vote.    
Harris and his aides selected members and staff for the two commissions with dual goals 
of achieving a degree of geographical and constituency-based representativeness while also 
ensuring solid majorities in favor of ambitious reform.  To avoid exacerbating tensions with 
party regulars by placing Harold Hughes in charge of the delegate selection commission, Harris 
opted for what was, as of 1969, a more congenial compromise choice for chairman: South 
Dakota Senator George McGovern.  Hughes would serve as vice-chairman, while two other 
members of his unofficial commission from the preceding year, Congressman Donald Fraser and 
former Kennedy campaign aide Fred Dutton, also received appointments.  Organized labor had 
two representatives on the new commission; Aaron Henry held one of two “civil rights” seats; 
and two moderate southern party leaders, Will Davis of Texas and LeRoy Collins of Florida, also 
accepted membership.  The 28-member panel also featured two political scientists steeped in the 
scholarship on reform and comparative party systems: the advocate-turned-critic of responsible 
party doctrine, Austin Ranney, and a leading U.S. scholar of British politics, Samuel Beer.   
If the official membership of the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection 
tilted towards reformers, the composition of the staff that McGovern and Harris recruited did so 
to a greater extent.  McGovern’s longtime aide Robert Nelson headed it, while his 1968 
convention coordinator Ken Bode served as research director and McCarthy campaigner Eli 
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Segal served as staff counsel.  Wexler, too much of a lightning rod to be appointed directly to the 
commission, used her position on a panel of outside consultants to maximum effect.  Like the 
Hughes Commission, the new panel would fatefully prove a staff-driven and dominated outfit.                        
 
“By the People Rather than By the Bosses” 
 
The preceding origin story of what became known as the McGovern-Fraser Commission 
is worth examination precisely because it embodied themes, actors, and patterns that would recur 
during the ensuing reform process.  The constellation of forces on each side proved an important 
constant.  From 1968 on, the most visible proponents of reform were those youthful, educated 
participants in McCarthy and Kennedy’s presidential campaigns and, more broadly, the era’s 
progressive social mobilizations related to civil rights, the Vietnam War, feminism, and the 
counterculture.  Their political outlook, emphasizing both procedural openness and substantive 
commitments on issues of peace, racial and economic justice, and identity, came collectively to 
be deemed the “New Politics.”  In contrast to New Left activists, New Politics reformers sought 
to work within the Democratic Party and envisioned a potentially majoritarian coalition.  This 
would combine the progressive elements of existing New Deal constituencies, unaffiliated 
middle-class voters motivated by interests like consumerism, feminism, and environmentalism, 
and such “out-groups” as youth, minorities, and the poor.31  The impetus was not circumscribed 
generationally, however.  Longstanding advocacy outfits like the ADA also supported reform, 
while collaboration between New Politics activists and the older Democratic club movement 
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found expression in the 1968 founding of the pro-reform New Democratic Coalition (NDC), 
which enjoyed a rocky organizational life but showed vitality in certain state chapters.
32
  
While fights over issues and candidates set the context for reform, its deeper stakes 
concerned programmatic politics and party nationalization.  Unsurprisingly then, the opposition 
to reform coalesced in 1968 as an alliance of the elements that had long undergirded the party’s 
reputation for pragmatic and decentralized bargaining.  The conservative South and the 
remaining urban machines constituted two of those blocs, but they lacked persuasive rationales 
for the legitimacy of the procedures – localized, often informal – on which they depended.33  It 
would instead be left to the other major anti-reform constituency, the majority faction of the 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) under 
president George Meany, to articulate the case against reform in the years after Chicago.  
The opposition of that wing of the labor movement had multiple sources.
34
  During the 
nomination battles of 1968, Meany and the AFL-CIO’s Committee on Political Education 
(COPE) had made an aggressive push for Humphrey, in part by pressuring member unions 
sympathetic to McCarthy or Kennedy to refrain from endorsement.
35
  Those efforts stemmed in 
part from a substantive commitment to hardline anticommunism in general and to continued U.S. 
military engagement in Vietnam in particular.  Ideology also overlapped with cultural and 
generational tensions.  The tenor of New Left and New Politics appeals antagonized many labor 
leaders and members, none more so than those in Meany’s base among the building and skilled 
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trades.
36
  Finally, the existing constellation of authority in the party privileged Meany and his 
allies.  Meany had successfully positioned himself as the primary interlocutor on behalf of labor 
in negotiations with the Johnson White House, while the AFL-CIO exercised significant 
influence in party conventions via relationships with the state party workers and officials who 
typically led delegations.  These arrangements relied on informal, face-to-face bargaining among 
small numbers of players.  A reform project intending to regularize delegate selection and 
convention procedures and to greatly expand the number of participants would render moot the 
informal power that Meany and COPE had garnered through painstaking work over the years.  
Thus ideology, culture, and institutional dynamics all combined to make them hostile to reform. 
But, contrary to most accounts of intra-Democratic conflict over reform, labor’s position 
was not monolithic.  Meany’s best-known rival had long been Walter Reuther of the United Auto 
Workers (UAW), who not only signified a leadership threat on the AFL-CIO Executive Council 
but also embodied a contrasting outlook on the labor movement and its political role.  Reuther 
espoused a social democratic vision putting labor at the organizational core of a broader, cross-
class array of progressive reform and social justice movements.  By the mid-1960s, that outlook 
translated into independent UAW support for a wide network of causes and organizations, from 
teacher and farmworker unionism to antipoverty efforts to campus activism.
37
  The UAW’s 
openness to coalitions with the New Left, new identity groups, and middle-class liberal activists 
put it at basic strategic odds with the Meany wing.  Foreign policy issues, moreover, exacerbated 
the conflict.  Reuther had dovish instincts on Cold War policy and, by the mid-1960s, faced 
intense pressure from other UAW leaders and rank-and-file activists to break with the AFL-
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CIO’s line on Vietnam.  In 1966 he issued a wide-ranging open letter to UAW locals decrying 
the AFL-CIO’s lack of “social vision.”  He pointed to the confederation’s “narrow and negative” 
foreign policy and its failure “to develop stronger ties with labor’s historic and essential allies in 
the liberal and intellectual academic community and among America’s young people.”38  He 
resigned from the AFL-CIO Executive Council in 1967.  The following year, the 1.4 million-
member UAW formally disaffiliated from the confederation. 
The split within the labor movement manifested itself in leaders’ approach to party 
reform.  Early in 1969, COPE director Alexander Barkan met with Fred Harris to object to the 
preliminary list of members of what would become the McGovern-Fraser Commission, claiming 
it was overly stacked with insurgents.  Shortly thereafter, Meany, Barkan, and AFL-CIO 
Secretary-Treasurer Lane Kirkland made the fateful decision to institute a blanket confederation 
boycott of the commission.
39
  As one labor source told a journalist, the panel would only serve to 
“give attention to those ‘New Politics’ nuts who helped lose the election for us.”40  UAW 
leaders’ outlook on party reform, by contrast, reflected their interest in allying institutionally 
with new social movement forces in the Democratic orbit.  Reuther worked directly with Harris 
to organize the McGovern-Fraser Commission at the beginning of 1969 with the goal, in 
Reuther’s words, of recruiting “people committed to bring about fundamental change in the 
structure and opportunity for participation in the Democratic Party.”41  The UAW’s 
representative on the commission, Bill Dodds, was an active member.  The union even helped to 
underwrite the commission’s activities on several occasions, providing facilities for regional 
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hearings in 1969 and funding the publication of the commission’s report, Mandate for Reform, 
the following year.
42
  Throughout this time, Paul Schrade, the UAW’s California director and its 
chief liaison to the New Politics, lobbied for reform from the outside as NDC co-chairman.   
 Following an inaugural meeting of the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate 
Selection in March, 1969, the panel held a series of 17 regional public hearings through the 
spring and summer while its staff catalogued state-by-state party bylaws and procedures.  The 
regional hearings generated publicity for the cause while activating reformist networks.  Witness 
lists were dominated by those activists most interested in participatory reforms, while the fairly 
paltry turnout of representatives from the regular party organizations reflected the same 
combination of strategic wariness and political weakness that the AFL-CIO was demonstrating.
43
           
 The New Politics vision of political coalition that underlay party reformers’ agenda for 
institutional change recurred as a subject of discussion at the hearings.  “New coalitions of big-
city Blacks, Youth, and suburban young to middle-aged must be brought into the party, if for no 
other reason than numbers,” said the civil rights activist and DC national committeeman 
Channing Emery Phillips during one hearing.
44
  “Younger voters, black citizens, and college 
educated suburbanites” were “three constituencies on which the Democratic Party must build as 
the lower middle class, blue collar vote erodes,” concurred commission member Fred Dutton, 
outlining the argument he would make in his 1971 book Changing Sources of Power.
45
  The 
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NDC echoed this sense of the emerging forces in politics in its call “to coalesce a massive 
constituency of the oppressed with a massive constituency of conscience” – a coalition that, it 
acknowledged, did “not presently compose a voting majority of politically active Americans, nor 
even of the Democratic Party.  But it is a large and growing proportion of the voting public.”46                    
Hearing witnesses drew a connection between the dynamics of that emerging political 
coalition and the growing importance of issue politics in American partisan behavior.  Edmund 
Muskie, Humphrey’s 1968 running mate and a widely recognized contender for the 1972 
presidential nomination, observed that “the electorate is becoming more educated.  The 
grassroots Democrats are becoming more educated.”  What this meant was that “ideas alone” – 
issues and policies rather than partisan spirit or patronage – were coming to determine the 
political behavior of increasing numbers of Americans.
47
  Muskie’s argument recurred 
throughout the hearings, and a commission staff memo tasked with summarizing the testimony 
of witnesses put the matter succinctly.  “Vast numbers of intelligent and energetic Americans 
today … do not respond to the traditional inducements of party loyalty or patronage.  They are 
issue-oriented citizens…”48   “The real heart and soul of a political party is its policy, its 
philosophy, its stand on the great issues of the day,” McGovern declared at one hearing.  “Really 
the only purpose of party reform is to provide a vehicle through which those policies can be 
determined by the people rather than by the bosses.”49   
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A short-term political conflict catalyzed reformers’ efforts in this regard.  The perception 
that existing procedures had failed to bring about party nominations representative of the rank 
and file’s views on the key policy issue of Vietnam had provided the impetus for the movement.  
But systemic reform had implications that extended beyond transient issues and policy conflicts, 
and was relevant to a category of political actor a good deal more specific than “the people.”  
Ensuring through nationally mandated guidelines that party elites in the patchwork of state 
organizations could no longer exercise arbitrary control over delegate selection would have a 
permanent, structural effect: the relative empowerment of issue-driven activists, who had the 
inclination and resources to mobilize voluntarily.  As primary systems proliferated in the years 
following reform, engaged activists’ systematically higher participation rates and organizational 
capacity did indeed provide them a new structural position in the party.
50
 
Party nationalization loomed as another core theme in the panel’s work.  Commission 
staff summarizing the regional hearings reported that, “in the area of party structure, many 
witnesses have expressed the view that the national party should play a more significant role in 
the ongoing affairs of the party.”51  “The U.S. has become more national in economic, 
communication, and, increasingly, social terms,” Dutton pointed out, “yet the party essentially 
reflects a commonwealth base not true of most of the rest of American life.”  He advocated 
measures to integrate state and local parties with “presidential politics and the more inter-related 
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policy which we really have now.” 52  The most vivid demonstration of McGovern-Fraser’s 
nationalizing thrust would be its very success in prodding state and local parties to open up their 
nominating procedures.  But since the activists that reformers sought to empower tended to be 
motivated by national issues, making the party more issue-oriented was itself a way to encourage 
nationalization.  Activists like the McCarthyites, Beer wrote, “see themselves not so much as a 
faction within a state party as part of a nation-wide combination, and therefore want a system 
which will register their strength in the nation as a whole … Our politics, in short, is becoming 
more ‘nationalized’ and the nomination system should reflect this fact.”53   
 Over the course of public hearings and several meetings of the commission’s Executive 
Council, members and staff articulated and fixed into place the key elements of the reform 
agenda they would mandate to states in early 1970.  These elements, formalized as eighteen 
guidelines in the report Mandate for Reform, were notably consistent with the prescriptions first 
laid out by the Hughes commission in the summer of 1968.  Most practical were requirements to 
make delegate selection procedures transparent, codified, timely (within the calendar year of the 
national convention), and accessible to all Democrats.  The participatory focus also underlay 
prohibitions on devices that privileged party officials and office holders, including the automatic 
designation of delegate status to such officials (so-called ex-officio delegates) and proxy voting 
and lax quorum requirements at party meetings.  Closely related to such participatory measures 
were efforts to ensure that minority views on policy and candidate preferences could not be 
snuffed out by majorities.  Thus, the McGovern-Fraser Commission formalized the abolition of 
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the unit rule in state-level procedures as well as at national conventions.
54
  Another guideline 
required that candidates for delegate seats declare their presidential preference.   
 Though these participatory reforms would prove to be by far the most consequential and 
transformative of the McGovern-Fraser Commission’s actions, a second category of provisions, 
concerning demographic representation, came unexpectedly to occupy the center of thorny 
controversy beginning in the fall of 1969.  At the behest of members Fred Dutton and David 
Mixner, a guideline that had reaffirmed the old Special Equal Rights Committee’s provisions on 
racial discrimination was turned into two, the first addressing discrimination based on race, the 
second doing so for “age or sex.”  Those agreeing to this were quick to aver that methods for 
enforcing the guidelines would not constitute anything resembling numerical quotas for specific 
groups.  But at the last commission meeting prior to codifying the guidelines, Austin Ranney 
noted that “our fellow black Democrats feel that something more is needed than a no-
discrimination rule,” and suggested adding language urging state parties to include fair 
representation of racial minorities in their delegations.  Indiana Senator Birch Bayh augmented 
Ranney’s proposal with language referring to “some reasonable relationship between the 
representation of delegates and representation of the minority group to the population of the state 
in question.”55  After the Commission narrowly voted to adopt Bayh’s additions, Dutton and 
others pushed to apply the same language to the guideline covering women and youth.  Many 
members blanched, including Ranney, now lamenting having “opened Pandora’s box.”56  But 
they were unable or unwilling to mount a pushback against the extension.  
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The results were two reform guidelines, A-1 and A-2, whose quota-like demographic 
requirements covering racial minorities, women, and youth would prove to be a lightning rod of 
intraparty controversy for the next several years.  Ironically, demographic affirmative action was 
never a guiding priority for the hard core of reform activists in and around the commission staff.  
After the haphazard introduction of such measures internally in November 1969, the impetus to 
strengthen rather than water them down came from outside social movements.  In 1971, the 
National Women’s Political Caucus (NWPC), a new feminist organization led by Bella Abzug 
and Patsy Mink, managed to secure a key policy from the chairmen of both the DNC and the 
McGovern-Fraser Commission.  They agreed to add language to A-1 and A-2 stating that failure 
to achieve demographic representation in proportion to the three targeted groups’ presence in the 
population would constitute prima facie evidence of discrimination in any credentials challenges.   
This confirmation in all but name that state parties now needed to meet numerical quotas 
for African Americans, women, and youth sparked an intractable debate.  The history of failed 
promises to enforce intraparty antidiscrimination provisions against African Americans rendered 
hollow claims that quotas were unnecessary to achieve representation.
57
  The new aggressiveness 
of feminist activists, moreover, disinclined many officials from rolling back A-2.  At the same 
time, reform activists whose core goals were open participation and proportional representation 
of views were in an awkward position to argue effectively for measures privileging demographic 
representation above other kinds.  They faced an intellectual conflict between reforms meant to 
empower the grassroots in choosing the composition of delegations and those directing state 
parties to compose them in specific ways.  That conflict also explained why, compared to the 
transformative effects of the participatory reforms, the significance of the demographic quotas 
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would prove largely symbolic.  In the short term, they provided the basis for a slew of credentials 
challenges at the 1972 convention, and thus were of some practical importance that year.  But in 
the long term, precisely because the main thrust of the McGovern-Fraser reforms circumscribed 
the autonomy of convention delegates and bound them to the wishes of primary and caucus 
participants, debate over provisions regulating the composition of delegations would dwindle.  
The real significance of the A-1 and A-2 guidelines in the early 1970s lay in how they 
symbolized the Democratic Party’s institutional posture toward the new social movements that 
had emerged over the previous decade.  The provisions for minorities, women, and youth 
reflected the incipient party coalition that New Politics advocates envisioned, and the very 
visibility of the changes in the makeup of conventions was part of the appeal.  The campaign to 
implement the reforms itself helped to channel movement efforts into the party.  “I thought I was 
retired from politics, partly by choice but mainly by having no playing field,” longtime activist 
Martha Ragland of Tennessee reported in 1971.  “But the 1968 convention and the McGovern 
Commission guidelines gave a new leverage.”58  Ragland and other’s involvement in the effort to 
bring Tennessee into compliance with McGovern-Fraser provided a new locus for state-level 
feminist organizing.  Similar mobilizations occurred across the country.  The composition of the 
1972 convention testified to the reforms’ effect: blacks’ share of delegates rose from 5.5 percent 
in 1968 to 15.5 percent; women’s rose from 13 to 40 percent; youth’s, from 4 to 21 percent.59  
These changes embodied the party’s interest in absorbing 1960s movement currents – in 
augmenting the progressive core of the New Deal coalition with newly mobilized constituencies.   
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This was a political posture that would be revealed, in the catastrophe of McGovern’s 
defeat that November, inadequate to the task of building a national electoral majority in early-
1970s America.  Indeed, it was hardly a posture that could address the disaffection of those 
millions of other Democratic voters who had moved in a radically different ideological direction 
in 1968, toward George Wallace’s campaign.60  And it was a posture that major Democratic 
elements bitterly opposed.  But, in the sharp contrast it struck with the coalitional strategy then 
being pursued by the GOP, and in the way it helped keep the era’s left-liberal energies channeled 
into a major party, it proved lastingly significant for party alignments going forward.
61
        
 
Pushing Through an Open Door 
 
The McGovern-Fraser reforms that exerted the greatest long-term effect on the party 
system were those that did away with methods by which party professionals could determine the 
makeup of delegations and their convention activity free from the input of activists and voters.  
The very act of implementing those reforms, of course, would require the cooperation of fifty-
five states and territories, each of which would need to meet the requirements either through 
private changes or a combination of internal party reform and state legislation.  This would be a 
tall order.  “You can define ‘all feasible efforts’ … anyway you like,” Will Davis of Texas had 
pointed out at the very first McGovern-Fraser meeting.  “There are plenty of conservative 
Democrats, who control the legislatures in several southern states, for example, and they are not 
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going to line up like sheep to pass reform legislation.”62  Davis’s logic was unassailable, and 
applied similarly to resistant states outside the South.   
Between McGovern-Fraser’s promulgation of its guidelines in the fall of 1969 and the 
convention in July 1972, opponents had several opportunities to mount an effective resistance.  
In October 1969, the commission distributed draft versions of the guidelines to thousands of 
officials throughout the country, soliciting their feedback.  Among the responses were notably 
few critiques from party regulars or their allies.  Such lonely dissents were outnumbered by 
endorsements of the guidelines or arguments that they did not go far enough.  Few regulars 
bothered to respond at all.  Their next opportunity to voice opposition came when the panel 
distributed its compliance letters to all state party chairmen and DNC members in February 
1970.  Most states replied with pro forma thanks and then took no action, while some set about 
immediately to pursue compliance in conjunction with state-level reform commissions.  Reform 
critics at the DNC might have been expected to translate resistance into meaningful action in 
1971 during the meeting to adopt the Preliminary Call to the convention.  Instead, the DNC 
voted to incorporate the entirety of the McGovern-Fraser guidelines into the Call.  Even then, 
states might still have opted for foot-dragging as a strategy to undermine reform.  But by the eve 
of the convention, 45 states and territories were deemed by the commission to have achieved full 
compliance with its guidelines, with the remaining ten in substantial compliance.
63
 
What accounted for the curious failure of the very forces targeted by the McGovern-
Fraser Commission to resist its reforms?  Practically, the local and state-based political actors 
who would be disempowered by the reforms lacked organizations at the national level in which 
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to coordinate a collective response.  And precisely because existing nominating procedures 
varied so widely across states, and had so often been informally or casually performed by 
insiders, party regulars lacked coherent and identifiable standards, arguments, or alternative 
proposals around which they could rally.
64
  Political developments also undermined the regulars’ 
strategic decision to refrain from vocal opposition for as long as possible.  Fred Harris resigned 
as DNC chair in early 1970 and Lawrence O’Brien replaced him, returning to the chairmanship 
he had vacated a year earlier.  Contrary to reformers’ fears, this ex-Kennedy and Johnson aide 
proved to be just as committed as Harris to implementing the McGovern-Fraser guidelines and 
more effective in doing so given his credibility among party leaders.
65
  O’Brien secured a crucial 
ruling from the DNC’s counsel confirming that failure to comply with the guidelines would be 
grounds for delegate credentials challenges in 1972.
66
  The 1970 midterms, which saw the 
election of many pro-reform Democratic governors, bolstered the momentum of state-level 
implementation.  Once O’Brien neutralized DNC opposition to the guidelines’ incorporation into 
the Preliminary Call in 1971, the regulars had run out of opportunities to turn the tide.                                               
 The sources of the regulars’ defeat were not merely practical and political, but also 
intellectual.  Opponents of the guidelines’ participatory emphasis never transcended the role of 
defenders of the status quo – and as defenders of existing procedures, they lacked a compelling 
case.
67
  Practices in numerous states were evidently irregular, arbitrary, and closed to new 
entrants.  The long legacy of intraparty struggles over southern organizations’ racially 
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discriminatory and undemocratic procedures delegitimized classic federalist arguments against 
national party incursions into state affairs.  From the very outset of the reform campaign in 1968, 
virtually no regulars vocally questioned the idea that establishing some basic set of uniform 
national standards for state nominating procedures would be desirable.  Nor did many regulars 
seriously question an emphasis on democratic participation in such standards.  When Richard 
Daley himself appeared at a McGovern-Fraser public hearing in Chicago in 1969, he gave no 
full-throated defense of the famously disciplined and closed Cook County party organization he 
led.  Tellingly, he instead proposed his own set of party reforms: a series of minor changes to 
convention practices along with the establishment of a presidential primary in every state.
68
   
Opponents of reform could not articulate a plausible argument for existing arrangements’ 
effectiveness in translating voter sentiment on policy issues into coherent and distinct party 
positions.  Reform advocates emphasized the failure of the 1968 nominating process to provide 
general election voters with a meaningful choice regarding Vietnam.  They attributed that result 
to institutional failure: a party nominating system that was unresponsive to engaged grassroots 
sentiment and vulnerable to the arbitrary decisions of entrenched actors.  Reform critics like the 
centrist Democratic strategists Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg could mount a persuasive 
counterargument that, in fact, the 1968 Democratic convention did produce both a nominee and a 
platform position on Vietnam that reflected the wishes of a rank-and-file party majority.  But 
what even these two able analysts could not do was explain how the unreformed nominating 
process worked systemically to ensure such outcomes.  The system’s “institutionalized helter-
skelterism,” they wrote in 1970, “is so complicated, it is hard to say exactly why and how it ends 
up as responsive as it is … What can be said about the delegate selection system is this: 
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Somehow it works.”  Delegates were either elected, selected by people who were elected, or 
“selected by people who were selected by people who were elected popularly at one time or 
another.  There is then, a democratic process, if far removed, behind each delegate.”69  This was 
as close to a full-throated defense of the existing system as any the era produced.  It left little 
reason to expect that the system could dependably adjudicate among and reconcile party factions 
divided over major issues. 
 What party regulars’ practical inefficacy and intellectual difficulties ultimately reflected 
was weakness – the wages of decades of organizational decline amidst long-range changes in 
American politics.
70
  The current beneficiaries of organizational arrangements dating back to a 
previous century’s era of non-ideological mass partisanship and transactional party activism 
were the occupants of often-sleepy state and local party organizations.  They lacked the 
inclination, credibility, or resources to fight back effectively against the forces calling for long-
overdue reform.  To a real extent, and notwithstanding the suspicions of the most militant 
activists, McGovern-Fraser-era reformers found themselves pushing through an open door.
71
  
 In contrast to the party regulars, the reformers benefited from the support of an outside 
coalition of organizations featuring an interlocking network of actors.  Anne Wexler consulted 
on the NDC’s Party Reform Task Force and headed the delegate selection reform effort at 
Common Cause, a new good-government organization founded by ex-HEW secretary John 
                                                 
69
 Richard M. Scanlon and Ben Wattenberg, The Real Majority: An Extraordinary Examination of the American 
Electorate (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970), 142-143. 
70
 Plotke, “Party Reform as Failed Democratic Renewal,” 254-261. 
71
 A similar analysis can be found in Samuel Beer’s notes for a commission presentation he delivered on May 10, 
1969, Box 11, Folder “Response: Intellectuals,” DNC Records.  
   
207 
 
Gardner.
72
  The ADA formed a Convention Task Force to monitor states’ implementation of the 
reforms, overseen by Wexler’s fellow Connecticut activist and now-husband, Joe Duffy, and co-
chaired by ex-McGovern-Fraser staffer Ken Bode, who had left the commission in 1970.  The 
leading staffer on the NWPCs’s Task Force on Delegate Selection was Phyllis Segal, whose 
husband Eli had served as McGovern-Fraser’s counsel, while the NWPC’s policy council 
included Arvonne Fraser, whose husband Don ascended to the chairmanship of the commission 
in January 1971.   Bode established his own independent organization, the Center for Political 
Reform (CPR), which coordinated pressure campaigns for state-level implementation and 
devised strategy for credentials challenges at the 1972 convention.
73
   
The pattern of state adoption of the guidelines, moreover, reflected not only the 
effectiveness of these new efforts but also the enduring legacy of a longer reform movement 
among issue-oriented Democratic activists.  Those states with traditions of volunteer party 
activism and robust “amateur” club activity – Minnesota, Wisconsin, Oregon – were 
disproportionately the earliest and easiest states to reform, while the longest holdouts were those 
states – Texas, New York, Connecticut – with surviving patronage-oriented party 
organizations.
74
  Even the latter states could only hold out for so long.  George McGovern’s 
unlikely presidential campaign gathered strength in the spring of 1972, amassing hundreds of 
pledged delegates amidst a crowded field as one opponent after another either stumbled on the 
trail or failed to adjust their strategy to the new procedural landscape of proportional delegate 
                                                 
72
 Shafer, Quiet Revolution, 54; Minutes, NDC National Steering Committee meeting, March 14, 1970, Box 1, 
Folder, 2, NDC Records.  
73
 Kenneth Bode and LaVerne Newton, “Center - Original Proposal,” Box 2807, Ken Bode Papers, Archives of 
DePauw University and Indiana United Methodism, DePauw University, Greencastle, IN. 
74
 Shafer, Quiet Revolution, 281-286, 328-329. 
   
208 
 
counts and participatory contests.  McGovern’s frontrunner status by the convention in Miami 
meant that there was little chance recalcitrant state parties would get a sympathetic hearing there.   
The saga of that most iconic of all machine organizations – Cook County of Illinois – 
dramatized perfectly the shifting constellation of intra-Democratic power in 1972.  As early as 
1970, activists in the state laid groundwork for a challenge to the delegates who would emerge 
from Chicago two years later.  The state’s NDC chapter launched Challenge ‘72 to monitor 
Richard Daley’s organization for reform violations and to mount a credentials challenge in 
Miami if need be.  “YOU just may occupy the seat next to Daley,” it announced cheekily in a 
report to members.
75
  By primary season of 1972, Cook County Democrats had given no 
indication of interest in complying with the guidelines.  “We’ll elect our delegates as we always 
have,” Daley told party workers in February.  “Why the hell should we let those people in 
Washington tell us how we should elect them?”76  In Illinois’s state primary that May, Daley’s 
organization got its 59 delegates elected as usual.  Immediately, a group of ten reform Democrats 
led by Alderman William Singer and civil rights activist Jesse Jackson filed a challenge to “the 
Daley 59,” done on behalf of “Democrats in general, and, in particular, all Blacks, Latin 
Americans, Women, and Young People.”77  Reform networks at the state and national level 
supported the challenge, which cited violations of six McGovern-Fraser guidelines by the 
Chicago regulars.
78
  The challengers held district caucuses to elect an alternative slate of 
delegates.  Regulars disrupted several of them, but an alternative delegation did come into being.   
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 The next step in the process testified to the degree of nationalization the party was 
undergoing.  Though the Commission on Rules, McGovern-Fraser’s less controversial 
counterpart panel, concerned itself chiefly with convention logistics, one reform it implemented 
bore directly on the Illinois challenge.  This was the new institution of “hearing officers” – 
impartial observers appointed by the DNC to hold open hearings in states where credentials 
challenges were occurring.  The officers would prepare finding-of-fact reports for the Credentials 
Committee to help guide its decisions.  Such a device was intended to bolster a rule-of-law ethos 
in the credentialing process and to reduce the degree of pure candidate-driven horse-trading that 
afflicted the panel.  The officer for the Chicago challenge withstood unrelenting hostility from 
Daley’s forces to hold a hearing and file a report.  He sided with the challengers, citing 
“abundant and probative” evidence that the regulars carried out “deliberate, covert, and 
calculated” violations of McGovern-Fraser guidelines.79  The report helped the challengers’ case 
in the Credentials Committee, which voted 71-61 in the challengers’ favor.   
 The regulars’ last chance to keep their seats came on the first night of the convention 
itself.  The mammoth array of credentials disputes pushed the floor debate on the pro-regular 
Illinois minority report to 2:00am.  Speaking for the regulars, attorney Raymond F. Simon 
charged that the alternative delegates “were chosen by a handful of non-elected, self-appointed 
usurpers.”80  Supporters of the challengers recited the litany of alleged violations by Cook 
County Democrats and invoked themes of reform and New Politics coalition-building.  Jesse 
Jackson connected the challenges against Cook County to those made against racially 
discriminatory southern states in 1964 and 1968.  “Mississippi was not an exception,” he 
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declared.  “Georgia was not an exception.  Chicago can’t be an exception.  We must nationalize 
the McGovern rules.”81  The final vote approached like a slow-motion wreck.  McGovern was 
fully aware of the disastrous symbolism that would accompany the ouster of 58 Chicago 
Democrats and their nationally iconic leader, but he was hamstrung from openly opposing the 
Singer-Jackson delegates by his New Politics supporters and a basic commitment to his own 
reforms.  A final compromise proposal to seat both delegations failed.  The convention voted 
narrowly against the pro-Daley minority report, thus confirming the Credentials Committee 
decision to seat the reformers.  The visceral nature of the hostilities in this drama could hardly be 
overstated, and was captured in the gendered language of a party official who told reporters, 
“They urinated right in the face of all those people.  They insulted Daley’s political manhood.”82        
 The intramural warfare that such language reflected continued throughout the general 
election and in the aftermath of McGovern’s landslide loss – and institutional reform was never 
far from the center of the factional strife.  In the summer of 1972, meetings among operators in 
Meany’s orbit lay the groundwork for a planned counterrevolution in the aftermath of the 
anticipated Democratic loss in November.
83
  Central to the plan would be a campaign to replace 
the McGovern-backed DNC chair, Jean Westwood, with the party’s former treasurer, Texas 
attorney Robert Strauss.  The plan commenced after the election, and Strauss was duly elected in 
December.  His first staffing decision was to hire an AFL-CIO staffer as the party’s executive 
director.  Strauss, a close friend of ex-governor and Nixon cabinet member John Connally, had a 
reputation as a southern conservative. Meany’s patronage of Strauss’s leadership captured well 
the alliances that had emerged out of shared opposition to New Politics reform. 
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 A related outside organization similarly originated in preelection meetings.  Ben 
Wattenberg began consulting in September with a dozen other New Politics opponents about the 
need to form an anti-New Politics outfit.  In the weeks after McGovern’s loss, the Coalition for a 
Democratic Majority (CDM) launched with inaugural meetings and a newspaper ad campaign 
featuring the headline, “Come Home, Democrats.”84  The major indictments CDM laid out 
against the New Politics were substantive rather than procedural, including its adherents’ alleged 
belief “that the United State must withdraw from its international responsibilities and effect a 
serious diminution of its own power.”85  A strain of incipient neoconservatism – centrally 
concerned with foreign policy but paired with hostility to New Politics activists’ affirmative 
action agenda – was at the ideological core of the group.  Despite this outlook and CDM leaders’ 
penchant for effective rhetorical attacks, its procedural agenda concerning McGovern-Fraser was 
fairly modest.  The coalition recommended repealing the demographic targets in A-1 and A-2 
and curbing regulations of slate-making and ex officio delegates.
86
  Overall, it combined 
aggressive attacks on New Politics ideology and strategy with quite tempered procedural 
recommendations, which modified but did not challenge fundamentally the core of the 
McGovern-Fraser reforms.   
That same dynamic could be seen in the deliberations of McGovern-Fraser’s successor 
panel, the Commission on Delegate Selection and Party Structure, tasked by the 1972 convention 
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with reviewing and reassessing the guidelines in light of the experience of that year’s election.87  
Chaired by Baltimore councilwoman Barbara Mikulski in symbolic reflection of the need for the 
party to repair relations with white ethnic constituencies, the new commission served during the 
year of its operations as an arena for chronic factional squabbling but little in the way of major 
rollbacks of reform.  Daley and the AFL-CIO’s Al Barkan maintained their antireform alliance to 
pressure Strauss regarding staffing decisions at both the DNC and the Mikulski Commission.  At 
commission meetings that year, reform critics made their case for nixing the demographic targets 
and restoring ex officio delegates.  Despite the pressure, Strauss the pragmatic dealmaker 
generally worked to ameliorate divisions.  The commission ultimately issued a report making 
several technical adjustments along with a compromise reform to guidelines A-1 and A-2.  The 
latter change rendered the demographic targets more stringent by making delegate distributions 
proportional to groups’ Democratic strength rather than their presence in the population, but also 
rescinded McGovern-Fraser’s provision placing the burden of proof on challenged delegations.  
A final measure furthered party institutionalization through a new Compliance Review 
Commission expanding on the role of hearing officers.
88
  Ultimately, the Mikulski Commission 
entrenched McGovern-Fraser’s participatory and nationalizing elements.  Despite McGovern’s 
election loss, the reforms’ intellectual and political underpinnings proved durable.     
 
Reform’s Forgotten Structural Turn 
 
 By the time the Mikulski Commission issued its report, the focus of debate over 
institutional change within the party, and the attention of wary party leaders like Robert Strauss, 
had largely shifted away from nominating procedures.  The new focus concerned the party’s 
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organization and mechanisms for enhancing issue-based deliberation and ideological cohesion 
within it.  The “Party Structure” component of the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate 
Selection’s mandate, in other words, was more than mere verbiage.  A Charter Commission 
would serve as a locus for carrying this element of the reform project out in 1973 and 1974.  
If, as we have seen, the issue focus and nationalizing thrust of McGovern-Fraser’s 
delegate-selection reforms drew from responsible party doctrine, the panel’s forgotten structural 
agenda bore even clearer connections to that outlook.  Though the structural efforts proved less 
enduring and easily entrenched than the nominating reforms, they still undermine portrayals of 
the reformers as anti-party zealots.  And in the shorter term, such reforms – particularly the 
institution of midterm conventions – exerted a real political impact, contributing directly to the 
processes of party differentiation and ideological sorting that commenced in the 1970s.   
From the beginning, McGovern-Fraser’s reformers considered structural issues in the 
national party to be a component of their mandate, and an answer to the Special Equal Rights 
Committee’s call in 1968 for a panel “to study the relationship between the National Democratic 
Party and its constituent State Democratic Parties.”  The commission temporarily narrowed its 
focus to delegate selection, as that topic faced the most pressing timetable.  But Fraser in 
particular remained committed to structural reform, and made suggestions in 1969 and 1970 to 
his own panel and to James O’Hara’s Commission on Rules on reforming the DNC, establishing 
a Democratic Advisory Council-style research arm, and drafting a party constitution.
89
 
 The latter proposal, to draft the first-ever charter for a major U.S. party with codified 
rules and procedures governing the national organization and its relationship to local and state 
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counterparts, saw a revival among interested actors in 1971.  Fraser and O’Hara identified 
overlapping jurisdictions between their respective panels regarding structural issues and DNC 
reform, and agreed early in the year to work jointly on those topics.  They built an informal 
network of correspondents on structural reform that included Sam Beer, James MacGregor 
Burns, and Michigan’s Neil Staebler, the advocate of programmatic party-building who had 
worked with Paul Butler at the DNC.
90
   The group considered longstanding responsible party 
proposals, from biennial party conferences to political education arms to national policy 
councils.  Other proposals connected organizational reform to the participatory ethos of the 
delegate selection reforms then underway, including a national dues-paying party membership 
system that could enhance grassroots participation while building a mass base for the party.   
 The discussions culminated in a joint meeting of the McGovern-Fraser and O’Hara 
commissions in the fall of 1971, where party nationalization and issue activism recurred as 
central themes.
91
  Anne Wexler praised “the assertion of the 1964 and 1968 conventions of their 
authority to adopt binding standards on constituent state Democratic parties” for finally enabling 
“the national convention to become the party’s national policy maker.”  Emphasizing 
programmatic party-building, Sam Beer situated his proposal for party issue conferences in an 
analysis of broad changes among voters.  “The electorate as a whole is showing a great and 
growing interest in issues and public policy,” he asserted, attributing the development to “the 
rising level of education among voters.”  He insisted that “There are votes in issues.  This is a 
heretical remark among some political scientists even today,” given the influence of works like 
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The American Voter that emphasized affective affiliations over ideology or issue positions.
92
  But 
Beer drew on new findings from scholars grappling with the tumult of the 1960s to claim “it’s 
finally getting around to political scientists that people in the millions choose the candidate they 
vote for and the party they identify with …on issues.  That’s the thing we haven’t allowed for in 
the structure of our party.”  James MacGregor Burns went further by connecting programmatic 
reform to an eventual ideological sorting of the party system itself.  A reformed party “would 
welcome and recruit members on the basis of one test and one test alone – belief in the principles 
and goals of the party as defined in the national platform,” and so, soon enough, “those who do 
not share its goals would see no point in joining it, or staying in it.”   
 The presence of another participant at the 1971 meeting, David Anderson of Canada’s 
Liberal Party, hinted at a notable theme of the era’s structural reform efforts: a transnational 
engagement with party systems in other democracies.  Fraser, whose congressional work focused 
on international affairs, frequently took advantage of his travels and interactions with foreign 
officials to discuss parties.  In 1971 he organized a meeting on party organization and reform 
with a British Conservative Party member, alongside O’Hara and Bob Nelson.93  And when 
considering proposals for a dues-paying Democratic membership, Fraser drew on Beer’s 
expertise to gather data on British Labor Party finances and dues’ role in it.94  Such engagement 
with other countries’ systems was hardly surprising.  The aspects of U.S. parties most widely 
considered exceptional were precisely those targeted by reformers, from their decentralization to 
their programmatic fuzziness.  The difficulty of attempting to gain through top-down reform 
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those elements of foreign systems that U.S. parties lacked for historical and constitutional 
reasons was not lost on the reformers.  “The British example has been very much in my mind,” 
Neil Staebler told Fraser, “but I do not find it possible to jump very far to their organizational 
forms because of our geographical diversity and federated character.”95  If history and structure 
limited the degree of centralization and coherence possible in the U.S., however, measures meant 
to institute national party supremacy and to foster issue activism might still fruitfully be pursued. 
Biennial national conferences of party delegates stood at the center of structural 
reformers’ proposals.  Such meetings’ international ubiquity was an argument in the idea’s favor.  
“Such a conference would take on the character less of the quadrennial national convention,” 
Burns argued, “than of the kinds of annual national policy-making conferences that are held by 
scores of political parties … throughout the world.”96  As Fraser later framed his case for a 
midterm conference, Democrats rarely made an “effort to think about the party and its role in 
society,” while “Western European political parties concern themselves with political education 
on an ongoing basis.  We could learn much from their example.”97  The late 1960s had seen 
renewed interest in this longstanding responsible party proposal as a channel for the seemingly 
explosive issue activism of the period, one less severe than nomination challenges.  Candidate 
McCarthy had proposed biennial conventions during the campaign, as did officials ranging from 
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Al Lowenstein to Jesse Unruh to Ed Muskie at the McGovern-Fraser field hearings the following 
year.
98
  The idea would soon prove one of the most consequential party innovations of the era. 
Fraser, O’Hara, and several of their staffers produced a draft charter in the spring of 1972 
that was striking in its sweep and ambition.
99
  The proposal called for a new national party 
membership system requiring annual enrollment, with a nominal fee “strongly urged.”  The 
state-based structure of the existing DNC would be replaced by a new system of seven regional 
organizations and a National Executive Committee composed of the national and regional 
chairmen, congressional leaders, and various at-large members.  Finally, the draft charter called 
for regional party conferences to be held on odd years and a National Policy Conference of 3,000 
delegates to take place on even years between the conventions.   
Support for the proposal came not only from avowed responsible party advocates but also 
New Politics activists better known for their focus on grassroots participation and demographic 
representativeness.  “Party responsibility, a stillborn concept in many sections of this country, 
now stands a chance of becoming the foundation of party organization and policy,” wrote one 
political scientist in a typical note of praise to Fraser and O’Hara.100  Support for the charter 
among New Politics activists could be seen in the sentiments expressed at a CPR meeting 
featuring representatives from the NWPC, the Youth Caucus, and other groups.  Though some 
voiced reservations about the proposal’s provision for ex-officio membership in party affairs, a 
meeting note-taker reported, “all agreed that the Fraser-O’Hara charter was much better than the 
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current structure.”101  Such support reflected the degree to which a participatory reform vision 
could be compatible with responsible-party prescriptions.       
 The political implications were just as apparent in the array of forces opposed to the 
proposal.  Democratic State Chairmen reacted with outrage to the regional party organizations 
that would supplant much of their power.  (Fraser and O’Hara eventually jettisoned them.)102  A 
mass membership system, meanwhile, struck many officials as a radical and foreign concept – 
“reprehensible and dangerous,” according to South Carolina’ Donald Fowler, privileging “those 
who are highly motivated because of special interests or extreme ideological commitments.”103  
A dues fee’s resemblance to a poll tax gave even some pro-reform liberals pause.  The drafters 
thus watered down the provision to a vague call for “periodic, personal enrollment in a manner 
specified by the Democratic National Committee,” with dues explicitly prohibited.104  Even in 
modified form, the proposal provoked intense opposition from elements who had long resisted 
responsible party reforms, from southern conservatives to machine pols to congressional elites.   
When Fraser appeared before a Democratic House caucus meeting to present the draft 
charter, Chicago Representative Frank Annunzio, a loyal member of Daley’s machine, was 
outraged.  He began rounding up the required signatures to call another meeting of the House 
caucus to discuss the charter exclusively.  Annunzio’s co-signers were disproportionately 
“southern and old-line congressmen,” according to the Washington Post, and eager to express 
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their alarm.  Wayne Hays of Ohio pointed to the activists who would dominate delegations at the 
proposed midterm conferences.  “These people shouldn’t run the party, elected officials should,” 
he said.  “I was elected by the people of my district.  Not by some packed caucus.”105  Florida’s 
Robert Sikes connected the charter’s “efforts to mold the Democratic Party into a liberal party in 
the hands of a narrow ideological elite” to a longer-range and dangerous agenda to transform the 
party system itself, defined by “a new division of the American party structure into liberal and 
conservative camps.”106  The emergency meeting of the caucus, held two weeks before the 
national party convention, turned into a raucous shouting match between representatives angry 
about the whole sweep of institutional reforms and defenders of the charter.  The former 
outnumbered the latter among those attending, resulting in a 105-to-50 vote for a resolution that 
formally opposed a convention vote on the charter and called instead for further study.
107
   
Fraser lobbied to win over skeptics in the weeks leading up the convention, supported by 
Common Cause and Democratic Study Group campaigns.
108
  But he could not ignore the many 
voices arguing that a charter was too complicated a project to tackle at an already overscheduled 
convention.  These voices included the McGovern campaign, wary of raising novel reform issues 
just when it needed to secure victory.
109
  Fraser and O’Hara eventually agreed to refrain from 
advocating a floor vote on the charter, instead pushing a resolution that called for a commission 
to pursue the charter-writing process and a midterm conference in 1974 to amend and ratify that 
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commission’s product.110  The resolution passed late on Thursday night, in one of the many 
chaotic roll calls that helped push the start of McGovern’s acceptance speech past 2:00am.111       
 The proposed charter of 1972 marked a peak for centralizing, programmatic party reform 
during this period.  The eventual product of the commission mandated by the Miami convention 
would be a much more modest set of bylaws and structures, though the limited changes they 
embodied all still ran in the direction of greater nationalization and issue focus.  The Charter 
Commission boasted a huge membership, the better to ensure the inclusion of all interested 
factions in the party.  From the outset, Robert Strauss worked to retain tight control over its 
work, with the overriding goal of patching up factional disputes over institutional issues.
112
  
Strauss, an ostentatiously pragmatic back-slapper, was averse to any forums that might occasion 
public party squabbling. He thus vehemently opposed the very concept of party-wide issue 
conferences.  The Miami convention had mandated that a Democratic Conference on Party 
Organization and Policy take place in 1974 to ratify the charter, but Strauss did all he could to 
control that meeting in the planning stages – and to keep discussion of public policy issues out of 
its purview altogether.  He was never less than candid about his view of the meeting.  “I am not 
the father” of the midterm conference, he told a reporter.  “And I would admit to you that I’m not 
Catholic and I would have practiced a little more birth control if I were father to this child.”113             
 Strauss’s outlook put him in direct conflict with reform advocates like Fraser, who 
worked throughout 1973 to build support within the DNC for including issue seminars and 
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platform discussion in the midterm conference and continuously sounded the alarm about 
Strauss’s efforts to marginalize and muzzle the meeting at the planning stages.  The terms of a 
debate that broke out between Strauss and Fraser that year did much to illustrate the intellectual 
and political stakes driving structural reform.  In response to one critical missive from Fraser, 
Strauss wrote a letter in March emphasizing his intention to “heal the wounds of the past, to 
bring Democrats together,” a goal he said would be jeopardized by introducing “ideological 
debate” into the mini-convention.114  “Your faith,” he wrote to Fraser, “that opening up the 1974 
conference to questions of public policy will serve to unite the party is not shared by all other 
Democrats across the nation.”  He then took a detour into academic disquisition: 
You cite the American Political Science Association Committee on Political 
Parties’ 1951 work, “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System,” as a guide 
to political reform in the Democratic party.  You should be aware that the APSA 
report has been criticized by some over the last several years as being ill-
conceived and contradictory … Political scientists have concluded that many of 
the suggestions employed in this document are inappropriate and dysfunctional to 
the American political system.
115
         
 
That this twenty-two year old political science report found its way into a debate among working 
politicians concerning party reform and conference logistics is notable.
116
  More notable still is 
the fact that Strauss aligned Fraser with that doctrine’s tenets while he sided with those critics 
who judged responsible partisanship “dysfunctional to the American political system.”     
Over the course of public hearings and commission meetings in 1973 and 1974, the 
charter debate pit those seeking cohesion and programmatic commitment against those touting 
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the pragmatic functions of traditional American parties.  As notes from one of the meetings 
summarized, “the broadest division in the Party is between those who feel the purpose of the 
Party is to elect Democrats, and those who feel the Party must represent some point of view.”117  
Fraser and Staebler led the reform coalition in the second camp, supported by most of the major 
New Politics and liberal advocacy groups.  Disputes between these reformers and Strauss in the 
first half of 1973 focused on the chairman’s efforts to limit the scope of the midterm conference 
and the ambition of the charter drafters.  The anti-reform coalition on the Charter Commission 
was led by the same elements that had fought McGovern-Fraser: southerners, machine pols, and 
the Meany wing of labor.  At a meeting in July 1973, the coalition demonstrated its strength by 
passing resolutions to schedule the midterm party conference for after the 1974 elections and to 
restrict conference discussion to the charter.  As a member put it, Democrats had recently “gotten 
into trouble by talking about the environment and Vietnam and things like that… The way to win 
elections is to get people to vote for Democrats because they’re Democrats.”118           
 Such arguments received their most articulate expression in a 1973 position paper 
prepared by the Coalition for a Democratic Majority called “Unity out of Diversity.”  The paper 
criticized the 1972 draft charter as well as newer proposals by Fraser and Staebler for seeking “to 
centralize, ideologize, and ‘Europeanize’ the Party in ways which run against the grain of 
American political tradition and the unique coalitional character of the Democratic Party.” 119  
CDM described the responsible party doctrine underlying the proposals as “an approach to the 
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role and structure of political parties which is suited to parliamentary systems of government – 
not out own.”  The paper acknowledged that the national parties had a stronger role to play, but 
called proposals to inject issue-based activism into party institutions dangerous and ill-timed.  
New issue cleavages, from Vietnam to law and order to the counterculture, divided Democrats 
among themselves.  “It is unrealistic to talk of the desirability – or even the possibility – of a 
united, liberal ‘national’ party driving out the impure and arousing new converts” while such 
divides remained.  Here the CDM’s political agenda merged with its procedural outlook, as the 
organization clearly saw the need for further intraparty struggle – and New Politics factions’ 
defeat – before reforms like issue conferences and policy councils might be safe to implement.   
The CDM advanced a coherent, tempered argument against the tide of reform efforts.  
But such intellectual engagement did not quite match the intensity and vitriol with which the 
anti-reform coalition, led as always by the flamboyantly aggressive Al Barkan of COPE, moved 
politically to strike out against factional enemies in 1973 and 1974.  Barkan led the push to 
replace Jean Westwood with Strauss after the 1972 election, and sustained the ultimately fruitless 
campaigns within the Mikulski Commission to roll back the McGovern-Fraser reforms.  
Simultaneously, he mobilized opposition to holding off-year party conferences, in 1974 or any 
other year.  His combativeness ran counter to the themes of comity and pragmatic compromise 
that other reform critics, Strauss chief among them, sought to emphasize.  A DNC staffer later 
recalled how Barkan and Meany “wanted not only to defeat the McGovern wing of the party but 
to castrate them and throw them to the sharks.”120  In a disastrous overreach, Barkan’s forces 
attempted to use a Charter Commission meeting in August 1974 to muscle through major roll-
backs of McGovern-Fraser reforms, prompting a walk-out by the commission’s black members 
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and most of their allies.
121
  The meeting dissolved for lack of a quorum, the anti-reformers drew 
condemnation, and Strauss subsequently kept his distance from the counterrevolutionaries.  
 No similar fireworks accompanied the actual midterm conference, formally titled the 
Democratic Conference on Party Organization and Policy.  2,035 delegates convened in Kansas 
City a month after the party’s massive, Watergate-fuelled congressional victories had produced a 
net gain of 3 seats in the Senate and 49 in the House.  The afterglow of those victories, combined 
with party-wide wariness over the infighting of the August commission meeting, bolstered the 
position of those seeking a conflict-free conference.  Strauss, chastened by criticism over his 
alleged role in the August debacle, pursued unity at all costs by micromanaging the conference 
planning and proceedings.  Orchestrated to within an inch of its life, this first ever midterm party 
conference fell far short of the grassroots-empowering and programmatic functions that 
proponents desired.  Those participants not engaged by the technical aspects of reform found it 
downright pointless.  “Never in the history of human boredom,” Texas Representative Jim 
Wright declared, “have so many traveled so far to be stirred by such matters of immeasurable 
triviality.”122  But the meeting set an important precedent while producing a constitution that, 
however dull, marked a new phase in the institutionalization of the party.   
 The party charter that emerged from the conference was a modest document.
123
  It 
included a carefully worded requirement for state-level affirmative action programs to “provide 
for representation as nearly as practicable” of minorities, youth, and women in proportion to their 
Democratic presence – but it forbade both mandatory quotas and credentials challenges based 
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solely on the numeric results of elections.  It created a Judicial Council “to adjudicate disputes 
arising from the interpretation and application of national Party law” – but it stipulated that the 
national convention and the DNC retain control over their own credentialing disputes.  It created 
a National Education and Training Council that gestured toward the kind of political education 
functions prized by Staebler and Fraser – but it remained vague about the nature and scope of the 
new entity’s responsibilities.  As for midterm issue conferences, a narrow floor vote at the 
Kansas City conference ensured that future meetings would not be a requirement enshrined in the 
party’s constitution.  “The Democratic Party may hold a National Party Conference between 
National Conventions,” the charter ultimately read, and its “nature, agenda, composition, time 
and place … shall be determined by the Democratic National Committee.”  Modest though it 
was, the charter signified a new step in party nationalization while inscribing the core elements 
of the era’s procedural reforms into stable party law.  It institutionalized a party model that was 
highly permeable and driven increasingly by volunteers and issue activists.   
 No actor was more central to the structural reform process than Fraser, designated by 
Neil Staebler as “the Thomas Jefferson of the New Democratic Party.”124  After the charter’s 
passage, Fraser established a new organization, The Democratic Conference, underwritten by 
unions, feminist groups, and reform lobbies, which worked in the coming years to defend the 
reforms and monitor the party’s institutional health.125  As the Age of Party Reform dwindled, 
Fraser remained engaged in the service of both participatory and responsible party principles.  
Simultaneously, he served as a leader in another reform project with direct bearing on the party 
system: the transformation of committee organization and partisan institutions in Congress.   
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Congressional Reform and Party Government 
 
During the joint meeting of the McGovern-Fraser and O’Hara Commissions in 1971, a 
question had been raised about whether or not the party charter should mention congressional 
organization.  Sam Beer cautioned against it on the grounds that the DNC lacked any formal 
ability to compel changes in the internal workings of the congressional party.  Henry Aaron, the 
Mississippi civil rights activist and party organizer, responded to Beer in frustration.  “Unless, 
Sam, we take a position somewhere that there is going to be a modicum of conduct that we 
demand by people who call themselves Democrats, or be willing to exclude them, you give me a 
great fear,” he said.  “The racist element that permeates the Democratic Party, it permeates it in 
terms of committee assignments.”  James MacGregor Burns chimed in to support Henry, calling 
the congressional party “a separate power base” whose southern contingent amounted to an 
“opposition party” that reformers would need to “confront and overcome.”  Fraser responded that 
this could only happen “by getting a congressional party that will refuse these people 
chairmanships.”  As another member put it, “Congress is going to have to reform itself.”126    
The exchange highlighted both the inextricability of congressional organization from any 
broader party reform agenda and the practical separation of the two arenas given America’s 
divided political institutions.  That institutional division has itself helped to structure scholarly 
assessments of organizational change, which tend to focus on distinct realms – the national 
committees, the conventions, Congress – in isolation.  But it is not coincidental that a 
transformative period of reform in Congress took place simultaneously to the nominating and 
structural reforms of McGovern-Fraser.  The two movements shared key personnel, resource 
support, political motivations, and theoretical premises about the function of parties.   
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 The role of responsible party doctrine in the movement for congressional reform was 
constitutive.  Key items eventually achieved in the 1970s, from eliminating the sanctity of 
seniority to empowering the caucus and party leadership to reforming the filibuster, had all 
appeared in the APSA Committee on Political Parties’ 1950 report.127  From its founding in 
1958, the leading force for institutional reform inside the House, the Democratic Study Group 
(DSG), peppered its reports and memos with explicit references to Toward a More Responsible 
Two-Party System.
128
  Moreover, the key responsible party themes informing the McGovern-
Fraser reforms – nationalization and programmatic partisanship – also underlay the major 
elements of congressional reform.  “The strength of the Democratic Party is in its national 
characteristics and broad-based responsibilities,” the DSG wrote in 1964, “not narrow regional 
interests.”  The party must “provide the necessary legislative machinery and internal party unity 
to guarantee action on the Democratic programs pledged in our platform.”129   
 Early, piecemeal efforts in the 1960s to challenge seniority and to discipline recalcitrant 
congressional Democrats connected directly to reform developments in the non-congressional 
party.  Civil rights-related controversies over convention delegations and party loyalty tests 
provided leverage for institutional activism within Congress.  An early demonstration of the 
House Democratic caucus’s capacity to punish dissident members came in 1965, when the DSG 
organized a successful campaign to strip the seniority of congressmen John Bell Williams of 
Mississippi and Albert Watson of South Carolina for their support of Goldwater.  The DSG, 
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referencing the MFDP delegate challenge the previous year, argued that stripping Williams and 
Watson’s privileges would reaffirm “the sound and historic role of the caucus in the achievement 
of party responsibility.”130  Four years later, the DSG persuaded the caucus to strip the seniority 
of Louisiana’s John Rarick, a founding supporter of George Wallace’s 1968 campaign.131   
 But such actions were sporadic and individually targeted rather than systemic.  At the 
mid-1960s high tide of Great Society legislative productivity, the concern for procedural reform 
had been tempered by the evident capacity of Lyndon Johnson and liberal congressional 
majorities to break through institutional logjams.  This capacity proved fleeting, however, largely 
stalling after Democrats’ 1966 midterm elections.  It was in the late 1960s, just as reformers 
began sweeping efforts at presidential nominating reforms, that the executive leadership within 
the DSG generated a new strategy to reform the core elements of congressional organization 
itself, focusing on internal party procedures as well as the structure and functioning of the 
committee system.  The person who first managed to cut through the uncoordinated proposals of 
his DSG colleagues and suggest a goal around which to coalesce action was Don Fraser.  In 
December 1968, he suggested that the DSG should lobby to achieve, as a matter of party policy, 
an up-or-down secret ballot vote in the Democratic caucus for all committee chairmanships at the 
start of each new Congress.
132
  His approach won unanimous support from his colleagues.  
The DSG’s campaign began with a successful effort in 1969 to pass a new rule requiring 
caucus ratification of the Committee on Committees’ nominations before they proceeded to a full 
House floor vote.  (The Committee on Committees consisted solely of the Democratic members 
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of the Ways and Means Committee, and controlled committee appointments for the caucus.)  The 
same year, the caucus also reinstated the practice of holding regular monthly meetings.  Under 
Fraser’s chairmanship, the DSG ramped up its communications and lobbying capacities and 
released two major reports.  The first compiled data on key votes in 1967 and 1968.  Over a third 
of all committee and subcommittee chairmen were found to have voted against the majority of 
their party more often than with it.  34 exceeded the Republicans’ overall record.133  The second 
report laid out the stakes of the fight over seniority, articulating critics’ charges that it 
“fragmented and diffused power in the House, thereby crippling effective leadership and making 
it impossible to present and pursue a coherent national program.”134  Congressional liberals grew 
increasingly open in attacking “the dead hand of seniority,” as one member put it.135  “Even 
societies that worship their ancestors,” Al Lowenstein quipped on Meet the Press, “don’t 
automatically put their ancestors in charge of the Armed Services Committee.”136   
 A political dynamic familiar to veterans of the Eisenhower years, meanwhile, helped to 
set the context for the reform push.  The ascension of a Republican president eliminated the 
coordinating effect for congressional Democrats of a co-partisan in the executive, and soon led to 
liberal criticisms that the congressional party leadership and committee chairs were failing to 
offer an effective and coherent opposition to the Nixon administration.  A DSG-endorsed caucus 
resolution proposed in late 1969 noted that “although we Democrats are in control of both 
Houses of Congress as a result of last year’s elections, we have no overall legislative program, 
and seemingly no prospect of developing one.”  The resolution called on all House committee 
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chairmen to review the 1968 party platform and develop a plan to bring its provisions to the floor 
in legislative form.
137
  Though the resolution failed by caucus vote, increasing numbers began to 
share the strategic critique implicit in its language.  Speaker John McCormack, 78 at the start of 
Nixon’s presidency and noted for his passive leadership style and deference to committee barons, 
came in for particular criticism for enabling the conservative coalition and resisting reform.
138
   
Just as party leaders during and after the 1968 Democratic convention had sought to 
appease insurgents by appointing a commission to study future nominating reforms, so did 
Speaker McCormack and Majority Leader Carl Albert agree in 1970, at the DSG’s suggestion, to 
appoint a Democratic Organization, Study, and Review Committee as a means of 
accommodating and tempering their critics.
139
  This committee’s output proved modest but 
consequential.  It recommended a procedure by which the caucus could vote up or down on 
specific chairmanship nominations made by the Committee on Committees: a request by ten 
members could force a caucus vote at the beginning of each Congress.  The committee also 
included explicit language noting that seniority need not be the only criterion used in selecting 
chairmen.  The Democratic Caucus’s adoption of these recommendations at the beginning of the 
92
nd
 Congress in 1971 marked a fundamental break with internal party practices that had helped 
to structure House lawmaking for the previous several decades.  At least as a matter of formal 
party procedure, committee assignments now rested on the sanction of the Democratic caucus. 
The mere existence of formal powers hardly guaranteed the ability to exercise them in 
ways antagonistic to congressional elites, however.  To do that, reformers depended on a major 
mobilization of outside advocacy and pressure in the early 1970s, carried out by many of the 
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same organizations and activist networks pushing McGovern-Fraser.  These included ADA, 
which began in 1970 to give congressional reform “the highest possible priority,” in the words of 
its chairman.
140
  The same year, Common Cause initiated intensive lobbying efforts related to 
congressional reform.  It organized letter-writing campaigns challenging the seniority privileges 
of specific House members as well as advocating system-wide reforms.
141
  In January of 1971, it 
advocated that the Democratic caucus strip the chairmanships of three southerners known for 
both conservatism and autocratic leadership styles: William Colmer of the Rules Committee, 
W.R. Poage of the Agriculture Committee, and John McMillan of the District of Columbia 
Committee.
142
  “I strongly urge you to vote for the defeat of three men who will probably be 
nominated for committee chairmanships,” wrote one typical constituent to a Democratic 
congressman (in this case Tip O’Neill) prior to the organizational meeting of the caucus.143  
Thousands of other letters likewise specified the three targeted chairmen.  All three survived 
challenges in the caucus, but the precedent of open votes on senior chairmen had been set.   
A broader network of groups coalesced in 1972 as the Committee on Congressional 
Reform, representing over 40 member organizations ranging from ADA and the National 
Committee for an Effective Congress to the League of Women Voters and the United Methodist 
Church Board of Christian Concerns.
144
  The liberal philanthropist Stewart Mott financed the 
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Committee at the same time he was underwriting activism related to party nomination reforms.
145
  
In coordination with the umbrella committee, Common Cause launched a new campaign of 
electoral pressure called Operation Open Up the System, which compelled members to submit to 
congressional candidates a questionnaire covering key reform issues.
146
  Such efforts not only 
helped make reform a salient issue in the 1972 congressional elections, but also popularized a 
specific kind of reform agenda, focused centrally on curbing the power and autonomy of 
committee chairs – “the feudal barons of Congress,” in John Gardner’s term.147     
The vision articulated by the reform network – a network consisting mainly of avowedly 
nonpartisan organizations – tended not to emphasize explicit responsible-party themes 
concerning discipline, party centralization, or ideological cohesion.  Instead, like that of the 
McGovern-Fraser activists, the discourse surrounding congressional reform was steeped in the 
New Politics-tinged language of participation and transparency.  Generational turnover in 
Congress and among the lobbyists and advocacy groups in Washington played a role in this 
participatory rhetoric, as a 1970 Nation article tracking “The Greening of Congress” observed.148  
But it was also true that several of the reformers’ agenda items did seek to diffuse power and 
enhance procedural regularity and transparency.  In 1970, for example, the DSG and Common 
Cause alike lobbied to include amendments to the Legislative Reorganization Bill that would 
require published records of roll call votes within committees as well as so-called “teller votes” 
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on legislative amendments within the Committee of the Whole.
149
  They also successfully 
lobbied the caucus’s passage of a ban on any member chairing more than one subcommittee, 
which had the effect of spreading chairmanships among lower ranking members.  Anti-secrecy 
and subcommittee empowerment remained themes of the reform movement over the next few 
years, and New Politics-influenced procedural concerns rather than responsible party doctrine 
underlay them.  The fact that both agendas were also supported by a cohort of junior Republicans 
further underscored their seeming distance from a conscious party-building effort.
150
          
Such decentralizing and nonpartisan aspects of the congressional reform movement 
would serve to color its subsequent scholarly reputation in accounts that emphasized its 
fragmenting effects.
151
  Those components of the reform movement, however, can easily be 
overemphasized.  Most of the decentralizing and anti-secrecy reforms justified on grounds of 
participation and transparency also instrumentally served the substantive and partisan goals of 
Democratic reformers.  Unrecorded teller votes on legislative amendments, for example, 
advantaged senior members with disproportionate control over the vote-gathering process, so 
reformers conceived of recorded teller votes as a reform that would advance the substantive 
goals of the party’s liberal majority.  Limiting members’ ability to chair multiple subcommittees, 
meanwhile, eliminated a widely used tool that committee chairmen had employed to agglomerate 
power.  Expansions of subcommittees’ numbers and resources similarly served both to boost 
rank-and-file participation and to provide the party’s middle tier with end-runs around 
conservative chairmen.  Virtually all key actors in the outside reform groups were themselves 
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liberals acutely aware of the connection between institutional reform, partisan behavior, and 
policymaking.  Even the most avowedly nonpartisan groups endorsed a normative commitment 
to intraparty majority rule.  When Common Cause distributed rankings of committee chairmen in 
1975, one of its criteria was conveyed by the question, “Does he use [power] to further the 
programs and policies favored by the Democratic majority or does he use power to undercut such 
programs?”152  Similarly, consumer activist Ralph Nader celebrated that chairs who “consistently 
violate caucus rules and vote more often with the Republican majority than with the Democratic” 
were now “on notice that they will be accountable to the Democratic majority.”153    
 This push for party cohesion and internal majority rule found notable if comparably 
limited expression in the other chamber of Congress in the early 1970s.  The Senate, with its 
extraordinarily open legislative procedures and limited capacity for centralized control, provided 
a set of incentives to its members that inevitably encouraged greater individualism than would be 
seen in the House, pre- or post-reform.
154
  Neither committee chairmen nor party leaders could 
aspire to exercise the kind of power over members’ behavior that they could within the House.  
Nevertheless, the outside reform coalition worked with Democratic liberals in the Senate to 
moderately strengthen the party caucus (known as the Conference in this chamber) and its 
leadership and to diminish the autonomy of conservative committee chairmen.  Majority Leader 
Mike Mansfield agreed in 1970 to let the Democratic Policy Committee make policy 
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recommendations to the Conference.  A year later, he agreed to hold Conference meetings 
automatically at the request of members and to appoint a committee to study seniority reform.
155
   
The incremental movement for party-enhancing reforms proceeded in the wake of the 
1972 elections, which produced a landslide victory for Richard Nixon that was largely devoid of 
coattails helping congressional Republicans.  Retirements, redistricting, and the electoral efforts 
of the reform coalition all helped to produce a younger and more pro-reform incoming 
Democratic caucus in both chambers.  The caucus soon passed a new requirement for automatic 
votes on all committee chairmanships at the beginning of each new Congress.  The year 1973 
also saw the establishment of the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee, which would serve 
as a kind of executive committee for the Democratic caucus, pursuing legislative coordination 
and making appointment recommendations to the Committee on Committees.  In another 
leadership-enhancing reform, the caucus voted to make the Speaker, majority leader, and whip 
all ex officio members of the Committee on Committees.  “We have made committee chairmen 
more accountable to the Democratic Caucus,” Fraser reported to his constituents in March. “We 
have also moved to strengthen the House leadership and centralize its decision-making 
capability.”156   
 Procedural strikes against the committee barons’ power still did not translate into the 
direct removal of individual chairmen by the caucus, however.  In this, the first organizing 
caucus that would include automatic votes on every chairmanship, the highest number of votes 
cast in favor of removing a sitting chairman was 49 against Richard Ichord of the Internal 
Security (formerly Un-American Activities) Committee, followed by 48 against W.R. Poage of 
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the Agriculture Committee.
157
  One factor contributing to the caucus’s continual reluctance to 
exercise its newfound powers was the forward movement of the very electoral realignment in the 
South and elsewhere that reformers sought to hasten through institutional changes.  The top 
target for reformers seeking to oust a chairman in previous Congresses had been South Carolina 
Representative John McMillan of the District of Columbia Committee, but a liberal primary 
challenge in 1972 removed McMillan from the race.  In the general election, a conservative 
Republican candidate defeated that liberal Democrat, in a preview of the basic partisan and 
ideological dynamic that would come to define congressional races in the South in later decades.   
 The breakthrough for reformers came in 1974, when the first congressional elections 
since the Watergate crisis and Nixon’s resignation ushered in an enormous crop of freshman 
Democrats.  Many of these new members, soon termed the “Watergate Babies,” had run on 
congressional reform platforms in coordination with the reform coalition and, in the case of 
House candidates, with financial support from the DSG.  Common Cause had expanded its Open 
Up the System electoral campaign that year, while the umbrella Committee on Congressional 
Reform promoted a comprehensive reform package covering issues related to seniority, party 
leadership, and committee structure.
158
  An extraordinary alignment of developments, ranging 
from the public atmosphere created by Watergate to massive generational replacement underway 
among members of Congress to the concerted mobilization of outside advocacy, finally appeared 
after the 1974 midterms to give reformers an opening for truly sweeping change.   
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At its organizational meeting in December of that year, the numerically expanded and 
demographically younger House Democratic caucus enacted the gamut of proposals included in 
the reform coalition’s package.  Two of the boldest provisions directly enhanced the power of the 
party leadership while indirectly empowering the caucus’s liberal majority.  First, the caucus 
voted to give the Speaker the power to appoint all Democratic members of the Rules Committee.  
Secondly – thanks to intense lobbying by not only the core reform coalition members but also, 
notably, the AFL-CIO – the caucus did away entirely with the Committee on Committees, 
removing the authority over committee appointments from its longstanding home at Ways and 
Means and placing it in the Steering and Policy Committee.   
The following month occasioned even more dramatic developments, as reformers seized 
the moment to make precedent-setting examples out of key committee barons targeted for ouster.  
The DSG, Ralph Nader’s Congress Watch, and Common Cause had all collaborated on a formal 
report assessing the record of fourteen House chairmen.  The report singled out F. Edward 
Hebert for “flagrant” conduct, while cataloging a range of abuses by six other chairmen relating 
to rule compliance, fairness, and fealty to caucus wishes.
159
  Common Cause distributed the 
report to congressional Democrats just days before the meeting of the Steering and Policy 
Committee.  Simultaneously, the 75-member freshman caucus flexed its institutional muscle by 
inviting every committee chairman to meet with it for what many perceived to be implicit 
auditions to retain their jobs.  Hebert got off on the wrong foot by referring to the freshmen as 
“boys and girls,” while Poage reported encountering hostility from the disproportionately liberal 
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and non-rural interlocutors at his meeting.
160
  Such chairmen found themselves in the unfamiliar 
position of needing to defend their records and actively campaign to retain their power.
161
         
Following the meetings with the freshmen, reformers carried their momentum through 
two crucial rounds of Democratic voting.  First, the Steering and Policy Committee voted to oust 
two chairmen for the first time: Wright Patman of Banking and Wayne Hays of House 
Administration.  Then, at the full caucus meeting the following day, House Democrats voted to 
uphold the Steering Committee’s ouster of Patman, narrowly rejected its decision on Hays, and, 
most stunning of all, also rejected its recommendations to retain Poage and Hebert as heads of 
their respective committees.
162
  The caucus had exercised its power to oust three sitting 
chairman, an unprecedented overturning of longstanding norms and practices.   
The response from the reformers’ targets mirrored the alarm that party professionals had 
conveyed in their reactions to McGovern-Fraser, castigating the barbarians at the gate.  
“Common Cause is running Congress,” Hebert declared on The Today Show in February.  “Who 
elected them?”163  Others made explicit comparisons between the reformers in Congress and 
McGovernites.  As the embattled chairman Richard Ichord declared at a caucus meeting, “what 
we are doing here is conducting another Miami Convention.”164  One twelve-term incumbent’s 
reaction to the developments constituted his own small contribution to the process of ideological 
sorting that would soon transform the party system itself.  “In the last few days,” Oklahoma 
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congressman John Jarman announced in January, “I have seen the caucus taken over by some of 
the same elements which took the party over in 1972.”  To Jarman, the intent of those leading the 
takeover was clear: “to do everything possible to force their liberal views on this Congress and 
on this country by nullifying the seniority system and punishing those who do not adhere to the 
liberal party line.”  Refusing “to serve under this kind of party control,” Jarman announced his 
intention to switch affiliation to the GOP.  House Minority Leader John Rhodes applauded 
Jarman’s move, and reflected on reform’s implications for realignment.  “For many years it has 
been speculated that moderate and conservative Democrats might find sufficient justification to 
cross party lines,” he said.  Seniority perks had long posed a “roadblock in this scenario,” but the 
reforms now removed the “incentive for many Democrats to maintain their affiliation with a 
party whose general philosophy is not reflective of their views.”165     
The same reformist surge rocking the House after the 1974 elections did not fail to affect 
the Senate.  That chamber’s Democratic Steering Committee appointed several new liberals to 
key committees while blocking the return of segregationist James Allen to Judiciary.  The 
Democratic Conference also passed a rule requiring automatic secret-ballot votes on all 
committee chairmen at the beginning of each Congress.
166
  Senate liberals also launched a new 
campaign against a longstanding target of responsible-party reformers: the filibuster.  For nearly 
three decades, activists had sought to change the requirements for cloture, arguing that the 
threshold of two-thirds of the chamber needed to break a filibuster mocked majority rule and 
empowered conservatives.  The newer congressional reform advocates in the early 1970s, led by 
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Common Cause, endorsed the cause.
167
  The 1974 election results combined with the ascension 
of liberal Republican Nelson Rockefeller to the Vice Presidency (the presiding officer of the 
Senate) to provide a window of opportunity.  Walter Mondale’s January 1975 proposal shied 
away from outright majority rule, calling merely for a reduction of the threshold from two-thirds 
to three-fifths to break a filibuster.  The rule change that eventually passed was compromised 
further.  A three-fifths vote of the entire Senate, rather than merely of those present and voting, 
would be required for cloture, and two thirds would still be required for votes related to Senate 
rule changes, a hindrance to future reform.
168
  Still, the move from a 67 to a 60 vote threshold for 
cloture constituted a significant change to a procedure that had only experienced comparable 
reform two other times in the twentieth century.  
When the dust settled in early 1975 after those tumultuous organizational meetings 
among House Democrats and the hard-fought achievement of a modest reform of the Senate 
filibuster, only the startling extent of the reformers’ victories was evident.  A vision of just how 
policymaking might change for the long term in the wake of those victories was still far from 
clear.  The special alignment of forces that had enabled such a breakthrough would prove 
difficult to replicate in the coming years, and thus the beginning of the 94
th
 Congress served as 
the high-water mark for deliberate institutional transformation within Congress.  Occurring just 
after Democrats’ ratification of a party charter, it might also be said to have marked the 
beginning of the end of the Age of Party Reform that had, starting in 1968, seen transformation 
across so many elements of America’s majority party and overall party system.     
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From Disarray to Centralization 
 
 It was not merely the impetus toward further institutional reform that dissipated quickly 
in the mid-1970s.  Optimism over the consequences of the reforms that had been implemented 
seemed to vanish just as fast.  Invocations of reform’s unintended consequences soon became a 
rote accompaniment to ceaseless commentary on political fracture and party decline in America.  
This focus on political disarray had multiple causes.  On one hand, as explored in more detail in 
the next two chapters, the later 1970s saw developments that exacerbated points of fragmentation 
and paralysis in the political system.  Stagflation presented novel, seemingly intractable policy 
dilemmas.  Successive presidents working in rocky terrain weakened their position by setting 
priorities at odds with key allies.  More subtly, tectonic shifts of party allegiance among 
demographic and constituent groups intensified the impression of disarray.  On the other hand, 
party reforms themselves did produce changes with some initially decentralizing effects.  The 
number of primary systems proliferated, for example, as states found them to be cheaper and 
logistically easier to establish in conformity with the new guidelines than conventions or 
caucuses.
169
  Since primaries were the most direct, unmediated system of delegate selection, their 
rise to predominance meant a relative marginalization of formal party organizations in favor of 
campaign armies amassed by individual political entrepreneurs.  This occasioned an explosion of 
commentary on the rise of “candidate-centered” politics.  The commentary also encompassed 
members of Congress, for whom reforms had created new opportunities for individualistic 
legislative behavior thanks to transparency rules and the proliferation of subcommittees.
170
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On both fronts, a critical scholarly literature of reform emerged quickly.  The first 
influential work on presidential nominating reform came from political scientists within the orbit 
of the CDM, most notably Jeane Kirkpatrick and that regretful McGovern-Fraser veteran, Austin 
Ranney.  They were soon joined by a panoply of centrist and neoconservative scholars, including 
Everett Carl Ladd, James Caesar, Nelson Polsby, and Polsby’s doctoral student Byron Shafer.171  
To these critics, reform was not merely an anti-party, neo-Progressive venture.  It was also a 
mechanism for transferring power from professionals and traditional constituency leaders – cast 
now as implicitly responsible and representative stewards of group interests rather than out-of-
touch bosses and hacks – to a new group.  In 1977 DNC testimony, Kirkpatrick termed reform’s 
benefactors “a verbalist elite” holding “a much greater interest in what might be called style and 
symbol issues, ideological issues … environmentalism and foreign policy and so forth, and much 
less interest in the bread and butter questions.”  Alarm over this ideological coloring compelled 
critics to make arguments similar to those lodged against responsible party doctrine.  Noting that 
delegates in 1972 were distinguished “by their zeal,” O’Hara argued that reform produced “a 
system that was open to capture by an aroused minority.”   Lost were “the views of the non-
participating Democrats, the casual Democrats … whose support we need in November.”172    
   Concern over the reforms was not limited to centrist and neoconservative critics, 
however.  Some of the most devoted proponents of responsible party doctrine worked throughout 
the later 1970s to organize a collective scholarly response to developments in party politics.  
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Starting with informal correspondence led by James MacGregor Burns in 1975, these scholars 
eventually organized themselves as the Committee on Party Renewal.  In roundtables at APSA 
meetings and testimony before party commissions, members generally endorsed the participatory 
thrust of the McGovern-Fraser reforms and directed their concerns instead at fragmenting 
developments like the proliferation of primaries.
173
   They advocated measures to strengthen the 
central party apparatuses and bolster issue-based party activism while protecting intraparty 
democracy.  But they were hardly confident about the prospects of achieving such goals.     
At the same time that fragmentation seemed to dominate party politics, however, moves 
to shore up and strengthen the parties commenced.  Some of these developments stemmed 
directly from changes made by party organizations.  The next two DNC reform panels to form 
after McGovern-Fraser, Mikulski, and the Charter commission took as their institutional goals a 
modest curbing of their predecessors’ participatory reforms and a restoration of the role of 
elected officials.  In 1978, the Commission on Presidential Nomination and Party Structure 
called for “add-on” ex-officio delegates numbering 10 percent of each state’s delegation.174  Four 
years later, a new Commission on Presidential Nomination expanded that concept with the 
introduction of “bonus delegates” to Democratic conventions – several hundred unpledged 
delegate slots reserved for public and party officials.
175
  The easing of factional tensions reduced 
opposition to such proposals.  In a self-reinforcing process, increasing party cohesion enabled the 
adoption of reforms to empower majorities and curb dissidents.   
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That dynamic would be far more forcefully, if less visibly, manifested in the informal 
ways that engaged activists, politicians, and interests came to coordinate nomination races after 
the 1970s.  In 1975, Fraser had lamented the proliferation of primaries and speculated on what 
the most feasible way might be to produce some degree of stability without jettisoning voter 
participation.  What might work, he said, would be to treat the primaries as “the one place down 
the track for the public to intervene in the process.  Then we could try to move one step earlier to 
get some kind of ad hoc or informal coalitions across the country which can try to reach an 
agreement on one or two or three candidates.”176  Something resembling that very system 
emerged by decade’s end.  Party actors would now seek through meetings, endorsements, and 
informal agreements to coalesce behind acceptable candidates prior to the race’s public phase – a 
process labeled by scholars the “invisible primary.”177  Increasing ideological cohesion within 
the parties only enhanced the ease and effectiveness of this coordination. 
The same gradual move from fragmentation to centralization commenced in the 
postreform Congress by the later 1970s.  As with the nominating process, the first wave of 
scholarly and journalistic commentary on the transformed Congress emphasized the unintended 
consequences of reforms that dispersed power.
178
  “On many days,” a reporter wrote, “Congress 
has all the earmarks of a Southern state legislature where, in the absence of party influence, a 
new coalition has to be put together for every roll-call.”179  The southern comparison was ironic, 
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since the transformation of that region proved so central to the revival of congressional party 
discipline.  Conservative southern Democrats were increasingly replaced by conservative 
Republicans, moderate Democrats representing biracial coalitions, or liberal Democrats in 
largely African American districts.  Remaining conservative Democrats began to liberalize their 
own voting, a result of electoral trends and new incentives for party loyalty brought by reform.
180
 
Growing ideological cohesion was not only an effect of reform.  It was also an impetus 
for the increasing utilization by party leaders of reform’s centralizing tools.  Here as in 
presidential nominations, cohesion made partisans more inclined to allow leaders to exercise 
coordinating and agenda-setting power.
181
  Beginning with Tip O’Neill’s Speakership in 1977, 
Democratic leaders flexed the institutional muscles afforded by reform.  They expanded the whip 
system and used the Steering and Policy and Rules committees to set the legislative agenda, 
along with Party Task Forces handling initiatives across multiple committee jurisdictions.
182
  The 
combination of ideological sorting and tighter control by party leaders caused voting cohesion to 
begin a rebound in the late 1970s that continued for decades. 
Leaders in the Age of Party Reform shared two responsible party goals: programmatic 
politics and party nationalization.  They were well aware that achieving them would catalyze the 
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ideological realignment of the two parties.  In 1969, a journalist had asked George McGovern 
what he thought about “a realignment of American parties to something a little closer to the 
British system, with conservatives in one party and liberals in another.”  He responded that, “on 
balance, it would serve the national interest … if we did move more in the direction of a unified 
party.”  Harold Hughes went further in the same interview, arguing that such a “leveling process 
of philosophical lines will take place if we open up the political processes at the precinct and 
ground level,” and “the sooner it happens the better off probably we would be in this country.”183 
Less than a decade later, many political observers had become more pessimistic.  They 
feared that the institutional disruptions caused by reform might not be alleviated.  “What would 
take the place of parties?” the Committee on Party Renewal asked in 1977.  “A politics of 
celebrities, of excessive media influence, of political fad-of-the-month clubs … of heightened 
interest in ‘personalities’ and lowered interest in policy.”184  The logic of ideologically driven 
partisanship is what kept this vision from coming to pass.  Far from being either issueless or 
partyless, politics in the postreform era became increasingly partisan as a result of being 
increasingly ideological.  Democrat-authored reforms were hardly the only driver of this process.  
But institutional changes did matter, and not only in ways unintended by their architects.   
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Chapter 5: The Making of a Vanguard Party 
To understand what happened to the Republican Party in the 1970s, ponder for a moment 
a realignment that might have been.  Past figures as disparate as Franklin Roosevelt, Karl Mundt, 
and Paul Butler had each discovered in turn that the work of remapping American parties along 
ideological lines was frustratingly slow and seemingly impervious to top-down orchestration.  
But that did not stop several aides of Richard Nixon as well as House leaders from pursuing one 
more bid for an instantaneous realignment of the congressional parties, in 1972 and early 1973.    
 Gerald Ford, the House minority leader, called the gambit “Operation Switch Over.”  
Early in the summer of 1972, he sensed that George McGovern’s impending presidential 
nomination provided the best opportunity yet to make an argument to the remaining southern 
Democratic congressional barons – conservatives like Joe Waggonner, George Smathers, and 
Jamie Whitten – that their party was truly lost to them.1  He sought to convince a sufficient 
number to switch parties en masse for control of the House to shift to the GOP.  Nixon, however, 
discouraged Ford’s pursuit of this plan until after the November elections, calculating that his 
personal electoral majority would be maximized by the symbolism of bipartisan support.   
A new effort proceeded in the winter following Nixon’s landslide victory.  Vice President 
Spiro Agnew publicly exhorted southern audiences to switch their party allegiance from 
Democratic to Republican, describing the former as a crew of “exotics, elitists, and philosophical 
abstractionists” whose new chairman had just “read George Wallace and John Connally out of 
the party.” 2  Simultaneously, backdoor talks took place between southern Democrats and Ford 
and Nixon aides, with Waggoner serving as a liaison.  Nixon’s lack of down-ticket coattails in 
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the 1972 election, however – a partial byproduct of his bipartisan campaign strategy – meant that 
the Democrats’ majority did not shrink sufficiently to enable willing switchers to give the GOP a 
House majority.
3
  Scattered reports claim that, during the wintertime negotiations, upwards of 35 
Democrats contemplated switching, though other sources indicate that the realistic number was 
half that.
4
  Whatever the count, discussion of a mass conversion ground to a halt in March, as the 
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities began its Watergate investigation. 
 The fact that, at such a late date as 1972 – a moment of maximal Republican electoral 
dominance at the presidential level – senior southern Democrats still either could or would not 
coordinate a mass conversion owed largely to a mix of personal and institutional factors 
mitigating against such bold ideological gambits.  The inertia borne of career-long affiliation to 
the party of Dixie was one factor, affecting not only officeholders but many of their constituents, 
who would continue to vote Democratic in down-ballot races for years to come. The institutional 
perquisites of seniority also mattered, and Ford encountered stiff resistance from GOP colleagues 
to the notion of transferring the converts’ seniority in the event of a switch.  Nevertheless, the 
evident effort put into orchestrating this instant congressional realignment lends it at least a 
modicum of plausibility in spite of its failure.  So it poses a tantalizing counterfactual, one that 
helps set into relief the nature of important changes that the GOP underwent in subsequent years.   
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“Operation Switch Over” was of a piece with the vision of partisan realignment that 
animated Nixon’s presidency and shaped his most ambitious political efforts.5  Such efforts – 
some implemented, others merely discussed – included the administration’s attempts to 
nationalize the 1970 midterm elections around a backlash against social unrest; its intensive 
courting of Dixiecrats like Virginia’s Harry Byrd; and Nixon’s grooming of the ex-Democrat 
John Connally of Texas as his heir apparent, who would head a Republican Party reconstructed, 
and perhaps even renamed, as a result of Nixon’s transformative leadership.6  All of these efforts 
revolved around a particular conception of the changing demographic landscape of electoral 
politics and its connection to a changing issue terrain for the party system.   
Though “the silent majority” served as a rhetorically effective evocation in speeches, 
Nixon aides typically used the shorthand “New American Majority” to describe their vision.  
Demographically, the majority combined the traditional bastions of Midwestern Republicanism 
with middle-class suburban voters in the Sunbelt states, George Wallace supporters in the South, 
and disaffected white ethnics in cities across the country.  Ideologically, the basis of the New 
American Majority, the new line of cleavage in a realigned party system, would concern cultural 
more than economic issues.  Nixonian conservatism rejected the libertarian anti-statism of 
Goldwater.  It was defined by opposition to the ferment of the 1960s – “the Social Issue,” as Ben 
Wattenberg and Richard Scanlon put it in the 1970 tome The Real Majority – rather than the core 
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architecture of the welfare state and postwar economic policy.
7
  It was a conservatism that could 
accommodate wage and price controls and turbo-charged Keynesianism (administered by the 
consummate statist conservative, Treasury Secretary John Connally), Social Security expansion 
and a guaranteed income.  Kevin Phillips called it “consolidationist Republicanism” in his best-
selling blueprint for an emerging partisan majority.
8
  Realignment theory itself bolstered the idea 
among Nixon strategists that a socio-cultural issue dimension would displace rather than 
augment the economic one as the basis for partisan conflict – for such “issue displacement” was 
allegedly the hallmark of realignments.
9
  The wooing of Southern Bourbon officeholders through 
Operation Switch Over and of Wallace populists in the electorate fit a plan to construct a party 
alignment largely around racialized social issues, cultural “permissiveness,” and foreign policy.      
To imagine Operation Switch Over succeeding in 1973 is to imagine a trajectory for 
American conservatism and party politics different from that which eventually occurred.  The 
aging Democrats targeted for conversion certainly held conservative positions on issues ranging 
from labor to civil rights to foreign affairs.  But they were not inculcated in an intellectual and 
institutional milieu that was only beginning to be constructed as of 1973, one that included 
congressional caucuses, think tanks, and advocacy organizations and was defined by 
ideologically-driven partisanship and a movement orientation.  These Democrats were in fact the 
last master practitioners of committed bipartisanship in American politics, and of an instrumental 
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kind of partisan maneuvering to maintain the South’s clout within the system.10  The question of 
whether Nixon’s New American Majority would have, in fact, taken political root had not 
Watergate destroyed his presidency is similarly speculative.  What matters is that the actual post-
Watergate trajectory of both GOP and conservative politics differed from his vision in key ways.   
The years following Watergate saw experimentation in conservatives’ approach to 
partisan politics, featuring arguments about the potential viability of a new party and the proper 
relationship between issues and partisanship.  Ronald Reagan’s nomination challenge to Ford in 
1976 signaled a new strategic convergence on pursuing ideological activism singularly through 
the GOP.  Conservatives built new organizations within and around the party and took advantage 
of changing institutional contexts to maximize their leverage.  Their efforts gained momentum 
during the Carter years, thanks partly to ideological business mobilization and an influx of 
“amateur” activism from the Christian Right.  The result by decade’s end was a reconfiguration 
of the GOP agenda, in which moderate elements on both social and economic issues were 
marginalized and the “fusionism” of the modern right became the programmatic core of the 
party.
11
  In this reconfiguration, contrary to realignment theorists’ predictions, party cleavages on 
cultural issues supplemented rather than supplanted those on economic and welfare state issues. 
In the explosion of historical literature on postwar American conservatism and, in 
particular, the right’s mobilizations during the 1970s, the partisan context of that movement-
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building has often been underemphasized.
12
  This is in keeping with contemporary commentary 
during that decade that cast ideological politics as symptomatic of system-wide party decline.  
But analyzing the conservative movement as a kind of partisan project helps to bring the right 
into a broader story of party development, one it shared with liberal activists and reformers who 
also sought to forge a more ideologically sorted, issue-based system.  Conservative actors and 
political elites not only made some of the same responsible-party arguments as liberal reformers 
– against transactional partisan organizations, in favor of issue politics and programmatically 
distinct parties – they also took advantage of new institutional reforms that were rendering the 
party system more permeable to activist influence.  That new institutional context and the 
coalitional efforts made by conservative activists in turn help explain why the party polarization 
that began at the elite level in the 1970s occurred along multiple issue dimensions at once.
13
   
From the 1970s onward, conservatives within the GOP would occupy the vanguard of 
efforts to inscribe a firmer line of ideological division into the party system, to marry partisan 
team spirit to substantive and philosophical zeal in pursuit of a politics of permanent combat.  
The congressional realignment of the white South that Operation Switch Over had symbolized 
would eventually take place, though its unfolding spanned decades rather than months.  But the 
southern Republicans who eventually came to power would operate differently from their 
Dixiecrat predecessors – conservative across more dimensions of policy, more steeped in the 
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ethos of a well-defined national conservative movement, and far more partisan in orientation.  
The conservative story of the Ford and Carter years is the story of how that combination of 
characteristics came to predominate within the GOP and, in so doing, changed American politics.    
 
Conservative Revolt and the New-Party Path 
 
Gerald Ford had been president of the United States for all of two weeks when he began 
receiving warnings of the collapse of conservative Republican support.  “There is a mini-revolt 
among congressional conservatives over some of the week’s activities,” legislative aide William 
Timmons wrote the president on August 22, 1974. Those activities ranged from weighty policy 
decisions to symbolic gestures, but they acquired an air of significance from their seeming 
confluence as the new president’s first, standard-setting batch of directives.14   They included a 
new policy regarding clemency for Vietnam War draft evaders; Ford’s reaffirmation of support 
for the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA); and Nelson Rockefeller’s nomination as vice 
president.
15
  “The House funny-farm rumors are that you will come out soon for busing, gun 
control, and abortion,” Timmons reported.  To calm right-wing nerves, he recommended holding 
meetings with both chambers’ conservative-dominated Republican Steering Committees: “If you 
approve, we’ll prepare some conservative issues to discuss at these meetings.”  Ford did not 
approve, checking off the “Do Not Schedule” option at the bottom of the memo. 
 That checkmark well captured both the new administration’s instinctive disposition 
toward movement conservatives and the latter’s marginal position in national politics as of 1974.  
Ford’s presidency, borne of crisis and forced into a harried midstream transition, lacked the 
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benefit of the kind of overarching agenda that typically emerges out of a campaign and lengthy 
preparation for office.  In a climate of crisis management, with national reconciliation and 
reassurance the basic orienting goal, Ford’s team opted for a default posture in the direction of 
prevailing policy currents.  In 1974, that direction, not only in Congress but among establishment 
Republicans, ran towards the center and away from the right.  Most decisions made during the 
early months of the administration reflected an inclination to shore up Ford’s left flank.   
This inclination also reflected the degree to which conservatives lacked intraparty 
leverage after years serving as fitful junior partners to Nixon.
16
  That weakness was evident, for 
example, in the administration deliberations regarding Ford’s vice-presidential pick.  It was not 
surprising that aide Bob Hartmann thought it wise to choose Rockefeller as a genuflection to the 
party’s moderate wing.17  More striking was the fact that Pat Buchanan, the old Nixon staff’s 
token hard-right voice, echoed the recommendation.  “If I were speaking of the President’s 
interest alone,” he wrote Ford, “regrettably, Rockefeller is the one.”  Picking Reagan or Barry 
Goldwater would “cause a mighty rupture in the liberal establishment and tear up the pea patch 
with the national press corps.”  Buchanan deemed Rockefeller “a strong and safe choice,” partly 
because of a soon-to-be-disproven sense that the he had “lost the old devil patina with the 
Right,” but also because Buchanan considered the liberal establishment a force still to be 
reckoned with.
18
  Similarly, Ford’s new policy for Vietnam draft evaders was conceived as a 
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conciliatory gesture, a break from Nixon-era divisions, with little thought given to a conservative 
backlash.
19
     
But the dam of conservative frustration, which had strained against Nixon’s ideological 
transgressions, burst in the wake of his fall, and the newcomer to the presidency immediately 
became the target of factional dissent that had roots stretching years in the past.  The swiftness of 
the “mini-revolt” that Timmons noted was striking.  His warning to Ford had partly been 
prompted by another staffer’s report of Senate cloakroom scuttlebutt.  Tennessee Senator Bill 
Brock remarked that his constituent calls and wires were “running 50-1 against [Rockefeller] 
already,” while Goldwater told the staffer, “You can kiss the Republican Party goodbye.”  
Idaho’s reliably blunt Jim McClure asked, “How many times do you have to kick a guy in the 
groin before you let up?”20  Backroom conservative grumbling soon turned into public criticism 
and streams of mail from GOP voters and officials.  Looking to the midterm elections, Georgia 
Congressman Ben Blackburn warned Ford that he threatened to “force many of our Republican 
candidates into a ‘me too’ posture when in confrontation with a liberal Democratic opposition.”21   
Grousing about me too-ism is the perennial recourse of ideologically committed 
partisans.  What made this disaffection significant was the action it inspired.  The Ford years 
would mark a productive and experimental period for conservative activists who sought a new, 
closer alignment of party and principle and who perceived, in the tangled thicket of public 
opinion, demographics, and changing institutions, an increasingly hospitable environment for 
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such a project.  That experimentation entailed a quixotic inquiry into third-party politics and, 
eventually, a direct intraparty challenge to the president.      
Prior to Ford’s ascension to the White House, during the stormy endgame of Nixon’s 
presidency, some conservatives were already envisioning the eventual transformation, if not 
outright replacement, of the Republican Party.  For most of them, such a possibility stemmed less 
from the short-term Watergate crisis than from long-term political changes to which the GOP 
had proven institutionally incapable of responding.  Watergate appeared merely a proximate 
cause to conservative political consultant Clif White, for example, when he speculated over 
lunch in January 1974 with National Review’s publisher William Rusher and editor William F. 
Buckley about the coming breakup of the GOP and “the development of a new political grouping 
after 1976.”22  That new grouping would likely still be the coalition of Wallace Democrats and 
Republicans aligned around the Social Issue.  But with Watergate having cut short Nixon’s fitful 
efforts to forge a new majority, and with public identification with the Republican Party at an all-
time low, it was increasingly possible to imagine the coalition taking a different form and name.       
A few months later, at a dinner honoring movement hero Clarence Manion, North 
Carolina Senator Jesse Helms gave a speech suggesting just such a possibility.
23
   His argument 
deftly rendered Watergate a symptom of a different, deeper-seated malady – namely, the 
American party system’s anachronistic ideological incoherence.  Helms asked his audience, 
“Could it be that it is time to forge new political parties, fashioned along the lines that the people 
are thinking, not along the existing lines of political power-seeking?  If we are going to have 
honesty in government today, we must have honesty in the basic philosophies of our political 
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parties.” “Honesty” recurred throughout Helms’s call for realignment, which implicitly rendered 
Watergate an apotheosis of the grubby, transactional default mode of American politics, of 
murky, “power-seeking” agendas breeding cynicism and disillusionment in the public.  The party 
system “must give an honest choice, and it must furnish the mechanism for politicians to carry 
out honestly the principles they set before the people.”  For now, though, Americans remained 
“locked into two major political parties by geography, by tradition, by sentiment,” in an outdated 
alignment that obscured rather than facilitated the expression of philosophical disagreement.  
The incoherence was evident in government – “conservative Democrats [in Congress] look 
across the aisle and … count the faces of men who wear the label of Republicans and practice the 
philosophy of liberalism” – and translated into cynicism and alienation among voters.   
A formal project of ideological party-building could redress this disillusionment, and as a 
“starting point,” Helms called for a version of that standby of responsible party reform (one 
recently institutionalized by Democrats), a midterm issues and platform convention gathering 
conservative delegates from every congressional district.  Helms, a television commentator 
turned politician whose well-earned reputation for scabrous hardball masked a serious 
intellectual engagement with American political history, made sure in his speech to tip his hat to 
a conservative pioneer of arguments for ideological party realignment, Karl Mundt.  Like Mundt, 
Helms was equivocal about whether this realignment should occur in the form of the existing 
parties or as new entities with new names.  “I intend to remain a Republican,” he said, “unless 
there is a general realignment into Conservative and Liberal parties, by whatever names.”   
 That Helms would be the one to emphasize this distinction between party and principle 
was fitting, since, as a recent party-switching southerner, he embodied the core transformation on 
which realignment hinged.  Indeed, the North Carolina scene in which Helms won election to the 
 258 
 
Senate in 1972 was a cauldron of shifting alliances and incipient sorting – American polarization 
writ small.  That election warrants brief attention for dynamics therein that proved prophetic.   
Both of North Carolina’s parties in 1972 had been riven by internal divisions, 
transforming rapidly.  Helms had anticipated challenging the conservative elder statesman 
Everett Jordan that year, but in the Democratic primary Jordan fell to a moderately liberal, pro-
Civil Rights challenger, Nick Galifinakis, thanks to the support of African American and 
younger voters.  As for the Republicans, Helms’s campaign, and the statewide network built for 
it, turned out to represent the beginning of a protracted effort by conservatives to wrest control of 
the state GOP machinery from a party establishment led by moderate governor Jim Holshouser.  
The governor’s faction, based in the historical strongholds of Republicanism in the state’s 
western mountain and Piedmont regions, was a non-ideological network of party professionals 
tied together by patronage and tradition rather than national issues.  Helms’s base of support 
skewed east, was overwhelmingly conservative, and included a large number of Democrats 
disaffected by the very forces of partisan change enabling someone like Nick Galifinakis to 
defeat someone like Everett Jordan.
24
  Thus the general election contest in 1972 pit a staunchly 
conservative Republican against a liberal Democrat, an alignment that had only occasional 
precedent in the state but whose logic would become increasingly obvious in decades to come.               
Helms’s come-from-behind victory over Galifinakis that November had several sources.  
He employed brutally negative, race-laden campaign tactics.  Numerous Democratic officials in 
the state crossed lines to support Helms, a dynamic exacerbated by George McGovern’s 
unpopularity in the state.  Most significant was the nature of the Helms campaign itself.  Initiated 
by a visionary attorney named Tom Ellis, Helms’s operation was manned by movement activists 
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recruited out of Young Americans for Freedom (YAF) and College Republicans.  Helms and 
Ellis brought in nationally known conservative consultants like Clif White and managed to 
outraise Galifinakis 4-to-1.  They spent the largesse on a sophisticated television and radio 
campaign tying the Democrat to his national party and its beleaguered presidential candidate.
25
   
What Helms and Ellis did with their operation after the election proved to have lasting 
national implications.  Ellis started the North Carolina Congressional Club as a fundraising 
committee to pay down Helms’s campaign debt.  Soon, the membership-based club expanded its 
operations to dinner events featuring conservative speakers as well as pathbreaking direct-mail 
efforts carried out by Richard Viguerie that brought in out-of-state revenue.  Over the course of 
the decade, the North Carolina Congressional Club turned into the National Congressional Club, 
one of the most powerful ideological Political Action Committees (PACs) in the country.  The 
club would recruit and fund conservative candidates for office in elections nationwide, in the 
process building computer files of donor lists to be utilized by other conservative organizations.
26
   
What Helms sought to advance in his 1974 Manion speech was a nationalized version of 
the politics he was already beginning to construct in North Carolina.  It was a system in which 
ideological activism, rather than the transactional, “power-seeking” politics epitomized by his 
rival Holshouser’s faction, undergirded partisan campaigns.27  It was a politics that emphasized 
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sophisticated media appeals and direct mail over the pragmatic precinct work of older party 
organizations.  It was an approach colored by a slash-and-burn, polarizing style of attack 
precisely because the binary lines of stark ideological conflict would align so closely with the 
partisan lines of campaigns.  For conservative activists seething at the timidity of allegedly 
conservative co-partisans in office, Helms’s vision resonated powerfully.  A few began working 
with Helms early in the Ford presidency to explore options for realizing it. 
One participant, National Review’s William Rusher, had less trouble than most writing 
off the GOP and contemplating an effort to hasten its decline in pursuit of a replacement.  He had 
always doubted the viability of the Republican Party as a conservative vehicle, and was more 
open to the coalitional potential of the Wallace movement than other northern conservatives, 
including William F. Buckley.  Helms’s speech, coming soon after Rusher’s discussion with 
Buckley and Clif White about the prospects for new party formations, inspired Rusher to write 
about the subject in his syndicated column.  Helms wrote Rusher that he was “grateful for your 
circulating the word about a renewed proposal for realignment” and invited him to meet him in 
Washington.”28  In the initial months of the Ford presidency, Rusher began finding allies among 
newly disillusioned leaders in institutions like YAF and the American Conservative Union 
(ACU).
29
  The awesome Republican electoral defeats in 1974 – forty-three House seats, six 
Senate seats, fifteen statehouses, six governorships – further emboldened conservatives to 
conceive of a final break with the decrepit party.   At a board meeting in December, the ACU 
initiated plans to explore state-by-state technical considerations for building a new party.  In an 
indication of the coalition this new formation was to embody, ACU president M. Stanton Evans 
                                                 
28
 Helms letter to Rusher, May 28, 1974, Box 39, Folder 1, Rusher Papers.  
29
 Rusher, Rise of the Right, 266; ACU Board Meeting minutes, Sept. 22, 1974, Box 21, Folder 10, ACU Papers.       
 261 
 
agreed to reach out to George Wallace “to discuss political cooperation with his constituency and 
organization.”30  Meanwhile, Rusher drafted a book-length manifesto for the project. 
The Making of the New Majority Party, hurried into publication in the spring of 1975, 
hinged its case on a talismanic statistical ratio and a tantalizing historical analogy.  The ratio was, 
approximately, 60-40.  Since the 1930s, Gallup had occasionally surveyed Americans about 
party realignment, asking which side they would prefer if the two-party system rearranged itself 
into ideologically sorted conservative and liberal parties.  Rusher opened his book by pointing to 
the Gallup result of spring 1974, which found that 26 percent of respondents chose the liberal 
party, 38 percent chose the conservative party, and 36 percent were undecided.
31
  By either 
ignoring the undecided block or splitting it by the same proportions as the affirmative answers, 
Rusher concluded that “59 percent of the American people considered themselves ‘conservative’ 
and only 41 percent ‘liberal.’”  This rough 60-40 conservative-liberal split had arguably been 
approximated in both the 1968 and 1972 presidential results.  In the former, 57 percent voted for 
either Nixon or Wallace versus 43 percent for Humphrey; in the latter, 61 percent voted for 
Nixon versus 38 percent for McGovern.  This was the ideological alignment that Rusher claimed 
now defined American politics, awaiting conservatives’ achievement of a new partisan apparatus 
to take advantage of it.  The conservative majority combined traditional GOP economic 
conservatives with Wallacite populists.  But the Social Issue’s congeries of cultural conflicts 
provided the main line of cleavage, pitting, in Rusher’s conception, producers of all stripes 
(“businessmen, manufacturers, hard-hats, blue-collar workers and farmers”) against the anti-
capitalist coalition of a New Class verbalist elite and welfare constituencies.
32
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The historical analogy, which would pop up constantly during the next two years in 
journalistic discussions of the GOP’s fate, reached back to the mid-nineteenth century.  The 
modern Republican Party, so the argument went, was experiencing the same decomposition that 
befell the very Whig Party it had supplanted in the 1850s.  The Whigs’ depleting leadership and 
organization, built around a cross-sectional agenda, proved incapable of surviving the onset of 
slavery as a primary political issue, and thus it found itself preempted and swiftly replaced by a 
fledgling party organized for the anti-slavery cause.  The analogous elements of the Republican 
Party’s plight circa 1974 included a new “issue,” in this case the Social Issue, creating a new 
political impulse that cut an apparently irreconcilable cleavage across the ranks of a major party; 
the majority-making potential of that same political impulse; and the old party’s decrepit 
leadership, organization, and popular approval.
33
  The Whig analogy underscored Rusher’s point 
that his would not be a minor third party, but rather a new major party, swiftly replacing the GOP 
up and down its ranks and representing a broad-based political coalition.  Indeed, Rusher’s 
argument was not quite a case for down-the-line conservatism in a new party vessel.  He 
endorsed, with qualification, the classic scholarly critiques of responsible party theory, and he 
also stressed that a coalition with the Wallacite Democratic tendency would necessarily mean 
accommodating a greater degree of statism than conservative orthodoxy normally allowed. 
Why could the Republican Party not be transformed from within, through the absorption 
of the social conservative impulse?  Rusher conceded that this was the normal course of 
American party politics and the most desirable possibility, but he saw both immediate and 
longer-term obstacles to conservatives’ changing and utilizing the GOP.  The immediate problem 
was the post-Watergate trough of party strength and popularity.  Gallup polls showed public 
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identification with the GOP vacillating between a fifth and a quarter of the population.
34
  
Meanwhile, “the leadership and organization of the Republican party are today at an all-time 
low.  In state after state it scarcely exists at all.”  But even this organizational decomposition was 
less a temporary result of Watergate than a byproduct of the key longer-term problem – “the 
party’s essential meaninglessness.  No one can effectively lead or even work for the Republican 
party today, because no one can possibly say what it stands for.”  The structural source of that 
incoherence was the inextinguishable presence of a “liberal-Republican minority whose only real 
function is to prevent any effective coalition with formerly Democratic social conservatives.”  
Though conservatives outnumbered liberals two-to-one among party convention delegates and 
enjoyed majorities in the congressional caucuses, Rusher saw the minority bloc as “ineradicable” 
and permanently capable of compelling programmatic adjustment in the wrong direction.  To 
account for the bloc’s unyielding opposition to engaging social conservatives, Rusher deployed 
the New Class analysis that the Nixon years made au courant among conservatives.  Liberal 
Republicans were themselves part of or sympathetic to that new symbolist elite.  Thus, class 
position determined their partisan function as obstructers of conservative majority-making.
35
 
Rusher lacked much argument for his claim that liberal Republican opposition would 
remain both permanent and permanently insurmountable.  It was more a fatalist conviction borne 
of exasperation after years spent as an intraparty brawler.  This gap in his argument hinted at the 
cul-de-sac that his third party project would reach once Reagan’s primary challenge made such 
an intraparty victory for conservatives seem plausible.  When fellow conservatives gave critical 
responses to Rusher’s argument, these were the sorts of objections they raised: Reagan would 
likely render this movement moot, the technical obstacles to new party formation were too 
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strong, and doctrinal divisions between economic and social conservatives posed more of a 
problem than Rusher thought.
36
  Those outside the fold could more easily point out that Rusher’s 
interpretation of polling data exaggerated the public’s support of a conservative party by 
ignoring the one-third who were undecided – as well as the half of respondents who opposed the 
very idea of ideologically aligned parties (versus 26 percent in support).
37
  Rusher was also 
selective in his claims about the 60-40 ideological alignment he ascribed to Americans, depicting 
Nixon as an unprincipled ideological chameleon, for example, while simultaneously interpreting 
his 1972 landslide as a landslide for conservatism itself.
38
       
 Nevertheless, the book’s main lines of argument and key data points became ubiquitous 
among conservatives in Rusher’s orbit.  The second Conservative Political Action Conference 
(CPAC), jointly sponsored by YAF and the ACU in 1975, showcased the new party project.  
Congressman and ACU official Bob Bauman cited the Gallup poll on conservative-party support 
in his speech, likening it to election outcomes in 1968 and 1972.
39
  He attributed party decline 
and popular political disaffection to the parties’ ideological incoherence.  As for the GOP, 
Bauman joked, “it is always difficult to speak publicly of a loved one, perhaps an aging uncle, 
who is suspected of suffering from a terminal illness … This country does not need a third party, 
but by any objective analysis it badly needs a second party.”  Senator James Buckley advocated a 
“philosophy of political alternatives … Republicanism of the kind that accepts, in the name of 
moderation, half the Liberal Democratic program holds no appeal to those Conservative-minded 
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independents and Democrats who were essential to the victorious Presidential election in 
1972.”40  Buckley refrained from a full endorsement of the new-majority party project, using it 
instead as a threat to compel GOP cohesiveness and militancy. 
 As for the man who had introduced the idea the previous year, Jesse Helms now added an 
important new line of analysis in his own CPAC speech.
41
  Though he still dutifully invoked the 
Whigs, Helms no longer made a straightforward Rusher-style case for coalition based on 
realignment theory and historical analogy.  Instead, he saw in the contemporary scene a 
historically novel departure from how American parties formerly operated, and used it to herald 
“the realignment of political action into philosophically consistent parties.”  American parties 
had traditionally been based on sectional interests, Helms explained, which, given the 
“homogeneity of the social systems in the various sections,” meant that “voters did not have to 
think about issues very deeply to get a man and a party generally representative of their 
interests.”  But when the Great Depression brought economic issues to the fore, Roosevelt used 
them to mobilize massive support in the North and the West, “combining it with the geographic 
tradition of the South” to form a powerful coalition.  The latter “geographic element in the 
coalition” began to break down in 1964, however.  In the 1960s, voters were growing “aware 
that their personal interests and the interests promoted by politicians were beginning to diverge. 
People began to get interested in issues.”  What was historically new, Helms implied, was that 
white southerners began to connect issues and voting.
42
  In 1968, “both Nixon and Wallace 
attracted voters because of their stands on specific issues; the Democratic candidate was a 
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creature of party structure and organization, and that structure could no longer deliver.”  Issue-
based voting in the context of ideologically scrambled parties unavoidably signified party 
decline.  In the 1972 election, “issues emerged as more important than party,” said Helms, 
pointing to a study showing that voters’ likelihood to back Nixon increased in proportion to their 
conservatism.  “The party which is based on geographic or social division is dead,” he declared.  
Issue-based politics meant issue-based parties – and thus the parties’ ideological sorting-out.   
Though Helms marshaled this argument about issue politics in service of the claim that a 
specifically conservative popular majority in the United States was ripe for mobilization, the 
argument itself resonated powerfully with major new findings among political scientists with no 
such agenda.  After the political tumult of the preceding decade, scholars in the 1970s began to 
reassess the dominant “Michigan School” view of mass political behavior laid out by Philip 
Campbell and his colleagues in their landmark 1960 work The American Voter.
43
  That study had 
deemphasized the role of issues and ideology in guiding voters’ behavior.  The authors identified 
partisanship, determined by affective ties of affinity and loyalty, as the overwhelming factor in 
voting.  A new view emerging in the early 1970s suggested that the Michigan School’s findings 
reflected the political quiescence and ideologically scrambled partisan lines characterizing the 
1950s more than any fundamental law of American voting behavior.  The American Political 
Science Review published a symposium on the subject of issue voting in the summer of 1972, led 
by Gerald M. Pomper’s argument that voters had moved a good deal of the way “from confusion 
to clarity” during the conflictive sixties.44  Pomper used survey data on six major policy issues to 
show both a tightening correlation over time between respondents’ party affiliation and positions 
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as well as respondents’ increasing ability to differentiate between the two respective parties’ 
issue positions.  Conflict, in Pomper’s account, educated American voters: “The events and 
campaigns of the 1960s … made politics more relevant and more dramatic to the mass electorate.  
In the process, party differences were developed and perceived.”45     
The 1972 McGovern-Nixon context only served to heighten the salience of issues and 
ideology in voting, just as Helms would note in his CPAC speech.  David Broder reported in 
1973 on the startling new findings coming out of Michigan School’s own headquarters, the 
University of Michigan’s Center for Political Studies (CPS).  A new CPS report’s conclusion 
that the 1972 contest could accurately be labeled “an ideological election” amounted to, in 
Broder’s words, “a revolution in American politics,” given the country’s traditional lack of 
programmatic parties.
46
  In 1974 two other scholars reported “major increases in the levels of 
attitude consistency in the mass public” since the 1950s, with New Deal-vintage issues as well as 
“new issues as they emerged in the 60s” becoming increasingly “incorporated by the mass public 
into what now appears to be a broad liberal/conservative ideology.”47   
Helms pointed to the rising salience of issues in determining voting behavior as a force in 
the realignment that would produce a new conservative majority party.  Hardly sharing that 
political objective, the APSA Committee on Political Parties had articulated the same systemic 
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goal – a programmatic party system – in 1950.48  More recently, the goal motivated many of the 
participants in the McGovern-Fraser reforms as well as, we shall see, a network of left-liberal 
issue activists.  Even in battle, ideologues left and right engaged in a shared partisan project.       
 Meanwhile, for conservatives considering the radical option of third party formation, the 
next task involved a dip into the kind of state-by-state exploration of ballot procedures and 
organizational requirements that liberals had recently engaged under the aegis of Democratic 
reform.  CPAC participants authorized the formation of a Committee on Conservative 
Alternatives (COCA) to provide “a formal mechanism to review and assess the current political 
situation and to develop future opportunities.”49  The fifteen members included Rusher, Evans, 
New Hampshire governor Meldrim Thomson, Phyllis Schlafly, and George Wallace’s aide Eli 
Howell.  Jesse Helms chaired.  The language Helms used in a statement following COCA’s 
inaugural meeting sounded themes of alienation and renewal that could easily have come from 
the McGovern-Fraser Commission.  “A time of profound change is upon our nation,” Helms 
intoned, “and old systems of political organization are passing.”  Helms decried “the American 
people’s headlong slide into alienation from the present system of parties.”  COCA would 
explore ways to remedy that alienation, including the option of forming “a major new party if the 
present political system fails to respond to the need for philosophical realignment.”50  Staffers in 
Helms’s Senate office performed most of the spadework for COCA.  One aide researched state 
election laws, producing a massive study taking up an entire bookshelf in Helms’s office.51   
                                                 
48
 Pomper emphasized this point in “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System? What, Again?” Journal of 
Politics Vol. 33 (Nov. 1971): 916-940. 
49
 Text of CPAC resolution, February 16, 1975, Box 3, Folder 26, ACU Papers.  
50
 Jesse Helms statement, March 7, 1975, Box 142, Folder 6, Rusher Papers.  
51
 John Fialka, “Arch-Conservative’s Crusade: Abolish the Republican Party,” Washington Star, June 24, 1975.  
 269 
 
Knowledge about ballot line procedures was important, of course, but it would ultimately 
amount to little without a plausible candidate.  Conservatives had no doubt who that should be.  
Six weeks after stepping down as Governor of California, Ronald Reagan delivered a closely-
watched speech at CPAC.
 52
   “I don’t know about you,” he related, “but I am impatient with 
those Republicans who after the last election rushed into print saying, ‘We must broaden the base 
of our party’ – when what they meant was to fuzz up and blur even more the differences between 
ourselves and our opponents.”  He attributed the record-low turnout of November’s midterms to 
the “feeling that there was not a sufficient difference between the parties.”  And he coyly raised 
the subject of the new majority party through a rhetorical question: “Is it a third party we need, 
or is it a new and revitalized second party, raising a banner of no pale pastels, but bold colors 
which make it unmistakably clear where we stand on all of the issues troubling the people?”  A 
new party project would sink or swim largely based on Reagan’s answer to that question. 
Third party advocates made their case directly and repeatedly to Reagan.  Rusher dined at 
his Pacific Palisades home, a copy of The Making of the New Majority Party in hand.
53
  Stan 
Evans followed up with a letter arguing on pragmatic grounds against Reagan’s chances as a 
GOP challenger to Ford, pointing out that the latter’s advantage was “unusually large in the 
heartland of organizational Republicanism – the North Central states.”  The primary calendar 
would force Reagan “to run a gauntlet of ‘pragmatic’ bosses and Republican loyalists of the type 
who tend … to be swayed by arguments about backing-our-President and not dividing the 
party.”54  A panoply of New Right leaders – Joseph Coors, Richard Viguerie, Paul Weyrich, 
Howard Phillips – along with Kevin Phillips, Pat Buchanan, and two Wallace aides made one 
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final effort to woo Reagan to a third party at a DC meeting in June.
55
  They were all too late.  In 
the fall of 1974, Reagan had, in fact, considered a third-party run for 1976, but his California 
financial backers and aides swatted the idea down.
56
  Ford’s missteps with Republicans bolstered 
Reagan’s confidence that he could topple the president through a nomination challenge.  His 
skepticism of the third party plan in turn fuelled conservative reluctance to back it.
57
  
 Rusher, for his part, felt committed to the project regardless of Reagan’s decision.  
Convinced that Reagan’s intraparty effort would fail, he proceeded with a state-by-state plan to 
ensure that, following this inevitable failure, the ex-governor would have the option of pursuing 
a third-party candidacy in the general election via ballot lines secured in as many states as 
possible.  In May he sent a memo to Helms outlining a plan to set up the “Provisional Organizing 
Committee of a new conservative party.”58  Summer saw the formation of the Committee for the 
New Majority, financed by Viguerie.
59
  Though one columnist described CNM as “a gun pointed 
at the heads of the two major parties,” the organizers did not think of it primarily as a deterrent 
threat.
60
  They sincerely hoped to hasten the GOP’s demise and replacement.   
The developing Reagan campaign, however, posed two obstacles to the project’s growth.  
First, it deflected conservative attention and resources from the effort, such that CMN never had 
means to mobilize grassroots support.
61
  The Conservative Caucus, a membership organization 
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that Howard Phillips built in 1975 as a potential “half way house” for a new party, similarly 
proved more effective as a force for GOP conservatives than as a new-party vessel.
62
  Secondly, 
Reagan’s campaign ensured that the pool of potential CNM supporters would be dominated by a 
certain type of activist: insular, faction-ridden, conspiracy-minded, and extreme.  Rusher realized 
that the route to achieving state-level ballot access lay in merging the CNM project with the 
network of organizers and entities left over from Wallace’s third-party bid in 1968, some of 
which already had ballot lines in many states.  But the activities of that network in the aftermath 
of Wallace’s reentry into Democratic politics had been marked by byzantine infighting.  By early 
1976, three partisan entities led by ex-Wallacites operated in varying states of mutual hostility: 
the American Party, the American Independent Party, and the American Independence Party.  
The former was implacably hostile to cooperation with the CNM project, while the latter two 
were open to a coalition.
63
  Even they, however, demanded that Rusher and other CNM 
organizers account for suspicious professional connections.  At a January 1976 meeting, Rusher 
had to explain his relationship to Bill Buckley, considered beyond the pale by the Wallacites due 
to his membership in the Council on Foreign Relations.
64
  When Rusher bemusedly recounted 
the inquisition to Buckley, the latter replied that the “situation sounds to me awfully close to the 
kooks, and I am troubled by it.  In the last analysis, if you have to deal with people of that sort, a) 
you’re not going to get anywhere and b) you are simply going to besmirch yourself.”65       
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 The comic-opera denouement of the CNM effort fulfilled Buckley’s prediction.  By June 
1976 the Committee had assured that ballot lines would be secured in at least 30 states.  But, as 
executive director Ken Rast reported to the CNM board, “the diverted attention of the Reagan 
types” jeopardized the prospects of securing a credible candidate for those lines.66  Reagan’s 
campaign had gained momentum in the spring, leading eventually to a convention that saw Ford 
win renomination through one of the smallest delegate margins in history.  The fact that 
conservative forces proved so capable of near-victory within the GOP undermined the idea that 
structural barriers would always prevent activists from ideologizing the party.  Meanwhile, the 
Democrats’ nomination of the southern evangelical Jimmy Carter seemed to moot the possibility 
that 1976 would see a breakthrough for a New American Majority electoral coalition.  These 
factors made Rusher and Viguerie’s efforts to recruit a plausible CNM candidate futile.  When 
they traveled to Chicago for the American Independent Party convention in August, the best they 
could propose was a ticket consisting of an ex-congressional staffer and Viguerie himself.  The 
delegates, for their part, revolted against these northern carpetbaggers’ machinations and opted 
instead to nominate the racist ex-governor of Georgia, Lester Maddox.  The band played 
“Dixie,” crowds waved “This is Maddox country” signs, the keynote speaker railed against 
“Atheistic political Zionism” – and Rusher and Viguerie walked out in disgust.67   
 The CNM was the right’s last notable extrapartisan effort in the twentieth century.  After 
the election – in which Maddox garnered 170,531 votes – Rusher decided his “inclination to 
attempt to cooperate any further with the people who run the American Independent Party 
approaches zero” and shuttered the CNM.68  The ACU circulated a strategic working paper after 
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the election that argued against further third-party adventures, emphasizing the clear potential for 
conservative strengthening within the GOP.
69
  In its short life, the CNM revealed a bit about the 
potentialities of new ideological coalitions in the 1970s and much about the enduring difficulties 
of challenging the U.S. two-party duopoly.  Ultimately, the project added to the impact of 
conservative political energies, and thus can be said to have served a modest ideological 
enforcement function.  But the action for the rest of the decade would take place inside the GOP.   
 
“No Pale Pastels:” Changing the Republican Party from Within 
 
Congress provided one locus for this intraparty activity.  During the Nixon years, Paul 
Weyrich had been a key organizer of congressional conservative opposition when serving as a 
young Senate staffer.
70
  Through these efforts, he also became the Hill liaison for Colorado beer 
magnate Joe Coors, advising him about worthwhile conservative projects to fund and facilitating 
contact with relevant parties.
71
  Two of the most important Nixon-era initiatives funded by Coors 
– the advocacy think tank Heritage Foundation and conservatives’ answer to the Democratic 
Study Group, the Republican Study Committee – had reflected the inside-outside advocacy 
strategy and penchant for aping the left that would become hallmarks of the right’s institution-
building.  The focus of Weyrich’s energies for the rest of the decade originated in the summer of 
1974.  Facing the impending disaster of the midterm elections, Jesse Helms and three other 
officials formed an emergency PAC to protect conservative incumbents.  Weyrich headed the 
outfit and secured Coors’s financing.  The Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress 
(CSFC) gave contributions to 71 candidates in November, and in the ensuing years Weyrich 
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expanded the operation, in emulation of the liberal National Committee for and Effective 
Congress (NCEC), to engage in fundraising, technical support, and candidate recruitment.
72
   
Though Weyrich was, like his New Right compatriots Viguerie and Howard Phillips, a 
reliable font of colorful press quotes heralding the destruction and replacement of the GOP, the 
CSFC in practice was almost entirely focused on intraparty activism.   Weyrich described in a 
1975 memo the importance of distinguishing the CSFC from “just another Republican 
committee,” suggesting that “it would help our credibility were we to back a conservative 
challenger to a liberal Republican.”73  CSFC’s strongly Republican orientation ensured that such 
challengers in practice would not be Democratic or third-party,  while the greater its success at 
promoting conservative Republicanism, the less necessary any new-party effort would be.
74
  It 
was through just this dynamic that external, ideologically-grounded electoral and advocacy 
outfits, from Americans for Democratic Action and the NCEC to the Conservative Caucus and 
CSFC, almost invariably served as para-partisan forces for ideological sorting and polarization 
between the two parties rather than as agents of new partisan formations.         
While the practical results of its activity made the New Right’s network a largely intra-
Republican force, a circle of conservative leaders worked more explicitly to keep political 
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energies channeled through the GOP during the Ford years.  In early 1975, Clif White and James 
Buckley organized the first meeting of 28 conservative luminaries known as “the St. Michael’s 
Group,” after the Maryland resort town that hosted them.  Attendees included senators and 
congressmen, journalists like James’s brother Bill, Rusher, and Tom Winter, GOP officials like 
Clarke Reed of Mississippi and Karl Rove of Texas, and financiers Coors and Roger Milliken.
75
  
The meeting’s impetus was the same as that motivating the third-partiers: the sense of a post-
Watergate power vacuum calling for conservative coordination.  The opening sessions assessed 
politics with “an emphasis on the Republican Party – the position of conservatism within it and 
its viability as a continuing vehicle for the realization of conservative goals.”76  Though new-
party advocates like Helms and Rusher made pitches, the majority of the attendees opposed them 
and steered the group toward intra-GOP work.
77
  Hence those advocates’ joking acronym for the 
St. Michael’s Group: COLA, the Committee on Limiting Alternatives.78  Its statements over the 
course of 1975 reflected a watchdog function, including calls for an open convention in 1976.
79
   
Beyond presidency-focused pronouncements, the group, as described in a memo by 
staffer David Keene, explored “ways in which conservatives can maximize their influence within 
the Republican Party organizational structure.”80  Clif White suggested an audit of the existing 
conservative institutional infrastructure in journalism, policy development, and electoral work.
81
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Keene, meanwhile, proposed specific action within the Republican National Committee (RNC).  
“We will have to make some gains at the National Committee level and shoot toward the 
selection of conservative National Committee members who are articulate enough to take the 
lead on various measures before the committee,” Keene wrote Buckley.  He suggested a funded 
effort to target states in which moderate and liberal RNC members were stepping down in 1976 
and ensure that conservatives replace them.  He made a case for the importance of nuts-and-bolts 
party work that invoked the danger of third-party efforts: “If we, as conservatives, are going to 
argue that the Republican Party is a vehicle through which we can achieve some specific 
political and policy goals, we will have to have some impact at the National Committee level.”82         
 All of these stirrings – in Congress, party organizations, and advocacy networks – put 
gradual conservative pressure on the Ford administration.  But in a system in which the president 
enjoyed enormous resources independent of the political parties, the most important point of 
ideological leverage over administration behavior remained the credible threat of a nomination 
challenge.  Thus, Ronald Reagan loomed as a specter over the Ford White House to the same 
extant that he came to dominate the organizational energies of American conservatism in 1975 
and 1976.  His potential candidacy exerted a meaningful rightward pull on an administration that 
also faced more than a typical share of political and institutional burdens to its left. 
 Indeed, Ford’s essentially untenable political balancing act during his two and a half 
years in office was a symptom of the flux and institutional transformations that defined the 1970s 
politically.  “President Ford is fighting hard these days to hold the middle ground of American 
politics,” wrote James Reston early in 1975, “but he’s getting into serious trouble with the huge 
Democratic Congressional majorities on the left and with an increasingly critical Republican 
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minority on the right.”83  The economic context – recession coinciding with rising inflation – 
particularly narrowed his range of options at the same time it guaranteed that his preferred policy 
prioritization of inflation would clash directly with the congressional majority’s focus on 
measures to end the recession.  In a fateful early confrontation with the swollen Democratic 
ranks of the 94
th
 Congress over a deficit-increasing tax cut, one White House aide made the case 
for vetoing the measure as a way to “make the President somewhat more popular with the right 
wing of the GOP and other conservatives as well.  We have been looking for some broad action 
that would accomplish this.”84  But the impetus to secure compromise and legislative agreement 
outweighed such considerations, and Ford signed the bill.  The subsequent flood of spending 
initiatives that emboldened congressional Democrats sent to Ford’s desk belie later depictions of 
the “Watergate babies” as a fundamentally new Democratic breed of fiscally conservative 
suburbanites.  They set the stage for Ford’s unprecedented deployment of the presidential veto.   
Given the hand it was dealt, Ford’s legislative operation performed well, making deft use 
of the remaining conservative coalition led by Waggoner to sustain 54 of the 66 vetoes issued.
85
  
Still, the exigencies of policymaking in such a divided government inevitably caused frustration 
among conservatives, particularly when veto threats and presidential brinksmanship proved 
hollow.  “He draws one line,” a Human Events editor complained, “and when Congress steps 
across, he falls back and draws another.  How can we accept that?”86  Jim McClure led a band of 
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right-wing senators who periodically demanded meetings with Ford to remind him that their 
support could not be taken for granted.  “This is a two-way street,” he warned the president.87            
 Reagan’s threat gave teeth to such conservative complaints, and over the course of 1975, 
the administration acted accordingly, shifting rightward.
88
  That summer Ford tapped Howard 
“Bo” Calloway, a conservative Georgian who had bolted the Democratic Party to support 
Goldwater in 1964, to chair the President Ford Committee for reelection.  The pick reflected the 
need to reach out to New American Majority constituencies and challenge Reagan in the Sunbelt.  
More dramatic was the unceremonious dumping of Nelson Rockefeller from the reelection ticket 
in October 1975, in an obvious sop to conservatives.  On the legislative front, meanwhile, Ford 
followed months of steadily proliferating vetoes with a fall proposal for a dramatic new package 
of steep federal spending cuts and tax reductions.  He then reversed course on a bill that his own 
labor secretary had drafted permitting the picketing of entire construction projects by unions in 
dispute with specific contractors – so-called “common situs” picketing.  Conservative activists 
and a resurgent business lobby blindsided the administration with a lobbying effort against the 
bill that generated more constituent mail than any other issue in Ford’s entire presidency.89  The 
blitz, waged through Viguerie’s direct-mail efforts, not only demonstrated that the New Right’s 
self-styled populism reflected little real deviation from conservative economic orthodoxy.
90
  It 
also signaled to Ford another issue that Reagan could use against him.  After bluntly telling 
Labor Secretary John Dunlop, “if I sign the bill I won’t get nominated,” Ford issued a veto – and 
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Dunlop resigned.
91
  “The Gerald Ford of November, 1975,” Pat Buchanan concluded, “is a more 
conservative President than the Gerald Ford of November, 1974.”92  This was unmistakably true, 
and unmistakably the result of concerted organization and advocacy. 
 In an illustration of the cross-pressures besetting the presidency during a period in which 
the parties remained ideologically riven, Ford’s efforts to shore up his right flank even provoked 
a threat from the GOP’s beleaguered moderates and liberals.  In September of 1975, a dozen 
Republican senators expressed written alarm to Ford about his rightward drift, while one of 
them, Maryland’s Charles Mathias, gave a major speech decrying the right’s effect on the party 
system.
93
  Mathias laid on the rhetoric of party declinism (“being an Independent today may not 
so much represent apathy as a disgust with the alternatives”) and echoed critics on the left and 
right in calling for an issue-based politics.  But he turned this call into an argument for reversing 
the exodus of “thoughtful, serious, concerned and moderate women and men” from the GOP due 
to right-wing ascendance.  That winter, Mathias pressed Ford for a meeting while speculating 
publicly about launching his own primary challenge or third-party presidential bid.
94
  Mathias’s 
behavior, which came to naught, reflected the general maladies of liberal Republicanism in the 
1970s, a tendency whose factional ranks, electoral base, and organizational strength were all 
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diminishing, leaving behind a motley collection of individual personalities and uncoordinated 
gestures of independence.
95
  The organization and initiative were all on the right by 1976.     
Still, when Mathias warned a Ford aide that, “should the Republican Party become a 
purely conservative party in 1976, the GOP may well lose its very claim to existence,” he was 
offering an idiosyncratic version of an argument echoed by others – one that cast Ronald 
Reagan’s challenge as a symptom of broader party decline.96  According to this argument, the 
post-reform proliferation of primaries rendered the system more porous to challengers and 
weakened party leaders’ control over nominations.  Reagan’s decision, egged on by a cult of 
zealous supporters, to spurn his own famous 11
th
 Commandment against GOP infighting and 
challenge a president was seen as a reflection of the incentives the new system offered during an 
era of continual party decomposition.  But, as we will see, Reagan’s failed challenge actually 
succeeded as a programmatic effort.  The price of Ford’s renomination was conservative 
ideological consolidation of the party itself.  This could be interpreted as “weakening” the party 
under a theory in which ideology and partisanship are dichotomous principles by definition.  But 
the political world that Reagan helped to build would undermine such dichotomies.                   
The ups and downs of Reagan’s primary battles with Ford have been well told before, 
from his early, near-fatal stumbles in New Hampshire and Florida to his recovery and 
spectacular late-season surge of victories heading into the Kansas City convention.
97
  What 
matters about the campaign for an analysis of American political realignment and polarization –
as in the case of Ted Kennedy’s Democratic challenge four years later – is the extent to which it 
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constituted an ideological and movement-oriented rather than personalized campaign.  It is in 
that light that the recurring clashes over strategy between the campaign’s resolutely non-
ideological director, John Sears, who sought to emphasize Reagan’s personal presidential 
qualities and political moderation, and its more conservative team members took on broader 
significance.  Indeed, Sears’s non-programmatic focus was in tension not only with other Reagan 
strategists but with much of his activist support.  Surveys of the delegates who eventually came 
to Kansas City, for example, revealed a stark ideological dynamic to the race, with 77 percent of 
Ford’s supporters describing themselves as moderate and 8 percent liberal, compared to the 85 
percent of Reagan’s backers who described themselves as conservative.98  As a historical matter, 
moreover, prior to the convention, the turning point in the campaign’s fortunes coincided with a 
change in strategy from character-based appeals to an issue-driven, ideological approach.  That 
change took place in North Carolina, at the behest of Jesse Helms and Tom Ellis.   
North Carolina’s March 1976 primary was a make-or-break proposition for Reagan after 
having lost five state contests in a row, and Ellis insisted on complete control over the effort, 
independent of Sears and his staff.  With Helms’s factional rival Jim Holshouser chairing Ford’s 
campaign in the state, the contest took on added stakes as a new round in the long-running battle 
for control of the state GOP.  Helms and Ellis activated the statewide network of movement-
conservative volunteers and donors they had been building since 1972, brought in veteran 
consultant Art Finkelstein to help with an unprecedented GOP primary voter identification effort 
yielding a new 80,000-name mailing list, and utilized massive direct-mail, television, and radio 
appeals.
99
  Most importantly, they pushed Reagan’s red-meat ideological material to the fore, 
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emphasizing hardline, nationalist, and caustically critical arguments, particularly concerning 
détente and the administration’s support for ceding U.S. control over the Panama Canal.  
Augmenting this approach was an independent campaign effort on Reagan’s behalf by the ACU, 
which ran issue ads and mobilized movement supporters in North Carolina as part of a $230,000 
expenditure.
100
  When Reagan defied pre-election polls to garner a shocking 53-47 percent 
victory in North Carolina, the win reenergized his campaign and set him on a winning streak 
across the South and West that featured more ideological than character-based appeals.
101
 
The final phase of the Reagan campaign underscored the programmatic focus that had 
come to define it: a party convention – and, in particular, a platform-writing process – that 
Reaganite activists dominated and defined even as their candidate narrowly lost the nomination.  
Heading into the convention, Reagan trailed Ford by about 100 pledged delegates.  Sears’s 
gambit to shake up the race in early August by having his candidate announce his running mate – 
moderate Pennsylvania Senator Richard Schweiker – managed to alarm conservative supporters 
without noticeably changing the dynamic of the contest.  Helms and Ellis, for their part, resolved 
to pursue a different, platform-based strategy for picking off Ford delegates.  In late July they 
convened a meeting in Atlanta with 40 conservative members of the Resolutions Committee, 
along with Reagan aides Lyn Nofziger, to hatch their plan.
102
  As Ellis explained, conservatives 
should back an alternative slate of platform planks to the right of Ford’s proposals on key foreign 
and domestic issues.  A platform fight would polarize the convention ideologically, and Reagan 
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would benefit by picking up some of Ford’s conservative delegates in the ensuing scramble.103  
For Helms and Ellis, success in defining the party platform would be its own reward even if it 
failed to garner Reagan new delegates, an outlook that set them apart even from sympathetic 
members of Reagan’s campaign staff.104  As Nofziger remarked to a reporter, there were three 
forces at work at the convention: Ford’s camp, Reagan’s camp, and “those crazy SOBs from 
North Carolina.”105  What gave the North Carolina group its power was the degree to which 
Reagan’s delegates shared its view of the platform.  Three quarters of his delegates reported in a 
survey that, if forced to choose, they would rather have a “correct” platform than party unity.106          
 The Ford campaign was well aware of “the determination on the part of the conservative 
delegates to get a very strongly worded conservative platform,” as one aide put it.107  Reflecting 
the administration’s rightward shift, the draft document already jettisoned certain moderate 
positions, like support for a Consumer Protection Agency, that had appeared in the 1972 
platform.  But Ford’s team knew more was to come.  Conservatives demonstrated their strength 
early in the process, when they secured passage in the platform committee of an amendment 
denying chairman Robert Ray the authority to personally appoint the seven subcommittee chairs.  
(All of Ray’s suggested chairmen were Ford supporters.)  The amendment’s narrow victory 
owed to the fact that many Ford-supporting committee members had not showed up for the 
Sunday meeting.  A Ford spokesman underlined the “amateur” zeal of Reagan’s activists in 
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explaining how the amendment passed: “The right-wingers always come early and stay late.”108  
The direct consequence of that amendment was a conservative revolt on the Subcommittee on 
Human Rights and Responsibilities, covering abortion and women’s rights.  The subcommittee 
voted down Ray’s pick for chairman in favor of Mississippi’s Charles Pickering.109  It then 
proceeded to add a new plank supporting a constitutional ban on abortion and to remove the 
existing GOP platform plank endorsing the ERA.  Through organized efforts by the Republican 
Women’s Task Force and the Ford camp, the ERA plank was narrowly reinstated in the full 
committee.  But it was an ominous development for GOP feminists, whose ranks were both 
thinning and concentrated at the elite rather than grassroots level.  The antiabortion plank, 
meanwhile, survived the committee, securing a place as party doctrine for decades to come.
110
                 
The centerpiece of the conservative challenge to Ford’s preferred platform language lay 
in foreign policy.  Reagan owed his resurgence in the spring to a relentless focus on a string of 
related issues tapping into deep-seated popular discontent with détente and with other diplomatic 
initiatives, like the cessation of U.S. control over the Panama Canal, that seemed to encapsulate 
American weakness and self-imposed limits.
111
  At Helms and Ellis’s behest, political scientist 
John East drew up an alternative plank entitled “Morality in Foreign Policy.”  The document 
singled out Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn as “that great beacon of human courage and 
morality,” an obvious swipe at the Ford Administration’s high-profile snubbing of the émigré 
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during a 1975 visit.
112
  The Helsinki Accords, the administration’s Taiwan policy, the Panama 
Canal handover, and Ford’s opposition to importing Rhodesian chrome all came in for criticism 
in East-penned amendments.
113
  In subcommittee, the “Morality in Foreign Policy” plank failed 
narrowly.  But Helms and Ellis rallied their forces for a floor vote at the general convention.  The 
Ford camp, fearing a roll call that would reflect majority opposition to the administration, opted 
instead to accept the “Morality” plank without a fight, though with some last-minute dilutions.114   
The platform that emerged out of the convention was a distinctly conservative document 
filled with implicit criticisms of the administration.  It was the most vivid illustration of the 
degree to which ideological activists dominated a convention that did, after all, eventually 
choose to renominate the incumbent president.  The “paradox in Kansas City,” journalist Tom 
Wicker wrote at the outset of the convention, lay precisely in the fact that Gerald Ford, entering 
with a two-digit delegate lead, had so little control over its unfolding.  “Even after he had 
withdrawn as a candidate for renomination,” Wicker observed, “Lyndon Johnson had greater 
command of the Democratic convention [in 1968] than Mr. Ford does of the Republicans 
today.”115  Everywhere the sense of right-wing momentum and initiative was palpable.  Liberals 
and moderates closed ranks around Ford and, with the exception of the fights over abortion and 
the ERA, deliberately eschewed any policy demands or platform advocacy of their own, 
knowing how weak their hand had become.  Speeches by liberal officials, such as Jacob Javits, 
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were drowned out by the blown horns of Reagan supporters.
116
  Even after strategically ceding 
major ground to conservatives regarding platform language, the Ford camp found itself forced to 
use valuable time shoring up the support of Helms and Ellis.  Off-the-cuff remarks by Ford 
supporters predicting that the platform would be ignored after the convention compelled Helms 
to demand a meeting with Ford under threat of withholding support.
117
  Ford called to assure 
Helms that he considered the platform “the consensus of the convention.  I didn’t like everything 
in it but I would abide by it.”118  At Helms’s behest, Ford made the same assurances to Ellis.119            
The most notable achievement of conservative activists at the 1976 convention may have 
been to turn the platform into a manifesto emphasizing contrasts with the opposition party rather 
than a thinly-veiled campaign brochure for a specific candidate.  The preamble to the 1972 GOP 
platform had reflected the Nixon administration’s complete control over the convention 
proceedings as well as its focus on championing its own accomplishments while occupying the 
broad middle ground of American politics: That platform predicted that the administration’s 
accomplishments would cause Americans to “rally eagerly to the leadership which since January 
1969 has brought them a better life in a better land in a safer world.”  The preamble to the 1976 
platform, also drafted during an incumbent Republican’s presidency, eschewed reference to any 
specific administration in favor of an appeal to programmatic contrasts: “You are about to read 
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the 1976 Republican Platform. We hope you will also find time to read the Democrats’ Platform. 
Compare. You will see basic differences in how the two parties propose to represent you.”120     
In the convention’s final day, when Reagan conceded after falling short by 108 delegates, 
his impromptu speech fittingly paid tribute to the platform that his candidacy helped to shape:  
There are cynics who say that a party platform is something that no one 
bothers to read and doesn’t very often amount to much.  Whether it is 
different this time than it has ever been before, I believe the Republican 
party has a platform that is a banner of bold, unmistakable colors with no 
pale pastel shades.  We have just heard a call to arms…121   
 
That call to arms had not been the sole work of Reagan’s campaign.  It was the product of 
extensive conservative experimentation during a period in which existing partisan arrangements 
seemed in flux.  What Reagan’s presidential challenge helped to reveal was that a changing GOP 
was, indeed, a hospitable vessel for conservative programmatic politics. 
 
Movement and Party: A New Symbiosis  
 
“Perhaps a little more emphasis on the ticket and a little less on the platform would have 
been helpful.”  That was how Ford’s running mate Bob Dole later described Reagan’s tardy and 
tepid campaign support during the 1976 race against Jimmy Carter.
122
  Reagan’s pointed decision 
to focus on the platform rather than Ford’s candidacy that fall reflected not only sour grapes, but 
also broader conservative disaffection with the president’s determinedly non-ideological 
campaign.  Facing an opponent who was himself an ideological cipher, Ford shied away from 
conservative programmatic appeals, demobilizing movement activists as a result.  Dole’s 
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frustration with Reagan captured the tension, inherent and to some degree ever-present, between 
party leaders seeking electoral majorities and ideological purists waving a banner of bold colors.  
The story of the right in the ensuing Carter years, however, is the story of a time in which 
that tension between party-building and ideological activism diminished meaningfully – a time 
when revitalizing the GOP went hand in hand with efforts to consolidate conservative control 
over the party.  This was partly the contingent result of a troubled presidential administration that 
responded to a difficult environment in ways that alienated its allies while mobilizing partisan 
opponents.
123
  But it was also a product of the very process of ideological sorting that activists 
had managed to initiate in the American system by the 1970s, as first elite party actors and then 
electoral constituencies began to more firmly align their partisan allegiance with their issue 
positions.  The Carter-era context opened up space for conservatives to make ideological appeals 
to a larger potential electorate, and the ongoing transformation of the party system helped to 
ensure that those appeals would redound to the GOP’s benefit.  The Carter years saw not only 
such ideological work on the right but also the activist tenure of an RNC chairman, Bill Brock, 
who would join Paul Butler and Ray Bliss in the small echelon of historically significant postwar 
party chiefs.  In a reflection of the changing political scene, Brock managed to combine Butler’s 
programmatic orientation with Bliss’s commitment to nuts-and-bolts organizing.  He helped 
make the GOP a finely-tuned and well-resourced vessel for the Reagan revolution to come.    
In the immediate aftermath of the 1976 election, the second electoral setback in a row for 
the Republican Party, few were predicting such a fast and dynamic rebound.  It was a time of 
soul-searching and prescriptive debate typical of parties under duress.  Ford plunged into efforts 
to renew, if not reorient, the party institutionally after the election.  He held a White House 
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meeting in December with three party eminences – Reagan the conservative standard-bearer, 
Connally the southern Democratic convert, and Rockefeller the icon of the beleaguered liberal 
and moderate faction – to discuss the GOP’s future and the viability of the two-party system.124  
Proposals from other party quarters struck notes of experimentation and renewal.  A Kansas 
congressman wrote to Ford about the idea of “holding a Mini-Convention, similar to the one held 
by the Democrats” in 1974, gathering party regulars as well as “conservative and independent 
groups.”125  Soon after, the RNC passed a resolution submitted to investigate the possibility of 
changing the party’s name so as to help overcome lingering resistance to the party brand among 
southerners.  Notably, such prescriptions were largely confined to intra-GOP rather than new-
party initiatives.  As Reagan himself told his followers at the start of the new year, the 
Republican Party remained the proper vehicle through which to “bring about the great 
conservative majority party we know is waiting to be created,” because “the biggest single 
grouping of conservatives is to be found in that party.”126 
Despite the talk of party unity, however, Reagan and Ford retained quite different visions 
for the GOP’s future and its connection to ideology.  When Ford told GOP state legislatures that 
“a contest within our ranks to prove who is purer of ideology will not attract the American 
people,” the target of his argument was obvious.127  That difference in strategic outlook helped 
sustain the factional rivalry between the two men after the 1976 election, which now took 
political form in the race to succeed Mary Louise Smith as RNC party chairman.
128
  Ford and 
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Reagan were each aligned with a candidate in the run-up to the January vote, with ex-campaign 
manager James A. Baker backed by the former and Utah committeeman Richard Richards 
backed by the latter.  In a sign of growing conservative strength within the party, sufficient 
support never materialized for either Baker or the explicit candidate of congressional moderates, 
Michigan governor William Milliken, and both bowed out a week before the vote.  That left the 
race largely a two-man contest between Reagan’s pick Richards and ex-Tennessee Senator Bill 
Brock, who was solidly conservative but had supported Ford during the previous year’s 
primaries and generally retained independence from both men.  The RNC election went to a third 
ballot before Brock finally captured a majority, thanks to eventual support from both anti-Reagan 
moderates and southern committeemen under Clarke Reed’s sway.  
Little in Brock’s career would have indicated the dynamism with which he tackled his 
new job, though an engagement with the mechanics of party-building and sensitivity to changing 
political dynamics had long been evident.  A Young Republican activist in the early 1960s, 
Brock had helped to organize the local GOP in Chattanooga just as the Democrats’ statewide 
lock on power began to break.
129
  He served three terms in the U.S. House before successfully 
defeating the Democratic incumbent Al Gore, Sr., in a 1970 Senate race that heavily emphasized 
the social and cultural issues Nixon’s strategists sought to amplify that year.  In the Senate, he 
amassed a more conservative voting record than his Tennessee colleague Howard Baker, while 
showing a talent for party work during his stint running the National Republican Senatorial 
Committee in 1974.  Brock lost his 1976 reelection bid to a moderate Democrat who forged a 
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biracial coalition with the help of Carter’s coattails.130  When Brock next turned to the RNC 
chairmanship, he campaigned on a message of party unity and nuts-and-bolts organizing.                                                
 Early in his tenure, that bid for unity met the resistance of conservatives mistrustful of his 
intentions and eager to purify Republican ranks during their time out of power.  Reaganites like 
Lyn Nofziger and Oklahoma committeeman Clarence Warner wrote to complain about RNC 
staffing decisions alleged to be biased toward GOP moderates and against Reagan supporters.
131
  
Other conservatives focused on the moderate and liberal Republicans in Congress receiving party 
support.  The New York Conservative Party organized a national mass mailing in the spring of 
1977, mobilizing ordinary Republicans to respond to RNC solicitations with letters declaring 
their opposition to apostate officeholders.  The letter writers sounded familiar notes about 
choices and echoes.  An Ohio man singled out Charles Percy and Jacob Javits in a letter to 
Brock, arguing that “a party which can have them within its ranks and yet write a platform at 
Kansas City like you did is a party of no conviction whatsoever! ... Mr. Brock, the people want 
rational alternatives to national problems.”  “We want a clear cut choice when we go to the 
polls,” concurred a New Jersey resident, “not a ‘me too’ party that promises to enlarge the 
welfare state fostered by the liberal Democrats.”  Brock’s response to such writers emphasized 
his shared conservatism while taking issue with “those who seek to describe every dot and tittle 
of conservative philosophy on every issue” and who deem as heretics Republicans “with whom 
the voter would agree 80 or 90 percent of the time.”132   
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 He gained the most notice for his aggressive efforts to rebuild the party organizationally, 
with a focus on grassroots and local levels of activity.  “We have become too dependent on the 
presidency,” Brock told the RNC in his acceptance speech, “oriented too much to the top of the 
ticket and thereby assuring our own eventual destruction as we ignore our eroding base in 
precinct and state legislature, in community and county government.”133  He launched a hiring 
spree at the RNC, recruiting fifteen Regional Political Directors and four Regional Finance 
Directors to work with state chairmen on their party organizations and election needs at the local 
and state levels.  Most aggressive of all was a program to place a salaried field organizer in every 
single state – a plan described by David Broder as “far more ambitious, not just in cost but in its 
redefinition of state and national party responsibilities, than anything that has been attempted 
previously” by either party.134  Noting that the GOP enjoyed unified control over the legislatures 
of only four out of fifty states, Brock initiated an unprecedented RNC project called the Local 
Elections Campaign Division, which concentrated on recruiting and training state legislative 
candidates.  Between 1977 and 1981, its efforts helped boost the number of GOP-held legislative 
seats by over 20 percent and the number of GOP-controlled legislatures from four to fifteen – 
fateful gains given legislatures’ control over congressional redistricting every new decade.135  
Such efforts also expanded the pool of trained and competent candidates for future higher office.  
Brock’s emphasis on the RNC’s Campaign Management College, candidate training seminars, 
and national conferences for party volunteer and professional education all similarly reflected an 
interest in cultivating sustained labor at the grassroots level for party activities.   
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Harnessing grassroots energies only worked, of course, if there was energy on the ground 
to be harnessed – and in this as in many other areas, Brock’s organizational approach came at a 
fortuitous time for the prospects of Republican Party growth.  Most significantly, the 
mobilization of evangelical Protestants to political activism in the late 1970s signified a massive 
infusion of new personnel to fill the cadres of Republican Party volunteers, professionals, and 
candidates.
136
  As an influx of new, predominantly middle-class actors to partisan politics 
embodying an issue-driven, ends-based “amateur” approach, the emergence of the Christian right 
invites direct comparison to the rise of club Democrats in the 1950s and the electoral efforts of 
1960s social movement activists.  It marked a new step in the long-running replacement by 
ideological activists of the old pragmatic party workers at the grassroots of American politics.   
GOP leaders like Brock hardly instigated this infusion.  Rather, political brokers 
capitalized on both tectonic demographic developments and short-term events, forging issue-
based ideological attachments among politicized Christians that soon became durable partisan 
ties.
137
  Conservative evangelicals mobilized to enhance their power within American Protestant 
institutions during the 1970s while shedding their aversion to political engagement.
138
  Catholic 
activists like Phyllis Schlafly drew Protestants into anti-feminist and other conservative causes, 
while key Protestant theologians like Francis Schaeffer helped to mobilize evangelical support 
for the formally Catholic-dominated anti-abortion movement.  Richard Viguerie’s mailing lists 
brought together motivated small donors across an array of issues, and from the early 1970s he 
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observed the cross-cutting predominance of evangelicals on his lists, notably among George 
Wallace supporters.  He and other New Right architects like Weyrich worked to connect nascent 
evangelical political interests with existing conservative organizations and support.  They took 
fateful advantage of the controversy over the Internal Revenue Service’s 1978 effort to revoke 
the tax exempt status of Christian schools deemed in violation of the Civil Rights Act.  That 
conflict drew evangelicals into a fight that touched on the core post-1960s political flashpoints of 
race and taxes, and New Right brokers and evangelical leaders like Jerry Falwell helped derive 
from it a coherent anti-government ideological basis for evangelical coalition with conservatives.   
The downstream effect of such elite linkages and issue mobilizations would be to channel 
conservative evangelical party activism almost exclusively into the GOP.  Brock’s training and 
recruitment efforts at the RNC took place at the inception of this process and did not involve 
explicit targeting of evangelicals.  But he perpetuated rather than resisted Christian conservative 
inroads into the GOP.  As the RNC’s counsel later put it, Brock and his team viewed evangelical 
churches as both vehicles for mobilization and a “distribution system” for GOP appeals.139  He 
invited top leaders including Falwell, Bob Jones, Pat Robertson, and Tim LaHaye to meetings to 
forge ties with the party and to provide input on the 1980 Republican platform.
140
  This party 
posture toward the nascent Christian Right in the late 1970s, mirroring that of both Reaganites 
and the conservative GOP congressional factions, came at a pivotal developmental stage.  It 
helped ensure the movement’s lasting primacy as a source for party volunteers and candidates.141      
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To finance the RNC’s extensive party-building efforts, meanwhile, Brock became as 
much of a path-breaker in party fundraising as he proved to be in organizing, and similarly 
capitalized on contemporary developments in ideological activism.  Brock viewed direct-mail 
fundraising in much the same way Viguerie did, as both an advantageous adaptation to the donor 
limits imposed by the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and a tool for engaging and 
codifying potential volunteers on given issue and electoral campaigns.  Brock invested the $2.6 
million surplus the RNC enjoyed as of spring 1977 into expanding the parties’ direct-mail donor 
base.  The result of this investment was an increase in that base from 250,000 to 1.2 million 
people in the next three years.
142
  In 1980, net revenues garnered by direct mail accounted for 
fully 73 percent of all the money raised by the RNC.
143
  To a more limited extent, Brock also 
sought to reap partisan gains from the political mobilization of business in the 1970s – a broad 
social development that, under FECA’s campaign finance regime, partially took the form of an 
explosive proliferation of corporate PACs, from 89 in 1974 to 1,204 in 1980.
144
  Brock appointed 
a coordinator “to lobby Corporate and Association Political Action Committees for the benefit of 
the Republican Party” and provided RNC consultation to businesses interested in establishing 
PACs and seeking advice on where to direct funds.
145
  His efforts ensured that the RNC had 
become a financial juggernaut by 1980, dwarfing its cash-strapped Democratic counterpart. 
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What Brock’s organizational work amounted to was not just the strengthening of the 
RNC’s capacities and the expansion of its campaign efforts but the relative nationalization of 
Republican activity – a centralization of technical support, candidate recruitment, and campaign-
service functions in the national party.  This structural shift took place, ironically, as the very 
result of Brock’s focus on building up the party’s ranks at the grassroots and lower levels of 
public office, since these new training and recruitment initiatives were centrally administered by 
the RNC.  They were not without controversy.  “Your program of State Organization Directors 
would be worthy of the most liberal Democrat alive,” Oklahoma committeeman Clarence 
Warner wrote to Brock, calling the initiative “a concentration of power, authority, and 
responsibility at the national level.”146  State chairmen occasionally complained about RNC 
organizers failing to coordinate with the state parties.
147
  Others expressed consternation with the 
RNC’s willingness under Brock to intervene in GOP primary contests, picking contenders to 
support in nomination fights for open seats in both the House and the Senate.
148
  With the 
national party serving as a newly powerful campaign-service and strategic institution, the GOP 
can be said to have pursued an organizationally focused process of nationalization during the 
1970s.  This contrasted with the Democrats’ procedural, reformist path to structurally expanding 
their national party’s authority.  Both approaches, however, made the U.S. party system more 
national in orientation, just as responsible party tenets prescribed.
149
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Another prescriptive tenet of responsible party doctrine was programmatic partisanship, 
or organizing parties around distinct and coherent policy positions.  To an extent unusual for 
most party chairmen – though not, to be sure, as extensively as Paul Butler had during his tenure 
at the DNC – Brock also attended to matters of issue development and ideological branding as 
RNC chair.  And as with grassroots mobilization and political finance, his efforts coincided with 
related developments among ideological movement-builders outside the formal party.  Brock’s 
interest in issue development and policy work was shared by other GOP leaders facing exile 
from national power after the 1976 election.  Gerald Ford was the highest-profile proponent of a 
new programmatic initiative, calling for a 35-member Republican policy council and a dozen 
issue task forces, whose chairmen would comprise a British-style “shadow cabinet” to the Carter 
administration.
150
  Partly to garner Ford’s support, Brock ran on a similar policy council idea in 
his bid for the chairmanship in January.
151
  Once elected, Brock spent months operationalizing 
the plan in the form of five Advisory Issue Councils, each to be governed by a small Policy 
Board and incorporating the work of 50-100 members.  Reminiscent of the structure of Butler’s 
Democratic Advisory Council of the late 1950s, the five RNC Issue Councils were intended, as 
Brock put it, “to restate with some clarity our own values, policies, and programs.”152   
Brock retained substantial cooperation and participation from congressional Republican 
leaders as well as major national figures in the party while pursuing this initiative.  This was a 
contrast to Butler’s experience, reflecting the relative programmatic cohesion Republicans were 
beginning to experience by the late 1970s.  Between 1978 and 1980, the Councils produced 
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roughly two dozen position papers focusing on economic and foreign policy issues.  Throughout 
the process, the focus was on developing positions that united the party and “distinguish[ed] the 
Republican philosophy and approach from that of the Democrats,” as Republican Senatorial 
Campaign Committee chairman Bob Packwood put it at a related 1978 issues session.
153
   
By far the most consequential work done by the Councils and by Brock’s related 
programmatic initiatives at the RNC concerned tax policy.  The rapid triumph of supply-side 
economics in American conservatism is a tale oft told.
154
  The sketchy doctrine of an obscure 
business economist named Arthur Laffer, the supply-side argument for federal income tax rate 
cuts that would raise rather than lower federal revenue found well-placed and energetic 
champions in the media, most notably the Wall Street Journal’s Robert Bartley and Jude 
Wanniski.  Irving Kristol, the most politically strategic of the neoconservative intellectuals, 
helped to bring both the idea and its chief evangelist, Wanniski, to the attention of officials in 
Washington, including Republican Congressman Jack Kemp.  Kemp adopted supply-side 
economics as his cause and in June 1977 introduced a Tax Relief Act, co-sponsored by Delaware 
Republican William Roth in the Senate, which reduced income tax rates across the board by 30 
percent.  The coordinated effort inside and outside of Congress to put income tax cuts at the 
center of the GOP agenda benefitted immensely from the great “tax revolt” of 1978, a wave of 
state-level reactions against property taxes that peaked with California’s Proposition 13.  The 
front-runner for the 1980 nomination, Reagan, would come under the supply-siders’ spell, 
putting Kemp-Roth at the center of his campaign and, eventually, shepherding it to passage in 
what became the cornerstone of his domestic policy legacy, 1981’s Economic Recovery Tax Act.  
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Less often noted is the unusually central role played by the RNC in promulgating Kemp-
Roth as a consensus GOP policy and a new key to the party’s brand during Brock’s tenure.155  At 
an RNC meeting in September 1977, Brock first succeeded in passing a party resolution formally 
endorsing the bill.
156
  During the same period, he and the Issue Councils’ director, Roger 
Semerad, set about bringing key supply-side advocates and sympathizers onto the Economic 
Affairs advisory council, including Kemp, David Stockman, Murray Weidenbaum, and Lew 
Lehrman.
157
  That council’s tax subcommittee helped to develop an issue network in Washington 
conversant in and supportive of aggressive income tax cuts as a supply-side growth strategy.
158
  
Its work was an instrumental component of the campaign by the likes of Bartley, Wanniski, and 
Kristol to instantiate the doctrine as GOP policy.  The advisory council unanimously endorsed 
Kemp-Roth in the summer of 1978.  Brock held a news conference with the bill’s sponsors to 
announce the RNC’s plan to fund a series of workshops and training programs educating 
Republicans across the country about the proposal and the theory behind it.
159
  Such work helped 
explain how supply-side economics became, in Rowland Evans and Robert Novak’s words, “the 
GOP’s first universally recognized economic theology since the protective tariff.”160  
Beyond the Issue Councils, Brock waged an aggressive political campaign in 1978 to 
make Kemp-Roth “the cornerstone of this year’s Republican campaign and communications 
                                                 
155
 Klinkner, The Losing Parties, 149. 
156
 Text of RNC Resolution Concerning Taxes, adopted September 30, 1977, Box 43, Folder 25, Brock Papers.  
157
 Roger Semerad memo to Bill Brock, June 24, 1977,  
158
 In addition to Klinkner, see Michael J. Malbin, “The Conventions, Platforms, and Issue Activists,” in The 
American Elections of 1980, ed. Austin Ranney (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), 101-102.  
159
 Bill Brock letter to George Murphy, July 6, 1978, Box 65, Folder 6, Brock Papers.  
160
 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “A New Tax-Cut Theology for the GOP,” Washington Post, June 8, 1978. 
 300 
 
efforts” as he put it in a letter to Howard Baker.161  At a July press conference he announced a 
multi-state “Tax Blitz” tour on behalf of Kemp-Roth, underscoring his intension to nationalize 
the midterm elections around the tax issue and touting the unanimity of Republican candidates’ 
position on it.  “This is a major, significant issue, a clear division between our parties,” he said.  
“We want to have our party and all our candidates speaking with one voice.”162  For the three-
day Tax Blitz in September, the RNC chartered a plane it christened the Republican Tax Clipper 
and took major Republican figures, including Ford and Reagan, to press events in eight cities.
163
  
After the election, during the 96
th
 Congress, Republicans demonstrated growing cohesion in a 
succession of votes on Kemp-Roth, each of which lost to Democratic opposition but helped to 
pull the debate over tax policy notably rightward.  By the time that supply-side devotee Ronald 
Reagan had ascended to the Republican nomination in 1980, forestalling last-ditch attempts by 
his moderate rival George Bush to tarnish the theory as “voodoo economics,” Brock’s policy 
apparatus at the RNC was well-placed to channel the Kemp-Roth proposal directly into the 
Republican platform.  Roger Semerad served as the executive director of the Republican 
platform committee that year, while the editor of the Issue Councils’ reports, Michael Baroody, 
worked as the platform’s editor-in chief.  The final document endorsed Kemp-Roth by name, 
devoted two lengthy sections to the tax-cut cause, and mentioned the word “tax” 145 times.164      
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That the GOP could achieve such programmatic unity around this or any other issue is 
notable in itself.
165
  The lasting significance of the party’s embrace of supply-side tax-cutting 
went beyond that, however, touching on key dynamics of electoral coalition-building that would 
allow for party polarization along multiple issue dimensions in the coming decades.  Simply put, 
a theory that severed a direct correlation between taxes rates and revenues – and disputed the 
zero-sum logic of conventional budget politics – amounted to a claim that tax-cutting did not 
necessarily require welfare state retrenchment.  That claim in turn held the potential to appeal to 
constituencies beyond traditional small-government conservatives.   
In this way, supply-side economics offered a solution of sorts to the right’s longstanding 
challenge of sustaining coalition between anti-statists and Wallacite social conservatives.  Back 
in 1975, when Bob Novak had considered Bill Rusher’s plan for a new majority party, he had 
described the tension this way: “Whereas Mr. Rusher sees give-and-take between economic and 
social conservatives, I see the necessity of all give and no take on economic grounds if a national 
party embracing the blue-collar vote is to be founded.”166  Now, three years later, Novak and his 
partner Rowland Evans could see the potential of supply-side theory to dissolve that tension.
167
  
“Whereas Republicans for the past half-century have tried pouring the castor oil of balanced 
budgets and reduced government services down the throats of resisting Americans,” they wrote, 
“Laffer has a prescription that makes them feel good.”  As one consultant marveled to a reporter 
in 1978, supply side arguments meant that the GOP “suddenly could become the party of 
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more.”168  Little wonder that one ambitious Republican, running for a House seat in a suburban 
Georgia district, centered his 1978 campaign on Kemp-Roth.  The issue, Newt Gingrich declared 
that spring, “exceeds anything I have seen in 18 years of politics and 5 years campaigning in its 
potential to create a conservative majority in this country.”169  That potential stemmed from the 
fiscal promise of a free lunch.  The tax cuts appealed to small-government conservatives, while 
their disconnection from specified spending cuts avoided alienating social conservatives.     
The work done by the Issue Councils under Brock, and in particular their role in helping 
to make tax cuts a programmatic lodestar of the Republican agenda and brand, provided part of 
the basis for Brock’s insistence to skeptical conservatives that he viewed the role of the 
opposition party in ways similar to them.  To those who complained about me-tooism and 
Republican capitulation to Democratic initiatives, Brock pointed to the tax campaign and the 
growing voting cohesions of congressional Republicans.
170
  In contrast to his predecessor Roy 
Bliss, and in line with basic responsible party tenets prizing the clarification of partisan 
differences over bipartisan cooperation, Brock generally espoused a parliamentary approach to 
party opposition.  Fittingly, he traveled to Great Britain to watch the Conservative Party’s 
historic electoral victory in the spring of 1979 under party leader Margaret Thatcher, and 
presented reports on that campaign’s themes and strategies to the RNC and Republican 
congressional leaders.  When he argued to skeptical conservatives that “Republicans have been 
ideologically consistent, coherent and committed” during the Carter years., Brock was appealing 
to a pervasive conservative sentiment at the time that political victory for Republicans required 
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disciplined opposition and programmatic line-drawing.
171
  Howard Phillips’ Conservative 
Caucus, for example, pursued the formation of a “Citizens’ Cabinet” – a conservative shadow 
government covering every executive department and framed explicitly as an effort to inject 
British-style partisanship into the U.S. policymaking process.
172
  (Unlike the RNC’s councils, 
which accommodated Republican moderates who wished to participate, this cabinet featured 
only strongly conservative voices.)  Brock was not the only Republican who traveled to Great 
Britain to study Thatcher’s victory, meanwhile.  Freshman congressman Gingrich did as well.173   
Though Brock’s programmatic initiatives reflected his emulation of British opposition 
party practice, their ultimate fate underscored enduring differences between the American and 
British systems.  Brock was the latest in a succession of party leaders who attempted to 
institutionalize an American version of the kind of in-house policy research, program 
development, and issue work that British and other European parties had long practiced.  But 
despite their impact in the run-up to the 1980 convention, the Issue Councils did not survive the 
end of Brock’s tenure that year.  Similarly, Brock’s venture into substantive policy journalism, a 
quarterly journal called Commonsense he intended as an RNC-funded version of Public Interest, 
survived for only a few more issues after Reagan’s inauguration.  What accounts for the short 
half-life of Brock’s programmatic initiatives, particularly given that his organizational 
innovations survived for decades to come?  Part of the answer is that, compared to parliamentary 
parties, the centrifugal forces in the U.S. system still had an impact on top-down efforts to 
establish party policy, even during a period of growing party cohesion.  But timing also mattered.  
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Brock served as party chairman during the exact period that witnessed the great 
flourishing of intellectual and policy activity carried out by the conservative movement’s 
interlocking network of corporate and foundation-backed think tanks, advocacy organizations, 
and lobbies.
174
  Between 1970 and 1980, to take one example, the American Enterprise 
Institute’s budget jumped from $1 million to $10.4 million and its staff increased sixfold.175  The 
Heritage Foundation, launched in 1973 with a $250,000 Coors grant, saw its budget surpass $7 
million by the beginning of the next decade, when it mobilized as the right-wing advance guard 
of the Reagan revolution.
176
  Developments in the 1960s had helped to challenge the legitimacy 
of disinterested, ostensibly non-ideological technocratic expertise and to inject ideology into the 
politics of policy knowledge.  Subsequently, the right’s long march through the institutions in the 
1970s had resulted in a great proliferation of new, politicized centers of issue expertise.  These 
avowedly ideological organizations lacked official partisan ties, but given the ideological sorting 
underway among the parties, their alliance with the GOP was clear.  This, rather than 
institutionalized research arms within the formal parties, became the model for partisan policy 
development.  Ideological think tanks and advocacy groups would serve as para-partisan entities, 
shaping the agenda of their allied parties and performing the function of programmatic 
differentiation prescribed by responsible party doctrine.      
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 As we have seen, in matters organizational, financial, and ideological, the formal 
Republican Party experienced a revitalization in tandem with conservative ascendancy during the 
late 1970s.  In a party system that was only starting to sort ideologically, the relationship 
between the party and right-wing activists was hardly conflict-free in these years.  But, despite 
tensions, partisans and ideologues were increasingly pulling in the same direction.  This dynamic 
could also be seen electorally.  1978 and 1980 proved to be important election cycles both for the 
GOP and for conservatism – and, especially, for conservatism’s position within the GOP.  
 As early as the fall of 1977, aides in the Carter White House were sounding warnings 
about the ill winds blowing for Democrats in next year’s midterm congressional elections.177  
Matters only darkened for the administration and its party in the ensuing months, as a confluence 
of events prompted a conservative breakthrough.  The policy battles of the Carter presidency, 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Six, comprised one key to the developments rendering 1978 
a watershed year in the history of American conservatism.
178
  Just as important were 
conservative activists’ efforts to leverage the battles into effective pressure on those Republicans 
inclined, either by substantive belief or norm-driven habit, to cooperate with Democrats.   
This was done through primary challenges, lobbying, and issue-based mailing campaigns.  
“I want a massive assault on Congress in 1978,” Viguerie boasted to a journalist in the summer 
of 1977.  “I don’t want any token efforts.  We now have the talent and resources to move in a 
bold, massive way.”179  New Right leaders personally lobbied conservative Senators to abandon 
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their reelection support for liberal colleagues.
180
  Candidate-oriented PACs, led by Reagan’s 
juggernaut Citizens for the Republic, distributed millions of dollars in 1978 in campaign 
donations, and their choices often hewed to an ideological logic in ways the official party organs 
could not.  Reagan’s PAC gave support in races at the Senate, House, gubernatorial, state 
legislative, and even state party chairmanship levels that systematically ignored liberal 
incumbents.  It also intervened in GOP primary contests for open seats.
181
  New Right activists 
went a step further than this, waging strong primary challenges against incumbent liberal 
Republican senators over the opposition of party officials like Brock.  Edward Brooke of 
Massachusetts barely survived a potent nomination challenge by a right-wing talk radio host, 
while New Jersey’s Clifford Case shockingly failed to beat back a challenge by ex-Reagan aide 
Jeffrey Bell, losing the GOP nomination in what Pat Buchanan described as “a political event of 
more significance than any other this election year.”182  Bell’s case to GOP primary voters that 
summer was explicitly ideological, and his subsequent general election loss to Bill Bradley 
contributed to the sorting of the parties – by enabling a liberal Democrat to replace a liberal 
Republican – even as it failed to aid in the overall rightward shift in Congress.               
In situations featuring intraparty conflict, Brock found himself in the position of opposing 
aggressive issue-base activism in the name of defending and strengthening the party.  The 
dichotomy between party politics and ideological politics was often presumed in the late 1970s 
discourse about the New Right.  Whether it was the letter sent to Brock in 1977 from eight 
Republican Senators warning of GOP “cannibalism” over the Panama Canal treaties or the 
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comments that Brock himself made in 1978 describing single-issue activism as “hazardous to our 
political system,” the fear that issue-driven politics was both a symptom and a cause of party 
decline grew in these years.
183
  But in a system where two parties structured political conflict, 
even a consciously unpartisan strategy of political coalition through single-issue mobilizations 
had the practical effect of driving ideological sorting and increased partisanship.
184
   
The 1978 and 1980 elections demonstrated that ideological politics could, in fact, deliver 
pragmatic partisan victories.  Republicans gained three Senate and fifteen House seats in 1978, 
and Brock was quick to point out that the RNC’s party-building investments at the local and state 
level paid off in a gain of 300 state legislators and seven governors.  The chairman also 
emphasized the ideological victory: “The 96th Congress, by all accounts, will be decidedly more 
conservative than the 95
th
,” he told one Republican.185  Brock’s occasional antagonist Paul 
Weyrich sounded the same theme in a post-election report to one of his major philanthropic 
backers, Richard Mellon Scaife.  He reported the CSFC’s calculations that 17 House races saw 
outcomes reflecting modest leftward shifts in the seat holder, compared to 32 races that produced 
strong rightward shifts.  “Not only did we gain in districts,” he wrote, “but we gained in intensity 
to the conservative cause.”186  In the Senate, ten new members represented a rightward shift from 
their predecessors, compared to four who reflected a move left.
187
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The behavior of Republicans in and out of Congress in 1979 and 1980 reflected a new 
cohesion and aggressiveness, borne of ideological zeal and favorable political winds.  “[T]here’s 
a new passion running beneath the impassive exterior of the House Republicans,” The Wall 
Street Journal reported in April 1979.  “It’s a new feistiness, a stick-’em-in-the-eye 
combativeness toward the Democratic majority.”188  Outside of Congress, the same marriage of 
ideological combativeness and political effectiveness was evident as the conservative standard-
bearer Ronald Reagan sustained his dominant position in the race for the GOP presidential 
nomination against a slew of rivals.  Once Reagan sewed up the nomination, the official party 
operation and independent conservative efforts mobilized on behalf of the same goal – a stark 
contrast with 1976.  Though Brock, in his capacity as leader of the official party organization, 
still expressed reservations during the race about the “divisive” role that such independent 
campaigns might play, the $10.6 million that National Conservative Political Action Committee 
and other outfits ultimately spent on Reagan’s behalf proved a help rather than a hindrance.189  .           
The election results of 1980 marked a Republican sweep that was also a conservative 
rout.  The GOP gained 12 Senate seats and 33 House seats.  As James Sundquist noted, 11 of the 
16 new GOP senators “had campaigned as ultraconservatives on social, military, and foreign, as 
well as economic, policy.”  The electorate also conveyed an increasing ideological logic to their 
partisan alignments.  Democratic Reagan supporters came from disproportionately conservative 
ranks, and a higher percentage of respondents in one survey reported seeing “important 
differences” in what the two parties stood for than in the last six presidential-year surveys.190   
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 Statistics help to frame what was happening to the party system – its shifting elite 
alignments, the changing relationship between partisanship and ideology.  But these changes 
were also lived experiences for men and women who had spent their careers in the parties, and 
those stories do their own kind of work to convey the dynamics involved.  To take the measure 
of the GOP’s transformation in the 1970s, consider one last story – a coda on a bygone era.       
 
The Saga of Mary Crisp: Factional Struggle and the Partisan Polarization of Social Issues 
 
 By June 1980, RNC Co-Chairman Mary Dent Crisp had begun to suspect that her 
Washington, DC, office was bugged.  For weeks she had wondered why sensitive information 
appeared to be leaking from her office to the press, and she noticed a beeping sound on the line 
during calls.  Eventually she called in a private investigator to conduct a counter-surveillance 
sweep of the office.
191
  The investigator found no direct evidence of bugging but noted “two 
suspicious situations” – a wire running from a neighboring office through Crisp’s room to an 
unknown destination, and an electromagnetic “energy/radio field” detectable at a window near 
her desk.
192
  Crisp reported this to fellow RNC officials, and three days later – an excessively 
long time, in her opinion – they called in another firm to investigate.193  Eventually the police 
themselves took over the investigation, finally concluding that no bugging had taken place.
194
 
Though this case was deemed a false alarm, the idea that espionage might take place in a 
party committee’s headquarters hardly seemed farfetched just two presidential election cycles 
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after the Watergate break-in.  What was more notable about the situation was the fact that Crisp 
suspected the culprits to be fellow members of her own party.         
The story of an RNC Co-Chairman whose gradual professional isolation brought her to 
the point of suspecting skullduggery by factional enemies captures in a vivid way a broader 
process that activists on the left and right helped to hasten during the 1970s: the partisan sorting 
of cultural and social issues.  Positions on issues relating to gender, religion, and the environment 
that had come to the fore thanks to 1960s movements did not, as of the early 1970s, have clear 
partisan valences.  That had begun to change by decade’s end, and nowhere was the dynamic 
more evident than in the politics of women’s rights.195  The untenable position in which Mary 
Crisp found herself in June 1980 resulted from the parties’ polarization in the preceding years.            
Crisp was a career-long GOP party worker and a feminist, and during the years of her rise 
within party ranks, few perceived such a combination to be contradictory.  Originally a precinct 
captain in Maricopa County, Arizona, Crisp served as a Republican national committeewoman 
during the Ford years and the national convention secretary in 1976.
196
  Despite her support for 
Ford in the nomination contest that year, she encountered little opposition from Reaganites when 
Bill Brock chose her as party co-chairman in January 1977 as part of a Sunbelt-heavy leadership 
team.  Within months, however, Crisp’s penchant for candid press quotes drew their ire, 
beginning with her public criticism of Reagan’s “idea of purism” and her insistence that the GOP 
had to be able to encompass figures as ideologically disparate as Barry Goldwater and Jacob 
Javits.
197
  The main focus of conservatives’ opposition to Crisp was her outspoken feminism.  
Her patron, Mary Louise Smith, had managed to serve as the party’s first female chairman 
                                                 
195
 See Wolbrecht, The Politics of Women’s Rights, 119-225. 
196
 “RNC Co-Chairman Mary Crisp Comes from the Grass Roots,” First Monday (March 1977), 8. 
197
 Thomas W. Ottenad, “Republican Battles are Now Mostly Intramural,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch.  
 311 
 
without controversy despite a reputation as, in one profiler’s words, an “ardent feminist.”198  But 
in the years since Smith first took the reins in 1974, a powerful anti-feminist movement had 
grown in coalition with other elements of the New Right.  When Crisp spoke out on behalf of 
abortion rights, federal support for childcare, redressing gender inequities in Social Security, and 
attacking job discrimination, those movement activists listened.          
The ERA was the key symbolic issue around which feminist and anti-feminist forces 
mobilized for a fight in the mid to late 1970s, and Crisp’s pro-ERA advocacy galvanized intense 
conservative opposition to a degree that Smith’s had not done just a few years earlier.  The 
National Women’s Conference, set to take place in honor of International Women’s Year (IWY) 
in Houston in November of 1977 following state-level delegate selection conferences, became a 
proving ground for anti-ERA and anti-abortion forces.
199
  That March, Phyllis Schlafly, the 
shrewd leader of STOP ERA and the Eagle Forum, launched a new initiative called the IWY 
Citizen’s Review Committee.  The project mobilized social and religious conservatives to 
participate in the state conferences and to work to elect their own as delegates.  Such action, 
taken relatively late in the process, resulted in conservative representation of a quarter of the 
Houston delegates.  A startled fellow GOP feminist described the mobilization to Crisp.  “The 
IWY at Nebraska was a disaster last weekend,” she reported in July.  “The ‘Pro-Lifers’ rallied 
hundreds of people to drive into Lincoln on Sunday, register, and vote for their slate. That was 
the end of a balanced slate. Their slate was 500 votes ahead of the next names.”200  Schlafly’s 
Committee also led letter-writing campaigns concerning the National IWY Commission’s draft 
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resolutions, which featured a panoply of liberal feminist planks including not only endorsement 
of the ERA and abortion rights but also federal aid for childcare, universal healthcare, and an end 
to discrimination based on sexual orientation.  In the run-up to Houston, conservatives deluged 
public officials and convention delegates alike with outraged letters.   
Crisp, as both an Arizona delegate to the conference and an RNC official, hardly escaped 
the deluge.  “I was appalled at the manner in which the Arizona IWY Convention was 
conducted,” one woman wrote to her, “and I am ashamed to know that you are a delegate of the 
IWY (at the same time as National Co-Chairman of the National Republican Party – my party).”  
Others similarly emphasized Crisp’s party position in denouncing her IWY activity.  Crisp was 
undaunted, pointing out in response that support for ERA ratification was included in the 1976 
Republican Platform, as it had been for decades before.
201
  The following year, she wrote to 
every GOP member of Congress to urge support for the bill extending the ERA ratification 
deadline.
202
  These efforts outraged conservatives anew and sent more streams of mail both to 
her office and to Brock’s.  One ex-senator articulated to Brock the partisan case against Crisp’s 
lobbying effort:  “It is quite obvious that this is a liberal Democrat sponsored effort at best, and 
therefore, not in the Republican area for activity.”203   
Brock would dutifully point out in response, just as Crisp did, that support for ERA 
ratification was a current Republican platform position.
204
  But the center of gravity on gender 
issues was shifting so rapidly within the party by 1978 that the letter-writer’s argument for what 
did and did not constitute a legitimate “Republican area for activity” was quite plausible.  The 
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polarization of the parties on gender was underway in Congress.  Since 1972, the percentage of 
House Democrats co-sponsoring legislation related to women’s rights had begun to exceed the 
figure for Republicans, with the margin expanding with each Congress. The same interparty gap 
began to open in the Senate by 1978.  Also starting in 1978, the difference in the National 
Women’s Political Caucus voting scores earned by the median members of the two parties began 
to skyrocket – with Democrats scoring ever higher and Republican scores plummeting.205   
 As Crisp ran into such crosswinds, the controversy she fostered became a source of 
growing irritation for Brock and his staff.  In early 1979, Jimmy Carter removed Bella Abzug as 
head of the National Advisory Committee on Women after Abzug openly criticized the 
president’s proposed budget cuts.  The entire membership of the Committee resigned in protest 
of the firing.  Crisp was among them, though she framed her action as a response to the 
Committee being treated like “a rubber stamp for the Carter administration” rather than as a 
“pro-Bella” gesture.  Conservative Republicans were hardly assuaged.  “Why oh why did you 
resign just because that dreadful Bella was removed?” a Virginia woman asked her.  A group of 
ten congressmen (all men) wrote Brock asking him to “please help us explain to Republicans in 
our Districts why the removal of Bella Abzug from any governmental body is not cause for 
rejoicing rather than regret and resignation.”206  Brock began to keep her at arm’s length at the 
RNC.  During early planning stages for the convention, relations broke down between the two 
over her perceived exclusion.  In notes for a meeting with Brock, Crisp expressed her frustration: 
“If my position is becoming impotent, I cannot sit back and let it happen.”207      
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Any temporary resolution of tensions between Crisp and Brock stemming from the 
meeting would be reversed during the primary election season of 1980.  As the Reagan campaign 
marched forcefully from state victory to state victory against his Republican competitors, Crisp 
grew increasingly vocal about the threat his candidacy would pose to the survival of the 
platform’s pro-ERA plank.  Engagement with issues like ERA and abortion rights – not to 
mention the enmity expressed by Reagan’s advisors and staff toward her – helped pique Crisp’s 
interest in John Anderson’s campaign.  The Illinois congressman had run as a maverick social 
liberal in GOP contests with little success; in March, he relaunched his bid as an Independent.  
On June 2, with Reagan having all but secured the GOP nomination, Crisp shared her thoughts to 
a Chicago Sun-Times reporter.  Supporting Anderson might pose a solution to the “big dilemma” 
pro-ERA women faced heading into a convention dominated by Reagan, Crisp said.  She deemed 
Anderson’s chances of winning “not so far-fetched” and referred to his GOP credentials as 
“impeccable – he only refuses to say he’s content with Reagan’s way of looking at problems.”208   
Within a day of the publication of Crisp’s interview, Brock sent her a blistering memo 
that called her comments “wrong and totally inappropriate for a major party official.”  So as to 
ensure that she “adopt the lowest profile possible” to avoid exacerbating the damage she had 
caused, Brock informed Crisp that he would eliminate her from the convention program and 
cancel the two events she had been scheduled to host.  Four days later, she informed her 
colleagues that she would not be seeking re-election.
209
  A week after that came the intrigue 
surrounding the bugging scare in Crisp’s office.  Brock made it abundantly clear that he thought 
Crisp’s suspicions were unwarranted.  Members of Reagan’s camp were happy to go farther, 
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offering sexist mockery to reporters through a veil of anonymity.  When a reporter asked one 
Reagan aide why Crisp might suspect that she was being surveilled, he responded, “I have no 
way of judging the reaction of frustrated middle-aged women.”210 
Crisp’s professional crisis coincided with the crisis of feminist Republicanism now 
culminating in the platform meetings that preceded the national convention in Detroit.  In early 
July, conservative delegates succeeded in routing the last-ditch efforts of the Republican 
Women’s Task Force (RWTF) to save the ERA plank.  The committee passed a draft resolution 
that scrapped the party’s 40-year-old endorsement of the amendment and included language 
condemning White House-directed pressure on anti-ERA states.  It also sharpened the anti-
abortion plank that conservatives had managed to first get adopted in 1976.  Gone were the 
previous platform’s acknowledgment of party differences on the issue and call for “continuance 
of the public dialogue on abortion.”  What was left was an unequivocal endorsement of a 
constitutional ban and a call for the legislative prohibition of taxpayer-funded abortions.
211
   
At the final RNC meeting that she would attend as co-chair, Mary Crisp reacted to these 
developments with a tearful but defiant speech that startled her colleagues.
212
  She declared that 
the new ERA and abortion language would “bury the rights of 100 million American women 
under a heap of platitudes … I am sorry, but I cannot turn my back on these issues, and I feel 
compelled to do whatever is within my power to prevent these two tragedies from occurring.”  
She finished her speech to silence from most committee officials – Brock included – along with a 
smattering of applause from the pro-ERA minority.  As Crisp left the committee room during a 
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recess, one female delegate ran up to her and kissed her on the cheek.
213
  But Crisp’s vow to 
reverse the platform committee’s actions proved futile.  The RWTF lacked the votes for a 
minority report on either plank, and both made it into the final platform.
 214
  The denouement of 
Crisp’s Republican career, meanwhile, was swift.  Her term ended on July 18.  Less than a 
month later, she took a new position: co-chairman of John Anderson’s independent campaign.    
The journey of Mary Crisp from party co-chairman to party dissident to party outcast in a 
few years played out as a one-woman dramatization of the ideological sorting that transformed 
the party system during the 1970s.  Two implicit questions would recur every time a new 
controversy flared up over her tenure: what was the proper Republican position on a given issue, 
and how should a given issue position relate to one’s bona fides as a Republican?   Revealingly, 
when a reporter told Reagan about Crisp’s blistering farewell speech in early July, he couched 
his combative response in the language of partisan loyalty: “Mary Crisp should look to herself 
and find out how loyal she’s been to the Republican Party for quite some time.”215  Reagan’s 
remark implied not only that conservative positions on social issues were the proper 
“Republican” positions, but that a sufficient degree of apostasy on those or other policy issues 
amounted to partisan disloyalty.  The plausibility of that first implication stemmed from the 
success with which issue-driven social conservatives had gained factional power within the 
GOP.  The plausibility of the second implication stemmed from the fact that the party system 
itself was transforming, becoming more institutionally permeable to issue-driven and ideological 
activists and, as a result, increasingly structured by a core left-right ideological alignment.   
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For those, like Crisp, on the losing end of issue-based factional conflict, the newly 
emerging ideological cast of American partisanship seemed synonymous with the breakdown of 
the party system itself.  “Establishing purity tests for political views is contrary to the basic 
assumptions underlying our two-party system,” she wrote in a post-convention statement she 
never released.
216
  Crisp was correct that such tests were contrary to basic assumptions that had 
underlay the American system for decades.  But those assumptions were no longer tenable.   
A brief look at the changing politics of women’s rights within the Democratic Party in 
1980 provides a different angle on why this was the case.  Feminist activists were an ascendant 
force within that party, one whose organizational clout had been on full display during the 1978 
midterm issue convention mandated by party reformers.  Carter’s frequent clashes with feminist 
leaders partly reflected that clout.  At the 1980 Democratic Convention, a few weeks after 
conservatives reversed the GOP’s ERA position, feminists demonstrated anew their mastery of 
issue politics within a reformed party structure.  Though most members and leaders within the 
feminist Coalition for Women’s Rights were aligned with Ted Kennedy’s nomination challenge 
against Carter, their policy agenda survived the collapse of Kennedy’s candidacy.  Thanks to an 
effective whipping operation at the convention, the Coalition not only secured the reaffirmation 
of existing planks supporting ERA ratification and opposing a constitutional amendment to ban 
abortion, but also managed to win convention floor votes on two planks opposed by Carter.
217
  
The first explicitly opposed restrictions on federal funding for abortions.  The second stated that 
the “Democratic Party shall withhold financial support and technical campaign assistance from 
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candidates who do not support the ERA.”218  The latter item was, of course, just the kind of 
“purity test” that Crisp decried, on the very issue that had compelled her to exit her own party.         
The simultaneous ascendance of feminist forces within the Democratic Party and 
antifeminist forces within the GOP illustrated the dynamic logic of issue sorting in a two-party 
system – one party’s position change affected the other party’s approach, along with the strategic 
arguments that internal factions might make.  As Gloria Steinem pointed out to fellow activists in 
the summer of 1980, the Republicans’ decision to stake out the right wing on women’s issues 
bolstered the electoral rationale for the Democrats to speak forthrightly on them as a way of 
mobilizing female voters.
219
  And the further such sorting proceeded on a given issue, the more 
obvious was the necessity of choosing a side – of joining one party’s coalitional team or the 
other.  That logic, combined with the iron laws of first-past-the-post electoral systems from 
which all third-party bids suffer, crippled Anderson’s ability to win the support of more feminist 
activists.  A NOW official who personally supported Anderson wrote to Crisp in the fall of 1980 
to explain why the organization itself had chosen not to endorse him, opting instead only to 
emphasize “total opposition” to Reagan: “[T]he labor-feminist alliance is important, and there 
are hopes that it will thrive and expand,” she wrote.  “John Anderson was viewed by many to be 
against labor reforms and was an unacceptable choice for the labor union advocates.”220  In other 
words, the logic of a labor-liberal coalition inclined NOW toward continued advocacy within the 
Democratic Party rather than to third-party adventures or a pose of bipartisanship.  The mirror of 
that coalition and logic was the GOP’s alliance of social and economic conservatives.   
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Seen this way, the great churn of socio-cultural conflict that the 1960s produced had not, 
by the end of the 1970s, established a new issue axis to replace government and economics as the 
defining cleavage of the party system, as many realignment theorists had predicted.  Instead, 
these new “postmaterialist” issues augmented the economic divisions.  Once the conditions were 
in place for such additive polarization to occur – permeable party institutions, the ascendance of 
issue-based and ideological activism as the predominant basis for partisan activity, and a clearly 
dominant faction within each party – the logic of its unfolding proved irresistible.  Thus, by the 
end of the 1970s, party divergence on issues from economics to race to gender to the 
environment began to become visible.
221
  The trick was establishing such conditions in the first 
place, and that was the key work done by political activists in the 1970s.  In this work, left and 
right both played a part, but the right was at the vanguard.  By using the GOP effectively as a 
vessel for ideological politics; by capitalizing on a changing institutional landscape to devise 
new mechanisms of discipline; and by pushing the boundaries of party norms as they related to 
the aggravation of conflict and the politics of line-drawing; conservatives in the 1970s managed 
to do more than anyone else to usher in the dynamics that still define American party politics.         
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Chapter 6: Liberal Alliance-Building for Lean Times 
For good reason, the 1970s has never been seen as a time of liberal ascendance.  Beyond 
the active and antagonistic contributions made by conservative activists themselves, an array of 
external developments set an increasingly difficult context for liberal progress over the course of 
the decade.  Stagflation produced a policy environment of zero-sum material conflict between 
groups, diminishing the political prospects for expansionary and inclusive social, economic, and 
regulatory policies.  Businesses, abetted by the newly porous institutional environment in 
Washington, engaged in new forms of both coordinated and narrowly-tailored political 
mobilization, resulting in an explosive proliferation of corporate lobbyists and advocacy groups.
1
  
The ranks of liberal issue advocacy organizations, meanwhile, also exploded in the wake of the 
1960s but came swiftly to be defined by an elite, professionally staffed, DC-based organizational 
model that eschewed cross-class mass membership and participation.
2
  A similar absence of 
grassroots activist energy also came increasingly to be seen in American liberalism’s foremost 
organizational bulwark, organized labor, as union density continued its long-running decline 
throughout the 1970s while businesses adopted a newly hostile posture and strategy.   
All these factors stood as obstacles to liberal political initiative from the 1970s onward, 
and unsurprisingly, they are central to a narrative that dominates American postwar political 
historiography nearly as much as the rise of the right: the breakdown of the New Deal political 
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order.
3
  But the partisan context for such ideological developments matters.  A narrative of 
liberal fragmentation and decline connects ambiguously to the resurgence of partisanship and 
ideological polarization that occurred in the last decades of the twentieth century.  Indeed, unless 
that polarization could be said to have been solely and entirely the byproduct of conservative 
ascendance within the Republican Party, a narrative of liberal decline exists in some tension with 
it.  As we have seen, conservatives in the Republican Party were at the vanguard of the 
transformation of American party politics in the 1970s.  But this chapter argues that, within the 
defensive parameters for liberalism set by the context of the era, changes occurred in both the 
structure and personnel of the Democratic Party and its allied activists that contributed 
meaningfully to the long-run transformation of the party system along more programmatic lines.   
Some of the same forces for change rendering the GOP more open to conservative 
takeover – most importantly, the atrophying of the conservative southern Democratic wing and 
its gradual replacement by Republicans – helped make the ranks of the Democratic Party more 
generally liberal via attrition.  But liberal activists, like their counterparts on the right, also 
worked consciously to bring about changes to the internal balance of power in their allied party.  
For liberals, the 1970s might be said to have featured fracture and disarray at the policymaking 
level but a gradual process of coalitional reformation at the activist level.  By decade’s end, in 
contrast to conservatives, activists on the left had succeeded neither in attaining national power 
nor in shifting the national policy discussion of major issues in a leftward direction.  What they 
had succeeded in doing, however, was consolidating a new coalition of groups, interests, and 
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movements as the grassroots and organizational base of the Democratic Party as well as its 
dominant national faction.  In doing this, they helped to drive forward the ideological sorting of 
the two parties and the tightening of the alignment between issue position and party affiliation.   
An important substantive implication of the coalitional work carried out by liberal 
activists in the 1970s paralleled that of activists on the right: the bases of each party grew 
respectively liberal and conservative on multiple issue dimensions simultaneously.  What this 
meant was that, contrary to the predictions of some realignment theorists, New Right populists, 
and New Politics liberals, a new party alignment based on the cultural and “postmaterialist” 
issues that emerged during the 1960s would not, in fact, supplant the older New Deal party 
alignment based on economic and welfare state issues.  The new alignment would instead exist 
alongside that economic dimension in an additive process of polarization.
4
   
Liberal activists and strategists played a crucial role in this process by consciously 
facilitating the reconciliation of elements of the liberal coalition that had fallen into conflict 
during the 1960s.  George McGovern’s landslide election defeat in 1972 helped to snuff out the 
most optimistic visions of a potential New Politics partisan coalition – under a Democratic or 
new-party label – uniting “constituencies of conscience” in a viable electoral majority.  It 
convinced many liberal activists drawn from or sympathetic to sixties cultural politics that they 
had to more effectively appeal to working-class elements of the old New Deal coalition on an 
economic basis.  The work of such activists helped to produce an important and undernoted 
political development of the 1970s: the reemergence of a labor-liberal alliance uniting 
progressive unions with 1960s-inspired social movements and issue groups in a series of formal 
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organizations.
5
  This was a conscious project pursued by an array of organizers and movement 
strategists, from the writer Michael Harrington to the United Auto Worker’s president Doug 
Fraser to the Chicago-based activist Heather Booth.  And thanks in part to the effects of the 
decade’s institutional reforms in empowering issue-driven and ideological activists in 
Democratic Party affairs, this labor-liberal coalitional work had a partisan impact.  Reform-
mandated midterm Democratic conventions, for example, provided forums for activists to tighten 
coalitional ties, a key background factor in the decade’s second potent intraparty challenge to a 
sitting president: Ted Kennedy’s 1980 bid for the Democratic nomination.   
Ultimately, a changing issue context, the effects of institutional reform, and the concerted 
activism of labor-liberal coalition partners all combined over the course of the 1970s to facilitate 
the absorption of “New Politics” cultural and social movement energies into a Democratic Party 
that was simultaneously losing its most conservative faction.  These twin developments marked 
the party’s core contribution to the making of an ideologically sorted party system, and it is this 
contribution that the declensionist narrative of post-1960s liberalism tends to obscure.
6
  Right 
and left alike participated in redrawing the lines of issues, ideology, and partisanship in the 
1970s.  Both stories are necessary to understand the dynamics of the Reagan years that followed.       
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“To Make Them Conscious of Their Common Need”  
As on the right, the major efforts of liberal issue and party activists in the 1970s to foster 
new, lasting political formations began with intellectual work – in the search for potential new 
coalitions latent in the political world that the 1960s had helped to produce.  Surprisingly 
enough, one project that would exert a meaningful impact on the mainstream Democratic Party 
sprung from the intense internal conflicts of a tiny political sect – the Socialist Party.    
Michael Harrington, a committed Party member who had gained mainstream fame with 
his 1960 work The Other America, was an activist-intellectual haunted by regret over a missed 
opportunity.  He had famously broken with the young activists of Students for a Democratic 
Society (SDS) at its founding meeting in 1962, in the process filling the paternal role in a 
generational Old Left-vs.-New Left drama.  In the wake of Vietnam, however, Harrington came 
to appreciate both the substantive contribution he saw the antiwar and new social movements 
making to American politics and the coalitional potential of such middle-class activism.  By 
1968 he was declaring the “youthful reform surge” of the McCarthy and Kennedy movements 
“the most exciting, and perhaps most significant, thing to have happened in American politics 
since the industrial workers of the CIO became an electoral force in the thirties.”  Applying a 
loosely Marxian form of New Class analysis, he hoped that the movement might “reflect the 
growth of a college-educated constituency in which quantitative expansion may well have turned 
into something qualitatively new: a mass base for ‘conscience politics.’”7   
During the Nixon years, Harrington’s increasing openness to the New Politics and new 
social movement activism placed him at odds with fellow acolytes of Max Shachtman in the tiny 
but influential circle of Socialist Party leaders.  His intraparty antagonists, including the ailing 
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Shachtman himself as well as younger activists like Tom Kahn and Penn Kemble, retained 
influence within mainstream Democratic Party politics through extensive personal and 
professional connections to the labor movement, civil rights organizations, congressional staffs, 
and journalism.  Kahn and Kemble formed the nucleus of the hawkish, anti-New Politics 
Democratic faction that became the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM) in 1972, 
reflecting the outlook of George Meany and his allies in the American Federation of Labor-
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO).  (Kahn was a top Meany staffer.)  Harrington 
battled them within the Socialist Party, breaking openly with their support for the Vietnam War 
in 1970 and arguing the next year that “profound changes in American class structure” – the 
emergence of an educated stratum inclined toward reform and potentially open to socialist 
appeals – made it imperative for the labor left to ally with New Politics constituencies.  As he 
saw it, even if the growing ranks of service and professional workers were to be organized, “it is 
likely that these college educated unionists are going to be open to a ‘New Politics,’ issue-
oriented approach.”8    
But as the landslide defeat of the New Politics candidate George McGovern approached 
in 1972, the Shachtmanites moved to consolidate their control of the Socialist Party in tandem 
with new preparations to battle McGovern supporters over post-election influence within the 
Democratic Party.  Harrington tendered his resignation as Socialist Party co-chairman, and in 
December 1972 the Shachtmanites rechristened the organization as Social Democrats, USA.  
Soon after, they distributed an exhaustive 38-page report detailing Harrington’s years-spanning 
“attempt to split the socialist movement.”  The report argued that on two fundamental issues – 
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“1.) Labor’s role and influence within the liberal coalition, and the related question of the role 
and influence of the affluent, educated elite making up the so-called New Politics movement, and 
2.) the attitude of socialists toward Communist totalitarianism” – Harrington had broken with 
core social democratic positions.
9
  Those positions in practice amounted to continued loyalty to 
the Meany wing of the AFL-CIO and continued adherence to an aggressively anticommunist 
foreign policy.  The Wall Street Journal was not alone in seeing Harrington’s ouster as a 
microcosm of conflicts in the Democratic mainstream, terming it “the successful first skirmish of 
a mounting attack against the New Politics, which is now underway on such traditional liberal 
fronts as the intellectual community, the labor movement, and the Democratic Party itself.”10 
While Meany’s allies and such likeminded strategists as The Real Majority authors Ben 
Wattenberg and Richard Scammon mobilized to lead a counterinsurgency against New Politics 
activists in the Democratic Party, many of those activists themselves used McGovern’s loss as an 
occasion to reevaluate.  Even prior to the defeat, numerous McGovern campaigners and allies 
had shared a perception that the New Politics coalition of professionals and various “out-groups” 
could not in itself constitute a viable electoral majority.  Two campaign staffers, Gerald Cassidy 
and Ken Schlossberg, had warned the South Dakota senator during the race to avoid “the 
appearance of deliberately dividing the electorate into ‘us’ and ‘them.’  The ‘us’ being the 
accepted McGovern constituency – the young, the black, the poor, the women’s libbers, etc. – 
and the ‘them’ being the rest of white middle-class working America…”11  Their warnings were 
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echoed outside the campaign by former McGovern-Fraser Commission staffer Joe Gebhardt, 
who urged his colleague Ken Bode to eschew actions on party reform that might “divide – more 
than naturally occurs – the ethnic working class from the young, black, poor, academics, highly 
educated, and liberal suburbanites.”12  McGovern’s shattering loss in November, in which he 
failed to win even a majority of union voters among his 37.5 percent overall share of the popular 
vote, painfully vindicated such concerns.  It provoked new attention to repairing the breaches of 
the last half decade in the name of coalition politics.  “We have always been a minority,” Joseph 
L. Rauh, Jr., told a post-election meeting of liberals.  “We made the mistake in 1972 of thinking 
we were a majority.  We really are a minority in search of a coalition.”13  
Harrington’s next move after his Socialist ouster signified just such a search – an effort to 
build ties between the labor left and 1960s-borne social movements.  At a small conference in 
early 1973 at NYU, Harrington convened a hundred compatriots to discuss “The Future of the 
Democratic Left,” out of which came a new organization, the Democratic Socialist Organizing 
Committee (DSOC).  Its founding manifesto described a nonsectarian vision of “coalition 
politics” and an ambition “to link together the various movements for reform and protest and to 
make them conscious of their common need…”14  Over the course of the year, a nucleus of 
organizers and intellectuals including older socialists like Debbie Meier, Irving Howe, and 
Bogdan Denitch as well as the youth activists Jack Clark and Frank Llewellyn organized a 
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shoestring office and monthly periodical called The Newsletter of the Democratic Left.
15
  By the 
time of DSOC’s inaugural convention in October of 1973, it counted about 200 members from 
Social Democrats USA and another 300 from the broader liberal left in the country.
16
   
That the UAW’s Victor Reuther and the American Federation of Teachers president 
David Seldon served as founding board members, soon to be joined by International Association 
of Machinists (IAM) chief William Winpisinger, reflected in miniature a fateful development 
within the labor movement at the time.  The crucible of the 1960s had helped to provoke an open 
split between Meany’s ruling faction within the AFL-CIO and a collection of dissident unions.  
Meany’s best-known rival had long been Walter Reuther of the UAW, whose brand of 
aggressive social activism and openness to coalitions with New Left, new identity groups, and 
middle-class liberal activists were anathema to the conservative federation president and to the 
AFL craft unions that made up his base of support.  Reuther’s marginalization on the AFL-CIO’s 
executive council, combined with his growing skepticism about the Vietnam War and Meany’s 
full-throated support for its escalation, eventually prompted the UAW’s disaffiliation in 1968.17  
As Chapter Four indicated, contrary to common depictions of monolithic labor opposition to the 
efforts of New Politics reformers, the support of the UAW and other unions played an important 
role in the party reform efforts of the early 1970s.  It took the 1972 presidential race, however, to 
bring fully into the open the existence of a dissident liberal union faction inside the AFL-CIO.   
The federation’s decision to remain neutral in the general election for the first time that 
year, muscled through an executive council vote by Meany, prompted an unprecedented 
                                                 
15
 Michael Harrington, The Long-Distance Runner: An Autobiography (New York: Henry Holt, 1988), 21-23. 
16
 Peter Kihss, “Socialist Unit is Founded Here,” New York Times, October 13, 1973. 
17
 Dark, The Unions and the Democrats, 73. 
 329 
 
independent political effort for McGovern by liberal AFL-CIO unions.
18
  Over thirty-three such 
unions plus two major nonaffiliated ones, the UAW and the National Education Association 
(NEA), representing about 8 million workers, endorsed and campaigned for McGovern that 
fall.
19
  Some AFL-CIO unions also withheld or placed new conditions on their financial 
contributions to the Committee on Political Education (COPE), the federation’s political arm, 
and developed new organizational capacities for independent political action.  The American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) devised its own political 
outfit, Public Employees Organized to Promote Legislative Equality.
20
  Frustration over the 
neutrality decision prompted Bill Lucy and other African Americans to form the Coalition of 
Black Trade Unionists.  The Communications Workers of America (CWA), meanwhile, set up 
regional political directorships engaged in grassroots electoral activities that expanded in scope 
after the election.  For CWA’s Glen Watts, breaking politically with the federation was 
revelatory.  As a participant in a later labor meeting paraphrased him, Watts “didn’t realize what 
the Communication Workers were capable of doing in community action at least until they 
stumbled into it during the McGovern campaign and their CAP Councils really flowered.”21 
What set these dissident unions apart from Meany’s faction in the AFL-CIO?  
Contrasting social and institutional bases underlay the two factions’ contrasting political 
outlooks, and conflict stemming from these differences would have important implications for 
party politics in the 1970s and beyond.  Substantively, the liberal labor officials followed in the 
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tradition of Walter Reuther (who died in 1970) in advocating an expansive social democratic 
political vision, an increasingly skeptical view of the Vietnam War in particular and hardline 
anti-Communism in general, and an interest in forging coalitional ties to reformist and New 
Politics constituencies.  These officials were disproportionately likely to be leading either 
industrial unions originally affiliated with the C.I.O. or some of the growing ranks of service, 
professional, and public-sector unions, while Meany supporters were concentrated among 
building trades and A.F.L. craft unions.
22
  This meant that, in addition to lingering that were a 
legacy of Depression-era conflicts between the A.F.L. and C.I.O., ethnic and gender disparities 
also informed the federation’s factional split.  The female and minority proportion of the rank 
and file grew more rapidly in the 1970s in the dissident service and public-sector unions than 
among Meany’s allies, just as those sectors’ share of the overall organized population grew.23    
The dissident wing of the labor movement, in other words, was changing 
demographically and intellectually in ways similar to the activist ranks of the Democratic Party 
itself, a phenomenon that Harrington had noted in his losing arguments with the Shachtmanites.
24
  
Liberal union leaders supported party reform efforts that would empower issue-based activists in 
the broader political arena, as a way of forging coalitional ties with left-of-center groups whose 
primary policy goals were not labor-related.  Three such leaders in particular would prove to be 
pivotal players in every major organized effort to strengthen a new left-liberal political and 
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partisan alliance in the 1970s, beginning with DSOC: Doug Fraser, the Scottish-born Secretary 
Treasurer and eventual president of the UAW; the IAM’s William “Wimpy” Winpisinger; and 
Jerry Wurf of the rapidly growing public employees union AFSCME.  All three men shared a 
broadly socialist ideological background and a basic comfort with the new social and cultural 
currents that 1960s activism had brought to the political surface. 
Harrington had little trouble sustaining the support and engagement of these liberal labor 
officials over the course of DSOC’s work in the next decade.  But fulfilling his organizational 
goal of bridge-building within the polyglot mass left would require a capacity to engage with 
non-labor activists that proved easier in theory than in practice.  DSOC’s white male-dominated 
leadership experienced growing pains and occasionally strained relations with feminist and 
minority activists.
25
  Its inaugural convention in October 1973 featured zero women speakers and 
no feminist planks, a failing for which Harrington was immediately pilloried by female 
participants.
26
  DSOC eventually secured more stable coalitional relations with feminist 
organizations and leaders, but its efforts to develop African American and Hispanic 
memberships bore little fruit save for significant relationships with black congressional leaders 
Ron Dellums and John Conyers. Among the remnants of the New Left, meanwhile, DSOC 
gradually forged ties with the SDS’s organizational heir, the New American Movement (NAM).  
Surveying the scene in a 1975 article, NAM leader Harry Boyte echoed Harrington’s optimism 
about the potential of the largely subterranean, non-electoral currents of left-liberal activism in 
the country – “a large-scale resurgence and expansion of grassroots insurgencies off college 
campuses” that included the growth of “women’s groups and projects of many sorts, consumer 
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organizations, civil rights groups, environmental and health and safety campaigns, [and] public 
interest and advocacy projects.”27  DSOC was one elite-level effort to connect such localized, 
organizationally diffuse activism with sympathetic labor leadership and a national agenda.    
An important ally in Harrington’s outreach to feminist, public interest, and community 
groups was the Chicago-based Heather Booth, herself a consummate bridge-builder.  Booth’s 
activist resumé was comprehensive: a student organizer, SNCC activist, and SDSer in college, 
she participated in a string of labor and tenant organizing projects in Chicago in the mid and late 
1960s, established the Chicago Women’s Liberation Union in 1969 and the Action Committee 
for Decent Childcare in 1970, and attended Saul Alinsky’s Industrial Areas Foundation Training 
Institute to learn new community organizing techniques in 1972.
28
  In 1973 Booth founded the 
Midwest Academy, a training center for radical and liberal organizers of all stripes that brought 
her into contact with a national array of neighborhood groups, state-level citizen organizations, 
unions, religious activists, and issue coalitions.
29
  The Academy’s annual summer retreat became 
an institutionalized gathering for liberal activists to socialize and collaborate in the 1970s and 
1980s.  In the course of establishing the Academy and building a national network of activist 
contacts, Booth came into regular professional acquaintance with Harrington, and soon enough 
would embark on her own major collaborative venture with liberal labor leaders.
30
               
If Harrington conceived of DSOC as a meeting ground for disparate elements of the 
activist left, he also intended to direct that collaboration toward a partisan agenda within the 
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Democratic Party.  In this DSOC reflected the orientation of much of the broader liberal-left.  In 
contrast to conservatives in the early and mid-1970s, liberal activists had only occasionally 
considered pursuing new-party ventures since the battles of 1968, and the party reforms, 
McGovern’s insurgent nomination, and his subsequent defeat in 1972 had all served to push such 
notions further to the margins.
31
  Rather than advocate third-partyism, DSOC articulated a vision 
of programmatic transformation within the Democratic Party.  The group’s founding statement 
made it clear that it retained the old Shachtmanite commitment to coalitional politics – to 
achieving ideological realignment through direct factional engagement within the Democratic 
Party – even as it extended this principle to support for the minority groups, feminists, 
environmentalists, peace activists, and public interest advocates that Shachtmanites disdained.
32
  
“The organizational focus for bringing together these disparate forces in the foreseeable future is, 
for better or worse, the Democratic Party,” the statement declared.  In the 1974 and 1976 
elections, “the serious choice between Left and Right will counterpose liberal Democrats to 
Reactionary Republicans and the latter’s Dixiecrat Fifth Column in the Democratic Party.”33   
But, importantly – and in contrast to the position that Shachtmanites had come to adopt – 
the statement went on to articulate a responsible party critique of the Democrats’ lack of 
cohesion and ideological coherence.  The fact that DSOC would pursue Democratic factional 
politics did “not mean that we regard the amorphousness of American party politics, or of the 
                                                 
31
 For post-1968 discussions about a new party, see Eugene McCarthy, “A Third Party May Be a Real Force in ‘72,” 
The New York Times Magazine, June 7, 1970; and  “A New Democrat Symposium: A Fourth Party in 1972?,” The 
New Democrat Vol. 1 No. 4 (1970).  In 1971, ex-McGovern-Fraser staffer Ken Bode investigated how to acquire a 
line on state ballots designated for a new party as a gambit to compel states’ implementation of the nominating 
reforms.  The supplemental ballot line was supposed to signify the threat of a bolt from the Democratic Party if the 
reforms were not adopted, but was never intended as a real party-building effort.  In any case, Bode soon dropped 
the project.  See Bode, “Memo On Researching the Supplemental Line,” June 10, 1971, Box 2816, Bode Papers.      
32
 For Harrington’s own reflections on the Shachtmanite strategy of realignment and how 1960s conflicts caused 
him to “significantly amend” but not abandon the strategy, see The Long-Distance Runner, 114-115.        
33
 Harrington, “We are the socialist caucus of the democratic Left,” Box 1, Folder 4, DSA Papers.  
 334 
 
Democratic Party in particular, as good.”  Contrary to those, “including some liberals, who 
celebrate the unprincipled and unprogrammatic character of the American party system as a 
bulwark against ‘extremism,’” DSOC believed that “the problems before America today cannot 
be solved on an ad hoc basis.”  The group envisioned a future in which “trade unionists, the 
minorities, the poor, and the middle class liberals and radicals would not simply vote for a party 
which is also heavily influenced by the Dixiecrat South and Big Business,” but instead “would 
turn it into their own party with their priorities.”  At the convention in October, Harrington 
declared that “our aim should be, not to make the Democrats a third party, but to help them 
become a liberal first party of the new American majority.”34  Not surprisingly, the Boston Globe 
reported that at the convention, “Walter Mondale was mentioned more often than Karl Marx.”35   
DSOC would come to focus on platform and program work within the Democratic Party 
for a number of reasons.  Practically, it was an area that the post-reform institutional 
environment had rendered conducive to the efforts of committed elite activists – allowing DSOC, 
in Harrington’s words, to play “a role quite out of proportion to our very modest numbers.”36  
Normatively, DSOC leaders shared a commitment to ideological partisanship that had 
longstanding roots in the labor movement and among socialist intellectuals.  And strategically, 
Harrington perceived in the 1960s growth of middle-class activism an emergent mass 
constituency for specifically issue-oriented politics.  He saw in these liberals something similar 
to what Jesse Helms saw in southern white ticket-splitters and new conservative activists: 
potential agents in the transformation of the party system along ideological lines.         
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DSOC’s first, modest effort in this vein occurred in late 1974, on the occasion of the 
Conference on Democratic Party Organization and Policy in Kansas City.  As discussed in 
Chapter Four, the Kansas City “mini-conference” was intended both to ratify a formal party 
charter as well as to inaugurate a new institution long advocated by responsible party reformers: 
regular midterm party conferences.  In the language of a 1972 convention resolution, such 
conferences were meant to “increase communication between disparate segments of the Party 
and to discuss and adopt Democratic statements of policy on various issues.”37  Reformers led by 
Congressman Donald Fraser had conceived of such meetings as both a means for enhancing the 
programmatic function of the party and, in James MacGregor Burns’ words, “a transmission belt 
between movement politics and party politics.”38  But DNC chairman Robert Strauss viewed it as 
a costly nuisance that would publicize intra-party divisions.  He scheduled it for after the 
November elections and restructured the meeting so as to avoid debates on policy issues. 
Though Strauss neutered its programmatic function, the mini-conference still served as a 
gathering place for issue and party activists, and DSOC sought to take advantage.  Harrington 
and his colleague Marjorie Phyfe ran as convention delegates in New York’s 17th district, 
winning thanks to the support of its longstanding Democratic reform club.
39
  At the conference, 
Harrington, Phyfe, and other DSOC-affiliated delegates had little substantive to do, but found 
socializing with activists and party officials encouraging.  “We were amazed at how open the 
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Party is to its left,” Harrington reported, “we were amazed at how many unorganized socialists 
were there, and we were amazed by the warm reception our ideas received.”40   
Those ideas, which remained the core substantive agenda of DSOC’s efforts for the rest 
of the decade, emphasized bedrock economic and domestic policies as a common ground for 
left-of-center interests divided by cultural and foreign policy issues.  Top policy items included a 
commitment to full employment, universal health care, nationalization of energy industries, and 
progressive tax reform.  This class-focused policy approach was shared by mainstream elements 
of the Democratic Party in the mid-1970s, both in Congress and among core party interest groups 
seeking to coalesce around a universalistic agenda.  The clearest expression of this strategy was 
the major mobilization behind the Humphrey-Hawkins full employment bill, first drafted by 
Congressional Black Caucus leader Gus Hawkins and Hubert Humphrey in 1974, which in its 
original form combined expansive federal planning measures to achieve a mandated target of 3 
percent unemployment with a legally enforceable right to work for every American.
41
  
Humphrey-Hawkins, as well as a series of universal health insurance plans backed by Ted 
Kennedy, would provide core points of programmatic focus for DSOC in the next several years.   
Following the 1974 mini-conference, Harrington and his colleagues decided to make a 
more intensive effort at factional politicking inside the Democratic Party, with a focus on the 
platform to be drafted and passed at the 1976 convention.  Harrington, Phyfe, and Jack Clark met 
in late 1975 to devise such a campaign, which, according to planning notes, would involve 
“build[ing] a programmatic tendency of the democratic Left in the Democratic Party and related 
constituent organizations (women’s movement, trade unions, etc.)” and “creat[ing] a presence for 
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that tendency at the Convention.”42  Its goals would include the involvement of DSOC personnel 
and allied delegates in testifying during the platform drafting process, “getting some of the 
planks adopted,” and in other instances provoking both a “platform cttee. fight” and a floor vote 
akin to the “‘68 peace issue fight.”  Like conservative delegates at the GOP convention, though 
with no candidate motivating their strategy, Harrington, Phyfe, and Clark conceived of a 
platform fight as an educational gambit, one that would serve as a demonstration of intra-party 
factional strength for liberal forces while provoking useful substantive discussion of key issues.      
The platform project, which received funding from the UAW, the IAM, and AFSCME, 
came to be called Democracy ‘76, with a declared purpose “to help redefine the political and 
programmatic debate in the 1976 presidential election.”43  Harrington circulated a draft economic 
manifesto for feedback from intellectuals and activists in his orbit, including Heather Booth and 
her husband Paul, then working for AFSCME.
44
  The resulting Democracy ‘76 statement took 
substantive aim at neoconservative critiques of Great Society social policy and called for more 
aggressive action by Democrats.
45
  “Far from being too radical, our liberal policy makers have 
not been liberal enough,” it read.  “We challenge our party, the Democratic Party, to live up to its 
rhetoric of being a party of the people against the special interests, and we insist that the liberal 
presidential candidates take their own rhetoric and their own stated values seriously.”46  
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This focus on the platform as opposed to a candidate campaign was deliberate.  The 1976 
Democratic nomination contest featured an unusually open field with a shifting array of plausible 
candidates.  Though Harrington personally supported liberal congressman Morris Udall, his 
commitment to a coalitional effort cautioned against becoming enmeshed in the race.  This 
outlook was shared by the nine liberal unions who formed the Labor Coalition Clearinghouse to 
coordinate endorsement and convention strategy apart from Meany’s influence.  They agreed to 
eschew efforts to produce a single collective endorsement and instead to focus on boosting their 
members’ presence in the convention delegations and influencing platform policy.47  Key actors 
within the Clearinghouse, however, did demonstrate an affinity for the dark horse candidate from 
Georgia, Jimmy Carter, both for his ability to cut into George Wallace’s support from southern 
white Democrats and for his seeming malleability on major issue positions.
48
   
Indeed, that malleability was the flip side of Carter’s central campaign strategy both in 
the nomination contest and the ensuing general election race: to deemphasize issues and run on 
his own personal appeal as a Washington outsider.  A relative cipher on policy, Carter drew 
some liberal support through his apparent willingness to accede to policy demands.  In April 
1976, for example, Carter delivered a speech unveiling his national health insurance plan that 
was drafted in close collaboration with the UAW, which had made its campaign support 
conditional not only on substance but even on specific word choices in the speech.  This dynamic 
would recur on a larger scale in the platform drafting process three months later.  Carter, having 
capitalized on early caucus and primary wins to build momentum in the media, secured the 
nomination long before the convention in July.  But a priority for his campaign remained shoring 
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up support on his left to avoid the kind of visible intra-party strife that had characterized the last 
two Democratic conventions.  This appeal to liberals manifested itself both in his choice for a 
running mate – the stalwart labor liberal Walter Mondale – and in his approach to the platform.   
While Carter forces remained in control of the process, they deliberately acceded to 
liberal demands on most of the platform’s substance.  DNC Chairman Strauss assigned an issue-
oriented liberal reformer as staff director of the platform committee, while Carter deputized 
Stuart Eizenstat and ex-ADA Chairman Joseph Duffy to represent his interests in the process 
with a highly conciliatory approach.
49
  The result was a strongly liberal platform whose 
centerpiece was a qualified version of Humphrey-Hawkins – legislation about which Carter had 
grave personal misgivings.  When Harrington testified before the resolutions committee on 
behalf of Democracy ‘76, he laid out an agenda that, in his words, “united leaders of the major 
progressive constituencies of the Democratic Party” and provided “a central policy core for the 
Democratic Administration which the nation will inaugurate in January.”50  To a striking degree, 
the platform document resulting from the committee reflected the substance of that agenda.  Its 
very first plank addressed full employment, while later ones included “a comprehensive national 
health insurance system with universal and mandatory coverage,” “opposition to the undue 
concentration of wealth and power,” and urban policies justified with explicit reference to the 
Kerner Commission on Civil Disorders.
51
  Beyond the platform, Carter’s campaign also fatefully 
agreed to support liberals’ resolution calling for another midterm party conference in 1978.                
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Of course, Carter’s acquiescence to liberal platform priorities ensured, as intended, that 
no policy fights would occur during the convention.  This ran counter to Democracy ‘76’s goals.  
As Harrington had explained it, the plan for the convention was “to mount an issues campaign.  
In 1968, the Democratic Convention debated the issue of Vietnam before a prime time television 
audience. Our ideal is to stimulate such a nationwide discussion of economic and social issues at 
this convention.”52  Carter’s preemptive concessions, however, forestalled such a discussion.  His 
team also tightened control to keep a lid on potential conflicts.  Strauss pushed a rule through the 
platform committee that increased the threshold requirement, from 10 percent of convention 
delegates to 25 percent, for petition signatures calling for a floor vote on minority reports.
53
  
Later, when a Wisconsin committeeman proposed twenty-minute televised debates on three 
policy issues of the convention’s choosing, Carter’s team mobilized to defeat his resolution.54   
Ultimately, the outcome of the convention consisted of a full-throated liberal party 
platform and a nominee whose commitment to either the platform or the activist ranks of his own 
party was highly questionable.  In his testimony to the platform committee, Harrington had urged 
the nominee to avoid the perennial American temptation to “finesse the issues” and win a 
personal rather than agenda-based victory.  UAW President Leonard Woodcock had gone 
further, sounding a classic responsible-party theme in calling on the committee to “declare, 
explicitly, that the national platform is supreme and preemptive with respect to general principles 
and broad national issues.”55  Such a notion was, of course, foreign to American party traditions.  
But it hinted at what would become a recurring argument of Carter’s liberal critics during his 
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presidency: that he betrayed a platform to which he was morally bound.  This critique would 
eventually lead key actors to mount the decade’s second major intraparty nomination challenge 
to a president.  Fittingly, as early as May 1976, Ted Kennedy himself criticized Carter’s platform 
testimony for “intentionally [making] his position on some issues indefinite and imprecise.”56      
 
Disillusion and Dissent in the Carter Years 
 
 Intentional imprecision could well describe both presidential candidates’ approach to 
issues in the general election contest that fall, to the chagrin of activists left and right.  “In 1976,” 
campaign chronicler Kandy Stroud would later write, “issues were no more important than the 
price of hoopskirts.”57  The limited programmatic stakes emphasized in the general election race 
reflected the circumstances that had led to the parties’ respective nominations.  A southern 
moderate, having capitalized on a fragmented liberal opposition in the Democratic primaries and 
committed to a personality-based campaign approach, squared off against a GOP incumbent 
whose own nomination had depended on the support of moderate party regulars and whose 
general election campaign would depend on an exceedingly cautious Rose Garden strategy.  This 
match-up ensured that the emerging fault lines of American politics that had been visible during 
Gerald Ford’s presidency would be tempered rather than exacerbated in the general election.   
Carter’s southernness and historical independence from Democratic liberals, for example, 
made an appeal to southern conservatives a tougher proposition for the Ford campaign, and left 
open the possibility of ideologically scrambled entreaties to other constituencies.  With the South 
foreclosed, one aide wrote in a June memo, Ford’s path to victory would run through the 
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industrial North, a region where GOP politicians project “a generally progressive image.”  At the 
same time, given continued liberal skepticism about Carter, the memo argued that Ford “can – 
and must – win a proportion of the liberal vote,” along with that of smaller targeted groups like 
environmentalists and teachers.
58
  Ford did, in fact, campaign in the South to diminish Carter’s 
advantage.  Indeed, in a sign of the continuing force of the partisan realignment at work in the 
South, Ford would actually win a majority of the white southern vote, even as Carter won the 
Confederate states themselves thanks to overwhelming support from African Americans.
59
  But 
Ford’s campaign shied away from explicitly conservative programmatic appeals, while 
conservative movement activists generally refrained from mobilizing electorally on his behalf.   
If Ford and Carter’s campaign strategies ensured that 1976 would not see a repeat of the 
programmatic contrasts characterizing the election of 1972, this fact gibed well with a view of 
the electorate shared by both campaigns’ pollsters.  “The notion that this country is made up of 
people who identify themselves as conservatives or liberals is just not correct,” Bob Teeter told a 
reporter in 1975.  “To the great majority of Americans, the whole idea of conservatism and 
liberalism is not useful.”  Pat Caddell agreed: “We just don’t have an ideological country now.  
We just have small groups on each side who take these things very seriously.”60  The swamp of 
mass opinion on major issues provided some support for this contention.  But to draw from 
Americans’ professed aversion to ideology a prediction that politics was moving in a non-
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ideological direction was a problematic leap.  For “small groups on each side” had an outsized 
capacity to affect the behavior of the parties and their politicians.  Their influence was enhanced 
both by the newly participatory institutional context of the reformed parties and Congress as well 
as by the steady diminishment of cross-pressures that ideologically dissident factions within both 
parties -- conservative southern Democrats, liberal northern Republicans – had traditionally 
exerted.  In this context, it was all the more consequential that the narrow victor of the 1976 
presidential contest, a loner resting his popular appeal on a kind of outsider anti-politics, would 
show a knack in office for choosing political battles that simultaneously mobilized right-wing 
opposition while alienating liberal Democrats.  In so doing, he would help accelerate the process 
of partisan ideological sorting while, like his predecessor, nearly losing control of his own party. 
If Carter proved in office to be, like Ford, a victim of the political times, his own political 
profile differed from his predecessor’s in ways that only compounded the difficulties.  Though 
Ford had been ill-equipped to respond to conservative mobilization, he was a stalwart party man 
with longstanding relationships in the national GOP and a commitment to party-building.
61
  
Carter, by contrast, came of age in a largely one-party state where political competition lacked an 
explicitly partisan dynamic.  He framed his political appeal as both a party novice and a DC 
outsider, and approached governance with a Progressive’s conception of public “trusteeship” that 
eschewed pragmatic bargaining and intra-party negotiation.
62
  Even leaving aside the real 
programmatic disagreements dividing the president from his party, such a political disposition 
translated into a governing approach calibrated to alienate allies and worsen political dilemmas.   
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In his first two years in office, Carter continually failed to set legislative priorities, 
sending an array of initiatives to Congress without a strategy for building and sustaining 
support.
63
  Modest, tepid stimulus measures and an increasingly austere approach to economic 
policy alienated liberals.  Amnesty for draft evaders, IRS scrutiny of Christian schools’ tax 
status, and a protracted renegotiation of the Panama Canal Treaty that Carter chose to attempt 
early in his tenure against the judgment of advisors – all served to unite and mobilize right-wing 
opposition.  Simultaneously, the president stoked bipartisan outrage in Congress through 
repeated targeting of parochial interests embedded in the appropriations process, from water 
projects to B-1 bombers.  Carter’s presidency occasioned continued right-wing ascendance 
within the GOP thanks partly to the influx of new streams of conservative activism.  But almost 
as quickly, liberal activists and their Democratic allies in Congress also mobilized to assert 
programmatic pressure on a titular leader of their party who seemed openly contemptuous of it.                    
Harrington, for his part, revamped Democracy ‘76 as Democratic Agenda, again with the 
financial backing of the UAW, AFSCME, and the IAM, and with Margaret Phyfe serving as 
executive director.  Harrington and Phyfe initiated the project in November 1977 through a 
major conference in DC, which focused substantively on full-employment policies and 
politically on resistance to Democratic waywardness in Congress and the White House.  
Conference leaflets explained that “The DEMOCRATIC AGENDA is the beginning of a 
movement to make sure that President Carter and the Democratic Congress keep the promises 
contained in the 1976 Democratic platform.”64 On the second day of the conference, participants 
marched to the Democratic National Committee to demand accountability to that platform.
65
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One day was dedicated to a series of panels on policy issues, some of which addressed both the 
tensions as well as coalitional potential among the left’s diverse constituencies.  A panel called 
“The Unnecessary Tradeoff:  Energy, Environment, Employment,” for instance, featured labor 
leaders and activist coalition groups like Environmentalists for Full Employment. 
 This attention to building organizational and intellectual alliances among historically 
leery movements typified liberal activities during the Carter years, which saw a great 
proliferation of acronym-happy coalitions.  The Full Employment Action Council (FEAC), co-
chaired by Coretta Scott King and union chief Murray Finley, followed rallies across the country 
in the summer of 1977 with a Capitol Hill lobbying effort on behalf of Humphrey-Hawkins.
66
  A 
coalition of consumer and labor activists organized the Campaign on Inflation and Necessities 
(COIN) to advocate targeted, sectoral anti-inflation policies as a substitute for recessionary and 
budget-cutting measures.
67
  Unions across the board, meanwhile, had reversed their opposition to 
the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) by the mid-1970s, and many of them would provide 
support for the campaign when the conservative counter-mobilization intensified.  On the fault 
line dividing environmental activists and labor, several important initiatives emerged in the late 
1970s, including Environmentalists for Full Employment as well as a major project launched by 
Heather Booth and William Winpisinger, the Citizen Labor Action Council (CLEC).
68
  
Substantively, CLEC’s focus on the misdeeds of large energy corporations offered a common 
ground for the 60 member organizations, which included unions, state-level citizen action 
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groups, public interest lobbies, and progressive neighborhood groups.
69
  CLEC, like Democratic 
Agenda, was a pragmatic coalitional effort.  More importantly, it represented the first of Booth’s 
ensuing efforts to draw grassroots citizen groups into national, electoral, and partisan politics.
70
      
One legacy of the decade’s party reforms was that activists disgruntled with Carter and 
seeking to forge new organizational ties had a focus for their efforts: the midterm party 
conference mandated by the 1976 convention.  Carter’s aides recognized that this conference 
posed a danger and needed to be controlled.  “Politically, we must pay special attention to the 
1978 Mid-Term Conference,” two staffers wrote Carter in May 1977.  “It can very easily be used 
by certain elements in this Party to embarrass the President and the Administration.”71  After 
vainly exploring ways that the DNC might wriggle out of its obligation to hold the conference at 
all, the administration instructed the national committee to again schedule it for after the 
congressional elections in November to diminish the gathering’s impact.72  The administration 
also sought to structure the conference rules so that delegates could attend issue workshops but 
would not be able to debate or vote on floor resolutions.
73
  After liberal lobbying, the DNC 
Executive Council dropped this rule in the summer of 1978, but it instead required the signatures 
of 25 percent of conference delegates to propose a resolution – and stipulated that the signatures 
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be presented to the DNC at least three days prior to the conference.
74
  The clear intent of both 
requirements was to make the introduction of floor resolutions logistically infeasible.              
The midterm conference, taking place in Memphis in December 1978, was the 
Democratic Agenda’s primary organizational focus, and it brought Harrington, his colleagues, 
and labor allies into close working partnership with Donald Fraser’s reform organization, the 
Democratic Conference.  Thanks to that consultation, the Agenda was made aware of the 
procedural requirements as they emerged out of DNC deliberations in the months leading up to 
the conference, and the group mobilized to jump the hurdles.  Marjorie Phyfe worked out of the 
Agenda’s New York office, contacting conference delegates and soliciting petition signatures on 
issue resolutions related to economic, social, and energy policy.  Three days before the 
conference, Democratic Agenda was able to present 409 delegate signatures for four policy 
planks to a shocked staff at DNC headquarters.  409 exceeded the 25 percent threshold.
75
   
The move testified to the degree to which years of networking among party and issue 
activists had rendered Democratic Agenda, in Harrington’s words, “a communication center of 
the liberal-labor wing of the Democratic Party.”76  The organization’s efforts were sufficiently 
notable for Carter’s spokesman to name it as the administration’s chief conference opponent in a 
press conference prior to the gathering.
77
  Over 500 of 1625 delegates to the conference attended 
a liberal caucus meeting jointly held by Democratic Agenda and the Democratic Conference the 
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day before, some sporting “Still 4/76” buttons in phonetic honor of the 1976 platform.78  Once 
the conference convened, Doug Fraser and UAW legislative director Howard Paster led the 
effort to whip support for the resolutions while negotiating with DNC chairman John White.      
At the midterm conference itself, the pro-Carter forces repeated the strategy they had 
used during the nominating convention two years earlier, combining tight organizational control 
with a concessionary posture regarding policy planks.  The official proceedings of the first two 
days accorded with the anodyne script devised by the administration: the screening of a hokey 
documentary celebrating Carter’s accomplishments on Friday night followed by a tepidly 
received live address from the president, and, on Saturday, a marathon of issue workshops.  Off 
the floor, meanwhile, negotiations on resolutions proceeded between White and various liberal 
forces – chiefly Doug Fraser regarding the Democratic Agenda-sponsored economic planks and 
Mildred Jeffrey and the National Women’s Political Caucus over resolutions related to the ERA, 
abortion, and gender representation in the party.  White agreed to Fraser’s demand that the health 
care resolution include language calling on Democrats and the president to pass national 
insurance legislation during the 96
th
 Congress.  In exchange for feminists’ backing down on a 
resolution forbidding the party from providing financial support for anti-ERA candidates, White 
also agreed to a guarantee of 50 percent female delegate representation at the 1980 convention 
and a pledge to work toward electing 50 women to Congress in 1980.
79
  Finally, administration 
forces did not resist Democratic Agenda’s efforts to dominate the 24 issue workshops, each of 
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which was to choose “platform advisors” for the 1980 platform drafting process.  Thus, virtually 
all of those advisors as well as the planks emerging from the workshops were liberal.
80
    
Despite their concessions, the Carter forces were unable to avoid a public confrontation.  
The point of opposition around which liberal activists coalesced was a resolution on the federal 
budget that had emerged out of a conference-eve meeting between labor leaders, the ADA, the 
Democratic Agenda, and the Democratic Conference.  Carter had announced in October that, as 
part of his anti-inflation agenda, he was committed to keeping the 1980 deficit below $30 billion.  
Given a previous commitment to increase defense spending by three percent above inflation, this 
pledge guaranteed painful austerity for domestic social programs.   The liberals in Memphis 
drafted a resolution explicitly condemning Carter’s budget priorities and insisting that social 
programs not face overall reductions.
81
  As one strategist explained to a reporter, the budget 
offered “an issue that unites the progressive community, such as it is here – labor, the black 
caucus, the women’s caucus, the city people.  There are a lot of special-interest resolutions 
floating around … The budget is the one that pulls the progressives together.”82  The resolution’s 
direct criticism of administration policies was a bridge too far for Carter, and Doug Fraser 
refused to back down in negotiations.  It became clear that the vote on this resolution, to be held 
on the final day of the meeting, would be the key test of strength between the contending forces.   
The administration left nothing to chance, deputizing 200 loyal delegates to act as floor 
whips and sending out nearly every senior White House official to lobby against the resolution.  
Ultimately, the roll call on Saturday counted 521 in favor of the resolution, 872 against.  Carter’s 
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victory owed to the large number of ex officio delegates at the conference, staunch southern 
support, and an effective effort to woo black delegates by Detroit mayor Coleman Young, who 
argued pragmatically against antagonizing a president on whom urban interests depended.
83
   
But the president’s victory was partial.  The conference had confirmed rather than 
obscured the reality of party disunity on core matters of program and policy.  That a conference 
under the administration’s own tight control would feature an open rebuke by 40 percent of its 
delegates to a president halfway through his term spoke volumes about the his perilous position 
as well as the clout of the party’s dissident faction.84  “There is no doubt that the left was the 
dominant force at the Democrats’ midterm conference,” the Congressional Quarterly concluded.  
“It managed to set the agenda for discussion, do nearly all the talking, and force the 
Administration to make serious concessions on resolution-writing and new party rules.”85  As a 
Nation editorial put it, “the midterm convention had been rigged, but poorly rigged.”86  It proved 
particularly significant in demonstrating a base of potential support for a nomination challenge to 
Carter in 1980 – which had been very much part of Harrington and Doug Fraser’s intentions.87   
Indeed, the conference provided an occasion for the most likely such contender to 
articulate liberals’ discontent and rally them to his side.  The Saturday workshop on health care 
featured a panel chaired by Arkansas governor Bill Clinton and comprised of White House aide 
Stuart Eizenstat, Health, Education, and Welfare Secretary Joseph Califano, Doug Fraser, and 
Senator Ted Kennedy.  After the Carter officials spoke staidly about the administration’s hospital 
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cost containment bill, the senator rose to his feet and offered a hoarse-voiced stump speech that 
electrified the auditorium’s crowd of 2,500.  Kennedy veered away from the topic of his own 
national health insurance bill to offer an expansive warning about the president’s policy direction 
and the Democratic Party’s fate.  “The party that tore itself apart over Vietnam in the 1960s 
cannot afford to tear itself apart today over basic cuts in social programs,” he shouted, prompting 
the audience to stand and applaud.
88
  To White House strategists, activists, and journalists alike, 
Kennedy’s performance looked unmistakably like the opening salvo of a nomination challenge.89   
 Before Kennedy felt sufficiently persuaded about the existence of a plausible path to the 
nomination to launch a formal campaign, however, liberals pursued further efforts at institution-
building in 1978 and 1979.  Two major initiatives in that vein, both launched partly in imitation 
of New Right organizational successes, represented efforts to go beyond single-issue coalitions 
like COIN, CLEC, and FEAC and to establish more durable political formations on behalf of a 
broad-based agenda.  The first, Doug Fraser’s Progressive Alliance, was ballyhooed but short-
lived, and proved historically significant more for the intellectual thrust of its political reform 
agenda than any practical political impact.  The second, Heather Booth’s Citizen Action, began 
more modestly but would grow greatly in size and significance over the next decade. 
 
Labor Liberalism in Lean Times   
 
 The UAW president’s initiative originated in the breakdown of the decade’s last 
remaining effort to address stagflation through corporatist bargaining among business, labor, and 
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government officials.
90
  The Labor-Management Group was an informal, 16-member committee, 
organized by Harvard economist and former Labor Secretary George Dunlop and co-chaired by 
Meany and General Electric chairman Reginald Jones.  It met periodically during the Nixon, 
Ford, and Carter years in an effort to address issues of mutual concern to unions and managers in 
a consultative manner – especially issues relating to wage and price inflation.  But from the point 
of view of one of its most important labor-affiliated members, Doug Fraser, the unprecedented 
corporate political mobilization during Carter’s first two years belied the group’s assumed 
context of consensual relations between labor and business.
91
  The struggle over a labor law 
reform bill in 1977 and 1978 was a case in point.  After passing easily in the House in October 
1977, the bill stalled in the Senate due to a filibuster.  Months of fierce lobbying to break the 
logjam failed in the face of a massive effort by business.  Emboldened by their earlier victory 
over common-situs picketing and organized in an array of coordinated fronts, from the Business 
Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce to advocacy groups like the Right-to-Work Committee, 
business interests teamed with conservative activists to wage a Capitol Hill “holy war,” in the 
words of the AFL-CIO’s chief lobbyist.92  This successful effort to block a modest reform bill, 
coming on the heels of similar mobilizations against a minimum wage hike, Humphrey-Hawkins, 
and the establishment of a Consumer Protection Agency, prompted Fraser to take a public stand. 
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 On July 18, 1978, he sent a letter to the Labor-Management Group’s membership as well 
as the press announcing his resignation.
93
  “I believe that leaders of the business community, 
with few exceptions, have chosen to wage a one-sided class war in this country,” Fraser 
contended, describing an across-the-board strategic shift among business elites “toward 
confrontation, rather than cooperation.”  Rather than legitimize the new posture by continuing to 
participate in an enterprise predicated on good-faith negotiation, Fraser announced, in a clarion 
call for militant social unionism, that the UAW would seek to make “new alliances” and “new 
coalitions” – to “reforge the links with those who believe in struggle: the kind of people who sat-
down in the factories in the 1930s and who marched in Selma in the 1960s.”  Fraser’s resignation 
letter caused a stir in the press and electrified liberals.  John Kenneth Galbraith told Fraser it 
“was the best progressive document I’ve read in years,” while Michael Harrington called it “one 
of the more important documents in recent American political history.”94  What resonated was 
not only Fraser’s identification of an ascendant, militant corporate-conservative alliance in the 
political arena, but also his commitment to reengaging the labor movement in coalition-building 
with other left-liberal activists and interests.        
 In the months following his resignation, Fraser worked with top UAW political staff to 
outline plans for a new national umbrella organization for left-liberal activists from labor, 
antipoverty, feminist, civil rights, consumer, and environmental backgrounds.
95
  In September of 
1978, Fraser formally invited leaders from over 100 such groups to attend a conference in Detroit 
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“to consider formation of a new alliance aimed at transforming the American political system.”96  
He framed the meeting as a response to conservative ideological initiative -- “the tremendous 
power of a newly sophisticated right-wing corporate alliance.”  He warned that “corporate 
reactionaries and their ideologues for the first time in years have taken the momentum from 
progressives in the arena of ideas,” and advocated a united front of left-leaning activist 
organizations to mobilize a response.  About two hundred delegates attended the convention on 
October 17, where agreement was reached to establish an Issues Commission as well as a 
Political Process Commission as initial steps.
97
  The organization itself was incorporated that 
winter as the Progressive Alliance, with the UAW’s Bill Dodds installed as Executive Director.  
A roster of unions from the dissident progressive wing of the movement served as the Alliance’s 
funding base outside of the UAW.
98
  The group drafted a statement of principles in January 
acknowledging the diversity of its membership but sounding a theme of solidarity: “While we 
each bring our own separate concerns to this alliance, we share a common belief that our 
individual problems can only be solved through collective action …”99           
 Most importantly, Fraser intended the Alliance to focus on reforming the political system 
– and his conception of such reform bore the mark of responsible party doctrine.  His invitation 
to the 1978 exploratory meeting outlined an agenda that included abolishing the filibuster and 
pursuing reforms “aimed at creating a stronger, more accountable, more ideological Democratic 
Party.”  The Alliance’s statement of principles similarly connected substantive progress with the 
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transformation of party politics. “We need political parties that are accountable, issue-oriented 
and disciplined to abide by their platform commitments,” it read.  “Revitalized parties and issue-
based politics are tools through which the struggle of the 1980s can be waged.”100        
 Indeed, Fraser’s personal outlook on party reform – vaguely Anglophilic and 
parliamentarian, oriented toward discipline and majority rule, rife with an older social 
democratic emphasis on militancy and ideological rigor – rhetorically departed from the 
McGovern-Fraser era’s language of inclusion and participation even as it shared those reformers’ 
commitment to issue-based politics.  A working paper on the Alliance’s reform program detailed 
a theory of partisanship that E.E. Schattschneider would have recognized.  “[D]emocratic theory 
links the effective political participation of citizens to the effective performance of 
governments,” it declared.  “Contenders for government power must obtain office on the basis of 
coherent, clearly specified principles and policies” and must try to enact those policies in office.  
“If they fail to do so, or, if in practice, their policies fail to serve the common good, citizens must 
be able to: 1.) identify who failed; 2.) hold them accountable for their failures; 3.) replace them.”  
This focus on clarifying lines of accountability underlay all of the reforms the paper advocated, 
from congressional changes already underway (“party caucuses must be able to require a high 
degree of loyalty from committee chairmen and members for the price of their committee posts”) 
to more elusive measures for controlling officials’ behavior (“candidates must be bound to party 
platforms”).  The report’s critique of the “politics of personality” and of competition aimed 
merely at “spoils of office” stemmed from that same responsible party ethos – the belief that “the 
parties must be strong, ideologically coherent, disciplined, and genuinely democratic.”101 
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 Motivating Fraser’s focus on political transformation was not just alarm at the gains 
being achieved by an ascendant alliance of business interests and conservatives, but also a 
perception of pervasive, systemic party decline that he shared with most journalists and scholars 
in the 1970s – especially as it pertained to Congress.  Fraser took pains to emphasize Congress’s 
culpability in the failures and frustrations of the Carter years.  “I think you have to attach more 
blame to the legislative branch of government than to the executive branch,” he told a reporter in 
1978.  “It has no cohesion.  There’s no discipline.”102  That same year Time ran a cover story on 
the “bold and balky” post-reform Congress that summarized the emerging consensus about the 
atomization and disarray of the institution and its parties.  “Many political scientists fear that 
Congress may eventually become unmanageable by its leaders,” it reported.103  For Fraser, the 
indiscipline and fragmentation of Democratic legislative behavior was directly connected to the 
party’s faltering commitment to labor-liberal policies.104  He singled out a younger group of 
Democratic freshmen and sophomores from suburban districts for particular condemnation, as 
neoliberal apostates dissenting from key progressive tenets related to taxes, regulation, and social 
provision.
105
  For Fraser as for many liberals during the Carter years, the fact that such heavy 
Democratic domination of both the executive and legislative branches could produce so little in 
the way of liberal policy achievements was a source of frustration and puzzlement.  “We had a 
big victory in ‘76,” one of his aides put it, “and wound up with a pile of shit.”106      
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 The legislative disarray of the Carter presidency that contemporaries like Fraser so often 
bemoaned has lived on as a touchstone in the prevailing historical narrative of post-1960s liberal 
collapse.  It is worth briefly qualifying the assessment.  The frustration of liberal policy goals 
during the Carter years was very real.  Moreover, some of the new Democrats arriving to 
Congress in this period, beginning with the massive influx of “Watergate babies” in 1974 and 
continuing in 1976 and 1978, did indeed embody the new issue orientation that Fraser lamented.  
They were liberal on social and cultural issues, while fiscally conservative and skeptical of 
redistributive state activism.
107
  Their influence combined with an external political-economic 
context marked by stagflation, resurgent conservative and antigovernment energies, and a trend 
toward retrenchment across the industrial world in the late 1970s, all of which put new 
constraints on liberal policy progress.  Measures of the congressional Democrats’ overall voting 
patterns on issues relating to business regulation and fiscal policy did show a slight rightward 
shift in the middle and late 1970s.
108
           
 The conservative trend within the Democratic Party of the 1970s is, however, easily 
overstated.  The same measurements showing a rightward shift in the congressional caucus’s 
economic positions showed leftward shifts on issues ranging from civil rights to foreign and 
military affairs to social welfare policy – and even labor legislation.109  Scholars and 
commentators have tended to give the iconic Democratic congressional class of ‘74 a monolithic 
cast as a cohort of suburbanite neoliberals paving the way for Reaganism.  But the Watergate 
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babies counted among their ranks not only the likes of Tony Coelho, Tim Wirth, and Gary Hart, 
but also such liberal future legislative leaders as Henry Waxman, George Miller, and Tom 
Harkin.  By the time a Democrat returned to the White House in 1977, he faced a congressional 
majority that hewed to more liberal policy priorities than his administration did.  In Carter’s first 
year in office, congressional Democrats set the pattern for intra-party relations by seeking to 
push him leftward on spending, the minimum wage, and public works and employment policy.
110
  
In a more pertinent example, the very 1978 labor law defeat that prompted Doug Fraser’s 
formation of the Progressive Alliance did not reflect a new anti-labor bias among congressional 
Democrats.  The House passed the bill by a vote of 257 to 163 before the measure met the fate 
that had befallen virtually all progressive labor law bills in the postwar era: a Senate filibuster 
sustained by conservative coalition votes and supported by only two northern Democrats.
111
   
   Despite the success of the labor law filibuster, even the southern Democratic component 
of that conservative coalition was undergoing changes by the end of the decade.  Indeed, easily 
the most important electoral development among congressional Democrats in the 1970s was the 
gradual, halting, but forceful transformation of both the numerical strength and, especially, 
ideological orientation of the party’s southern ranks.  By removing some of Congress’s most 
conservative lawmakers from Democratic ranks while altering the behavior of others, southern 
realignment was already serving to make the party more internally coherent and marginally more 
liberal overall, even as other developments introduced countervailing, fragmenting influences.          
 The institutional and political settings in which lawmakers operated were more 
significant contributors to the frustrations and disarray of Carter-era policymaking than any 
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ideological changes among congressional Democrats.  As described in Chapter Four, the 
congressional reforms implemented in the first half of the decade contained both centralizing and 
decentralizing measures.  In the initial years following the reforms, the decentralizing changes 
predominated, as party leaders hesitated to maximize their use of new powers and individual 
members swamped the system in the absence of management and coordination by legislative 
“traffic cops.”  The Carter White House exacerbated such centrifugal tendencies through 
particularly ineffective efforts at congressional coordination as well as its prioritization of the 
kinds of sweeping and comprehensive reform packages – on thorny issues like energy, welfare, 
and budget policy – that Congress has difficulty tackling even under the best circumstances.112  
Importantly, however, the legislative frustrations of those years were already serving to motivate 
further organizational changes that would ultimately diminish rather than perpetuate party 
fragmentation.  Under the energetic speakership of Tip O’Neill beginning in 1977, the House 
leadership began pursuing the expansion of its whip system, the enhanced use of the Steering and 
Policy and Rules committees to manage legislation, and the deployment of Task Forces handling 
initiatives across multiple committee jurisdictions.  Partly as a result, Democratic voting 
cohesion began a rebound in the late 1970s that continued for decades.    
 These developments were latent and largely undetectable to activists like Doug Fraser 
amidst the legislative confusion and conservative mobilizations of the Carter years, however.  
What was vividly clear was both a sense of liberal disarray as well as a Democratic president and 
congressional majority’s obvious lack of commitment to the progressive party platform of 1976.  
Other liberal activist organizations were thinking in terms similar to Fraser during Carter’s 
presidency, whether seen in Democratic Agenda’s claim that the “drive for a more responsible 
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Political Party structure never been more attractive than it is now” or ADA officials’ insistence 
that “the 1976 platform is not obsolete, and those who are elected under it should stay with it.”113  
But even most liberal allies acknowledged that party discipline and platform accountability were 
particularly elusive goals in the American political system.  As a UAW staffer noted in an 
internal commentary, the Progressive Alliance’s working paper on political reform seemed “to 
be striving for a degree of party discipline that is compatible only with a parliamentary 
system.”114  David Broder echoed that notion in a sympathetic profile that described Fraser’s 
efforts as “sailing upstream against a strong current of public desire for direct, participatory 
democracy.”115  Moreover, the umbrella structure of the new Alliance made it a collection of 
disparate issue groups with differing institutional set-ups and approaches, and only some of those 
member organizations were receptive to a focus on party reform.
116
   
Nevertheless, even while pursuing more substantive issue campaigns during the 
organization’s three-year life, the Progressive Alliance maintained an emphasis on institutional 
reform through the work of its Political Process Commission.  In a reflection of their shared 
responsible party outlook, Doug Fraser had asked that tireless reformer, Minnesota Congressman 
Donald Fraser (no relation), to chair the commission, but the latter declined due to his continued 
stewardship of the similarly oriented Democratic Conference.
117
  Co-chaired instead by the 
political scientist Chris Arterton and the feminist and gay rights activist Gloria Johnson, the 
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Commission met several times over the course of 1979 and 1980, addressing as key themes 
“Political Parties and Money in Politics,” “Citizen Participation,” “Census and reapportionment,” 
and “the politics of alliances and coalitions.”118  As discussed below, the Alliance would also 
play a pivotal role at the 1980 Democratic convention in securing both a liberal platform and a 
commitment from the DNC to investigate questions of party reform and responsibility. 
The Alliance had long-term aims that extended beyond such study groups and convention 
skirmishes – and the way the group conceptualized such aims typified the approach of liberal-left 
activists in the late 1970s.  Included in an internally distributed “Long-Range road map” in early 
1979, for example, were plans for the “establishment of a more or less formal caucus within the 
Democratic Party,” the forging of a “media network” of progressive communications efforts, the 
“creation of an ‘AEI’ on the left,” and the building of a 25,000-name mailing list to be overseen 
by “a ‘Viguerie’ on our side.”119  The latter two items, in their explicit mimicry of recent 
conservative efforts at institution-building, reflected liberal’s growing fascination with the 
ascendant New Right and their desire to emulate its organizational approaches.   
Indeed, in analyzing the right’s activities as potential models for action, liberals 
effectively helped their ideological antagonists construct what would become the dominant 
political narrative of the later twentieth century – the phoenix-like rise of the conservative 
movement – as that very rise took place.  Mike Miller of the CWA gave presentations on the 
New Right’s mobilizations in 1978 to liberal and Democratic audiences, including the DNC, 
while the NEA prepared a national conference on the new conservative threat to education.
120
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270 liberal organizations formed the network Interchange in April 1978 as a communications 
hub exchanging “alerts on the New Right’s actions.”121  The ADA distributed 250,000 copies of 
its report “A Citizen’s Guide to the Right Wing” that same year.122  1979 featured NOW 
workshops on “Reproductive Rights and the Right Wing” and a National Conference on Right-
Wing Strategy organized by Democratic activist and Interchange co-founder Midge Miller.
123
  
Richard Viguerie, the flamboyant New Right direct-mail pioneer, loomed large among 
liberal activists as a movement tactician to emulate.  As Progressive Alliance leaders put it in 
1979, “the central problem for progressives in the 1980s is to create movement and momentum.  
Viguerie is a master of this analysis.  In his own words, he uses anti-abortion and Prop 13 
sentiment as vehicles to identify and coalesce like-minded individuals.”124  Even as these 
organizers hoped for a “‘Viguerie’ on our side,” the consultant and direct-mail guru Thomas R. 
Mathews earned that designation from reporters.
125
  A former Common Cause official who built 
up a massive mailing list of liberal donors over the 1970s, Mathews used polarizing issue appeals 
to expand his base while raising funds for his clients – the epitome of Viguerie’s approach.126   
By the end of the decade, liberal strategy memos abounded calling for the explicit 
emulation of conservative organizational innovations from the 1960s and 1970s.  This marked an 
ironic new turn in a long-running cycle among ideological activists, since so many of those very 
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innovations on the right had begun as answers to organizations on the left.  The American 
Conservative Union was the right’s ADA.  The Republican Study Committee was the right’s 
Democratic Study Group.  The National Conservative Political Action Committee was the right’s 
National Committee for an Effective Congress.  The Heritage Foundation and the American 
Enterprise Institute were the right’s versions of the Brookings Institution.   As the cycle of 
combat and emulation continuously recurred, the right and the left alike helped to drive further a 
process of organizational and ideological polarization in American politics.  
Major asymmetries would structure this dynamic from the 1970s onward, however, and 
the fate of the Progressive Alliance helps illuminate some of the factors underlying the left’s 
relative disadvantage.  After a flurry of activity, intellectual engagement, and ambitious 
planning, the Alliance buckled under its own top-heavy structure, officially disbanding in April 
1981.  Long prior to that official decision, the organization found itself hamstrung by the need to 
accommodate myriad member organizations, and its leadership struggled against key allies’ 
accurate perception that all the effective power remained concentrated in the UAW.
127
  In a 1980 
letter to Michael Harrington, one departing staffer called the Alliance “about as productive as 
flower tending in seventh century Byzantium.  Lots of nice sprouts that keep getting stepped 
on.”128  But more important than any such organizational dysfunctions was the manufacturing 
crisis, particularly in the auto industry, that was beginning take a toll on the American labor 
movement at the same time that employers launched a newly aggressive mobilization against 
unions.  The long-term decline of labor would exert a crippling handicap on left-liberal 
mobilizations in the next few decades – not least by ensuring the Democratic Party’s continued 
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dependence on corporate financial support – while in the short term the auto crisis had a practical 
and devastating effect on the Progressive Alliance.  From 1979 onward, Doug Fraser’s attentions 
were increasingly concentrated on the looming bankruptcy of Chrysler and efforts to secure 
federal help for the company, and between 1979 and 1981 the UAW’s membership declined by 
20 percent amidst a wave of plant closings.
129
  The Alliance lost priority in the crisis.  So central 
was the UAW’s stewardship and support for the Alliance that Fraser’s decision to step down as 
the group’s chair in March of 1981 swiftly precipitated its disintegration. 
Beyond suffering travails specific to the labor movement, meanwhile, the Progressive 
Alliance could be said to have shared in a deficiency common to much of the liberal-left at the 
time: it lacked a mobilized mass grassroots constituency comparable either to those that drove 
the social movements of the 1960s or to the growing ranks of engaged foot soldiers for Christian 
right and tax-revolt causes in the 1970s.  Against the loftier hopes of its organizers, the Alliance 
remained largely a staff-dominated coalition of letter-head organizations.  This lack of real 
grassroots muscle played as important a role as the conflicting legal and strategic postures among 
member organizations in hindering the Alliance’s ability to engage in such factional party efforts 
as candidate sponsorships and primary challenges.
130
  It was not a problem unique to the 
Alliance.  By the late 1970s, the Democratic Agenda also began to acknowledge an inability to 
buttress its influential elite-level party operations with a mass base or grassroots leverage.  “We 
have had an impact on program and structure within the Democratic Party qua party,” one leader 
pointed out at in 1979, “but we have no electoral clout.”131  A year later, DSOC’s Ruth Jordan 
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offered a similar assessment and recommended renewed efforts to build independent, locally-
rooted grassroots bases for Democratic Agenda.
132
  But such efforts never succeeded.   
Those failures reflected the general post-1960s tendency of many advocacy groups on the 
left to organize as elite, staff-dominated letterhead organizations lacking mobilized mass 
constituencies, a popular hollowing-out of movement politics that could also be seen in the 
increasing emphasis on legal rather legislative strategies for pursuing political aims.
133
  Indeed, 
the combination of continued influence and diminished grassroots muscle could characterize the 
position of liberal Democrats writ large at the time.  Congressional Quarterly’s assessment of 
the 1978 Midterm Democratic Conference in Memphis noted how the meetings dynamics 
“pointed up the ambiguous role of liberal activists in American politics – increasingly important 
within the nation’s majority party, but isolated from public policy decisions and from national 
opinion itself.”134  That isolation stemmed not merely from the mistrust and conflicting priorities 
of the Carter administration, but from a mass electoral weakness that reduced liberals’ leverage.       
It was precisely this lack of a grassroots base that activist Heather Booth sought to 
address when she built upon the organizing efforts of the issue-based labor-liberal energy 
coalition CLEC to pursue a broader national initiative called Citizen Action.  Through the 
Midwest Academy as well as her work alongside William Winpersinger at CLEC, Booth had 
begun to forge a national network of relationships and commitments among several state and 
local level citizens and consumer groups.  In December 1979, Booth convened a three-day 
Citizen Action Organizing Conference in Chicago that brought together representatives from 
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liberal unions and five of the most active and influential state-level citizens groups: the 
Connecticut Citizen Action Group, Massachusetts Fair Share, Ohio Public Interest Campaign, 
Oregon Fair Share, and the Illinois Political Action Council.
135
  The aim was to achieve “a 
national dimension” to the issue work being done by the state groups, and in particular to expand 
CLEC’s state coalitions into multi-issue organizations and campaigns.136  As an early blueprint 
laid out, the new organization would provide resources and financial support to unions, churches, 
and citizen organizations for “the development of national issue coalitions.  Whenever requested, 
Citizen Action will offer assistance to unions, churches, and citizen organizations.”137   
To the extent that those efforts remained focused on practical, locally-rooted struggles 
over issues like toxic waste contamination, plant closings or the decontrol of natural gas prices, 
Citizen Action and its organizational antecedent, CLEC, were not quite innovators.  Rather, they 
served as nodes of activity on a national level that could scale up campaigns, coordinate among 
member groups, and share resources and personnel.  More importantly, they served as 
institutional connectors between, on the one hand, the community organizing, public interest, and 
consumer groups that were an activist legacy of 1960s social movements and, on the other hand, 
the progressive wing of American labor.  The alliance was vividly embodied in the oddball 
public teamwork of Heather Booth the veteran New Left feminist and William “Wimpy” 
Winpersinger the gruff, fiftysomething Machinists union boss – a partnership continuously on 
display at CLEC and Citizen Action meetings in the late 1970s and 1980s.  George Meany 
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personally advised Winpersinger against working with Booth given her New Left background.
138
  
But Winpisinger saw an alliance with such forces as the only hope for revitalizing progressive 
politics in America.  Booth and her partners in state-level citizen groups felt the same way.   
Moreover, Citizen Action did not ultimately confine itself to issue campaigns that 
avoided electoral or partisan entanglements.  As of early 1979, “Should the organization have a 
relation to electoral politics?” remained an open question for the nascent group’s founders.139  
But CLEC ‘s rapidly growing lobbying efforts on oil deregulation, both at the state level as well 
as in Washington, helped serve both as a model for formal political engagement as well as an 
inducement to consider electoral activity as a component of Citizen Action’s approach.  By the 
end of the decade, Booth and fellow leaders in the organization like Michael Ansara of 
Massachusetts Fair Share and Robert Creamer of Illinois Public Action had begun the process of 
coaxing community and consumer activists who had resisted electoral and partisan politics to 
take the plunge.
140
  The goal should be, in Ansara’s formulation, to “seize control of the 
Democratic Party,” and to do that, “winning office” was key.141   
The model of the Republican right remained paramount.  Michael Harrington told Citizen 
Action conference attendees in 1980 to recall Barry Goldwater’s famous landslide defeat.  “What 
did the Goldwaterites do?” he asked.  “They did what we should do.  They got up and they 
started organizing.  They doubled and redoubled their efforts.  They have now totally and 
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completely taken over the Republican Party.”142  In a 1981 Citizen Action strategy memo, Bob 
Creamer called for progressive Political Action Committees modeled on the right, with an eye 
toward ideological recruitment and endorsements of candidates for office.  He also cautioned 
against pursuing third-party adventures for the time being.  “A progressive political apparatus 
should function primarily within the Democratic Party (though not always).”143  The caveat 
signaled a desire to maintain a semblance of independence from Democrats, but it was not a 
harbinger of any significant activity on behalf of Republican candidates.  From the outset, 
Citizen Action had a team affiliation with one of the two major parties – and stuck with it.   
Precisely because a wariness of electoral and partisan politics had colored so much of the 
left-liberal activist approach since the 1960s, for such organizations to turn toward the formal 
political arena marked a historically significant development.  At the Citizen Action conference 
held in the traumatic aftermath of Ronald Reagan’s 1980 presidential victory, Heather Booth 
announced that “we need to seriously review part of the previous advice given by myself and 
others: that the organizations represented here, and others like us around the country, should not 
be particularly electoral.”144  She outlined the reasons that community and public interest groups 
had eschewed elections in the past, from the relative effectiveness of Alinsky-style 
“accountability sessions” with public officials to the dangers of becoming overly entwined with 
the conflicts and compromises of individual candidates.  She also recounted the saga of the 1964 
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party’s convention fight (in which she had participated), 
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portraying it as a formative experience of betrayal and demoralization at the hands of seeming 
allies in the formal political arena.  But she then laid out the case for her generation of activists to 
overcome their aversion to that arena.  “Electoral organizing should be considered one more tool, 
one more weapon, in our arsenal,” she said.  “If we want a majority constituency, we need 
alliances with people who have organized primarily in an electoral direction … We need to build 
a political machine.”  Her words signified a new intensification of Citizen Action’s efforts, 
which soon included the provision of training, resources, and personnel for groups working on 
over a hundred local, state, and federal election campaigns in 1982.
145
        
The “ground game” undergirding such electoral efforts was a signature contribution of 
the public interest and community organizations to broader progressive politics in the last 
decades of the twentieth century: the large-scale revival of canvassing.  Though door-to-door 
recruitment and mobilizing campaigns had been mainstays in urban electoral politics and in the 
voter registration drives of the civil rights movement, the advent of television, phone-banking, 
and large-scale direct mail practices reduced the incentives for such canvassing efforts during the 
mid-20
th
 century.  But the innovations of encyclopedia salesman-turned-environmental activist 
Marc Anderson and an ex-Nader’s Raider named Edward Zwick during the 1970s led to the 
rapid spread and professionalization of the canvass as a fundraising and recruitment tool for a 
full array of consumer, feminist, environmental, civil rights, and economic justice groups.
146
  The 
turn toward electoral politics that organizers like Booth began to take by the end of the decade 
thus marked the introduction of a new stream of canvassing resources and operations to the 
Democratic Party.  Citizen Action grew significantly over the course of the 1980s as it became 
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ever more closely associated with Democratic get-out-the-vote operations and campaigns on 
behalf of Democratic legislative initiatives.  Indeed, that partisan association grew so tight that 
the organization would eventually come under legal scrutiny regarding its tax status at the same 
time that many member groups grumbled about cooptation.  Such concerns only illustrate the 
degree to which organizations like Citizen Action had come to establish themselves as the 
grassroots base of the party during a seeming era of liberal decline.   
In doing so, they fulfilled an important, underappreciated political development that had 
begun with the explosion of social movement activism in the 1960s.  Particularly in the wake of 
1968’s insurgent campaigns and George McGovern’s landslide defeat in 1972, these activists 
had demonstrated occasional antagonism towards, and frequent wariness of, mainstream party 
politics.  Such a disposition has underlay a scholarly view that distinguishes the 1960s-vintage 
movements analytically from the “amateur” reformist and issue-based activism that had 
galvanized Democratic politics in the 1950s.  The older amateurs were a type of partisan activist 
doing party-related work, according to this view, while activists of the New Left generation and 
afterward were fundamentally apartisan, their growing political importance a symptom of party 
decline.
147
  But if the work of leaders like Heather Booth succeeded in helping not only to 
midwife a reconfigured labor-liberal alliance but also to foster the gradual reentrance of a 
generation of issue and movement activists into Democratic politics, then that scholarly 
distinction collapses.  Instead of helping to usher in a long-term anti-party political era, the 
network of activists and organizations spawned by the 1960s ultimately contributed to the 
ideological sorting and structuring of the two-party system, by enlisting on one side for battle.  
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Such enlistment was a contested, fitful process requiring intellectual and organizational work, 
but it had largely occurred by the dawn of the Reagan years. 
 
Sailing Against the Wind  
 
Before those years commenced, liberal activists mounted one more significant partisan 
effort that, though a failure in the short term, embodied vital coalitional ties that endured into the 
Reagan era.  The successful platform work done by Democratic Agenda and feminist 
organizations at the Democratic convention in 1976 and the midterm conference in 1978 had 
largely failed to affect the Carter administration’s behavior.  This failure helped to convince such 
activists that a credible nomination challenge was required for 1980.  “A serious issue challenge 
has to also be a candidate challenge,” Harrington wrote his colleagues in early 1979, just as a 
Progressive Alliance official emphasized to Doug Fraser “the necessity of considering the 
building of a left challenge (EMK) within the Democratic Party so that Carter cannot play 
general-election, right wing politics from now through ‘80.”148  Those initials specified the 
candidate whom activists had in mind.  At least since his barn-burning speech at the party 
conference in Memphis, activists had been “waiting for Teddy.”    
Long cast as a quixotic effort by a political celebrity whose ideological appeal was a relic 
of bygone times, Edward M. Kennedy’s 1980 nomination challenge against Jimmy Carter has 
recently come under renewed scholarly appreciation, as a venture stemming directly from the 
significant coalitional work carried out by liberals in the 1970s.
149
  As with Reagan’s challenge 
to Ford four years earlier, Kennedy’s campaign appeared to many contemporaries as 
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symptomatic of a party system rapidly fragmenting into a candidate-centered free-for-all.
150
  But 
the potency – and clearly programmatic cast – of both of these challenges in fact make them 
signposts of the polarization underway during an era better known for its surface confusions. 
Certainly by the time Ted Kennedy began to seriously contemplate the run that so many 
Democratic officials and activists urged him to make, beleaguered Jimmy Carter was feeling the 
pinch of this polarization.  A crippling political-economic context of stagflation, soaring energy 
prices, and right-wing resurgence put the president in a position that was bound to exacerbate 
conflict with liberals in his party.  “It is damn hard to be in a Democratic administration in 
Republican times,” one Carter administration official told David Broder at the 1978 Memphis 
conference.
151
  In May 1979, Carter’s domestic policy advisor Stuart Eizenstat sent a memo to 
senior White House officials signaling the danger signs on Carter’s left.  “I am increasingly 
concerned that the President is moving further and further from his Democratic Party base by a 
number of actions,” he wrote, including “his economic policy, which is widely viewed as 
Republican in thrust,” as well as his austerity budget and support for decontrol of oil prices.  
“Can we get together on this to develop ways to reach out to our badly estranged friends?”152   
Eizenstat’s pleas, along with those of his liberal ally in the administration, Vice President 
Walter Mondale, fell on deaf ears, as Carter became increasingly convinced by advisor Pat 
Caddell that a deeper problem than mere party politics beset the country -- a psychic crisis of 
confidence and faith in public institutions that had to be addressed explicitly.  The result was 
Carter’s famous Camp David summit of citizens and civic leaders in July 1979, followed by a 
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televised address to which posterity would lend the moniker “the malaise speech.”153  Carter’s 
analysis of the nation’s ills tapped directly into the prevailing sense among political observers of 
a system crumbling in the face of dissensus, mistrust, and apathy – “fragmentation and self-
interest,” as he put it.  The speech was initially well-received by the public, but it did little to 
assuage committed liberals convinced that viable programmatic solutions to the nation’s 
problems were, in fact, available, only to be rejected by an ideologically compromised president.        
 Kennedy certainly thought this way, and his emerging but still unofficial candidacy was 
closely connected, in both program and personnel, to the coalitional network of progressive 
unions and environmental, consumer, and feminist activists working to bolster a left Democratic 
faction in the late 1970s.  His hiring of Carl Wagner as a political advisor in late 1978 typified 
such connections – Wagner was both an ex-McGovern activist and current staffer at AFSCME – 
as did the intensive legislative and lobbying work he did with Doug Fraser through the Coalition 
for National Health Insurance.
154
  In July 1979, William Winpisinger lent his signature to the 
first major national direct-mail effort to raise funds for a draft Kennedy movement, an operation 
overseen by the “Viguerie of the left,” Tom Matthews.155  The ADA voted to endorse a Kennedy 
challenge that summer, while NOW announced opposition to Carter’s reelection in December.156   
To be sure, some of the leading lights of labor-liberal coalitional politics in this period 
remained loyal to Carter due to specific ties of interest and policy.  Most significant was the 
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N.E.A.’s decision to endorse the president for reelection in 1979.  The teachers’ union, under 
Terry Herndon’s aggressive leadership, was at the vanguard of left-liberal activism within the 
Democratic Party at the time.  Its endorsement, rewarding Carter’s fulfillment of campaign 
commitments to raise federal education spending and establish a Department of Education, 
ultimately provided Carter with important electoral muscle to complement the inherent 
advantages of incumbency in his fight against Kennedy.
157
  Such conflicting positions among 
allied organizations, meanwhile, persuaded the leaders of coalitions like Democratic Agenda and 
Progressive Alliance to eschew official organizational involvement in the race in favor of 
continued work on platform and issue advocacy.
158
  Countless individual leaders in these groups, 
however, from Harrington and Doug Fraser on down, became active Kennedy supporters.                     
  The details of Kennedy’s vexed primary campaign, formally launched in November 
1979, have been well chronicled by journalists and historians.
159
  Less noted is the striking 
parallel in trajectory and form between his campaign and the Reagan insurgency of 1976.  In 
both cases, an initial campaign strategy deemphasizing ideology and issues in favor of gauzier, 
candidate-centered appeals appeared to contribute to losses in early caucuses and primaries.  
Mid-campaign changes of course then turned the respective efforts into programmatic crusades 
on behalf of ideological party activists – crusades that failed to make up for early delegate losses 
but that carried the fights to the conventions and to alterations in the party platforms.  In both 
cases, the campaigns reflected the labor of a broader array of activists and interests than just the 
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personal followers of the candidate, and thus, even in defeat, they exerted an impact their 
respective parties by demonstrating the vitality of the majority factions within them.    
The Kennedy men who devised an initial campaign strategy eschewing ideological 
appeals – the role performed by John Sears in the 1976 Reagan campaign – included campaign 
manager Steven Smith, pollster Peter Hart, and political advisor Paul Kirk.
160
  There was a clear 
logic to their thinking.  As of fall 1979, Kennedy’s lead over both Carter (whose approval rating 
frequently fell below 30 percent) and various prospective Republican presidential candidates in 
public opinion polls was consistently large.  Moreover, in a reflection of Carter’s collapse in 
standing and public confidence, an array of Democratic activists and major politicians running 
the gamut from George McGovern to Scoop Jackson to Robert Byrd had beseeched Kennedy for 
over a year to launch a campaign against the president.  Given the evident wishes of the public 
and of broad swathes of the party, Kennedy’s advisors deemed it sensible to pursue a general 
election-style campaign from the outset, heavy on platitudes about “leadership” and light on the 
substance of his already well-known liberalism.
161
  But the cautious strategy confused and 
demobilized Kennedy’s supporters while helping to render him an uncomfortable, inarticulate 
campaigner.  The first months of the campaign, meanwhile, coincided with an upsurge in 
Carter’s support as a result of two crises that initially drew Americans to their commander in 
chief’s side: Iranian militants’ raid of the U.S. embassy on November 4 and the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan a month later.  In the shadow of these crises, Kennedy suffered a 2-to-1 defeat in 
the Iowa caucus, followed by losses in New Hampshire and a string of southern primaries.        
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The campaign soon agreed on a course correction toward more explicit programmatic and 
ideological appeals, which Kennedy debuted in a major address at Georgetown University in late 
January.  Repeating a phrase he had used in his triumphant speech at the 1978 midterm party 
conference – “sometimes a party must sail against the wind” – Kennedy articulated a classic case 
for hewing to the core programmatic traditions of Democratic liberalism so as to offer a stark 
contrast with the opposition.
162
  “We cannot permit the Democratic Party to remain captive to 
those who have been so confused about its ideals,” he declared, making the same case to 
Democratic primary voters that Reagan had made to Republicans four years earlier when calling 
for a party banner of “bold colors” rather than “pale pastels.”  The program Kennedy laid out 
was liberal across the board, endorsing national health insurance, wage and price controls to 
tackle inflation, increased environmental protections, new arms control efforts, curbs on wasteful 
military spending, and even cautionary notes about the danger of an overly belligerent Cold War 
posture.  (“Let us not foreclose every opening to the Soviet Union.”)  The speech electrified his 
supporters and helped refuel his campaign’s fundraising.  Reenergized on the stump now that he 
felt freer to launch issue critiques of Carter from the left, Kennedy began to make headway in 
primary contests, particularly in the industrial north.  Compared to Reagan’s late-primary surge 
in 1976, Kennedy’s comeback was fitful and uneven, and he ultimately entered the 1980 party 
convention trailing Carter’s delegate count 1,239 to 1,964, in contrast to the mere double-digit 
deficit Reagan had held against Ford at the eve of the GOP convention in 1976.  But his support 
was substantial enough to give him leverage in major convention decisions in August. 
The characteristics of the supporters that Kennedy drew over the course of his campaign 
reflected just the coalition that left-liberal activists like Michael Harrington, Doug Fraser, and 
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Heather Booth had sought to construct in the 1970s.  As the agenda laid out in his Georgetown 
speech indicated, Kennedy’s issue appeal mirrored those activists’ additive approach to 
coalition-building, in which cultural and foreign policy liberalism augmented rather than 
supplanted New Deal economic appeals.  Kennedy’s campaign rested on mobilized support from 
a large portion of the labor movement, feminists, environmentalists, consumer groups, African 
American organizations (including the Congressional Black Caucus), Hispanic activists, and the 
nascent gay rights movement.  The class base of this support did not skew upwards in the manner 
of McGovern in 1972, and the programmatic core of the campaign – the common ground for all 
of these groups – was a liberal agenda on economics and the welfare state.163  By pursuing this 
additive approach, liberal Democrats paralleled their conservative counterparts in the GOP, who 
worked in the late 1970s to sustain New Right and Christian conservative mobilizations on social 
issues without trimming conservative positions on the economy. 
The campaign’s final echo of Reagan’s 1976 insurgency occurred at the Democratic 
convention in August.  By the end of the primary season, Kennedy’s delegate deficit was 
essentially prohibitive.  But after Carter rebuffed an offer to hold a televised policy debate with 
Kennedy in exchange for his withdrawal and endorsement, the challenger decided to pursue a 
long-shot rules strategy aimed at destabilizing the alignment of delegate support.  The campaign 
mobilized at the DNC’s Rules Committee hearings in June to seek an “open convention,” in 
which delegates pledged to Carter would be allowed to reassess their allegiances.
164
  Kennedy’s 
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forces, lacking a committee majority, lost the fight.  But they vowed to take a rules challenge to 
the convention floor in August – along with a series of minority reports on the party platform.   
Liberal forces’ success in dominating the platform process was the major surprise of the 
1980 convention.  The process could first be seen in the same Rules Committee sessions that 
quashed the open convention effort.  The Progressive Alliance, the Democratic Conference, and 
Democratic Agenda worked in tandem to secure passage of two resolutions related to party 
reform.  The first tasked the DNC with creating a new Commission on Party Accountability, 
which would explore measures that could “yield an effective and disciplined effort to implement 
the Platform of the National Democratic Party.”165  The second, mandating another midterm 
party conference in 1982, won in a narrow committee floor fight over the explicit opposition of 
Carter forces.
166
  Kennedy even made noise about pursuing a requirement that presidential 
candidates put in writing their position on each platform plank as a condition of appearing on the 
ballot.
167
  Though he soon dropped the proposal, it reflected his candidacy’s connection to 
responsible party views of platform accountability and party discipline.  
In addition to such efforts at institutional reform, the summer saw a successful push by 
liberals to influence the platform’s substance.  At the Resolutions Committee hearings in late 
June, Kennedy forces advocated an alternative platform called “A Rededication to Democratic 
Principles,” which contrasted starkly with the cautious document written by Carter loyalists on 
the drafting subcommittee.  The Kennedy alternative explicitly ruled out the pursuit of anti-
inflationary measures that would increase unemployment, authorized wage and price controls, 
and called for a new $12 billion jobs program.  The committee rejected these planks, but at the 
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same meeting, environmentalists and feminists allied with Kennedy delegates to successfully 
pass sharpened anti-nuclear and pro-choice resolutions.
168
  These surprise votes against the 
administration were indications of a growing restiveness among delegates.  In the month leading 
up to the convention in New York, the Kennedy campaign built political momentum on behalf of 
the minority planks, benefitting from the help of platform-focused groups like Democratic 
Agenda and the Progressive Alliance.  On Tuesday, August 12, the day of the convention’s 
platform session, the Agenda held a Town Hall rally featuring speeches from Fraser, 
Winpisinger, Cesar Chavez, Ruth Messinger, Eleanor Smeal, and Gloria Steinem, all advocating 
a bolder party platform.
169 
 And that evening, before a primetime television audience, Kennedy 
spoke on behalf of his economic planks in what became the most acclaimed speech of his career.   
“I have come here tonight not to argue as a candidate but to affirm a cause,” Kennedy 
intoned.  “I am asking you to renew the commitment of the Democratic Party to economic 
justice.”  Kennedy laid out the substantive vision represented by his minority planks, that 
vision’s connection to Democratic history, and its contrast with the Republican approach.  At the 
concluding lines declaring that “the work goes on, the cause endures, the hope still lives, and the 
dream shall never die,” the convention hall erupted into a near-riot of applause and chanting that 
lasted thirty minutes.  The speech provided the final bit of persuasion to Carter strategists 
engaged in behind-the-scenes negotiation with Kennedy forces over the platform.  Now 
convinced that a floor vote on Kennedy’s planks would embarrass the president, they sent word 
to convention chair Tip O’Neill that they would accept all of them, with the exception of wage 
and price controls.  O’Neill swiftly gaveled his way by voice vote to the passage of all of 
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Kennedy’s other proposals, including the disavowal of recessionary anti-inflation measures and 
the $12 billion jobs program.
170
  The 1980 Democratic nomination was Carter’s.  But much of its 
platform belonged to Kennedy – and to the robust liberal coalition mobilized behind him.           
 
Issues, “Single Issues,” and the Democratic Coalition 
 
 Back in November 1979, Ruth Jordan of Democratic Agenda surveyed the new left-
liberal coalitions that had sprouted up in the preceding years: 
There’s the Full Employment Action Council, the Citizen/Labor Energy 
Coalition, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, the Democratic 
Agenda, Democratic Conference, COIN, CAPE and Progressive 
Alliance.  There’s Interchange, the Consumer Coalition for Health and 
even the Consumers’ Committee for No-Fault Insurance. Too many 
coalitions?  For the trade union leaders called upon to provide the bulk 
of the financial support for many of these organizations, it must certainly 
seem so.
171
  
 
A reader encountering Jordan’s list in the pages of DSOC’s newsletter might draw several 
conclusions.  On the one hand, the array of organizations conveyed a sense of energetic and 
experimental alliance-building, evident even amidst the disillusion and frustrations of Carter-era 
policymaking.  And indeed, as we have seen the 1970s was a time in which many on the broad 
liberal left worked effectively to forge a rapprochement between the forces of 1960s-borne 
cultural and social activism and older elements of the New Deal coalition.  Central to this work 
were leaders within an American labor movement that was itself undergoing important 
compositional and ideological change.  By the end of the decade, not only had progressive 
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unions managed to establish important and enduring ties with many left-liberal groups, but 
divisions within the labor movement itself were beginning to diminish.
172
    
 But Jordan’s list also hinted at key limitations in left-liberal political activism, underlying 
an enduring asymmetry with conservative forces.  The organizations mentioned almost all lacked 
mass memberships and bases, and tended to be staff-driven coalitions of coalitions.  As Jordan 
emphasized, moreover, organized labor provided the bulk of the funding for these groups.  This 
fact imposed a limitation on liberals’ organizational prospects that would only become more 
acute as union density in the United States declined with increasing speed through the 1980s and 
1990s.  Organized labor’s decline, taking place within the context of resurgent political activism 
by business interests, conservatives’ ascendance within the Republican Party, and steady 
increases in the cost of political campaigns, had important implications for an enduring partisan 
asymmetry as well.  The GOP’s ideological agenda and its funding base reinforced one another.  
Both the party and its supporters shared an increasingly cohesive anti-regulatory and anti-tax 
conservatism.  In contrast, Democratic office holders and activists faced cross pressures between 
donors from labor and other liberal ranks and the business support upon which many still 
depended.  This undergirded an imbalance in the relative coherence and aggressiveness of the 
two major parties’ respective policy agendas and programmatic appeals.   
 The laundry-list quality of Jordan’s catalogue hinted at another source of the imbalance 
between conservative and liberal forces, and between the two parties into which the forces were 
sorting at the dawn of the Reagan era.  The very process of attempting to stitch together the 
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electoral, legislative, and partisan activity of newer movements and issue groups with older labor 
and civil rights interests helped to lay bare the fragmented quality of post-1960s liberalism.  
More enduringly than its conservative counterpart, liberal coalition work came to bear that 
critical moniker: “single-issue politics.”  Activists were cognizant of the problem.  At the 1978 
meeting called by Doug Fraser, a sympathetic attendee told Newsweek that “all the one-issue 
people wound up in arguments about which issues were the most important,” while a reporter at 
the Democratic midterm conference two months later compared listening to the delegates speak 
to “opening the morning ‘mailing list’ envelopes.  There were dozens of different ‘very special 
pleas.’”173  The Progressive Alliance had pitched itself in its founding statement as a solution to 
the problem of balkanization: “Individual interest groups and causes have evolved in 
unprecedented numbers … Many of us have been activists in such single-issue struggles of 
necessity, yet we join together recognizing the compelling need for a common program and the 
political vehicles to achieve it.”174  But the outfit never really managed to transcend the problem.   
Left-liberal fragmentation had implications for the mainstream party with which such 
activism was aligned.  Increasingly the Democratic Party would be described as a mere vessel for 
the disparate agendas of implacable single-issue groups – a visionless and incoherent 
organizational broker for particularist interests and identity groups.  By contrast, though 
conservative movement-builders in the 1970s and 1980s had their own coalitional challenges and 
their own set of single-issue allies, they benefited from a comparatively overarching movement 
consciousness and esprit de corps among activists.  And this contributed to the relative sense of 
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programmatic cohesion and confidence among Republicans as they achieved sweeping electoral 
victories in 1980 and went about the task of governing in the Reagan years.                       
 That such contrasts and asymmetries existed, however, does not mean that liberal 
activists and Democratic reformers did not contribute to the ideological sorting of the party 
system in the 1970s.   For decades, a key goal of liberal activists interested in changing partisan 
dynamics in the United States had been to compel the ouster of the Democratic Party’s 
conservative faction based in the South.  By the end of the 1970s that process was well 
underway.  A related longstanding goal of party reformers, one emphasized anew by those who 
drove the McGovern-Fraser and congressional reforms in early 1970s, was to increase the access 
and influence of issue-driven activists in party affairs and to make substantive issues the basis for 
partisan activity.  The criticism that began to attach to the party by the end of the decade – that it 
was a prisoner of its own single-issue and ideological client groups – was itself an indication 
that, for better or for worse, reformers had also achieved this goal.  Finally, the coalitional work 
done by labor-liberal activists, like the efforts of supply-siders and cultural conservatives on the 
right, contributed to the additive quality of the issue dimensions around which the parties sorted.    
 By the end of the 1970s, certain political observers were beginning to perceive the rise to 
prominence of issue politics and the attendant ideological sorting of the party system, though 
hardly any predicted that such developments would also fuel a revival of partisanship itself.  
Nearly two decades after producing his path-breaking analysis of issue-oriented “amateur” 
activism, James Q. Wilson emphasized in 1979 “the enhanced importance of ideas and ideology” 
in shaping and driving political conflict in contemporary politics.
 175
  A New Class of educated 
professionals had grown enormously as a portion of the electorate in the years since he wrote 
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about reformist Club Democrats, and Wilson now noted that members of such a class tended to 
practice a more issue-oriented and ideological brand of politics on both the left and the right.  
“[T]he rise of an educated, idea-oriented public,” he argued, combined with the greater 
permeability of political institutions achieved by reformers,  has produced both the “‘one-issue’ 
politics so characteristic of the present era” and growing polarization of the two major political 
parties at the national level.  Within Congress, “the Republican party seems to have become 
more consistently conservative and the Democratic party more consistently liberal.”  Among 
legislators, “the principle of affiliation” had grown to be “more clearly based on shared ideas, 
and to a degree those shared ideas conform to party labels … The notion of party in Congress has 
been infused with more ideological meaning by its members.”                
 If Wilson and others observers sensed at the end of the 1970s that the notion of party was 
being infused with more ideological meaning in American politics, few of them predicted that 
such an infusion might bring with it a growing degree of discipline in partisan behavior.  Wilson 
described the confluence of ideological politics and weakened, fragmented political institutions 
as underlying “the schizophrenia of contemporary politics.”  But ideological sorting was making 
both parties’ ranks less, rather than more, internally schizophrenic, and that fact would have 
profound effects on party politics in the last decades of the twentieth century.  Liberals’ 
contributions to this process were substantial – notwithstanding the fact that the decade ended 
with their most profound political defeat in the postwar era.           
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Conclusion: Polarization Without Responsibility 
 The triumphs of Ronald Reagan and his party in the 1980 election were sweeping and 
decisive.  The president-elect’s claims of having earned an electoral mandate for conservatism 
were difficult to counter.  But when political journalist James Reston assessed the meaning of the 
race that had just transpired, it filled him with foreboding.  “The sad thing about this election,” 
he wrote soon after the polls closed, “is that it has not clarified the nation’s problems but 
deepened them; not unified the people but divided them.”  Reagan’s refusal to dull the 
ideological edge of his message during the general election meant that, unless he and his 
supporters chose “cooperation instead of confrontation” with the forces they defeated once faced 
with the task of actually governing, the country would continue to be wracked by division.  In 
penning this post-mortem, Reston the centrist veteran wrote like a man without a country.  The 
very notion that the outcome of a presidential race in a two-party system could or should leave 
Americans more united would prove to be the intellectual remnant of a closing political era.
1
   
 Once in office, and particularly during his first term, Reagan’s programmatically 
coherent and ambitious governing approach served to strengthen rather than fragment partisan 
politics.  In an intellectual climate still dominated by discussion of party decline and disarray, a 
few contemporary observers managed to detect how Reagan’s ideological presidency might 
undergird partisan revival.  “On a whole range of domestic economic and role-of-government 
questions,” noted the realignment theorist James Sundquist soon after his election, “any 
perception that political parties do not take clear stands must have been shattered by the forceful, 
categorical positions taken by Ronald Reagan and his party during the campaign.”  Because 
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Reagan’s agenda “drew clean lines between the parties,” it could be expected to “create, or 
reinforce, the attachment of voters to the parties.”2  A few years later, Sidney Milkis would 
reaffirm Reagan’s historic accomplishment in helping to rejuvenate the party system via 
ideological governance.  “Reagan’s firm adherence to conservative principles,” he wrote, 
“contributed significantly to the emergence of a new kind of Republican party, one more national 
and programmatic in its orientation than the traditional GOP.”  In this and other ways, his 
administration “marked both a restoration of the modern presidency and a revitalization of 
partisan politics.”3     
 As this dissertation has shown, however, the Reagan presidency was less the cause than 
the result of a process of ideologically driven partisan revival already underway at its inception.  
The construction of an ideologically sorted and defined party system is what made Reagan’s 
approach to presidential campaigning and governing viable.  And this project was not the 
achievement of any individual leader, let alone a president.  It was rather the product of 
conscious work carried out by myriad activists, reformers, and politicians on both the left and 
right – Ronald Reagan very much among them – over the course of several decades.  
 To end this account with Reagan’s ascendance is not to imply that the new system of 
ideologically defined parties had emerged fully by the 1980s.  In fact, the partisan sort of 
conservatives and liberals among both public officials and American voters would continue for 
years to come, and as long as the process remained incomplete, the late-century political scene 
retained elements of fluidity and flexibility.  Nevertheless, Reagan’s presidency does mark a 
culmination and an endpoint in an important sense.  By the advent of that presidency, the 
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system’s advocates and architects had managed to put in place conditions that would make the 
dynamic logic of continuous ideological sorting between the two parties all but irreversible in the 
coming years.  And indeed, the patterns that we have seen in party politics since the 1980s might 
be described as “More of the same – only more so,” with each passing year. 
 
A New “Party Period” in American Politics 
 
Congress proved to be the leading edge in manifesting resurgent polarization and partisan 
discipline in the 1980s – though, in the blinding light of the Reagan Revolution’s initial 
legislative breakthroughs, such polarization was harder to detect.  Indeed, Reagan owed his 
central achievements in tax and fiscal policy to a bipartisan congressional majority, with the 
disproportionately southern and conservative Democratic “boll weevils” led by the likes of Phil 
Gramm and Richard Shelby supplying him with the margin of victory in the House.  That 
coalition functioned only for the first two years of his presidency, however.  The 1982 midterm 
elections, occurring amidst a recession, saw the loss of Republicans’ Senate majority as well as 
Reagan’s working bipartisan majority in the House.  Divided government and resurgent 
partisanship would prove to be the twin themes of the remainder of the Reagan era and beyond.    
Scholars late in the 1980s first began to quantify the steadily increasing rates of party-line 
voting in both the House and Senate, and to connect this development to public officials’ 
changing institutional environment.
4
  Indeed, though the long-term processes of ideological and 
coalitional sorting were at the heart of the resurgence in party strength and cohesion in the 1980s, 
the institutional reforms implemented during the previous decade proved crucial in facilitating 
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this development.  By curbing the independent power centers formally found in the major 
committees and empowering central party organs to control the legislative agenda – conditional 
on majority support from the party rank and file – the 1970s reforms secured a functional link 
between ideological cohesion and party discipline.  During the Reagan and George H.W. Bush 
presidencies, the Democratic House Speakerships of Tip O’Neill and Jim Wright revealed a 
growth in the capacity of congressional party leaders to coordinate legislative behavior and 
articulate coherent programmatic positions that set them starkly apart from their predecessors.
5
  
More bills were passed under “suspension of the rules,” and floor activity was reined in.  Wright 
in particular accelerated the use of such practices, famously provoking the ire and indignation of 
the Republican minority, for example, when he kept the clock running for an extra 15 minutes on 
a vote in 1987. 
Those Republicans’ outrage would prove ironic, as the congressional GOP, first in the 
minority and then eventually in the majority, developed a highly disciplined and confrontational 
legislative and political strategy that would take partisan combat in both chambers to new heights 
of intensity.  Newt Gingrich, an ambitious House member from the Atlanta suburbs, led the way.  
In 1983 he organized the Conservative Opportunity Society (COS) among younger and more 
conservative representatives and helped lead this faction to eventual dominance within the House 
GOP conference on the basis of an explicit critique of bipartisan engagement with the majority.
6
  
The COS’s confrontational strategic posture toward the Democrats also entailed an agenda for 
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internal party reform that echoed liberal Democrats’ achievements during the 1970s reform era.  
This included proposals to revamp and amplify Republican Research and Policy committee 
activities, regularize conference meetings, and expand whip operations.
7
  Such an agenda also 
included new scrutiny by the conservative GOP majority toward wayward committee chairmen.
8
   
Gingrich’s ascension to the House minority whip post in 1989 sharpened the factional 
conflict with what he characterized as an accommodationist Old Guard within the GOP 
leadership.  That Old Guard’s outlook, epitomized by minority leader Bob Michel’s insistence 
that the congressional minority had “an obligation to the American people to be … responsible 
participants in the process,” grew increasingly out of step with a Republican rank and file that, 
with each new election cycle, became steadily more movement-conservative in orientation.
9
  
Newer members took a dim view of participation in Democratically-backed legislative initiatives 
and agreed with Gingrich that the surest route to winning a majority would be to combine high-
profile public relations confrontations with Democrats with the articulation of a distinct 
alternative programmatic agenda, akin to the opposition party in a parliamentary system.   
The Republican congressional takeover in 1994 following a nationalized midterm 
election centered around an explicit party manifesto, Gingrich’s Contract with America, marked 
a culmination of the developments that had led to a particular kind of “responsible” two-party 
system in the United States Congress.  From 1995 to 2006, Republicans in control of Congress 
took the centralizing and discipline-bolstering tactics pioneered by Democrats and dramatically 
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expanded their use.  As Speaker, Newt Gingrich worked to curb seniority procedures for 
determining committee ranks among GOP members and placed term limits on committee 
chairmanships. Tactics intended to bring committees under the party leadership’s thumb only 
grew more routine and effective in the hands of Gingrich’s successors in the leadership.  “The 
job of Speaker is not to expedite legislation that runs counter to the wishes of the majority of his 
majority,” then-Speaker Dennis Hastert declared in 2003.  “On each piece of legislation, I 
actively seek to bring our party together.  I do not feel comfortable scheduling any controversial 
legislation unless I know we have the votes on our side first.”10  This so-called “Hastert rule,” 
capturing in practical language the main thrust of a dynamic theorized by political scientists as 
“party cartel” control, epitomized the arrival of a new era of party dominance in Congress.11  
Significantly, in the same speech Hastert made passing reference to the fact that occasionally, 
“we have a hard time convincing the majority of the House to vote like a majority of the House, 
so sometimes you will see votes stay open longer than usual.”  And indeed, many of the same 
Republicans who had cried foul at Speaker Wright’s clock-extending gambit in 1987 would 
pursue much more extreme versions of such tactics as a matter of course while in the majority, 
from keeping votes open several hours past the limit to scheduling votes at midnight to shutting 
minority members out of conference committees altogether.
12
   
The Senate, boasting (or suffering under) the most permissive rules of any legislative 
body on Earth, saw similar developments in partisan polarization during the last decades of the 
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twentieth century, but with quite different consequences than those observed in the increasingly 
parliamentarized House.  As in the House, growing partisan discipline coincided with a much-
lamented decline of civility and comity in the upper chamber – and, significantly, the pioneers of 
confrontational and hyperpartisan tactics in the Senate were found generally to be Republicans 
who had first served in the House during the years of Newt Gingrich’s rise to party leadership.13  
But the individualistic and countermajoritarian procedural environment in the Senate meant that 
partisan discipline more easily helped to produce obstruction and paralysis than it did party-line 
passage of major legislation.  The post-reform story of the Senate filibuster offers the most 
illustrative case in point.  The employment of filibusters became ever more partisan as 
ideological sorting gradually transformed the Senate.  And as the filibuster came to be seen as 
one more partisan tool at hand for Senate minorities, its use came to be more frequent and 
routine.  Between the 1960s and the 1970s – very early in the progression of ideological sorting 
among the parties – the average frequency of filibusters doubled.  That frequency would triple 
again in future decades.
14
   
It is in this light that the failure of reformers after 1975 to further reduce or eliminate the 
supermajority threshold for cloture takes on such significance.  Ideological polarization in the 
House helped to drive, and was in turn further driven by, institutional changes that made that 
chamber increasingly capable of disciplined party-line legislating along the parliamentary lines 
that responsible party advocates had always envisioned.  By contrast, the persistence, even in 
modified fashion, of countermajoritarian procedures in the Senate like the filibuster ensured that 
ideological sorting would have the effect of intensifying rather than mitigating minority 
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obstruction there, by strengthening the minority party’s cohesive will to utilize all tactics at 
hand.
15
  Defenders of the filibuster had often warned that reform would pave the way to the 
Senate becoming as partisan and non-deliberative as the House.  “If this body ever goes to 
majority cloture,” John Stennis warned typically during the 1975 debate over reducing the 
threshold required for cloture, “the Senate will never be the same again.”16  The historical 
consequence of the filibuster surviving the Age of Party Reform as a tool for the steadily 
polarizing parties, however, was that the Senate would more than ever become a redoubt for 
systematic minority obstruction – the graveyard of responsible party governance even during 
periods of unified party control in the executive and legislature.   
It was not until well into the twenty-first century that the very partisan polarization that 
had driven the proliferation of filibusters (by increasing the minority’s determination to block 
unwanted legislation whenever possible) began at last to threaten the filibuster’s very survival as 
an institution (by bolstering the majority’s determination to overcome minority obstruction).  
This new development could first be seen in the George W. Bush-era Republican threat to use 
the “nuclear option” to ban filibusters on judicial nominees, and culminated in the Barack 
Obama-era Democrats’ decision to deploy that very option in 2013.  The power of party 
polarization might very well lead to the forced disappearance of filibusters altogether in short 
order.       
Party revival took hold initially and most dramatically in Congress, but it was hardly 
limited to that institution in the last decades of the twentieth century.  A new wave of political 
science scholarship on the “polarized” or “partisan presidency” has challenged older notions 
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about an inherent zero-sum conflict between strong parties and a strong presidency.  As this 
recent scholarship has documented, presidents from Reagan onward have faced a changing 
institutional environment and strategic incentives that align their interests – and explicit 
rhetorical affiliation – with that of their own parties to a greater extent than was seen in the 
midcentury era.
17
  The constraint posed by unified opposition from the out-party has, at the same 
time, only strengthened during this period, as has the tendency of a president’s merely taking a 
position on a given issue to have the effect of polarizing both public and elite opinion along 
partisan lines.
18
 
Party organizations themselves manifested the effects of ideologically-driven partisan 
revival.  In the wake of Bill Brock’s pioneering tenure, both the Republican and Democratic 
National Committees saw major strides in professionalization and fundraising prowess from the 
1980s onward.  Programmatic functions such as those pursued experimentally by Paul Butler and 
Brock were sidelined, and neither the national committees nor the parties’ congressional 
campaign organizations enjoyed direct control over candidate nominations.  But the national 
organizations evolved into important “parties-in-service” – centralized and bureaucratized 
entities oriented toward providing campaign resources and political intelligence to state and local 
candidates.
19
  The institutional development of national party organizations in the last three 
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decades is as much a story of party nationalization as it is a byproduct of “candidate-centered 
politics” emerging from reform.     
 The world of interest group politics, fluidly bipartisan in the ideal-type of midcentury 
pluralist theory, also polarized in tandem with the parties from the 1980s onward.  Issue activists 
and interest groups came increasingly and consciously to be drawn into the zero-sum logic of 
two-party competition, enlisting as soldiers for one or the other major party.  They did this 
precisely as a result of the increasing degree to which the parties took distinct and differentiated 
policy positions on an expanding number of issues.
20
   
The relationship between the formal parties and their core group allies came to be 
institutionalized and routinized.  Major labor unions began sharing mass mailing lists with the 
DNC early in the 1980s; increasingly coordinated their participation in the Democratic 
presidential nominating process; and regularized their cooperation with congressional 
Democratic leaders.
21
  Joint labor-liberal “ground game” organizations, starting with Citizen 
Action, became evermore closely enmeshed in day-to-day Democratic electoral operations.  
Citizen Action endured years of allegations that such coordination crossed legal lines before 
                                                                                                                                                             
A. James Reichley, “The Rise of National Parties,” in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., The New Direction 
in American Politics (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985), 175-200; Paul Hernnson, Party 
Campaigning in the 1980s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Philip A. Klinkner, The Losing Parties: 
Out-Party National Committees, 1955-1993 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 71-196; Daniel J. Galvin, 
Presidential Party Building: Dwight D. Eisenhower to George. W. Bush (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 
2010), 120-159, 225-262. 
20
 Sinclair, Party Wars, 308-343; Katherine Krimmel, “Special Interest Partisanship: The Transformation of 
American Political Parties” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2013), 22-72. 
21
 James B. Booe letter to Douglas Fraser, February 23, 1983, Box 70, Folder 16, UAW President’s Office: Douglas 
A. Fraser Collection, Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI; Rick Scott memo to Gerald 
McEntee and William Lucy, October 29, 1991, Box 15, Folder 6, AFSCME President’s Office: Gerald McEntee 
Collection, Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI; Taylor E. Dark, The Unions and the 
Democrats: An Enduring Alliance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 125-190. 
 395 
 
having to disband in the mid-1990s in the wake of a union fundraising scandal.
22
  Heather Booth 
helped to found a new national body composed of many of the same affiliates in 1999 called US 
Action.  More broadly, the Citizen Action model of a national umbrella coalition uniting labor 
with post-’60s social movement organizations – usually co-chaired by both a union leader and a 
consumer, citizen group, or feminist activist – came to typify Democratic electoral and issue 
campaigns in the new century, from the “527” electioneering group Americans Coming Together 
in 2004 to the Obama-era issue coalitions Health Care for America Now and Americans for 
Financial Reform.  Lobbyists and advocates for issues like the environment, meanwhile, whose 
formative organizing experiences revolved around successful bipartisan legislative strategies in 
the pre-polarized era, came gradually and painfully to adjust their approach to new partisan 
realities.
23
        
In keeping with the broader patterns of post-1970s partisan developments, the GOP 
proved to be at the vanguard of interest group mobilization and coordination.  The panoply of 
New Right “single issue” groups along with the Christian Right proved to be quick and eager 
adapters to a partisan political strategy, with the GOP operative-led Christian Coalition (formed 
in 1989) epitomizing the near complete convergence of ideological advocacy with partisan 
politics.  Republicans proved even more aggressive in seeking to transform the political strategy 
of business interests and corporate lobbyists from one of bipartisan pluralism to a stable 
resource- and personnel-sharing partnership with the GOP.  Though the political mobilization of 
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business in the 1970s had independent impetuses outside of Republican influence, the party’s 
increasingly conservative cast and cohesion in the 1980s and 1990s made it an ever more natural 
political partner.  At the same time, Republican leaders beginning with Gingrich began actively 
pressuring business interests to limit their support for and employment of Democrats.  Gingrich 
famously warned the major business-backed Political Action Committees on the eve of the 1994 
midterm elections that, “for anybody who’s not on board now, it’s going to be the two coldest 
years in Washington.” 24  The so-called K Street Project that he and Tom DeLay went on to 
develop in the House, along with Trent Lott and Rick Santorum in the Senate, focused on 
pressuring Washington-based lobbying firms to hire GOP staffers and compelling organized 
business interests to limit their campaign donations to Republicans.  “If you want to play in our 
Revolution,” DeLay boasted, “you have to live by our rules.”25   
As they did with party cohesion and interest-group mobilization, conservative 
Republicans also led the way in stimulating – and benefitting from – a polarized policy research 
and media landscape.  Thanks in part to the efforts of an interlocking network of conservative 
foundations, the right enjoyed a dramatic numerical advantage among the ideologically driven 
think tanks that began to proliferate in the 1970s.
26
  The same funders also helped to ensure the 
growth of a powerful conservative media infrastructure in print, radio and television airwaves, 
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and, eventually, the internet.
27
  In the case of both policy research and political media, 
Democrats and liberals pursued important parallel initiatives, but they generally occurred later, 
as reactive and imitative efforts.                                  
Such persistent asymmetry in partisan developments between Republicans and 
Democrats since the 1970s raises anew a basic analytical question.  Is polarization even the right 
frame in which to view recent political history, or is it merely the byproduct of a rightward 
movement of both major parties that the GOP has pursued to a far greater extent?  The continued 
breakdown of the New Deal political order and the conservative drift of the Democratic Party 
remain dominant themes of post-1960s political historiography, and for the last two decades of 
the twentieth century, those themes are identified in the emergence of the “New Democrat” 
movement that brought Bill Clinton to power.  That movement, with its institutional origins in 
the Committee on Party Effectiveness established in 1981 by House Democratic Caucus 
Chairman Gillis Long and, starting in 1985, in the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) 
outside of Congress, was indeed a historically significant factional project.
28
  New Democrats 
argued in the wake of the GOP’s victories in the 1980s that Democratic electoral survival 
demanded a policy course-correction on various issues.  They advocated centrist positioning on 
cultural and law-and-order issues and neoliberal approaches to economic and fiscal policy 
compared to the liberal agenda of the party’s congressional base.  No such moderating force 
within the GOP exercised anything like New Democrats’ intraparty influence during the 1980s 
and 1990s.   
                                                 
27
 Jeffrey M. Berry and Sarah Sobieraj, The Outrage Industry: Political Opinion Media and the New Incivility (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
28
 Paul S. Herrnson and Kelly D. Patterson, “Toward a More Programmatic Democratic Party?  Agenda-Setting and 
Coalition-Building in the House of Representatives,” Polity 27 (Summer 1995): 607-628; Kenneth S. Baer, 
Reinventing Democrats: The Politics of Liberalism from Reagan to Clinton (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
2000).  
 398 
 
Nevertheless, this dissertation has argued that the endurance of left-liberal strength and 
the marginalization of conservatives within the post-1960s Democratic Party have been 
overlooked in historical scholarship.  For now it will have to be merely asserted that, likewise, 
the significance of the New Democrats has been at once overstated and misperceived by scholars 
and observers.  Ideologically, New Democrats embodied the centrism of post-Civil Rights-era 
southern Democrats and suburban economic moderates rather than the conservatism of the old 
Solid South bloc and its modern, fleeting efflorescence among the boll weevils.  The ideological 
space separating factions within the contemporary Democratic Party has not come close to 
matching that distance during the peak of the party’s midcentury dominance.  Politically, 
moreover, New Democrats consistently advocated a strong, programmatically defined 
partisanship rather than the bipartisan legislative practices celebrated by defenders of the pre-
polarized system.  New Democrats pitched moderate programmatic initiatives in explicitly 
partisan terms, and made a point of advocating issue positions that, while more conservative than 
those of the liberal Democratic base, fell to the left of Republican policy.  In this sense they were 
as shaped by the context and pressures of an ideologically sorted party system as other political 
interests of the period.         
 Dominant historical accounts have also exaggerated the New Democrats’ alleged 
intraparty triumph and ideological “takeover” within the Democratic Party.  That party has, in 
reality, faced the continuous task of accommodating an electoral and interest group coalition that 
encompasses both liberals and moderates.  Indeed, the absence of any final victories in intraparty 
struggles between moderate and liberal Democrats helps to shed light on the real nature of 
partisan asymmetry in the modern age of polarization.  If scholars such as Geoffrey Kabaservice 
are correct in identifying a coherent and distinct ideological tradition in the moderate 
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Republicanism of previous eras – one that eschewed populist politics while emphasizing public-
private partnerships and state activism in pursuit of market-oriented policy solutions – it may be 
plausibly argued that this tradition has migrated parties in the contemporary era, to define a 
distinct faction among Democrats.
29
  Such a development can have contrasting implications for 
the behavior of the two major parties without contradicting the dynamics of a party system that is 
itself defined by a clear ideological division.                     
 
Responsible Partisanship, Governmental Dysfunction 
 
 By the 1990s, the interaction between an increasingly disciplined party system and the 
fragmented, veto-laden American constitutional structure began to reveal a growing potential for 
crisis.  Within a year of the Republican takeover of Congress, a budget stand-off between 
Speaker Gingrich and President Clinton precipitated a government shutdown.  The impeachment 
battle two years later embroiled the country in a conflict that, for all of the salacious 
atmospherics of the sex scandal that provided its pretext, was at heart a deadly serious 
ideological struggle.  Surveying the deepening partisan divide in Washington in 1998, scholar 
Nelson Polsby remarked acerbically to The New Yorker that “the trouble began when we political 
scientists finally got our wish – ‘responsible’ political parties instead of broad, non-ideological 
coalitions.  The idea was, of course, completely nuts from the start.”30  
From a protracted presidential election requiring judicial intervention to resolve to the 
charged politics of war, economic crisis, and the fate of government in ensuing years, the 
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American political scene during the first decade and a half of the twenty-first century seemed 
fated by the old curse: “May you live in interesting times.”  The volatility of political events – 
the “wave” elections producing swings in partisan control and public policy followed soon after 
by apparent electoral backlash, the politically induced crises within and between the legislative 
and executive branches – disguised the stable unidirectional trajectory of systemic political 
change, toward ever stronger and more perfectly ideologically sorted partisanship.  
Developments seeming at first to herald the introduction of potentially destabilizing or realigning 
forces within the system soon proved to be symptoms and further catalyzers of partisan 
polarization.  When the Tea Party insurgency developed in the first two years of Barack Obama’s 
presidency, for example, many commenters saw it as a libertarian movement that cross-cut 
existing partisan divides.  But in reality it epitomized the additive, multi-dimensional quality of 
contemporary party polarization, as Tea Party activists were revealed to be, straightforwardly, a 
mobilization of the existing GOP base, with conservative positions across the board on economic 
and cultural issues and a uniform opposition to compromise with Democrats.
31
  The 
congressional leadership that the Tea Party helped bring to power subsequently demonstrated its 
responsiveness to the wishes of these citizens by instigating not only another government 
shutdown but also two separate default-threatening showdowns over the statutory debt ceiling. 
By the new century, scholarly and journalistic observers had begun finally to discern the 
dynamics of the new system and to tease out troubling implications.  Discussion of party decline 
and fragmentation diminished.  Political scholarship on partisanship and polarization flourished – 
including new models of party behavior positing that “intense policy demanders” rather than 
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pragmatic politicians were the key drivers in American politics.
32
  Commentators began to revisit 
political scientists Juan Linz’s old observation that states with presidential systems tend toward 
crisis and breakdown compared to those with parliamentary systems.
33
  Linz had long cast the 
United States as an exception to this tendency thanks to the country’s famously undisciplined 
political parties, but both he and others now began to reconsider that exceptionalism.
34
  Fifty-
four years after the American Political Science Association released Toward a More Responsible 
Two-Party System in the United States, meanwhile, the same body published a new prescriptive 
report on national party politics.  Rather than advocate the sharpening of party lines as APSA 
had in 1950, the new report focused its attention on devising mechanisms to facilitate 
deliberation, negotiation, and compromise.
35
   
All told, decades of work carried out by the activists, intellectuals, and political elites at 
the center of this dissertation had finally helped to produce the nationalized and ideologically 
distinct parties prescribed by responsible party doctrine.  But, in a Madisonian system still 
defined by separated powers, myriad veto points, and staggered elections that all but ensure the 
recurrence of divided government, party majorities now find themselves with little sustained 
capacity to implement their program.  Hence the modern American predicament of responsible 
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parties without responsible party government – a volatile ill-fit between disciplined ideological 
partisanship and fragmented political institutions that turns routine conflict into chronic crisis. 
What might this dissertation’s account of the origins of this predicament tell us about the 
prospects for getting out of it?  If ideologically disciplined parties are ill-suited for a system of 
fragmented political institutions, potential solutions could involve reforming the parties, or they 
could involve reforming the institutions.  Much public commentary decrying the decline of 
civility in politics and waxing nostalgic about the midcentury era of bipartisanship focuses 
attention on the parties themselves as the entities in need of reform.  But despite this 
dissertation’s emphasis on the agency of historical actors in helping to bring about the 
ideological sorting of the parties in the first place, the plausibility of new actors being able to 
effectively reverse that process seems hard to credit.  Nor does there seem to be an obvious route 
by which advocates might devise and legitimate a new basis for partisan affiliation in the United 
States different from ideology and issue orientation. 
As for reforming the political system itself, the story of postwar congressional reform 
shows us that institutional change can be brought about when sustained effort and fortuitous 
circumstances allow, and that changes far less sweeping and radical than some wholesale 
upending of the Constitution can still prove consequential.  In the contemporary era, further 
reforms of certain anti-majoritarian elements not found in the Constitution itself, such as to the 
Senate’s supermajority requirement for cloture, might constitute a compelling new program for 
institutional reform.  But, crucially, reforms that are intended to allow partisan majorities to more 
easily implement their agenda when in power represent accommodations to polarized 
partisanship – ways to make the new partisanship “work” better in the American context – rather 
than efforts to mitigate it.  And little evidence indicates that significant numbers of Americans 
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support reforms that are intended to make peace with our polarized parties.  American voters 
may be, like the Founders before them, partisans in spite of themselves.
36
  To turn many of them 
into conscious advocates of strong party government may require particularly profound and long-
term changes in American political culture. 
This is another way of saying that Americans’ ambivalence about parties, which is as old 
as American parties themselves, reflects a basic ambivalence about what values should be 
emphasized in the political system.  Trade-offs among competing democratic goals abound.  
Pragmatic bargaining might come at the expense of coherent policymaking.  Principled 
representation of constituents might come at the expense of compromise.  Achieving a more 
clubby elite spirit of comity might come at the expense of democratic participation and 
accountability.  If it has succeeded at all, the preceding account of the work carried out by 
engaged citizens to reshape American partisanship in the pursuit of national policy and 
ideological goals has leant their efforts a degree of historical recognition and respect.  The lesson 
that their thought and experience hold for contemporary citizens may merely be that the pursuit 
of effective collective decision-making in a democracy is as difficult and unending a task as it is 
a vital one.         
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